
KAKOW COLLECTION 

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THE DESPATCHES OF FIELD-MARSHAL 
THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON 






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The Despatches 

of 

Field- Marshal 

The Duke of Wellington 

During his Campaigns in India, Denmark, 

Portugal, Spain, The Low Countries, 

and France, 

And Relating to America, 

FROM 1799 TO l8 15 



Selected anD BrrangeD 

BY 

WALTER WOOD 

AUTHOR OF 

; THE RIFLE BRIGADE,' 'THE NORTHUMBERLAND FUSILIERS, 

'WITH THE FLAG AT SEA,' ETC. 



New York 
E. P. Dutton & Co. 

London : Grant Richards 
1902 






Gift 

Mrs. A •"•""■ Bolle Karcw 

1912 

PRINTED BY 

BILLING AND SONS, LIMITED, 

GUILDFORD 



^0 

GENERAL VISCOUNT KITCHENER OF KHARTOUM, 
G.C.B., G.C.M.G., 

^his Work is f ebicateb, 

WITH 

His Lordship's Special Permission 



INTRODUCTION 

This volume, consisting of selections from the despatches 
and documents relating to the various campaigns of the 
Duke of Wellington in India, Denmark, Portugal, Spain, the 
Low Countries, and France, from 1799 to 1815, is an epitome 
of the monumental work compiled by Lieutenant-Colonel 
Gurwood, Esquire to His Grace as Knight of the Bath. The 
despatches as published by Colonel Gurwood fill twelve 
bulky volumes, but, like the compilation of Nelson's de- 
spatches by Sir N. H. Nicolas, much that is dull and tedious 
is included, and great numbers of documents are given which 
have little or no present-day interest. 

I have adopted the plan of so selecting the papers that they 
present the Duke of Wellington, to use Colonel Gurwood's 
happy expression, as ' the historian of his own brilliant 
career.' I have completed the precis of the Duke's services 
from 1835 to the time of his death, in 1852, and when notes 
have been needed to make certain points clearer or more 
interesting I have added them. With the exception of these 
notes, which are initialled, in order to distinguish them from 
Colonel Gurwood's, the entire book is a condensation of his 
work. My task has been to choose the most interesting 
passages, to give them headings, and to bring together some 
of them — as in the case of those relating to America — from 
several volumes, for convenience of reference, so that they 



INTRODUCTION 



may tell their own story of the unparalleled achievements of 
our greatest soldier. I have excluded the formal beginnings 
and endings of despatches and letters, and where sentences 
of any length have been omitted their absence is indicated by 
dots. 

Wellington's early military career is described in the 
despatches from India, and the documents relating to the 
Peninsula give a picture, plain and striking, of the long years 
of battle and suffering by that matchless army of which the 
Duke proudly said that he thought he could have gone any- 
where and done anything with it. The wonderful series of 
victories beginning with Roleia and ending with Waterloo 
are described in simple language, and at the end of each is 
given the return which shows the cost in killed and wounded 
of the triumph. But even these figures, terrible as they are, 
do not by any means indicate the total death-roll. The 
British losses in the Peninsula and at Waterloo have been 
estimated at 3,807 officers and 54,283 men killed or wounded, 
but that total does not include Spaniards, Portuguese, Bruns- 
wickers, nor Hanoverians ; nor do they relate in any way to 
the enormous losses by disease, losses in comparison with 
which the slain in battle are insignificant. 

The selections cover an amazing variety of subjects. They 
show the work which Wellington accomplished and the means 
by which he did it, and they reveal a state of things without 
parallel in military annals. The savage discipline of the 
Peninsular army is a matter of common knowledge, but stern 
work made stern measures necessary, and it was only by his 
iron rule that the Duke was able to bring his troops tri- 
umphant out of unexampled dangers. Terrible as the 
picture is which the despatches paint, it is in no degree 
exaggerated. The supplementary pages of Napier and lesser- 



INTRODUCTION 



known contemporary writers, like Gleig, Captain J. Kincaid, 
the Marquis of Londonderry, and Quartermaster Surtees, tell 
of horrors and sufferings to which Wellington has not referred; 
but in themselves the documents furnish a story which needs 
no embellishment or help. 

With few exceptions, the despatches and casualty lists 
relating to the fights in which Wellington and his officers 
were engaged are given, but some of the returns of killed and 
wounded have not been included in the volume. I have, 
however, retained the particulars of notable affairs like El 
Bodon and Arroyo dos Molinos. The spelling through- 
out the despatches is unaltered, and therefore it may be 
well to give that of the Peninsular and other victories as it 
appears amongst the ' honours ' in the Army List : ' Assaye,' 
' Roleia,' ' Vimiera,' ' Talavera,' ' Busaco,' ' Fuentes d'Onor,' 
' Albuhera,' 'Arroyo dos Molinos,' ' Ciudad Rodrigo,' 
' Badajoz,' ' Salamanca,' ' Vittoria,' ' Pyrenees,' ' Nivelle,' 
' Nive,' ' Orthes,' ' Toulouse.' 

Colonel Gurwood, the compiler and editor of the de- 
spatches, was born in 1790. He began life in a merchant's 
office, but a love disappointment caused him to enter the 
army, and in 1808 he joined the 52nd Light Infantry (now 
the 2nd Battalion the Oxfordshire Light Infantry) as an 
Ensign. He saw long and hard service in the Peninsula, 
and led one of the forlorn hopes at the storming of Ciudad 
Rodrigo in 1812. He was wounded three times during the 
campaign, and was severely wounded at Waterloo. For 
many years he was private secretary to the Duke of Welling- 
ton, by whom he was entrusted with the editing of His Grace's 
general orders and despatches. This colossal task occupied 
the Colonel many years, and the published volumes prove his 
care and industry. The last volume of the despatches, with 



INTRODUCTION 



the indexes — in itself a monumental compilation — were in 
the press at the time of the Colonel's death. This was 
hastened by his excessive mental toil and his old wounds. 
He died by his own hand, at Brighton, on Christmas Day, 
1845, leaving a widow and family. Colonel Gurwood was a 
C.B. and Deputy Lieutenant of the Tower of London, and 
received £200 a year in recognition of his literary services. 



CONTENTS 



PAGE 

xiii 



Precis of the Duke of Wellington's Services 

Explanation of Indian Terms ----- X xvi 

India- 
Battle of Seringapatam - ... 8 
The Marhatta War - 30 
Battle of Assye - . ... 50 

Wellesley in Denmark - - - - - 107 

The Peninsula- 
Battle of Roli^a - - - - - - 122 

Battle of Vimeiro - - - - - - 128 

Passage of the Douro and Battle of Oporto - - 145 

Battle of Talavera - - - - - - 165 

Battle of Busaco - .... 227 

Battle of Barrosa ------ 247 

Battle of Fuentes de Onoro - - - - 252 

Battle of Albuera - .... 2 6o 

Affair at El Bodon ------ 276 

Affair at Arroyo dos Molinos - - - - 282 

Storm of Ciudad Rodrigo - - - - - 289 

Storm of Badajoz ------ 296 

Battle of Salamanca - 309 

Siege of Burgos ------ 329 

Battle of Vitoria - 

The Pyrenees ----_. 

Passage of the Nivelle - 

Passage of the Nive - 

Battle of Orthez ---.-. ^gr 

Battle of Toulouse .--... 402 

Wellington and America - 

Waterloo ------- 



346 
356 
382 

387 



Index 



413 
43i 

47i 



PRECIS OF THE COMMISSIONS, SERVICES, OFFICIAL 
COMMANDS, AND PUBLIC HONOURS 

OF 

FIELD-MARSHAL THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 



Born - 

Ensign 

Lieutenant - 

Captain 

Major 

Lieutenant-Colonel - 

Colonel 

Major-General 

Lieutenant-General - 

General, in Spain and Portugal 

Field- Marshal 



May i, 1769- 
March 7, 1787. 
December 25, 1787* 
June 30, 1791. 
April 30, 1793. 
September 30, 1793. 
May 3, 1796- 
April 29, 1802. 
April 25, 1808. 
July 31, 1811. 
June 21, 1813., 



1794. 



Embarked at Cork in command of the 33rd Regiment 
to join the Duke of York's army in the Netherlands, 
and arrived at Ostend 

Re-embarked and proceeded by the Scheldt to Antwerp - 

1795- 

As senior officer commanded three battalions on the 

retreat of the army through Holland - 
Early in the spring, on the breaking up of the ice, the 

army, including the 33rd Regiment, re-embarked at 

Bremen for England. 
On return to England, embarked in the command of the 

33rd Regiment for the West Indies, on board the 

fleet commanded by Admiral Christian 



June. 
July. 



January. 



October. 



pr£cis 



1796. 

But owing to the heavy equinoctial gales, after being six 

weeks at sea, returned to port - - - January 19. 

Destination of the 33rd Regiment changed for India - April 12. 

Joined the 33rd Regiment at the Cape of Good Hope - September. 



1797. 



February. 



Arrived in Bengal ------ 

Formed part of an expedition to Manilla, but recalled on 

arrival at Penang ----- August. 

Returned to Calcutta ----- November. 

1798. 

Proceeded on a visit to Madras - - - - January. 

Returned to Calcutta - ... March. 

The 33rd Regiment placed on the Madras establishment - September. 

1799- 

Appointed to command the subsidiary force of the Nizam, 

the 33rd Regiment being attached to it - - February. 

Advance of the army on Seringapatam ; Colonel Wellesley, 
moving on the right flank, attacked and harassed by 
the enemy .----- March 10. 

Tippoo Sultaun in position at Mallavelly ; the attack and 
defeat of his right flank by the division under Colonel 
Wellesley, and the cavalry under Major-General 
Floyd ------- March 27. 

Arrival of the British army before Seringapatam - - April 3. 

The army take up their ground before the west face of 
that fortress : first attack on the Sultaunpettah Tope, 
by the 33rd Regiment and 2nd Bengal Native Regi- 
ment, under Colonel Wellesley - - - April 5. 

Second attack with an increased force, the Scotch Brigade 
(94th Regiment), two battalions of Sepoys, and four 
guns ------- April 5. 

Siege of Seringapatam, until .... May 3. 

Assault and capture : Colonel Wellesley commanding the 

reserve in the trenches ... - May 4. 

Colonel Wellesley appointed Governor of Seringapatam - May 6. 

A Commission, consisting of Lieutenant-General Harris, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Barry Close, Colonel the Hon. 
A. Wellesley, the Hon. H. Wellesley, and Lieutenant- 
Colonel Kirkpatrick, appointed by the Governor- 
General for the settlement of the Mysore territories - June 4. 



PRECIS 



Commission dissolved ..... July 8. 
Colonel Wellesley appointed to the command of Seringa- 

patam and Mysore ..... July 9. 

1800. 

Colonel Wellesley named to command an expedition 
against Batavia, in conjunction with Admiral Rainier, 
but declines the service, from the greater importance 
of his command in Mysore .... May. 

The tranquillity of Mysore troubled by Dhoondiah Waugh, 
a Marhatta freebooter. Colonel Wellesley takes the 
field against him ..... July. 

Defeats him ; death of Dhoondiah, and end of the 

warfare ...... September 10. 

Recalled from Mysore to command a force assembling at 

Trincomalee ------ October. 

Appointed to command this force, to be employed at 
Mauritius, or in the Red Sea, in the event of orders 
from Europe to that effect ; or to be ready to act 
against any hostile attempt upon India - - November 15. 

1801. 

A despatch, overland, received by the Governor-General, 
with orders, dated October 6, 1800, to send 3,000 men 
to Egypt ...... February 6. 

The expedition being ready at Trincomalee, the Governor- 
General directed the whole force to proceed to the 
Red Sea ; and appointed General Baird to command 
in chief, and Colonel Wellesley to be second in 
command ------ February 1 1. 

In the meantime, Colonel Wellesley, having received from 
the Governors of Bombay and Madras copies of the 
overland despatch from Mr. Dundas, sailed from 
Trincomalee for Bombay in command of the troops - February 1 5. 

Colonel Wellesley, on his way to Bombay, informed of 
the appointment of Major-General Baird to the chief 
command ------ February 21. 

Prevented, by illness, from proceeding on the expedition 
to Egypt ; Colonel Wellesley is ordered to resume 
his government of Mysore - April 28. 

1803. 
Appointed to command a force assembled at Hurryhur 

to march into the Marhatta territory - - - February 27. 

Advance from Hurryhur ----- March 9. 
Arrival at Poonah ------ April 20. 



PRECIS 



The Peshwah replaced on the musnud 

Empowered to exercise the general direction and control 
of all the political and military affairs of the British 
Government in the territories of the Nizam, the 
Peshwah, and of the Marhatta States and Chiefs in 
the Deccan ; similar authority being given to General 
Lake in Hindustan - 

The Marhatta War commenced - 

Siege and capture of Ahmednuggur 

Siege and capture of Baroach - 

Battle of Assye ------ 

Siege and capture of Asseerghur - 

Battle of Argaum - - - - 

Siege and capture of Gawilghur - - - - 

Treaty of peace with the Rajah of Berar - 

Treaty of peace with Dowlut Rao Scindiah 

1804. 

Surprise of a body of predatory Marhattas, who were 
routed and destroyed, after an extraordinary forced 
march, near Munkaiseer - 

A sword of the value of ,£1,000 voted to Major-General 
Wellesley by the British inhabitants of Calcutta 

Visits Bombay • 

Fetes and address by the garrison and inhabitants 

A golden vase voted to Major-General Wellesley by the 
officers of his division ; afterwards changed to a 
service of plate embossed with ' Assye ' 

Returns to the army near Poonah 

Resigns the military and political powers vested in him 
by the Governor- General - 

Left the army for Seringapatam - 

Address voted to Major-General Wellesley, on his return 
from the army, by the native inhabitants of Seringa- 
patam ------- 

Called to Calcutta to assist in military deliberations. 

Appointed a Knight Companion of the Bath 

The civil and military powers vested in him on June 26, 
1803, and resigned on June 24, 1804, renewed by the 
Governor-General - 

Returns to Seringapatam by Madras 

1805. 
Resigns the political and military powers in the Deccan, 
and proposes to embark for Europe - 



May 13. 



June 26. 
August 6. 
August II. 
August 29. 
September 23. 
October 21. 
November 29. 
December 15. 
December 17. 
December 30. 



:} 



February 6. 

February 21. 
March 4 to 
May 16. 



February 26. 
May 17. 

June 24. 
June 28. 



July 6. 
September 1. 



November 9. 
November 30. 



February 24. 



PRECIS 



xvu 



Addresses on quitting India : 

From the officers of the division lately under his 

command - 

Answer -.-... 
From the officers of the 33rd Regiment 
Answer .-.._. 
From the native inhabitants of Seringapatam 
Answer --.... 

Grand entertainment given to him at the Pantheon at 
Madras by the civil and military officers of the 
Presidency ...... 

Appoints Colonel Wallace, Major Barclay, and Captain 
Bellingham to superintend the prize affairs of the 
army of the Deccan ----- 

The thanks of the King and Parliament for his services 
in the command of the army of the Deccan, com- 
municated in General Orders by the Genernor- 
General - - - 

Embarks in His Majesty's ship Trident for England 
Arrival in England - 

Appointed to command a brigade in an expedition to 
Hanover, under Lord Cathcart 

1806. 

Appointed Colonel of the 33rd Regiment, vice Marquis 
Cornwallis, deceased - 

On the return of the expedition from Hanover, appointed 
to command a brigade of infantry in the Sussex 
district ...... 

Returned to serve in Parliament. • 

1807. 

Appointed Secretary to Ireland (the Duke of Richmond 
being Lord- Lieutenant) 

Sworn of His Majesty's Privy Council 

Appointed to a command in the army under Lord Cath- 
cart, in the expedition against Copenhagen - 

Affair at Kioge ------ 

Appointed to negotiate the capitulation of Copenhagen - 



February 27. 
March 8. 
February 28. 
March. 
March 4. 
March 4 



March 5. 



March 6. 



March 8. 

March. 

September. 

November. 



January 30. 



February 



April 3. 
April 8. 

July. 

August 29. 
September 5. 



Receives he thanks of Parliament for his conduct at 
Copenhagen, in his place in the House of Commons, 
and replies to the Speaker .... February 1. 

Returns to Ireland. 

Appointed to command an expedition assembled at Cork July. 



PRECIS 



The expedition sails for Coruna and Oporto 

Finally lands at the mouth of the river Mondego, in 

Portugal ...--_ 

Affair of Obidos ----- 

Affair of Rolica ------ 

Battle of Vimeiro ------ 

Superseded in the command of the army by Lieutenant- 

General Sir H. Burrard - 

By the desire of Lieutenant-General Sir H. Dalrymple, 

the Commander of the Forces, he signs the armistice 

with Lieutenant-General Kellermann, which led to 

the Convention of Cintra - 
A piece of plate, commemorating the Battle of Vimeiro, 

voted to Lieutenant-General Sir A. Wellesley by the 

General and Field Officers who served at it - 
Commands a division of the army under Sir H. Dalrymple 
Convention of Cintra - 

Returns to England - 

Court of Inquiry on the Convention of Cintra 
His evidence before it 
Returns to Ireland. 

1809. 
Receives the thanks of Parliament for Vimeiro, in his 

place in the House of Commons, and replies to the 

Speaker .-..-. 

Appointed to command the army in Portugal 
Resigns the office of Chief Secretary in Ireland - 
Arrives at Lisbon and assumes the command 
The Passage of the Douro and Battle of Oporto - 
By a decree of the Prince Regent of Portugal, appointed 

Marshal-General of the Portuguese Army - 
Battle of Talavera de la Reyna ... - 

Created a peer, by the titles of Baron Douro of Wellesley 

and Viscount Wellington of Talavera 
Meets Marquis Wellesley at Seville and Cadiz 



July 12. 

August 1 to 3. 
August 15. 
August 17. 
August 21. 

August 21. 



August 22. 



August 22. 
August 22. 
August 30. 
October 4. 
November 17. 
November 22. 



January 27. 
April. 
April. 
April 22. 
May 12. 

July 6. 

July 27 and 28. 

August 26. 
November 2. 



1810. 

Thanks of Parliaments voted for Talavera - - February 1. 

Pension of .£2,000 per annum voted to Lord Wellington 

and his two succeeding heirs male - February 16. 

Appointed a member of the Regency in Portugal, in con- 
junction with Lord Stuart de Rothesay, then Mr. 
Stewart, His Majesty's Minister at Lisbon - - August. 

Battle at Busaco ------ September 27. 



PRECIS 



Takes up a position to cover Lisbon in the lines, from 
Alhandra on the Tagus to Torres Vedras and the 
sea ....... 

Follows the retreat of the French army, under Marshal 
Massena, to Santarem - 

1811. 

Again follows the retreat of the French army to Condeixa, 
and from thence along the line of the Mondego, to 
Celorico, Sabugal, Almeida, and Ciudad Rodrigo 
Affairs with the French army on its retreat : 

At Pombal ------ 

At Redinha ------ 

At Cazal Nova ----- 

At the Passage of the Ceira, at Foz dArouce 

At Sabugal ------ 

Thanks of Parliament for the liberation of Portugal 

Battle of Fuentes de Onoro - 

Fall of Almeida ...... 

Battle of Albuera ------ 

Siege of Badajoz raised - - - - 

Concentration of the army on the Caya - 

Carries the army to the north - 

Affair at El Bodon ------ 

Affair at Aldea da Ponte ----- 

License granted in the name of the King, by the Prince 
Regent, to accept the title of Conde do Vimeiro, and 
the insignia of Knight Grand Cross of the Tower and 
Sword, from the Prince Regent of Portugal - 
General Hill's surprise of General Girard at Arroyo 
Molinos ...... 



October 10. 



November 16. 



March 5 

to 
April 10. 

March 11. 
March 12. 
March 14. 
March 15. 
April 3. 
April 26. 
May 3 and 5. 
May 11. 
May 16. 
June 10. 
June 19. 
August 1. 
September 2 5. 
September 27. 



October 26. 
October 28. 



Storm of Fort Renaud, near Ciudad Rodrigo - - January 8. 

Siege and capture of Ciudad Rodrigo - - - January 19. 

Created by the Regency a Grandee of Spain, with the 

title of Duque de Ciudad Rodrigo.- 

Thanks of Parliament for Ciudad Rodrigo - - February 10. 

Advanced in the British peerage by the title of Earl of 

Wellington ------ February 18. 

Vote of Parliament of ,£2,000 per annum, in addition to 

the title ...... February 21. 

Siege and capture of Badajoz .... April 6. 

Thanks of Parliament for Badajoz - - April 27. 

Forts at Almaraz taken by General Hill - - - May 19. 

62 



xx PRECIS 

Siege and capture of the fortified convents at Salamanca June 27. 
Battle of Salamanca ----- July 22. 

Charge of cavalry at La Serna ... - July 23. 

The Order of the Golden Fleece conferred by the Regency 

of Spain. 
Enters Madrid ------ August 12. 

Appointed Generalissimo of the Spanish armies. 
Advanced in the British peerage by the title of Marquis 

of Wellington ------ August 18. 

Advanced by the Regent of Portugal to the title of 

Marquez de Torres Vedras. 
Marches towards Burgos ----- September 4. 
Siege and failure of Burgos .... October 22. 

Retreat to the frontier of Portugal, to - - - November 19. 

Thanks of Parliament voted for Salamanca - - December 3. 

A grant of ,£100,000 from Parliament, to be laid out in 

the purchase of lands to that value, as a reward for 

his services, and to enable him to support the dignity 

of his peerage ----- December 7. 

Advanced by the Regent of Portugal to the title of Duque 

da Victoria ------ December 18. 

Visits Cadiz, where he is received by a deputation of the 

Cortes ------ December 24. 



Appointed Colonel of the Royal Regiment of Horse Guards January 1. 
Returns to Portugal by Lisbon, where he is received by 

the whole population ----- January 16. 
Fetes given by the Regency and at San Carlos. 

Letter on quitting the 33rd Regiment as Colonel - February 2. 

Elected a Knight of the Garter - March 4. 
Advance into Spain in two columns ; the left column, under 

Lieutenant-General Sir T. Graham, by the north bank 

of the Douro ; the right column to Salamanca - May 6. 

Quits Freneda for Salamanca ... - May 22. 

Affair near Salamanca ----- May 25. 
The Commander of the Forces proceeds to the left column, 

at Miranda de Duero ----- May 29. 

Affair of the Hussar Brigade at Morales de Toro - June 2. 

Junction of the two columns at Toro, and advance of the 

army on Valladolid and Burgos - - - June 4. 

The Castle of Burgos blown up - - - - June 12. 

The Ebro turned at San Martin and Rocamundo - June 14. 

Affair at San Millan - June 18. 

Battle of Vitoria ------ June 21. 



prAcis 



Promoted to Field-Marshal {Gazette, July 3) - - June 21. 

Pursuit of the French army to France by Pamplona and 
the passes of Roncesvalles and Maya in the Pyrenees ; 
and by Tolosa, San Sebastian, and Irun. 

Thanks of Parliament for Vitoria - July 8. 

Siege of San Sebastian ----- July 17. 

The Regency of Spain, on the proposition of the Cortes, 
offer to bestow on the Duque de Ciudad Rodrigo the 
estate of the Soto de Roma in Granada, ' in the name 
of the Spanish nation, in testimony of its sincere 
gratitude '------ July 22. 

First assault and failure at San Sebastian - - July 25. 

Advance of the French army under Marshal Soult, by 
Maya and Roncesvalles ; the right and centre divi- 
sions of the army concentrating near Pamplona - July 24 to 27. 

Battle of Sorauren . . . July 28. 

Retreat of the French army into France - - - July 30. 

Affair at the Puerto de Echalar - - - August 1. 

Reoccupation of the positions on the Pyrenees by the 

allied armies - - - - - August 2. 

Second assault and fall of San Sebastian - - August 31. 

Affairs on the Bidassoa and San Marcial - - - August 31. 

Castle of San Sebastian capitulated - - - September 8. 

Passage of the Bidassoa and entrance into France - October 7. 

Surrender of Pamplona ----- October 31. 

Thanks of Parliament for San Sebastian and the opera- 
tions subsequent to Vitoria - October 8. 

The whole of the army descend into France ; passage 

and battle of the Nivelle . . - November 10. 

Passage of the Nive ----- December 9. 

Marshal Soult attacks the left and right of the British ) December 10 
army, and is successively defeated - - -J to 13. 



1814. 

Leaves two divisions to blockade Bayonne, and follows 

Marshal Soult with the remainder of the army 
Affair at Hellette ------ 

Battle of Orthez ------ 

Passage of the Adour at St. Sever - 

Affair at Aire ------ 

The permission of the Prince Regent granted to the 
Marquis of Wellington to accept and wear the 
insignia of the following Orders : Grand Cross of the 
Imperial Military Order of Maria Teresa ; Grand 
Cross of the Imperial Russian Military Order of 



February. 
February 14. 
February 27. 
March 1. 
March 2. 



PRECIS 



St. George ; Grand Cross of the Royal Prussian 

Military Order of the Black Eagle ; Grand Cross of 

the Royal Swedish Military Order of the Sword 
Detaches two divisions to Bordeaux 
Affair at Tarbes ------ 

Thanks of the Prince Regent and the Parliament for 

Orthez ..-.-- 

Passage of the Garonne - - - - - 

Battle of Toulouse -.-•--.- 

Advanced in the British peerage by the titles of Marquis 

of Douro and Duke of Wellington 
Visits Paris _....- 

Visits Madrid. King Ferdinand confirms all the honours 

and rewards conferred upon him in His Majesty's 

name by the Regency and the Cortes 
A grant of ,£400,000 voted by Parliament, in addition to 

the former grants - ... 

Arrives in England - 

Proceeds to pay his respects to the Prince Regent, then 

at Portsmouth with the allied monarchs 
His reception in the House of Peers on taking his seat as 

Baron, Viscount, Earl, Marquis, and Duke - 
Returns thanks at the bar of the House of Commons, and 

is addressed by the Speaker - - - - 

Appointed Ambassador to the Court of France - 
Banquet given by the Corporation of London 
Heraldic honours bestowed - 

Assists at the Congress at Vienna 

1815. 

On the arrival of Buonaparte in France, appointed Com- 
mander of the British Forces on the Continent of 
Europe, and from Vienna joins the army at Bruxelles 

Puts himself in communication with Prince Blucher, in 
command of the Prussian army on the Meuse 

Moves the allied army towards Nivelle, on the French 
army, under Buonaparte, crossing the frontier at 
Charleroi ... - 

Battle of Quatre Bras - 

Retires to a position to cover Bruxelles, on the border 
of the Forest of Soignies *-.'"-- 

Battle of Waterloo .•_-_. 

Created Prince of Waterloo by the King of the Nether- 
lands. 

Thanks of the Prince Regent and Parliament for Waterloo 



March 4. 
March 8. 
March 20. 

March 24. 
April 4. 
April 10. 

May 3. 
May 4. 



May 24. 

June. 
June 23. 

June 24. 

June 28. 

June 30. 
July 5. 
July 9. 
August 25. 
November 1. 



April 11. 
May 2. 



June 15. 
June 16. 

June 17. 
June 18. 



June 22. 



PRECIS xx 

Pursuit of the fugitive remains of the French army to Paris. 
Surrender of Cambrai ----- June 25. 

Surrender of Peronne. 

Paris capitulated ------ July 3. 

By his interference, prevents the column in the Place 

Vendome and the Bridge of Jena being destroyed - July 6. 
A grant of ^200,000 voted by Parliament, in addition to 

the former grants ... - - July. 

Appointed Commander-in-Chief of the allied armies of 

occupation in France • - - - - October 22. 



Assists at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle 

Appointed Field-Marshal in the Austrian, Russian, and 

Prussian armies ■ 

The evacuation of France by the allied armies 
Appointed Master-General of the Ordnance 



1819. 



Appointed Governor of Plymouth 

1820. 
Appointed Colonel-in-Chief of the Rifle Brigade 

1821. 

Attends George IV., King of England, to the field of 
Waterloo ------ 



Assists at the Congress of Verona 

1826. 

Proceeds on an especial embassy to St. Petersburg 
Removed from the government of Plymouth to be 
Constable of the Tower of London - 

1827. 

Appointed Colonel of the Grenadier Guards 

Appointed Commander-in-Chief - - - - 

Resigns ------- 

Reappointed ...... 

1828. 

The King having called upon him to serve in the 
office of First Lord of the Treasury, he resigns the 
command of the army - 



October. 

October. 
November 1. 
December 26. 

December 9. 

February 19. 

October I. 
October 22. 

February. 
December 29. 



January 22. 
January 22. 
April 30. 
August 27. 



February 15. 



xxiv PRECIS 

1829. 
Appointed Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports - - January 20 

1830. 
Resigns the office of First Lord of the Treasury - - October. 

1834. 

Elected Chancellor of the University of Oxford - - January. 

Entrusted by the King with the whole charge of the 
Government and the seals of the three Secretaries 
of State ...... November. 

Continues Secretary of Foreign Affairs - - - December. 

1835. 
Resigns ....... April. 

1837. 
Elected Master of the Trinity House. 



Warmly receives his old adversary, Marshal Soult, who 
visited England as Ambassador at the Coronation of 
Queen Victoria. Lord High Constable of England 
at the Coronation and the Queen's wedding. 

1842. 
Reappointed Commander-in-Chief for life, by patent, 
on the death of Lord Hill - 

1846. 
End of his career as a party politician. 

1847. 
As Commander-in-Chief, as in other things, Wellington 
was opposed to change. He held that corporal 
punishment was indispensable in the British army, 
which must always be recruited from the ' scum of 
the earth.' Was wishful that the Prince Consort 
should succeed him as Commander-in-Chief, so that 
the army might remain in the hands of the Sovereign, 
and not fall into those of the House of Commons. 



August 15. 



Personally planned the measures taken to protect London 
from the Chartists, and saw to their execution. 

1850. 

Made Ranger of Hyde Park and St. James's Park, 
August 31. Stood godfather to the third of Queen 
Victoria's sons. 



PRECIS xxv 

1851. 
Frequent visitor to the Great Exhibition. 

1852. 
Drove on September 13 from Dover to Walmer, and 

returned to dinner two hours later than usual ; was 

very hungry, and ate hastily and heartily. In the 

night he had a fit, and in the course of the 14th he 

gradually sank, and died in the afternoon. 
Palmerston wrote of him : ' No man ever lived or died 

in the possession of more unanimous love, respect, 

and esteem from his countrymen.' 
Buried with great pomp in St. Paul's Cathedral, after 

lying in state at Walmer and Chelsea Hospital - November 18. 



EXPLANATION OF INDIAN TERMS AND TITLES 



Ackbar. A journal, newspaper. 
Amildar, or Aumildar, Aumils. 

Native officers, uniting civil, 

military, and financial powers ; 

employed in the collection of the 

revenue. 
Anna. The sixteenth part of a 

rupee. 

Baee, Baye. Princess or lady of 
high rank. 

Bajary. Millet. 

Balla. Above. Balla-ghaut, above 
the ghaut ; Balla killa, the upper 
fort or citadel in a fortress. 

Bandy. A cart or gig. 

Batta. Field allowance to the 
army in money. 

Bazaar. Market. One was always 
established in camp. 

Beetel. See Otter and Paun. 

Begum. Lady of high rank ; widow 
of a Prince. 

Behauder. Title of courtesy of 
high respect ; literally, Invincible. 

Bheels, The. Supposed to be the 
aborigines of India, inhabiting the 
mountainous districts bordering 
on Candeish and the Northern 
Conkan. These wild and un- 
civilized people, who usually 
live by plunder and robbery, 
are governed by chiefs called 
Naiks, most of whom are now 
paid by the British Govern- 
ment. 

BHOONSLAH. The family name of 
the Rajahs of Berar. The name 
and titles of the Rajah in 1803 
were Senah Saheb Soubah 
Ragojee Bhoonslah. 

Bhow. A Hindu title. 



Brinjarries. Grain-dealers who 
supply armies with rice and grain, 
loaded in bags on bullocks. 

Buckshee. Commander-in-Chief 
of an army, or officer holding 
that rank. 

Camavisdar. A native revenue- 
collector in Guzerat. 

Campoos. Brigades of regular 
infantry in native armies. 

CHINNA. A sort of grain, pulse. 

Choultry. A covered building for 
travellers or for troops. 

Choute. Tribute ; a fourth of the 
revenue exacted as tribute by the 
Marhattas. 

Choire Chitty. A written order 
or authority on papers. 

Circar, or Sircar. The Govern- 
ment ; also a province or geo- 
graphical division of a Soubah. 

Coast, The. Applied formerly to 
the territory subject to the Presi- 
dency of Madras. 

Confederacy, The Marhatta, 
as mentioned in this work. The 
alliance formed by Scindiah, 
Holkar, and the Rajah of Berar 
against the Peshwah, who sought 
and obtained British aid. 

Coolies. Men and women of low 
caste, who carry baggage, etc., 
with armies ; porters, labourers. 

Coss. A geographical measure, 
irregular, but generally equal to 
two miles. 

Coulthee. A grain for horses. 

Cowle. Mercy, quarter, protec- 
tion, solemn pledge or promise. 

Cowlnamah. Paper of protection, 
given usually in time of war ; 



EXPLANATION OF INDIAN TERMS AND TITLES xxvii 



an agreement in writing, a pro- 
clamation. 

Crore. One hundred lacs, or ten 
millions. Crore of pagodas, about 
,£4,000,000 ; crore of rupees, 
about ,£1,000,000. 

CUSHOONS. Brigades of infantry. 

Cutwahl. Chief officer of police 
and superintendent of bazaars. 

Dar. When joined to another 
word means the holder of an 
office or an officer in charge of a 

post. See KlLLADAR, SOUBAH- 

dar, Zemindar. 
Dawk. The post, as also the post 

manner of travelling in India, 

carried in palanquins by bearers. 
DESHMOOK. An officer in the 

Deccan, receiving 10 per cent. 

upon the clear revenue of the 

district. 
Dessarah. A great military fes- 
tival among the Marhattas. 
Dewan. The principal native 

Minister, or chief of the revenue 

department. 
Dhurmsala. A place at or near 

a village for the reception of 

travellers. 
Divan. A council of a Prince and 

his Ministers. 
DOLL. A yellow pulse or pea. 
Doolies. Palanquins, made light 

for carrying sick and wounded 

soldiers. 
Droog. A fortified hill or rock. 
Dubash. An agent ; the native 

at Madras who manages the 

money concerns of Europeans 

and serves as interpreter. In 

Bengal this person is called 

Banyan and Sircar. 
Dufter. Record office. 
Durbar. Court of an independent 

Prince ; levee. 
Durrar of Horse. Corps of. 

Enaum. Grants of land, rent- 
free. 

Fanam. A coin 45 to a pagoda ; 
Madras currency, 2d. to 2^d. 
each. Gold fanam, a coin 3^ to 
a rupee. Silver and gold coins 



of the same denomination are 
generally of the value of 15 
to 1. 

Garce. A measure containing 
4,800 pucca seers of 2 pounds 
each. 

Ghaut. A pass through hills ; a 
ferry over a river ; a range of 
mountains. 

Ghee. A kind of butter made of 
buffalo's milk. 

Ghurree. A gong or bell upon 
which time is struck ; also a wall 
flanked by towers. 

GOLLAH. That part of the camp 
where the brinjarries are 
stationed. 

Golundauze. Artillerymen of 
native troops. 

GOMASTAH OF BRINJARRIES. 
Agent or Commissioner. 

Grab. A small two-masted vessel, 
chiefly used for coasting in the 
East. 

Gram. A kind of pulse or grain 
with which the horses and gun- 
bullocks are fed in India. 

Guickwar. The family name of 
one of the great Marhatta chiefs 
holding Guzerat. The name and 
titles of the chief in 1803 were 
Rajah Anund Rao Guickwar. 

GUNNY-BAGS. Sacking in which 
rice is carried. 

Havildar. A non-commissioned 
officer of native troops of the 
rank of sergeant. 

Hircarrahs. Messengers em- 
ployed to carry letters, generally 
Brahmins. They are sent also 
to gain intelligence and used as 
guides. 

Holkar. The family name of one 
of the great Marhatta chiefs, 
formerly a jaghiredar of the 
empire, but afterwards declared 
his independence ; his territory 
in Malwa, and his capital Indore. 
The name of the chief in 1803 
was Jeswunt Rao Holkar. 

HURGOORY, or Huzooriahs. Per- 
sonal attendants of a chief of his 
own tribe or caste. 



xxviii EXPLANATION OF INDIAN TERMS AND TITLES 



Jaghire. A grant of territory from 

a sovereign Prince to a subject. 
JAGH1REDAR. The holder of a jag- 

hiredar, usually for life only. 
J ah. Title of the Nizam and of 

Scindiah. 
Jemidar. The junior rank of officer 

in the native troops. 
Jowarry. A kind of Indian 

corn. 
Jungle. Wood, high grass or 

reeds ; waste country. 

Karkoon, or Carkoon. A native 
revenue officer under the col- 
lector ; an agent. 

Khareetah. A letter, despatch. 

Khelaut. Robe or dress of honour 
with which Princes confer dig- 
nities. 

Killa. Balla killa, the upper fort 
or citadel of a fortress. 

Killadar. The governor of a 
fort. 

Karkana. Term applied to the 
cattle department of the army, 
and where the elephants are 
kept. 

Kur. When attached to a name, 
as Nimbulkur, Nepauneekur, etc., 
designates the chief of that 
family. 

Kurch, Durbar. Court charges. 

Lac. One hundred thousand. Lac 
of rupees, at 2s., about ,£10,000 ; 
lac of pagodas, about ,£40,000. 

Maha. Great. 

Maistry. Head-artisan. 

Marhatta Empire. Founded by 
the celebrated Sevajee over a 
considerable race of people about 
the middle of the seventeenth 
century ; afterwards divided in- 
to several independent govern- 
ments, the Rajah of Sattarah, a 
descendant of Sevajee, still being 
chief, although only nominally 
governing through the Pesh- 
wah, the chief magistrate of the 
empire. The principal chiefs of 
the Marhatta Empire in 1803 
were : The Rajah of Sattarah, 
the Peshwah, the Rajah of Berar, 
Dowlut Rao Scindiah, Jeswunt 



Rao Holkar, Anund Rao Guick- 

war. 
MATROSS. A bombardier. 
Maunkarries. Men of high caste, 

nobles. 
MEER SUDDOOR. One of the great 

officers of Tippoo's government ; 

his particular charge was the 

forts, etc. 
Mogul. The title of the Moham- 
medan Emperors of Hindustan ; 

one of the sects of Mussulmans. 
MoHUR. A gold coin varying in 

value, according to weight, from 

12 to 14 or 15, and even 16, 

rupees. 

MOO LUCK-GHER Y, MULUK 
Geeree. Collection, exaction, or 
kind of revenue in Guzerat. 

MOONSHEE. Letter-writer, tutor, 
secretary. 

MOPLAHS. A race residing in 
Malabar Proper, descended from 
the Arabs who colonized on that 
coast. 

MUCCUDUM OF BRINJARRIES. 

Conductor. 
Musnud. Throne. 
Mutaseddee. Accountant, chief 

clerk, or secretary of brinjarries. 
Mutuluk. Deputy. 

Nabob, or Nawaub. Mussulman 
King or chief; often a title of 
courtesy unattended with power. 

Naig, Naik, or Naigue. The 
lowest rank of non-commissioned 
officer in native troops, answer- 
ing to that of corporal. Naik is 
also a title of the chiefs of the 
Bheels. 

Nairs. A warlike race of Hindus 
inhabiting the mountainous and 
jungly parts of Malabar. 

Nanperverish. Persons who are 
destitute. Nanperverish fund, 
for such as are destitute. 

Nerrick. Price - current of the 
market. 

Nimmuk wallah. Literally, salt- 
eater. Eating salt in the East 
is a bond of faith and friendship 
among the natives to those with 
whom they eat it. 

Nizam. The Soubahdar of the 
Deccan, reigning over a large 



EXPLANA TION OF INDIAN TERMS AND TITLES xxix 



portion of territory between the 
Wurda, Godavery, and Kistna 
Rivers. Capital at Hyderabad. 
The names and titles of the 
Nizam in 1803 were Nizam and 
Dowlut, Asoph J ah, Soubahdar 
of the Deccan. He was succeeded 
in the same year by his son, 
Secundar Jah. 

Notch, Noutch. A dance, Indian 
fete. 

Nullah. A stream, watercourse. 

NUZZER. An offering, a present 
made to a superior, a fine or fee 

Oomrah. High rank of nobility. 

Otter and Paun. Essence of 
the preparation of betel-nut, pre- 
sented to visitors on quitting a 
durbar. 

Ougein. The ancient capital and 
seat of government of Scindiah 
in Malwa. 

Paddy. Rice in the husk. 

PAGODA. Hindu temple of worship. 
A gold coin of about 8s. value. 

Patan. Name applied to the 
Afghan tribes. 

Patel, or POTAIL. The hereditary 
head-manager of a village, and 
the medium of communication 
between a village and a Govern- 
ment. 

Payen. Lower. Payen-ghaut, the 
country below the Ghauts. 

PEONS. Irregular infantry, armed 
with swords or matchlocks, em- 
ployed chiefly in the defence of 
forts and in the collection of the 
revenue. 

Pkrgunnah. A district ; the 
largest division of land in Zemin- 
darry. 

PESHCUSH. Tribute, fine, quit-rent 
on the stipulated revenue. 

Pesh - kanah. Chief agent, or 
manager to a Resident. 

Peshwah. Literally, the first. The 
chief magistrate of the Marhatta 
Empire, nominally under the 
Rajah of Sattarah, but usurping 
his authority. His capital and 
seat of government at Poonah. 
The names and titles of the 
Peshwah in 1803 were Sreemunt 



Bajee Rao, Ragonaut Rao, 

Pundit Purdhaun. 
Pettah. A suburb or outwork of 

a fortified place, with wall and 

ditch. 
Phousdarry, or Foudarry. The 

criminal court of law in Mysore. 
PlNDARRIES. Freebooters, who 

ravaged the countries of other 

nations. 
Polygars. Natives who consider 

themselves independent. They 

inhabit forts, hills, and woods, 

armed with pikes and matchlocks. 
POONAH. The capital and seat of 

government of the Peshwah. 
PUNDIT. A learned Brahmin. 
Purneah, or Pourneya. The 

celebrated Dewan of Mysore. 

PURWANAH, PURWUNNA. A 
Government, or official order. 

Rahdarry. An order of route and 
supplies. 

Rajah. The Hindu title of a Prince. 

Rajpoot. A high caste of Hindu 
soldiers inhabiting the country 
Rajpootana. 

Rannee. Hindu Princess; the wife 
of a Rajah. 

Rao, or Row. A title under the 
rank of Rajah. 

Rupee. A silver coin, value about 
2s. in the explanation of lac, but 
is sometimes is. iod. ; it varies 
in value all over India. Of this 
coin there are several kinds, viz., 
Chandoree, Sicca, Pondicherry, 
Rajah, etc., all varying in rela- 
tive value. 

RUSSALAH OF HORSE. A division 
or corps of, less than a durrah. 

Ryot. Peasant or labourer. 

Sattarah. The capital of the 
country so named. Though the 
Rajah of Sattarah was, as de- 
scendant of Sevajee, nominally 
the head of the Marhatta Empire, 
yet the real power has been 
usurped, and was exercised by 
the chief magistrate, the Pesh- 
wah. 

Scindiah. The family name of a 
great Marhatta chief, jaghiredar 
of the empire, but afterwards 



xxx EXPLANATION OF INDIAN TERMS AND TITLES 



independent. His territory was 
in Malwa, and his capital Ougein. 
The names and titles of the chief 
in 1803 were Maharajah Ali J ah 
Dowlut Rao Scindiah. He had 
much increased the territory of 
his predecessors by conquest in 
Hindustan, and his power at 
Poonah by his influence over the 
Peshwah. 

Sebundy. Irregular native soldiers, 
country militia employed gene- 
rally in the police and revenue. 

Seer. A dry measure, rather more 
than a pint ; or 2 pounds weight. 

Sepoys. Native troops. 

Serinjaumy, or Surinjam. 
Grants of jaghires for personal 
expenses or for raising troops ; 
charges of collection. 

Sevajee. The founder of the Mar- 
hatta Empire in the seventeenth 
century, whose descendants were 
Rajahs of Sattarah. 

Sewary, Souarree, Soiree 
Retinue, suite. 

Shekar. A hunt. 

Shroffs. Native bankers, money- 
changers. 

Silladar. Horsemen bearing 
arms and finding their own 
horses and equipment. 

Sirdar. Chieftain, captain, head- 
man, gentleman. 

Sirlushkur. One of the princi- 
pal officers of state under the 
Peshwah. 

Sirsoubah. An officer under the 
Soubah. 

Soubah. A province. 

Soubah, Soubahdar. Governor- 
General, Prince over other 
Rajahs or Princes ; used indis- 
criminately by General Welles- 
ley and others as applied to the 
Nizam ; Viceroy or Governor of 
a soubah or province ; subaltern 
officer in native troops. 

Soucar. Banker, merchant, money- 
lender. 

SULTAUN. Mussulman King, the 
title assumed by Tippoo. 

Sungum. Literally, the confluence 
of two rivers. As the British 
Residency at Poonah was situ- 



ated at such a position, the Sun- 
gum means the Residency. 
Sunnud. Patent, authority for 
holding land or office ; grant or 
command of a Prince or chief. 

Talook. Lands and villages under 
the protection of a fort ; district 
held under superior authority. 

Tandah. As applied to brinjarries, 
a body, a horde, an encampment. 

Tank. Reservoir for water. 

Tannah. Police-station. 

Tappall. The post. 

Titles. Attached to proper names 
among Hindus, beginning with 
the lowest rank : (1) Rao or 
Row, (2) Rajah, (3) Wunt. At- 
tached to proper names among 
Mohammedans : (1) Khan or 
Cawn, (2) Behauder, (3) Jung, 
(4) Dowlut, (5) Moolk, (6) Oom- 
rah, (7 ) J ah. 

Tope. A grove or thicket. 

Tuncaws. Orders for the collec- 
tion of the revenue. 

Vakeel, or Vaqueel. Envoy, am- 
bassador, agent. 

Wheel. Called the perambulator, 
to measure distances ; always 
used by General Wellesley in 
India at the head of the column 
of march to regulate the rate of it. 

Zeafet. An entertainment ; an 
extraordinary allowance on par- 
ticular occasions, either in money 
or provisions, as a reward to the 
troops. 

Zemindar. Landholder ; Govern- 
ment officer, charged with the 
finance department ; superin- 
tendence of the land revenue. 

Zenana. The apartment of the 
women. 

Zereen Putka. The golden 
pennon ; the standard of the 
Marhatta Empire, which always 
accompanied the Peshwah when 
he took the field in person, and 
was sometimes sent with another 
commander when the Peshwah 
chose to remain at Poonah. The 



EXPLANATION OF INDIAN TERMS AND TITLES xxxi 



charge of the zereen putka con- 
stituted such officer Commander- 
in-Chief. Major-General Wel- 
lesley was anxious that this 
charge should be conferred on 



Appah Dessaye, with whom he 
was satisfied, and it would have 
indicated that the Peshwah was 
earnestly engaged in the prose- 
cution of the war. 



The names of chiefs and towns are variously written to signify the 
same persons and places. These, from the liberty observed in Indian 
orthography, the reader of Indian history will understand. The com- 
piler has adopted the most general spelling of such names, and has 
attempted to adhere to it ; but not always, for when he had a doubt he 
has left it as in the manuscript. 



INDIA 



THE EARLY SERVICES 

OF THE 

DUKE OF WELLINGTON IN HOLLAND 
AND INDIA 

Lieutenant-Colonel the Hon. Arthur Wellesley 
embarked at Cork in command of the 33rd Regiment* in 
May, 1794, and landed in the month following at Ostend to 
join the British army under His Royal Highness the Duke 
of York, then in the Low Countries. The approach of the 
French army under General Pichegru rendered it necessary 
to evacuate Ostend without delay, and the 33rd, with two 
other battalions, proceeded round by the Scheldt to Antwerp, 
where it remained encamped during the month of July. On 
the retreat of the army under the Duke of York from Alost 
into Holland, Wellesley took up his allotted station with 
his regiment, and joined in the retrograde movement on 
Breda and Bois-le-Duc. The French army followed, and on 
September 14 there was a serious affair near Boxtel. 

The British army afterwards continued to retreat towards 
Nimeguen, and took up a position on the right bank of the 
Waahl. While posted between the Waahl and the Leek 
several affairs took place with the advance of the French 
army, in which the 33rd were engaged both in the attack on 
Tuyl, on December 30, 1794, and at Meteren and Gelder- 

* Now the 1st Battalion the Duke of Wellington's (West Riding 
Regiment). This is the only regiment in the British Army which is 
named after a subject of the Crown. Upon the death of the Duke 
Queen Victoria, in remembrance of him, commanded that the regiment 
should be known as the Duke of Wellington's, and should bear as its 
badge His Grace's crest and motto — ' Virtu tis fortuna comes? — W. W. 

I — 2 



WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 



malsen on January 5, 1795- Crossing the Leek, the retreat 
was continued by Amersfoort, Deventer, and Coeverden, 
to Meppen on the Ems. In these operations, Wellesley, as 
senior officer, commanded a brigade, consisting of three 
battalions, in the rearguard. The campaign ended by the 
re-embarkation of the British army at Bremen on the 
breaking up of the ice in the spring of 1795. 

On the return of the army to England, the 33rd landed at 
Harwich, and was for a short time encamped at Warley. 
In the autumn it proceeded to Southampton, and Wellesley 
embarked with it for the West Indies in the fleet commanded 
by Admiral Christian. After many delays from contrary 
winds the fleet sailed ; but the expedition having been about 
six weeks at sea during the most tempestuous weather, in 
which many of the vessels composing it were lost, was 
obliged to return to Portsmouth. 

The 33rd was landed and quartered at Poole. Its destina- 
tion having been changed for India, it was again embarked 
in the beginning of April, 1796 ; but Wellesley, in conse- 
quence of severe illness, was unable to leave the country. 
He, however, followed shortly afterwards, and joined his 
corps at the Cape of Good Hope. He proceeded with it to 
Bengal, and arrived at Calcutta in the beginning of 1797. 
At the end of that year the 33rd formed part of the 
expedition from Bengal to attack Manilla ; but on arriving 
at Penang, where the other part of the expedition from 
Madras had joined, fresh orders were received for the recall 
of the troops to their several presidencies, in consequence 
of apprehensions entertained by Lord Hobart, Governor of 
Fort St. George, that Tippoo Sultaun might be induced, by 
the absence of the troops, to invade the Carnatic. 

The 33rd returned to Bengal, and Wellesley soon after- 
wards went to Madras on a visit to Lord Hobart, previously 
to the departure of his lordship for Europe. After an 
absence of two months he returned to Calcutta, having 
rapidly examined the establishments of Madras and other 
parts of the Carnatic. 

The Earl of Mornington (afterwards Marquis Wellesley) 



INDIA 5 

having been appointed to succeed Sir John Shore* as 
Governor-General of India, arrived at Calcutta on May 17, 

1798. 

At the period of his departure from England, it was 
generally believed, and he was himself confident, that he 
would find India in a state of profound peace, and that 
expectation was fully confirmed by the reports which reached 
him upon his arrival at Madras from the several authorities 
at the different presidencies of India. 

Internal tranquillity prevailed throughout the Company's 
possessions, and no apprehension was entertained of hostile 
designs on the part of any of the neighbouring States. 

In the absence of all appearance of danger from abroad, 
his lordship's attention, upon his arrival at Calcutta, was 
principally directed to internal affairs. This state of tran- 
quillity was not, however, of long duration — it was inter- 
rupted by the discovery of the hostile designs and treacherous 
conduct of Tippoo Sultaun, and followed by the campaign 
of 1799 the commencement of Colonel Wellesley's military 
career in India. 

Although Tippoo's hatred of the British nation, and his 
eager desire for vengeance and for the recovery of the 
provinces which Lord Cornwallis had compelled him to 
cede to the Company and its Allies in 179 1, were well 
known, yet it appears that no suspicion was entertained, 
before the receipt of this intelligence from the Mauritius, 
that he had actually adopted such decided measures of 
hostility. It was, however, soon afterwards discovered that 
he was engaged in similar negotiations with Zemaun Shah, 
and several other native Princes, as well as with the French 
officers in their service ; and it was also ascertained that he 
had actually succeeded in engaging the French officers in 
the Nizam's service to enter into his views. 

His Highness the Nizam, Soubahdar of the Deccan, had 

in his service a force of 14,000 well-disciplined infantry, 

commanded by M. Raymond, with 124 French officers, eager 

partisans of the French Republic, and who were on the point 

* Afterwards Lord Teignmouth. 



WELLING TON ' 5 DESPA TCHES 



of erecting the French standard at his capital, Hyderabad. 
The strength and efficiency of this corps, and its position on 
a vulnerable part of the frontiers of the Company's territory, 
demanded immediate attention. By the judicious and prompt 
interference of the Governor-General, a British detachment, 
commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Roberts, was secretly but 
expeditiously despatched to Hyderabad on October 10, 1798 ; 
and on the 22nd of the month, under the orders of the 
Nizam, the whole of the French officers were compelled to 
surrender without firing a shot. His Highness being thus 
relieved from their control, concluded a new treaty of alliance 
with the British Government, whereby he bound himself to 
exclude, not only from his army, but from his dominions, all 
Frenchmen or other adventurers from Europe, and likewise 
engaged to maintain at his capital a corps of British troops 
for the effectual security of the alliance. A treaty was also 
formed with the Peshwah, the nominal head of the Marhatta 
Empire, which secured the neutrality of that chief in the 
absence of any other stipulated advantage. 

Lord Mornington obtained information of all the Sultaun's 
measures, and prevented their execution. He ordered Lieu- 
tenant General Harris, the Commander-in-Chief at Madras, 
to assemble the forces of the Company in the Carnatic. His 
Excellency proceeded in person to Fort St. George, where 
he arrived on December 31, 1798, for the purpose of super- 
intending and directing the preparations for war in the event 
of failure in negotiation. 

The 33rd Regiment had been, in the meantime, sent from 
Bengal to be placed on the Madras establishment, where it 
arrived in September, 1798. In November the greater part 
of the troops were assembled and encamped at Wallajahbad, 
under the orders of Wellesley, with whom the general super- 
intendence remained until February following, when General 
Harris arrived to assume the personal command of the army, 
which had proceeded to Vellore. The attention which 
Wellesley had bestowed on the discipline and well-being of 
the troops, and in practising them in combined field-move- 
ments, with the admirable system he adopted for supplying 



INDIA 7 

the bazaars, which were kept constantly well provided, 
attracted general notice and approbation. . . . 

The Governor-General on February 3 despatched his 
commands to General Harris, to enter the Mysore territory 
with the forces assembled at Vellore, and to Lieutenant- 
General Stuart to co-operate with the Bombay army from 
Malabar ; while at the same time he gave intimation to the 
Allied Courts, and the British Admiral on the coast, that he 
now considered the Company at war with Tippoo Sultaun. 

The army assembled at Vellore exceeded 20,000 men, 
whereof 2,600 were cavalry and 4,300 Europeans. It 
marched on February 11, and on the 18th was joined by the 
British detachment serving with the Nizam, 6,500 strongs 
under Lieutenant-Colonel Dalrymple, with an equal number 
of the Nizam's infantry, including a portion of the sepoys 
lately under French, but now, according to treaty, under 
British officers, commanded by Captain John Malcolm,* and 
a large body of the Nizam's cavalry under Captain Walker. 

The whole of the Nizam's force was under the superinten- 
dence of Meer Allum, His Highness's Minister, and in order 
to give it the utmost degree of efficiency and respectability, it 
was deemed proper to add one of His Majesty's regiments of 
infantry to the Company's battalions serving with it, and to 
form the whole into a separate division. Meer Allum ex- 
pressed a wish that the Governor- General's brother should 
be appointed to command the Nizam's forces, and General 
Harris felt the importance of selecting an officer who pos- 
sessed his own confidence, and who was likely to enjoy that 
of Meer Allum. The 33rd Regiment was accordingly attached 
to the Nizam's contingent, as this force was denominated, 
and the general command of it was thus given to Colonel 
Wellesley. 

The forces assembled under the orders of General Harris 
consisted of upwards of 30,000 men, and, in the words of the 
Governor-General, an army more completely appointed, more 
amply and liberally supplied in every department, or more 
perfect in its discipline, and in the acknowledged experience, 

* Afterwards Lieutenant-General Sir John Malcolm, G.C.B. 



WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 



ability, and zeal of its officers, never took the field in India. 
The army of the western coast, equal in excellence, under 
Lieutenant-General Stuart, consisted of 6,400 fighting men, 
of whom 1,600 were Europeans, whilst a detachment of about 
4,000 under Lieutenant-Colonel Brown, and another of 5,000 
under Lieutenant-Colonel Read, marched to co-operate with 
the Commander-in-Chief, from the southern districts of the 
Carnatic and the Baramahl. 

SERINGAPATAM. 

The Bombay army, under Lieutenant-General Stuart, 
marched from Cannanore on February 21 : General Harris 
entered the Mysore territory on March 5, and commenced 
his operations by the reduction of several forts on the 
frontier. . . . 

On March 6 Tippoo Sultaun passed his own frontier, and 
attacked a detachment of the Bombay army near Sedaseer. 
This attack, though sustained by a body not exceeding 2,000 
men, was repulsed, and the enemy thrown into disorder, even 
before General Stuart could collect the whole of his divided 
force. After this signal failure Tippoo retreated precipitately 
to his camp at Periapatam, and remained there until 
March 11, without making any further attempt to molest the 
Bombay army. He then moved to Seringapatam, and after- 
wards marched from thence to meet the Madras army under 
General Harris. 

The army under General Harris was not ready to make its 
united movement upon Seringapatam until March 9. Many 
delays occurred from the British army being overloaded with 
equipment and materials for siege, in addition to the 
cumbrous baggage of the Nizam's army, a host of brinjarries, 
and the innumerable followers of the camp. The draught 
and carriage bullocks died in great numbers, and the arrange- 
ments necessary to remedy this evil compelled the army to 
halt on the nth, on the 14th, on the 15th, and again on the 
18th. . . . 

The army moved on March 28 to Sosilay, where there is 



INDIA 9 

an easy ford to cross the river Cauvery. Tippoo Sultaun fell 
back on Seringapatam, and the British army arrived on the 
ground for the siege of that fortress on April 5. . . . 

The siege proceeded. On May 3 the breach appeared to 
be practicable, and preparations were eagerly made for the 
assault. On the morning of the 4th the troops destined for 
the attack were placed in the trenches before daylight, that 
the enemy might not observe any particular movement. The 
heat of the day, when the people of the East, having taken 
their mid-day repast, give themselves up to repose, and when 
it was confidently expected that the troops in the fortress 
would be least prepared to resist, was chosen for the hour of 
assault ; the experience of former wars, and especially of that 
under Lord Cornwallis, having proved that the enemy was 
always found more watchful and alert at night than in the 
heat of day. 

Two regiments and ten flank companies of Europeans, 
three corps of grenadier sepoys, and 200 of the Nizam's 
troops, formed the storming party, consisting of 2,500 Euro- 
peans and 1,900 native infantry. Major-General Baird, who 
had solicited the command, divided this force into two 
separate columns, which, on mounting the breach, were to 
file off to the right and left. Colonel Sherbrooke commanded 
the right column, destined for the attack of the southern 
rampart, and Lieutenant-Colonel Dunlop commanded the 
left, to clear the northern rampart. The forlorn hope of each 
attack consisted of a sergeant and twelve Europeans, who 
were followed by two subalterns' parties ; that of the right 
column was commanded by Lieutenant Hill, of the 74th, and 
the other of the left column by Lieutenant Lawrence, of the 
77th Regiments. Wellesley remained in the advanced 
trenches in command of the reserve, to support the troops in 
the assault, in case it should be necessary. 

At one o'clock the troops began to move from the trenches. 
The width and rocky channel of the Cauvery, though it con- 
tained but little water, its exposure to the fire of the fortress, 
the imperfection of the breach, the strength of the place, the 
numbers, courage, and skill of its defenders, constituted such 



io WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

an accumulation of difficulties that nothing less than un- 
bounded confidence in the force and courage of his men could 
have inspired a prudent general with hopes of success. The 
troops descended into the bed of the river, and advanced, 
regardless of a tremendous fire, towards the opposite bank. 
' In less than ten minutes from the period of issuing from the 
trenches, the British colours were planted on the summit of 
the breach.' Tippoo Sultaun, although advised by the most 
judicious of his officers, had neglected to cut a trench, so as 
to insulate the angle of the fort in which the breach had been 
effected, and the assailing parties under Baird, Sherbrooke, 
and Dunlop taking the directions ordered, soon cleared the 
ramparts. . . . 

The Losses at Seringapatam. 

General Return of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing of Corps 
composing the Army before Seringapatam from April 4 to 
May 4, 1799. 





Officers. 


Europeans. 


Natives. 


Killed - 


- 22 


181 


119 


Wounded 


- 45 


622 


420 


Missing 


- — 


22 


IOO 



In the abstracts it appears that the strength of Tippoo 
Sultaun's forces on May 4, 1799, consisted of 48,000 men, 
about 22,000 of whom were either in the fort or in the 
dependent entrenchments of Seringapatam ; and that the 
army commanded by Lieutenant-General Harris consisted of 
8,700 Europeans and 27,000 natives, of which force 20,000 
assisted at the siege. 

The Governor-General, on the arrival at Madras of the 
despatch announcing the fall of Seringapatam, issued a 
General Order to the army in India, offering his cordial 
thanks and sincere congratulations to the Commander-in- 
Chief, and to all the officers and men composing the gallant 
army which achieved the conquest of the capital of Mysore 
on that memorable day. . . . 

Wellesley entered the fort immediately after the assault, 
and was one of the few present when Tippoo Sultaun's 



INDIA 1 1 

body, which was still warm, was discovered in the sallyport 
gateway. 

Major-General Baird having desired to be relieved, 
Colonel Wellesley, being next on the roster, was ordered on 
the same night to command within the fort. 

Wellesley as Governor. 

To Lieutenant- General Harris. 

' 10 a.m., May 5. 

I We are in such confusion still, that I recommend it to 
you not to come in till to-morrow, or, at soonest, late this 
evening. Before I came here General Baird had given the 
treasure in charge to the prize agents. There is a guard 
over it, and it appears to be large. 

' As soon as I can find out where the families of the great 
men are, I shall send guards to take care of them. At 
present I can find nobody who can give me any information 
upon the subject. I have here now the 12th, 33rd, and part 
of the 73rd, and the 2nd of the 5th, 2nd of the gth, and 2nd 
of the 7th. These troops ought to be relieved this day as 
early as possible by two regiments of Europeans and three 
of sepoys. 

' There are some tigers here which I wish Meer Allum 
would send for, or else I must give orders to have them shot, 
as there is no food for them, and nobody to attend them, 
and they are getting violent.' 

Plundering.* 

To Lieutenant-General Harris. 

1 Half-past twelve. 

' I wish you would send the provost here, and put him 
under my orders. Until some of the plunderers are hanged, 
it is vain to expect to stop the plunder. 

I I shall be obliged to you if you will send positive orders 
respecting the treasure.' 

* This was an evil with which Wellington was constantly harassed 
when on active service. — W. W. 



12 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

' Seringapatam, 

'May 5, J799- 

' Things are better than they were, but they are still very 
bad, and until the provost executes three or four people it is 
impossible to expect order, or indeed safety. 

' There are, at this moment, sepoys and soldiers belonging 
to every regiment in your camp and General Stuart's in the 
town. 

' It would surely be advisable to order the rolls to be 
called constantly, and to forbid any people to leave camp. 

' For a few days likewise it would be very advisable that 
the officers of the army should suspend the gratification of 
their curiosity, and that none but those on duty should come 
into the town. It only increases the confusion and the terror 
of the inhabitants. Till both subside in some degree, we 
cannot expect that they will return to their habitations.' 

'Seringapatam, 

'May s, 1799. 

' Plunder is stopped, the fires are all extinguished, and the 
inhabitants are returning to their houses fast. I am now 
employed in burying the dead, which I hope will be com- 
pleted this day, particularly if you send me all the pioneers. 

' It is absolutely necessary that you should immediately 
appoint a permanent garrison, and a commanding officer to 
the place ; till that is done, the people will have no confi- 
dence in us, and everything must be in confusion. That 
which I arrange this day, my successor may alter to-morrow, 
and his the next day, and nothing will ever be settled. A 
garrison which would be likely to remain here would soon 
make themselves comfortable, although it might be found 
convenient hereafter to change some of the corps sent in ; 
but these daily reliefs create much confusion and distrust in 
the inhabitants, and the camp is at such a distance that it 
is impossible for the officers or soldiers or sepoys to get down 
their dinners. 

' I shall be obliged to you if you will order an extra 



INDIA 



13 



dram and biscuit for the 12th, 33rd, and 73rd Regiments, 
who got nothing to eat yesterday, and were wet last night. 

' In hopes that you will attend to my recommendation to 
send a garrison in to-morrow, I shall look out for a place to 
accommodate one or two battalions of Europeans and three 
or four of sepoys.' 

Wellesley exerted himself to the utmost to prevent excess 
of every kind. Cowle flags were hoisted in different parts of 
the town, and public notice given that severe examples would 
be made of any persons detected in the act of plundering 
the houses or molesting the inhabitants, for, although General 
Baird had given protection to some of the principal families, 
and used every means in his power to restore order in the 
town, yet it could not be expected that the tumult and 
disorder, which were unavoidable in a city so extensive 
taken by assault, could immediately subside, nor was it until 
four men had been executed for plunder that perfect tran- 
quillity was restored. These examples and the personal 
activity of Wellesley, who went himself to the houses of the 
principal families with safeguards, soon inspired a general 
confidence. The inhabitants who had quitted the town 
during the night of the storm, and had slept in the open 
fields, returned quickly to their houses and occupations. In 
a few days the bazaars were stored with all sorts of provisions 
and merchandise, for which there was a ready and advan- 
tageous sale, and the main street of Seringapatam, three 
days after the fort was taken, was so much crowded as to be 
almost impassable, and exhibited more the appearance of a 
fair than that of a town just taken by assault. 

General Harris, on the receipt of Wellesley's report, con- 
tained in his letter of the 6th, lost no time in carrying into 
effect the recommendation. He immediately directed a 
regular garrison for Seringapatam, and appointed Wellesley 
to the command of it. . . . These duties of necessity devolved 
upon the officer in command of Seringapatam in consequence 
of the sudden and complete dissolution of Tippoo's govern- 
ment, the dispersion of all the public functionaries, and the 



14 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

helpless situation of the late Sultaun's family then in the 
palace. 

The complete subjugation of Mysore was the immediate 
consequence of the fall of Seringapatam and the death of 
Tippoo Sultaun. . . . 

On the settlement of the Mysore territory by the Commis- 
sion, the provinces which fell under British protection and 
authority became a distinct command ; and Wellesley was 
confirmed in it by the Governor-General, receiving his orders 
from, and reporting direct to, the Supreme Government at 
Calcutta. . . . 

The tranquillity of Mysore was interrupted by the celebrated 
Dhoondiah Waugh, one of those adventurers who have so 
often subverted empires and founded dynasties in the East. 
This freebooter had formerly committed various depredations 
on the territories of Tippoo Sultaun, who, having secured 
his person, compelled him to conform to the Mahomedan 
faith, and afterwards employed him in military service ; but, 
either detecting him in some treacherous project, or sus- 
pecting his fidelity, the Sultaun confined him in irons in 
Seringapatam. After the assault he was released, with 
several other prisoners, by the inconsiderate humanity of the 
British troops, and immediately fled, accompanied by several 
of Tippoo's disbanded army. He proceeded to Bednore, and 
laid that rich country under severe contributions, which he 
exacted with unrelenting cruelty, perpetrating throughout 
the province the most atrocious acts of rapine and murder. 
His band being considerably increased, a light corps of cavalry 
and native infantry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Dalrymple, 
moved against him from Chittledroog, and another light 
corps, under Colonel Stevenson, advanced into Bednore in 
another direction. Dhoondiah crossed the Toombuddra, 
followed by these corps, and suffered considerable loss ; but 
he effected his escape into the Marhatta territory, and the 
pursuit ceased, as the Governor-General had strictly pro- 
hibited any violation of the Marhatta frontier. 

Colonel Wellesley was now in chief command, and was 
long occupied in visiting the different provinces of the late 



INDIA 15 

conquest, making roads and communications, and organizing 
the civil as well as the military establishments. 

A Country not worth Fighting for. 
To Major Munro, Collector at Canara. 

'Camp in the Province of Loo, 
' October 8, 1799. 

' . . . This country, into which I have come to visit my 
posts on the Marhatta frontiers, is worse than that which 
you curse daily. It is literally not worth fighting for. . . . 

1 The drubbing that we gave to the Marhattas lately has 
had the best effects, and although all the robbers are in 
motion to cut each other's throats, they treated us with the 
utmost hospitality, and have sent back our people whom 
they had driven away.' 

Wounded Inhabitants. 
To Lieutenant-Colonel Close. 

'Seringapatam, 

'■January 10, 1800. 

' . . . I have arranged for the wounded inhabitants and 
sepoys. . . . 

' They have hitherto received three-quarters of a seer of 
rice and three pice, or thirty cash, per day : the expense to 
the Company, about one fanam each. As they would be 
much better enabled to live by getting the fanam than by 
getting the rice and the pice, I have determined to give it to 
them. 

' They were nearly all examined by an invaliding com- 
mittee ; from those which this rejected I have withdrawn 
the allowance, and have extended it to a few who are in the 
general hospital, who were so sick as to be unable to attend 
the invaliding committee, and whose names do not therefore 
appear on its proceedings. The whole number is under 
ninety, so that the expense will amount to about two pagodas 
per day.' 



1 6 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

Trouble with Dooley-boys. 

To Lieutenant-Colonel Close. 

' Seringapatam, 

'January 24, 1800. 

' . . . We have had much trouble in procuring dooley-boys 
to send away the 74th Regiment. There are numbers of them 
in this country, as I am informed ; but Purneah's people, in- 
stead of providing them, have sent to the 74th about half the 
number of coolies ; and even of those that were sent from 
hence one half have deserted, and the remainder refuse to 
carry the doolies. The inconvenience of all this is, that the 
corps is delayed. . . .' 

'TO EAT THE PYCHE RAJAH !' 

To Lieutenant-Colonel Close. 

1 Seringapatam, 

' February 9, 1 800. 

' . . . I am much at a loss to know how to form the detach- 
ment for Wynaad. . . . We have here about 500 pioneers, 
and they shall accompany the detachment. I reckon that 
the whole will be ready to start from Seringapatam in the 
second week in March. ... I reckon the detachment will 
be strong as follows . . . 

' This will be sufficient, with guns and artillerymen, to eat 
the Pyche Rajah ! . . .' 

Villainies in the Store Department. 
To Lieutenant-Colonel Close. 

' Seringapatam, 

' June 4, 1 80 1. 

' I have been so much taken up by the inquiry into the 
complaints from the store department that I have not had 
time to write since I received your letter. . . . 

' You cannot conceive what a scene of villainy has come 
out, almost the whole of it since I went to the field last year 
or when I was away with the army upon the former 
occasion. . . .' 



INDIA i 7 

The Difficulty of pleasing Subordinates. 

To Lieutenant-Colonel Harness. 

' Seringapatam, 

''February 2, 1800. 

' ... It rarely happens (particularly in this country) that 
it is in the power of an officer in command to please those 
who are under his orders, and when he is so fortunate, it is 
to be attributed as much to their good disposition, as to any 
efforts he may have made for that purpose. I regret exceed- 
ingly, on public as well as private grounds, that the 74th 
Regiment is removed from Bangalore ; but you must have 
been long enough in this country to perceive that the public 
interest and convenience are not upon all occasions the cause 
of the public measures. . . .' 

Elephants for Lady Clive. 

To Lieutenant-Colonel Close. 

' Seringapatam, 

'February 3, 1800. 

' . . . I shall send on Wednesday twenty elephants and 
one hundred draught bullocks for Lady Clive's use. She 
leaves Madras in the first week in March, and I propose to 
go to the frontier to meet her. She will do well, in my 
opinion, to stop at Bangalore till the month of June, as April 
and May are very hot here. I have desired Grant to ask 
her to Dowlut Baug, the zenana of which, when a little 
improved, will accommodate her and her family admirably. 
Neither of the palaces would answer for a woman at all, as 
they are so much exposed. . . .' 

Hunting Thieves. 

To Major Munro. 

'Seringapatam, 

' March 2, 1 800. 

' Since Colonel Close's return to Seringapatam, I have had 
some conversation with him respecting the thieves in Soonda. 
It has appeared to him and to me, that the only mode by 

2 



WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 



which you can expect to get rid of them is to hunt them out. 
In the province of Bednore we employed some of the Rajah's 
cavalry ; with the support of our infantry. Some thieves 
were caught, some of them were hanged, and some severely 
punished in different ways : the consequence has been that 
lately that country has not been visited by them ; and most 
probably a similar operation in Soonda would have a similar 
effect. I have spoken to Purneah on the subject, and I find 
that he can assist with about two hundred and fifty or three 
hundred horsemen, without inconvenience; these, divided into 
two or three small parties, supported by our infantry, would 
give a proper shekar ; and I strongly advise you not to let the 
Marhatta boundary stop you in the pursuit of your game 
when you shall once have started it. Two or three fair 
hunts, and cutting up about half a dozen, will most probably 
induce the thieves to prefer some other country to Soonda 
as the scene of their operations. . . .' 

Flogged and sent about their Business. 

To Lieutenant -Colonel Close. 

' Seringapatam, 

' March 9, 1 800. 

' . . . We have been perfectly quiet here since I wrote to 
you. The court-martial sentenced the four men to be 
hanged, but as I have not the power of putting the sentence 
in execution, excepting in a case of emergency, which, when 
they had finished their proceedings, did not exist, and as the 
men tried were not at the head of the riot, I have had them 
well flogged, and sent about their business. . . .' 

Uneasiness about a Command. 

To Lieutenant-Colonel Close. 

' Cannanore, 

' April 5, 1800. 

1 . . . I have received a letter from Disney, who has lost 
his wife, and is attacked by the liver complaint himself, and 
is so much out of sorts altogether as to have determined to 



INDIA 



19 



quit the service and go home immediately. His command, 
which is on many accounts a very important one, will 
devolve upon a Lieutenant in the Bombay army ; and I 
assure you that, considering the disturbance on the Marhatta 
frontier, the riches of Nuggur, and the general inclination of 
all manner of people to plunder, I am rather uneasy at the 
charge being in the hands of a person who must be so in- 
experienced. Under these circumstances I am desirous of 
sending there Colonel Montresor from Chittledroog, whom I 
do not know, but he bears an excellent character. I shall 
not do so, however, till I hear from you whether there is any 
objection to it.' 

No Hand Grenades in India. 

To Lieutenant-Colonel Close. 

' Seringapatam, 

''April 21, 1800. 

' . . . I received last night a letter from Colonel Tolfrey, 
from which I guess that he neither thinks his force sufficient 
to force Anakeery, nor does he like his equipments, as he 
wants hand grenades, of which I believe there are none in 
India, certainly none at Seringapatam. . . .' 

Snowball Growth of Discontent. 

To Major Munro. 

' Seringapatam, 

'May 7, 1800. 

' I am glad to find that your people in Canara are so free 
from the foul crime of rebellion. . . . 

' I think that upon the whole we are not in the most 
thriving condition in this country. Polygars, nairs, and 
moplas in arms on all sides of us, an army full of disaffection 
and discontent, amounting to Lord knows what, on the 
northern frontier, which increases as it advances like a 
snowball in snow. . . .' 



WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 



Sickly Cavalry. 
To Lieutenant-Colonel Close. 

' Camp at Archinelly, 
' May 22, 1800. 

' . . . I have received a most distressing account of the 
state of the 1st Regiment of Cavalry; they had been very 
sickly ; latterly some men have died ; the whole regiment are 
much frightened and out of spirits, and about twenty sepoys, 
nine of whom had been many years in the service, have 
deserted. I have desired Pater to halt them at Hurryhur, to 
put the sick under cover, and the whole regiment into the 
fort if necessary. 

' As Dr. Anderson thinks they will not recover either 
health or spirits till they reach Arcot, I am afraid that I 
shall be obliged to send them to the rear entirely, and 
eventually to the Carnatic. . . .' 

A Troublesome Officer. 

To Lieutenant-Colonel Close. 

'Camp at Chtttledroog, 
' Ju?ie 8, 1800. 

' I told you in my letter of yesterday that I had sent 

Captain West to to inform him that I conceived his 

letter to be highly disrespectful and improper ; as such, that 
I called upon him to withdraw it, and acknowledge his sense 
of its impropriety in a form which I sent him. He had one 
hour to consider of this proposition ; he declined to do as he 
was required, and he was in consequence put in arrest. 

' I sent by this post all the papers and a statement of the 
case to the Adjutant-General. Since I arrived here a gentle- 
man has come on the part of to say that he was willing 

to withdraw his letter. I desired him to inform that 

he was now in arrest ; that he had had an opportunity of 
withdrawing his letter and acknowledging his error, which he 
had not taken, and therefore that all he had to say upon the 
subject must go to the Commander-in-Chief.' 



INDIA 21 

' . . . I hope General Braithwaite will not order a court- 
martial upon till my hands are less full of business. I 

have hinted this in my letter, and I shall be glad if you will 

give him a line upon the subject. In that case shall 

cool his heels or his head at Chittledroog till the campaign 
is over.' 

An Unfortunate Appointment. 

To Lieutenant-Colonel Close. 

' Camp at Hurryhur, 
' June 1 8, 1800. 

' ... If I had heard of the circumstance which you 
mentioned to me at Seringapatam previous to the appoint- 
ment of the gentleman in question to his command, he 
certainly never should have been appointed. . . . 

' He is a gentleman, a man of the world, and one who 
appears to look to his character. I write to him by this 
post, and you may depend upon it that he must either act as 
he ought, or he shall be removed from his command. . . .' 

Hard Pressed for Money. 

To Lieutenant-Colonel Close. 

' Camp Left Bank of the Toombuddra, 
'■June 26, 1800. 

' . . . I am quite confounded by the intelligence that we 
shall have no money from Captain Macleod ; we shall really 
be quite aground in August if I do not get a lac of pagodas 
somewhere.' 

A Deserved Fate. 

To Lieutenant-Colonel Close. 

'Camp on the Right Bank of the Werdah, 
' July 6, 1 800. 

' . . . Goklah has certainly been beat and killed, and the 
circumstances of the affair are nearly as I stated them to you 
in my last letter. The majority of his troops, however, I am 
informed are still together, and can be brought forward. . . . 



WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 



' I have received the proceedings of the court-martial. 
Sheik Fereed is found guilty of treason, and is sentenced to 
be imprisoned to the end of the war ! Hyder Beg is acquitted. 
I cannot approve of, although I have confirmed, these 
sentences, and I have desired Colonel Cuppage to keep 
Hyder Beg in confinement. 

' In future I must proceed by a court of inquiry, which 
shall deliver an opinion whether the prisoner is guilty or not, 
as I find it is impossible to impress officers with an accurate 
notion of the extent and consequences of the crime of treason, 
and of the punishment which it deserves and meets in all 
civilized societies. . . . 

' Goklah, then, met with the fate which he deserved.' 

Fort Dummul stormed. 

To Lieutenant- Colonel Close. 

'Camp at Dummul, 

''July 26, 1800. 

' I have the pleasure to inform you that I stormed and got 
possession of Dummul this morning. I attacked it in three 
places, at the gateway and on two faces, and carried it with 
a trifling loss, which was to be attributed chiefly to the 
eagerness of the soldiers to get upon the ladder, and it broke. 

' It is a strong stone fort, well built, with a dry ditch. 
The ladders used were above thirty feet long, and, in my 
opinion, the fort ought not to have been attacked with 
them. . . .' 

Happy Troops. 

To Major Munro. 

'Camp at Soondootty, 

'■August 1, 1800. 

' . . . I must halt here to-morrow to refresh a little, 
having marched ever)' da)' since July 22, and on the 30th, 
the day on which I took his baggage, I marched twenty- 
six miles, which, let me tell you, is no small affair in this 
country. 



INDIA 23 

' My troops are in high health and spirits, and their 
pockets full of money, the produce of plunder. . . .' 

A ' Rights of Men ' Man. 

To Lieutenant-Colonel Close. 

'Camp at Soondootty, 

'■August 3, 1800. 

'. . . Our friend Munro has sent an amildar into the 
countries right of the Werdah, who is playing the devil. 
I have, however, ordered him to the presence, and have 
proclaimed in the country that he has no authority from me. 
He is a kind of rights of men man, who has ordered the 
people to pay no revenue to anybody, and of course is 
obeyed. One of the consequences of his orders is, that the 
peons put into the different villages and forts by the Bhow 
do not receive their subsistence; they have threatened to 
hang their havildars, and now plunder the country. . . . 

'Camp at Kittoor, 

' August 5, 1800. 

'. . . It is necessary to curb Munro's amildars a little, who 
are taking possession of every place in the country, whether 
belonging to friends or to foes, and who have given great 
disgust to the allies. . . .' 

Condition of Supplies. 

To Major Munro. 

' Camp at Hoobly, 

' August 20, 1800. 

'. . . The fighting men of the Company's troops, to whom 
alone I allow rice in times of scarcity, consume eighty loads 
a day, including those of Bowser's detachment. Thus, then, 
as long as rice is produced at all in the bazaars — that is 
to say, while we are in a country which produces rice — I 
allow about 100 loads of brinjarry to be sold : or, if the 
country is plentiful, I allow still more. When rice was not 
to be got in the country, as was the case between the Werdah 



24 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

and Toombuddra, and, indeed, till we came to Kittoor, I 
allowed none to be sold by the brinjarries, excepting to the 
grain department, and I issued it to the troops at the rate of 
half a seer gratis. Then they consumed eighty bags per 
diem. 

' At this rate of consumption, I have now in camp some 
thirty-three days' rice, and between the rivers, Lord knows 
what. It is, however, very clear that I am now in no want, 
and that I am not likely to suffer any. . . .' 

Evils of extending Territory. 

' In my opinion, the extension of our territory and in- 
fluence has been greater than our means. Besides, we have 
added to the number and the description of our enemies, by 
depriving of employment those who heretofore found it 
in the service of Tippoo and of the Nizam. Wherever we 
spread ourselves, particularly if we aggrandize ourselves 
at the expense of the Marhattas, we increase this evil. We 
throw out of employment, and of means of subsistence, 
all who have hitherto managed the revenue, commanded or 
served in the armies, or have plundered the country. These 
people become additional enemies : at the same time that, 
by the extension of our territory, our means of supporting 
our government, and of defending ourselves, are proportion- 
ably decreased. 

' Upon all questions of increase of territory, these con- 
siderations have much weight with me, and I am in general 
inclined to decide that we have enough — as much, at least, if 
not more than we can defend. . . . 

' As for the wishes of the people, particularly in this 
country, I put them out of the question. They are the only 
philosophers about their governors that ever I met with — if 
indifference constitutes that character.' 



INDIA 



The King of the Two Worlds. 
To Major Mtmro. 

' Camp at Yepulpurry, 

'■September n, 1800. 

' 1 have the pleasure to inform you that I gained a com- 
plete victory yesterday, in an action with Dhoondiah's 
army, in which he was killed. His body was recognised, 
and was brought into camp on a gun attached to the 19th 
Dragoons. 

' After I had crossed the Malpoorba, it appeared to me 
very clear, that if I pressed upon the King of the Two 
Worlds with my whole force, on the northern side of the 
Dooab, His Majesty would either cross the Toombuddra with 
the aid of the Patan chiefs, and would then enter Mysore ; 
or he would return into Savanore and play the devil with 
my peaceable communications. I therefore determined, at 
all events, to prevent His Majesty from putting those designs 
in execution, and I marched with my army to Kana- 
gherry. . . . 

' The King of the World broke up on the 9th, from Mal- 
gherry, about twenty-five miles on this side of Raichore, 
and proceeded towards the Kistna ; but he saw Colonel 
Stevenson's camp, returned immediately, and encamped on 
that evening about nine miles from hence, between this place 
and Bunnoo. I had early intelligence of his situation ; but 
the night was so bad, and my horses so much fatigued, that 
I could not move. After a most anxious night, I marched 
in the morning and met the King of the World with his 
army, about five thousand horse, at a village called Conah- 
gull, about six miles from hence. He had not known of my 
being so near him in the night ; had thought that I was at 
Chinnoor, and was marching to the westward with the inten- 
tion of passing between the Marhatta and Mogul cavalry 
and me. He drew up, however, in a very strong position, as 
soon as he perceived me, and the victorious army stood 
for some time with apparent firmness. I charged them with 



26 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 



the igth and 25th Dragoons,* and the 1st and 2nd Regi- 
ments of Cavalry, and drove them before me till they 
dispersed and were scattered over the face of the country. 
I then returned and attacked the royal camp, and got posses- 
sion of elephants, camels, baggage, etc., etc., which were 
still upon the ground. The Mogul and Marhatta cavalry 
came up about eleven o'clock, and they have been employed 
ever since in the pursuit and destruction of the scattered 
fragments of the victorious army. 

' Thus has ended this warfare, and I shall commence my 
march in a day or two towards my own country. An honest 
killadar of Chinnoor had written to the King of the World 
by a regular tappall, established for the purpose of giving 
him intelligence that I was to be at Nowly on the 8th, 
and at Chinnoor on the 9th. His Majesty was misled by 
this information, and was nearer me than he expected. The 
honest killadar did all he could to detain me at Chinnoor, 
but I was not to be prevailed upon to stop, and even went so 
far as to threaten to hang a great man sent to show me 
the road, who manifested an inclination to show me a good 
road to a different place. My own and the Marhatta 
cavalry afterwards prevented any communication between 
His Majesty and the killadar. . . .' 

An Unbearable System. 

# 

To Lieutenant-Colonel Close. 

'Camp at Nalloody, 

' October 2, 1800. 

' . . . The history of Captain 's conduct is quite 

shocking. A particular caution was given by me to Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel Mignan, when I desired him to send these 
troops through the Rajah's country ; which caution I con- 
clude he gave to Captain . There is no remedy for this 

conduct, excepting to bring this gentleman to a court-martial 
as soon as possible ; and I shall be obliged to you if you will 
write me a public letter upon the subject. 

* Afterwards the 22nd Light Dragoons. 



INDIA 27 

' The bygarry system is not bearable ; it must be abolished 
entirely, or so arranged and modified as to render it certain 
that the unfortunate people employed as coolies are paid, are 
not carried farther than their usual stage, and are not ill- 
treated. When all that is made certain, it will be found 
cheaper and more convenient for these gentlemen to hire 
coolies than to trust to the chance of procuring brinjarries on 
the roads, and there will be but little call for the latter. . . . 

' Besides Captain , I have another Bombay gentle- 
man in my eye, who has lately come through this country 
with a convoy of arrack, and I suspect played the same 
tricks — that is to say, never paid the people pressed and 
employed by him in the public service. I have desired that 
inquiries may be made upon the subject, and if I find my 
conjecture to be founded I shall try him at the same time 
with Captain . . . . 

' I think it probable that Lieutenant-Colonel Mackay will 
have refused to obey his order to march ; and if so, we shall 
have a fine kettle of fish at Seringapatam ; but, in any event, I 
don't think the Government will pass over his refusal to allow 
an officer to obey their orders, although conveyed in a letter 
beginning " Dear Colonel." . . .' 

The Case of an Assistant-Surgeon. 

To Lieutenant-Colonel Close. 

'Camp at Hoobly, 

• October 15,1 800. 

' . . . I shall call for the court-martial which you mention. 
Colonel lately made a complaint of an assistant- 
surgeon, just arrived in the country, who disobeyed his 
orders. The young man was put in arrest, and has since 
made the most ample apology. The Colonel will not re- 
ceive the apology, and I am about to send him an order to 
join the army, to prosecute the assistant-surgeon ; so that 
there is an end of his career for some time. . . .' 



WELLING TON' S DESPA TCHES 



Distrust of a Surveyor. 

To Lieutenant-Colonel Close. 

'Camp at Misserycotta, 

'•November i, 1800. 

' . . . I am obliged to you for your information regarding 

the ceded countries ; I applied to for some, having 

understood that his attention for the last years of his life 
has been entirely taken up by inquiries into and surveys 
of those very countries. In answer to my application, he 
proposes that I should send him a map of my marches, 
and all the geographical information which I have received 
from Bombay (which, by-the-by, is nothing less than true) ; 
and he then promises to make a map of the whole. Into 
this he will most probably insert the result of his own 
dreams. . . .' 

The Expedition to Egypt. 

To the Hon. Henry Wellesley. 

1 Bombay, 

' 'April 8, 1 80 1. 

' My fever has left me, but I am still weak, and I have got 
another disorder, of which it appears the medical men here 
do not know the nature, and which, I think it probable, will 
oblige me to go to a cold climate. This circumstance, and 
the great probability held out by the late despatches from 
Europe, that Sir Ralph Abercrombie's attack upon Lower 
Egypt will be postponed, or, rather, will never take place, and, 
therefore, that the operations proposed in the Red Sea will 
likewise be relinquished, have induced me to determine not 
to go. . . . 

' The ships are all gone, excepting one which came in only 
yesterday, having sprung a leak at sea. Arrangements were 
immediately made to move the troops to other ships, and 
they will go to-morrow. From what I have seen of the 
state of the ships, the troops, the water-casks, etc., I am con- 
vinced that if we had not come here the expedition would 
have been obliged to quit the Red Sea before they would 



INDIA 29 

have been there one month. The 10th Regiment* have to a 
man got the scurvy, and lost above twenty men on their 
passage from Ceylon. 

Wellesley's Removal from Command. 

To Colonel Champagne, with the Army under Major-General 

Baird. 

' Bombay, 

' April 11, 1801. 

' I am entirely ignorant of the circumstances which have 
caused my removal from the command of the troops ; but I 
conclude that the Governor-General found that he could not 
resist the claims that General Baird had to be employed. I 
believe you know that I always thought that General Baird 
had not been well used, when I was called to the command. 

' But I do not think it was proper that I should be disap- 
pointed more than he was, in order that he might have no 
reason to complain. However, this is a matter of little con- 
sequence to anybody but myself, therefore I say no more on 
the subject. 

' Lord Wellesley allowed me to return to my old situation, 
but said that he should regret my doing so; and for this 
reason, and because I saw in the General the most laudable 
intention to allow me to render him the services I could, I 
determined to proceed upon the expedition. I was, however, 
seized with a fever, and a breaking out all over my body ; 
and here I am under a course of nitrous baths for a cure. 
When I shall be well God knows ! but in the meantime I 
cannot join the armament. 

1 1 see clearly the evil consequences of all this to my re- 
putation and future views ; but it cannot be helped, and to 
things of that nature I generally contrive to make up my 
mind. . . .' 

* Now the Lincolnshire Regiment.— W. W. 



3 o WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 



THE MARHATTA WAR. 

In the autumn of 1802, the advance and capture of Poonah, 
by Jeswunt Rao Holka, the consequent flight of the Pesh- 
wah, and the warlike preparations of the several chiefs, led 
to the interference of the British Government in the affairs 
of the Marhatta States, in which Major-General Wellesley 
bore a conspicuous part. 

Stores for the Troops. 

To Jonathan Duncan, Esq., the Governor of Bombay. 

' Seringapatam, 

'January 20, 1803. 

' . . . The articles of which we shall be principally in 
want are food for our Europeans, for our native troops and 
followers, and for our horses, military stores, medical stores, 
and money. 

' For the Europeans we ought to have 10,000 gallons of 
arrack, in kegs of 6 gallons each, well fortified with iron 
hoops. . . . 

' For the European troops, 90,000 pounds of salted meat 
will be required, also packed in kegs well fortified, 45 pounds 
in each keg, besides pickle, etc. ; and the same quantity of 
biscuits in round baskets, containing 60 pounds each ; these 
baskets to be covered with waxed cloth. Slaughter cattle 
for 3,000 Europeans for one month would likewise be useful ; 
but these might remain in a situation in which it would be 
probable they might get some food, and would be attended 
to till the army should be prepared to send for them. 

' For the natives, all that we shall require is 600 garces 
of rice. Each garce contains 4,800 pucca seers, each seer 
2 pounds. 

' Salt, however, is an article of necessary consumption, 
both to the European and the native troops, and of this 
article it is desirable that there should be in the depot 
60 garces. 



INDIA 31 

'We shall want military stores only in case we should 
have fought an action previously to our arrival at Poonah. . . . 

' In respect to food for our horses, I am afraid that that 
which they use is not procurable at Bombay, viz., coulthee ; 
but if coulthee is procurable, there ought to be 150 garces of 
that grain in the depot ; if not, an equal quantity of chenna. 

' Medical stores — we ought to have three months' con- 
sumption of these for 3,000 Europeans and 15,000 native 
troops, particularly bark, Madeira wine, mercurial ointment, 
calomel, and not forgetting nitrous acid. 

' In respect to money, I conclude that General Stuart will 
write to you particularly. I have not the means of estimating 
our expenses ; but I think you ought to be prepared to send 
us 16 lacs of rupees. . . .' 

Wellesley commenced his march from Hurryhur on 
March 9, and crossed the Toombuddra River on the 12th. 
The progress of the British troops through the Marhatta 
territories was most successful. . . . 

Destruction of Wheel Carriages. 

To Lieutenant-Colonel Harness. 

'Bottom of the Bhore Ghaut, 
' April 20, 1803, 8 a.m. 

1 The road down the ghaut is so bad that the cavalry guns 
have been detained at it till now, and I think that we shall 
not march from hence till nine or ten. . . . 

' I shudder when I think of the dreadful destruction of 
the wheel carriages which there will be, on this day's and to- 
morrow's march. 

' You will find some of my leavings upon the road. If the 
cavalry tumbrils which I mean cannot be repaired, the 
3-pounders shot in particular must be taken out of them, and 
brought forward. That is a scarce article. 

' Your march of this day will be something about twelve 
miles ; that of to-morrow to Lovey about ten ; the following 
day, twelve. 



32 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 



' I do not recommend a halt, as its consequence may be 
that some belonging to us may stay on the ground for ever.' 

A Fine Cavalry Performance. 
Major Malcolm to Lord Clive. 

'Camp near Poonah, 

' April 24, 1803. 

' I have much satisfaction in informing your lordship of the 
arrival of the whole of the force under the Honourable Major- 
General Wellesley at Poonah, which city, there is every 
reason to conclude, was saved from total destruction by a 
rapid movement of the cavalry under the General's command, 
who actually marched near sixty miles in thirty-two hours to 
its relief. . . .' 

Anxious to get to Work. 

To Lieutenant-Colonel Close. 

'Camp at Poonah, 

' April 26, 1803. 

' God send the Peshwah soon here ! My fingers itch 
to do something for the security of the Nizam's frontier ; and 
till the Peshwah is re-established at Poonah, and his govern- 
ment begins to have some authority, it will not answer to 
alter the disposition which must insure that object only to 
save a few villages from plunder. . . .' 

The Care of the Sick. 

To Colonel Stevenson. 

' Poonah, 

' May 2, 1803. 

' . . . You must immediately establish a hospital, and 
leave in it all the sick of the Scotch Brigade that require 
carriage. Look for some secure place for this establishment 
within the Nizam's frontier. If you do not do this, the first 
action you will have will be ruinous to you. I know that the 
surgeons will carry about the sick men till they die, although 



INDIA 33 

I am aware that, generally speaking, it is best to keep the 
sick with their corps ; but in a case of this kind, where there 
are so many men sick, and the carriage for the sick is so in- 
sufficient, and there is every probability that there will be 
more sick, a hospital must be established, in which every 
case not on the mending hand ought to be thrown. 

' I cannot give Mr. Kennedy any assistance of surgeons. 
The best man you have should be left in charge of the 
hospital, and the care of the corps from which you take him 
given to somebody else. One gentleman will easily attend 
two corps. . . .' 



Arrest of Wandering Europeans. 
To the Secretary of Government, Bombay. 

' Camp at Panowullah, 
'■May 4, 1803. 

' I have to inform you that I have lately arrested in this 
camp two wandering Europeans, who, I rather believe, are 
deserters from the Portuguese service, and I have sent them 
in charge of a party going from hence to Panwell with 
brin-jarry bullocks. 

' My object in arresting them was to prevent people of 
this description from frequenting this camp, with a view to 
entice the European soldiers to desert, and I have directed 
that they may be sent over to Bombay, and delivered over 
in charge to the Town Major of that garrison. 

' I shall be obliged to you if you will bring my request 
before the Honourable the Governor in Council, that these 
men may be sent to Goa by the first opportunity that may 
offer.' 



34 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

Lack of Iron. 

To Colonel Murray.* 

'Camp at Poonah, 

' May 15, 1803. 

'. ... It is a most extraordinary circumstance that I can- 
not get iron from Bombay. I hear that some is landed at 
Panwell ; but instead of sending it up, or arrack, or pro- 
visions, they are sending medicines, which, however useful, 
might have been deferred, till we get other articles essen- 
tially necessary to our consumption, or to enable us to move 
from hence. . . .' 

A Fine but Quarrelsome Officer. 

To Lieutenant -General Stuart. 

'Poonah, 

' May 26, 1803. 

' I have not received your secretary's letter upon the sub- 
ject of Captain Mackay, and I have therefore omitted to 
communicate to that officer your determination respecting 
him as stated to me in your letter of the 17th. Captain 
Mackay is an honest and zealous servant of the public, and 
he conducts his own important department in such a manner 
as always to have the cattle under his charge in a most 
efficient state for work; but he is the most unaccommodating 
public officer that I have met with. He has never failed to 
contrive to quarrel with the head of every other department 
with which he has been concerned, and I have always had 
the greatest difficulty in keeping matters between him and 
others in such a state as that the service should not be 
impeded by their disputes. 

' I imagine that the difficulties between Captain Mackay 
and Major Symons, to which you have alluded, are to be 

* Colonel Murray, to whom these letters are addressed, was of the 
84th Regiment, and afterwards, as Lieutenant-General Sir John Murray, 
commanded the division of the army on the eastern coast of Spain, and 
was tried by a general court-martial for his conduct at Tarragona. 



INDIA 35 

attributed to the state of Captain Mackay's temper, and 
possibly, in some degree, to a want of accommodation on 
the part of Major Symons. I make no doubt but that you 
will have observed that this officer, also, although an 
excellent man, has more of the oak than the willow in his 
disposition. . . .' 

To the Secretary of Government, Bombay. 

'Camp, Jaum, 

' November 9, 1803. 

'. . . I have also to acknowledge the receipt from Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel Coleman of a letter from the Government of 
Bombay on August 29, with various depositions of deserted 
bullock-drivers, against Captain Mackay, taken by the 
Superintendent of Police at Bombay. 

' Unfortunately for the service, the gentleman against whom 
these accusations have been made was killed at the Battle of 
Assye ; otherwise I should not now be obliged to write his 
defence. This officer was notoriously the most humane and 
gentle towards the natives of any I have yet seen in this 
army ; indeed, this virtue was carried to an excess in his 
character, that might almost be termed a fault. . . . 

'As the officer is killed, his character cannot be entirely 
cleared from the stigma recorded respecting it, on the 
authority of the lowest and vilest men in society. But I can 
safely say that, as far as I can answer for another man, these 
depositions do not contain one word of truth, excepting that 
the deponents deserted from the service.' 

Leave of Absence. 

To Colonel Murray. 

'Camp, 

'May 26, 1803. 

'. . . I imagine that it is not intended by the Commander- 
in-Chief that an officer shall keep his leave of absence in his 
pocket, in order to avail himself of it at any moment that he 
may think proper, however inconvenient to the service. But 

3—2 



36 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

I am aware that there is no use in detaining an officer in an 
employment to which he has a dislike, and therefore you 
will avail yourself of your leave when you may think 
proper ; only I request you to give me timely notice of your 
intention. . . .' 

A Mistake in Character. 
To Lieutenant-General Stuart. 

' Camp at Poonah, 

1 May 27, 1803. 

'. . . The more I see of them, the more I am convinced 
that we have entirely mistaken the character of these people, 
and that unless they are permitted to plunder the country 
through which they pass, or to have profits such as the 
native armies are able to give them from plunder, they will 
not follow the troops to any distance from the place at which 
they usually reside. I have had the greatest difficulties 
with them, and they have deceived me and broken their 
engagements upon every occasion. Colonel Stevenson, who 
has another set, has been obliged to punish, and even to put 
ome to death, for plunder in the Peshwah's country. . . .' 

Capture of Ahmednuggur. 

To Lieutenant-Colonel Close. 

' Camp at Angah, 

'June 16, 1803. 

'. . . I hear good accounts of Ahmednuggur ; it is full of 
everything we want. The property of this country is lodged 
there. The capture of that place will relieve our immediate 
distresses, and will give everybody spirits. . . .' 

To Lieutenant-Colonel Close. 

' Camp, 

'■June 18, 1803. 

'. . . All depends upon your success at Poonah, unless we 
should have a war, in which case I expect that the capture 
of Ahmednuggur will set me up again. 

' It is very extraordinary that the Peshwah's Government 



INDIA 37 

should have sent nobody to settle his country, which runs 
from Poonah up to this place ; the people are in the villages, 
but there appears no government, nor indeed anything except 
thieving.' 

To Lieutenant-General Stuart. 

' Camp, 

i Jit fie 24, 1803. 

'. . . Matters have turned out in the most unfortunate 
manner, and I have been disappointed in all the hopes 
of assistance which I had formed from Bombay, Poonah, etc. 
... I have above informed you of the degree of assistance 
which I have received from the Peshwah's Government, and 
the forage of Poonah was so expensive, particularly after the 
Peshwah's arrival, that the cattle got but little ; it was of a 
bad kind, gave them little sustenance and when they 
began to march they died immediately ; so far, therefore, 
from being able to return for fresh loads, they are not able to 
carry on those they have got. In short, we have discovered 
once more that, without assistance from the Government 
of the country in which we are acting, we cannot carry 
on militarjr operations at the distance of 700 miles from our 
supplies. . . .' 

To the Governor -General. 

'Camp at Ahmednuggur, 
' August 12, 1803. 

' The weather cleared up so much on the 7th instant as to 
allow me to march to this place on the 8th. I had in the 
morning despatched a messenger to the Killadar of Ahmed- 
nuggur, to require him to surrender his fort ; and on my 
arrival in the neighbourhood of the pettah I offered cowle 
to the inhabitants. This was refused, as the pettah was held 
by a body of Arabs, who were supported by a battalion of 
Scindiah's regular infantry, and a body of horse encamped 
in an open space between the pettah and the fort. 

' I immediately attacked the pettah with the pickets of 
the infantry, reinforced by the flank companies of the 
78th Regiment, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel 



38 



WELLINGTON'S DESPA TCHES 



Harness; in another place with the 74th Regiment and 
1st Battalion of the 8th, under the command of Lieutenant- 
Colonel Wallace ; and in a third with the flank companies of 
the 74th, and the 1st Battalion 3rd Regiment, under the com- 
mand of Captain Vesey. The pettah wall was very lofty, and 
defended by towers, and had no rampart ; so that, when the 
troops had ascended to the attack, they had no ground on 
which they could stand ; and the Arabs who occupied the 
towers defended their posts with the utmost obstinacy. 

' At length they were obliged to quit the wall, and fled to 
the houses, from which they continued a destructive fire 
upon the troops. Scindiah's regular infantry also attacked 
our troops after they had entered the pettah. In a short 
time, however, after a brisk and gallant contest, we were 
completely masters of it ; but with the loss of some brave 
officers and soldiers, as your Excellency will perceive by the 
enclosed return. . . .' 

' Return of the Killed and Wounded of His Majesty's and the 
Honourable Company's Troops, composing a Detachment in 
Advance of the Grand Army, under the Command of Major- 
General the Hon. A. Wellesley, in the City of Ahmednuggur, 
on August 8; and during the Siege of the Fort of Ahmed- 
nuggur, on August 9, 10, and II, 1803. 



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R. Barclay, Dep. Adj.-Gen. 



INDIA 39 

Bravery of Arab Troops. 
To the Hon. the Governor of Ceylon. 

' Camp, 

1 October 14, 1803. 

' I did not take any of the Arab troops prisoners who were 
opposed to the troops under my command at Ahmednuggur, 
those who defended the pettah having been, with the 
Killadar, driven out, and the troops who defended the fort 
having made a capitulation, under which they were allowed 
to evacuate it ; I have therefore no Arabs in my possession. 
If I had, I should take the liberty of suggesting to you my 
doubts of the propriety of employing them on the island of 
Ceylon. They are undoubtedly the bravest of all the troops 
that I have yet seen in the service of the native powers, and 
they defend the posts entrusted to their charge with deter- 
mined valour, but I have never seen them in the field, and I 
believe that they do not serve willingly except in garrison. 
They are a high-spirited people, and are by no means amen- 
able to discipline and orders, which it is absolutely necessary 
should prevail in our camps and forts ; and I believe that it has 
happened more than once in India that they have mutinied, 
even when well treated, and have been the cause of terror to 
their employers. . . .' 

Sufferings from Famine. 

To the Governor-General. 

'Bombay, 

'■May 2, 1804. 

' I have the honour to enclose the copy of a letter which I 
have thought it necessary to write to Major Graham, con- 
taining orders to make provision for feeding the poorer 
classes of the inhabitants of Ahmednuggur, who were suffer- 
ing from famine. I am sorry to inform your Excellency 
that, notwithstanding the arrangements directed in that 
letter have been carried into execution, nearly fifty people 
in that town die daily. The distress in all parts of the 
country is extreme. 



40 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

' The Commander of the Mysore Horse, who has gone in 
search of food within the territories of the Soubah of the 
Deccan, informs me that his horses are entirely unfit for 
service from want of food, that several have died, and that 
he fears the troops will disband unless removed to a country 
which suffers less from famine. . . .' 



Freebooter and Murderers. 

To Major Graham. 

'Camp at Chinchore, 
'■June 20, 1804. 

' I have had the honour of receiving your private letter of 
the 16th instant, containing a copy of the evidence against 
the freebooter impostor Seyd Sultaun Aly. I know nothing 
about that person, and I do not believe that he has ever 
been even a menial servant of mine. I desire that he may 
be publicly whipped in the pettah of Ahmednuggur, for 
having made use of my name to plunder the country ; and 
that he and his followers may be put in irons, and employed 
for six months at hard labour upon the works of Ahmed- 
nuggur. 

' I desire that you will make inquiry into the circumstances 
of the murder committed between Coraygaum and Soupah ; 
and if you should find that the persons who are now in con- 
finement in the main guard at Ahmednuggur are guilty of it, 
I beg you to give orders that they may be hanged in a public 
place.' 

Camels for Camp Equipage. 

To Colonel Murray. 

'Camp, 

' June 12, 1803. 

' . . . I have bought twenty-seven camels to carry the 
camp equipage of the 78th Regiment, which I propose 
should be paid for by the Government of Bombay. . . .' 



INDIA 4 i 

AURUNGABAD FORT. 

To Colonel Stevenson. 

'Camp at Angah, 

'-June 1 8, 1803. 

' ... It appears that it is the intention of the Nizam's 
Government that the person who has hitherto been in 
charge of the fort of Aurungabad should be deprived of his 
charge. . . . 

1 1 think it probable that the garrison at present in Aurung- 
abad will refuse to give up the fort, unless an engagement is 
made to pay them their arrears. . . . 

' If the garrison should refuse to give up the fort on any 
grounds, you must attack it, and get possession of it by 
force ; but I request you to give strict orders that the place 
may not be plundered, and that no disorder may be com- 
mitted by our troops who may be employed on this service. 
The officers must recollect that many females of the Nizam's 
family are in Aurungabad, and that His Highness would be 
more sensible of any injuries that they may suffer from the 
licentiousness of the troops than he will be of the benefit 
which his Government might derive from their valour and 
discipline. . . .' 

Dearth of Cattle. 

To Lieutenant-Colonel Close. 

' Camp, 

'■June 19, 1803. 

' Our distresses increase upon us for want of cattle. I was 
obliged to leave behind this morning 500 loads of stores and 
100 of provisions. You will be a judge of the mortality of 
cattle from the following statement. There was a muster on 
the 15th, and there were 500 good carriage bullocks in the 
grain and provision department, more than were required for 
the loads, and a sufficiency in the stores. The consumption 
between the 15th and 18th was 250 loads of provisions, and 
yet on the 18th the deficiency of carriage is found to be 100, 
making the loss of cattle in the provision department in three 



4 2 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

days 850 bullocks. In the store department it has been, in 
the same period of time, about 600. The gun cattle keep up 
well, notwithstanding the bad weather, but it is by force of 
exertion. 

' Yesterday the drivers were out till nine at night in quest 
of forage. We moved a short distance in the morning, and 
they must have been in motion at three o'clock, so that these 
people were on foot for eighteen hours yesterday. I have 
been in difficulties of this kind before, and have surmounted 
them, and I shall surmount these if I can get any assistance 
from Poonah, or if the Peshwah or his people will show any 
sign of our being here upon his business, or even with his 
knowledge or consent ; or if he will not do that, if he will 
send anything like an amildar to the country, or anybody to 
take charge of the Government, with whom I might com- 
municate. But under present circumstances I am in a worse 
situation by far than I should be in an enemy's country ; in 
such I should act for myself, and should establish a Govern- 
ment as I go on. There is forage in the country, and grain 
also, but it is all hidden underground, and we are forced to 
dig for everything we get, notwithstanding that we give a 
large price for it. . . .' 

The English Name disgraced. 

To Lieutenant-Colonel Close. 

' Camp, 

'July 20, 1803. 

' . . . What has passed in Guzerat is disgusting to a 
degree. The English name is disgraced, and the worst of it 
is that endeavours are made to conceal the disgrace under 
an hypocritical cant about humanity ; and those feelings 
which are brought forward so repeatedly respecting the 
garrison of Parneira are entirely forgotten in respect to the 
unfortunate British soldiers of the 75th and 84th Regiments, 
who, unlike the gentlemen, submitting to be humbugged 
by a parcel of blackguards, are suffering in the rains. . . .' 



INDIA 43 



Duelling. 



To Lieutenant-Colonel Harness, Lieutenant-Colonel Wallace, 
and Lieutenant- Colonel Maxwell. 

' Camp, 

''July 20, 1803. 

' I have to inform you that it is generally reported in camp 

that the late Captain B , of the 78th Regiment, was shot 

in a duel, and a letter addressed to me, which I enclose, and 

which was found among Captain B 's papers, tends to 

confirm the truth of that report. I therefore request you 
will meet and ascertain the cause of the death of the late 
Captain B . . . .' 

To stop Desertions. 

To Colonel Murray. 

' Camp, 

1 July 20, 1803. 

' . . . I am concerned to hear of the desertion of the 
soldiers of the 84th, and I dare say that they are come to 
Ahmednuggur; but possibly I shall shortly be able to give 
a good account of them. It is now too late to send out to 
look for them. 

' If you can catch the people who enticed them to go away, 
let me know, and I will send you an order to assemble a 
general court-martial to try them. They shall certainly 
be hanged, if to punish them in that manner be allowed by 
the sentence of the court-martial. 

' In the meantime, I recommend that you should take this 
opportunity of forbidding your soldiers to go into Poonah at 
all, and punish any man who goes there. Also take up and 
punish any low European or half-caste man, or the attendant 
upon such a one, such as a strange cook-boy, whom you may 
find about the bazaar, or barracks, or the lines, or anywhere 
in communication with the soldiers. 

' When I first came to the Marhatta territory these animals 
flocked about my camp, but I seized and punished them, and 
sent all I caught to Bombay, to be returned to Goa by the 



44 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

first opportunity. By these means I have not lost one 
European deserter. 

' I long to hear of your catching the palanquin gentleman. 
If you can prove against him that he enticed away your 
soldiers, you may seize and punish him, if you find him 
in your bazaar, and send him a prisoner to Bombay ; that 
measure will stop this trade. 

' Try the thieves by a line court-martial and punish 
them.' 

' Camp, 

'July 22, 1803. 

' I have received your letter of the 20th. You will receive 
this day orders to carry into execution the sentence of the 
general court-martial, which tried a Bombay sepoy who 
deserted some time ago ; and orders to assemble a general 
native court-martial to try the deserters you mention. If 
there is evidence of the desertion with their arms and ac- 
coutrements of the three men, I beg that they may be all 
tried ; if there should not be evidence, one of them may be 
admitted to give evidence against the others. 

' But I should think that there will be no want of evidence 
that they left their corps and were brought back prisoners. 
They shall be shot also, if the court-martial should sentence 
that punishment.' 

'Camp, 

''July 24, 1803. 

' . . . I return your paper containing the deposition of the 
soldiers against the foreigners, supposed to have enticed 
away the three men of the 84th who are missing ; and, 
although they may not be the persons who took those three 
men away, it is very clear that their occupation is to entice 
the British soldiers to desert. I request, therefore, that, 
upon the receipt of this letter, you will punish these men 
publicly in the bazaar and lines of the detachment under 
your command. You will afterwards keep them in confine- 
ment till an opportunity shall offer, when you will send them 
to Bombay, in charge of a guard, and report to the Governor 



INDIA 45 

that they are sent as deserters from the Portuguese service 
and from the ships. You will also request that they may be 
sent to Goa. . . .' 

'Camp at Walkee, 

'•August 2, 1803. 

* . . . You will receive by this day's post orders to carry 
into execution the sentence of the general court-martial on 
the two sepoys. 

' Lieutenant Burnes' letter is a curious production, and I 
beg that you will do me the favour to inform him that, for 
reasons which I thought valid, but which I do not think it 
necessary to communicate to him, I thought it proper to 
bring the prisoners, Hurry Sing and Hurry Rao, to trial for 
the crime of desertion only ; and that, in future, I beg that 
he will do me the favour to confine his attention to his own 
business, and leave my duty to be done by myself and the 
officers appointed to assist me. . . . 

' P.S. — Let your communication with Lieutenant Burnes 
be verbal, as I wish to avoid all future correspondence upon 
this subject. Indeed, that mode of communication is to be 
preferred on all occasions.' 

Want of Troops. 

To Lieutenant-General Stuart. 

' Camp, 

'July 30, 1803. 

' . . . The tragical result of the military operations in 
Ceylon has added considerably to the difficulties of the 
present moment for want of troops. There is no doubt but 
that Mr. North will require reinforcements from the Govern- 
ment of Fort St. George, but I cannot imagine from what 
quarter they are to be sent. . . . 

'The departure of the French fleet is a sign either that 
war was declared when the corvette which arrived at Pondi- 
cherry left France, or that the declaration of war was expected 
immediately. The French Admiral may be expected to 



46 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

return to India, as soon as he may be joined by his rein- 
forcements. I hope that Admiral Rainier will also receive 
reinforcements. . . .' 

Employment of Enemies. 

To the Governor of Bombay. 

'Camp at Walkee, 

1 August 2, 1803. 

' ... In all parts of India, particularly in those territories 
which have belonged to the Marhattas, there is a numerous 
class of people whose only occupation and only mode of pro- 
curing subsistence has been the military service. This class 
is usually entirely deprived of subsistence by the transfer of 
the government of those countries to the Company ; and they 
are driven to seek for it either in rebellion at those moments 
when the British troops are engaged in foreign wars, or in 
the armies of our enemies. These they are ready to lead 
into our districts, with all the knowledge derived from long 
residence and service within them, and they become, in fact, 
our most dangerous enemies. 

'The employment of these people, therefore, at such time 
as sebundy is advantageous, not only as it saves the regular 
troops, and gives a larger body of troops for field service, 
and prevents the loss of their discipline, but because it 
lessens the number of idle and discontented at the time of 
general invasion and confusion, and that of our most 
dangerous enemies. . . .' 

Justifiable Retaliation. 

To the Governor of Bombay. 

' Camp at Rackisbaum, 

' September 3, 1803. 

' The enemy, having found it impossible to seize any of 
the districts belonging to the Soubah of the Deccan, or to 
plunder them to any extent, have seized the persons of some 
of the principal inhabitants of the towns near which they 
have passed, and have detained them as securities for the 



INDIA 47 

payment of certain sums which they have required from the 
districts. 

' In order to put a stop to this practice it is necessary to 
retaliate upon them. Accordingly, I request you will be so 
kind as to give directions that the mother and relations of 
Jadoon Rao Bhow may be seized, and that they may be 
informed that they will be detained as securities for the 
persons of the hostages seized in this unjustifiable manner by 
Dowlut Rao Scindiah. . . .' 

Good Condition of Troops. 

To Lieutenant-General Stuart. 

' Camp at Kurcah, 

' September 8, 1803. 

' ... It is impossible for troops to be in better order 
than those under my command. My marches are made 
at the rate of three miles in an hour, and a few days ago I 
marched twenty-two miles and a half in seven hours and a 
half. . . .' 

Picking Shot from a Breached Wall. 

To Colonel Stevenson. 

'Camp, 

' September 9, 1 803. 

' . . . Upon considering the state of the ordnance and 
ammunition with both divisions, I have determined not to 
send you my guns. I have only 1,350 shot ; you have 300, 
and a field equipment for your 12-pounders, which I suppose 
to be 100 for each, making in the whole 2,050 shot. If you 
had no equipment whatever for your 18 -pounders, my 
12-pounders would be necessary for battering; but as it is, 
you will have a breaching battery of two 18-pounders and 
one 12-pounder, tolerably supplied with ammunition, which 
is certainly better than four 12-pounders. . . . 

' I send you, however, some ammunition, together with 
one lac of pagodas. . . . 



48 WELLINGTON'S DESPA TCHES 

' If you used your 18-pounders at Jalnapoor, you might be 
able to pick the shot out of the breached wall. I was obliged 
to do this at Ahmednuggur ; otherwise I should not have had 
even the equipment that I have at present, as the stores were 
in confusion and concealed in extraordinary places, and could 
not be readily found. . . .' 

Private Quarrels and Courts-Martial. 
To Colonel Murray. 

' Camp, 

' September 14, 1803. 

' . . . I have long observed that the subjects which have 
come under the consideration of general courts-martial in 
this country are in general referable to private quarrels and 
differences, with which the public have no concern whatever. 
The character of the officers of the army is undoubtedly a 
public concern ; but in many instances it would be much 
more proper, and more creditable for both parties, to settle 
these differences by mutual concession, than to take up the 
time of the public by making them the subject of investiga- 
tion before a general court-martial. . . .' 

1 Camp, 

' September 16, 1803. 

'. . . These courts -martial are distressing indeed at 
present. I wrote you a long letter upon the subject the other 
day, and I shall not repeat now what I said then. We must 
endeavour to stop these trifling disputes, and turn the atten- 
tion of the officers of the army to public matters, rather than 
to their private concerns. 

' It occurs to me that there is much party in the army in 
your quarter ; this must be put an end to. And there is 
only one mode of effecting this, and that is for the Command- 
ing Officer to be of no side excepting that of the public, to 
employ indiscriminately those who can best serve the public, 
be they who they may or in whatever service. The conse- 
quence will be that the service will go on ; all parties will 
join in forwarding it and in respecting him ; there will be 



INDIA 49 

an end to their petty disputes about trifles ; and the Com- 
manding Officer will be at the head of an army instead of a 
party. . . .' 

A Litigious Lieutenant. 

To Colonel Murray. 

'Camp at Assye, 

' September 25, 1803. 

' I have the honour to enclose a packet of papers which I 
have received from Lieutenant Procter, the Fort Adjutant of 
Surat. I beg that you will let him know that I cannot 
receive any letter from him, unless sent through his Com- 
manding Officer ; and, at all events, I cannot order a court- 
martial to assemble for the trial of an officer for conduct at 
his (Lieutenant Procter's) trial, the proceedings of which have 
been approved of by the Commander-in-Chief at Bombay. 

' It appears to me that Lieutenant Procter is of a very 
litigious disposition, and a very improper person to fill the 
situation of Fort Adjutant at Surat. If you should be of this 
opinion, I request you to report it to the Government of 
Bombay, and recommend that another officer may be 
appointed.' 

Anxiety for a Young Friend. 

To Major Shawe. 

' Camp, 

' September 28, 1803. 

' I have received a letter from Mr. Thomas Pakenham, a 
writer on the Bengal establishment, respecting whom I am 
particularly interested. He is the son of Admiral Pakenham, 
a very old friend of Lord Wellesley and of me. I believe 
him to be very young and inexperienced ; I therefore most 
anxiously recommend him to your care and attention. I 
have also given him a letter of recommendation to my friend 
Mr. Ross, whom I have requested to have an eye upon his 
conduct, and, above all things, to prevent him from keeping 
bad company. 

4 



50 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

' Should the college last, of course he will attend that in- 
stitution ; if not, I have desired him to acquire a knowledge 
of the country languages. I request you to urge him par- 
ticularly upon this point, and do not allow him to be idle. 

' Do not allow him to run in debt. . . .' 



THE BATTLE OF ASSYE. 

To the Governor-General. 

' Camp at Assye, 

' September 24, 1803. 

' I was joined by Major Hill with the last of the convoys 
expected from the river Kistna on the 18th ; and on the 20th 
was enabled to move forwards towards the enemy, who had 
been joined in the course of the last seven or eight days by 
the infantry under Colonel Pohlman, by that belonging to 
Begum Sumroo, and by another brigade of infantry, the name 
of whose commander* I have not ascertained. The enemy's 
army was collected about Bokerdun, and between that place 
and Jaffierabad. 

' I was near Colonel Stevenson's corps on the 21st, and 
had a conference with that officer, in which we concerted a 
plan to attack the enemy's army with the divisions under our 
command on the 24th in the morning ; and we marched on 
the 22nd, Colonel Stevenson by the western route, and I by 
the eastern route, round the hills between Budnapoor and 
Jaulna. 

' On the 23rd I arrived at Naulniah, and there received a 
report that Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar had moved off 
in the morning with their cavalry, and that the infantry were 
about to follow, but were still in camp at the distance of 
about six miles from the ground on which I had intended to 
encamp. It was obvious that the attack was no longer to be 
delayed ; and, having provided for the security of my baggage 
and stores at Naulniah, I marched on to attack the enemy. 

' I found the whole combined army of Scindiah and the 
Rajah of Berar encamped on the bank of the Kaitna River, 

* M. Dupont. 



INDIA 51 

nearly on the ground which I had been informed that 
they occupied. Their right, which consisted entirely of 
cavalry, was about Bokerdun, and extended to their corps 
oMnfantry, which were encamped in the neighbourhood of 
Assye. Although I came first in front of their right, I de- 
termined to attack their left, as the defeat of their corps of 
infantry was most likely to be effectual ; accordingly I 
marched round to their left flank, covering the march of the 
column of infantry by the British cavalry in the rear, and by 
the Marhatta and Mysore cavalry on the right flank. 

' We passed the river Kaitna at a ford beyond the enemy's 
left flank, and I formed the infantry immediately in two 
lines, with the British cavalry as a reserve in a third, in an 
open space between that river and a nullah running parallel 
to it. The Marhatta and Mysore cavalry occupied the 
ground beyond the Kaitna on our left flank, and kept in 
check a large body of the enemy's cavalry which had followed 
our march from the right of their own position. 

' The enemy had altered the position of their infantry 
previous to our attack : it was no longer, as at first, along 
the Kaitna, but extended from that river across to the village 
of Assye upon the nullah, which was upon our right. We 
attacked them immediately, and the troops advanced under 
a very hot fire from cannon, the execution of which was 
terrible. The piquets of the infantry and the 74th Regiment,* 
which were on the right of the first and second lines, 
suffered particularly, from the fire of the guns on the left 
of the enemy's position near Assye. The enemy's cavalry 
also made an attempt to charge the 74th Regiment at the 
moment when they were most exposed to this fire, but they 
were cut up by the British cavalry, which moved on at that 
moment. At length the enemy's line gave way in all 
directions, and the British cavalry cut in among their broken 

* Now the 2nd Battalion the Highland Light Infantry. This regiment, 
the 19th (Princess of Wales's Own) Hussars, and the Seaforth High- 
landers are the only British regiments bearing 'Assaye' as an honour. 
These regiments were granted the special honour of a third colour. — 
W. W. 

4—2 



5 2 WELLING TOW S DESPA TCHES 

infantry ; but some of their corps went off in good order, and 
a fire was kept up on our troops from many of the guns from 
which the enemy had been first driven, by individuals who 
had been passed by the line under the supposition that they 
were dead. 

' Lieutenant-Colonel Maxwell, with the British cavalry, 
charged one large body of infantry, which had retired and was 
formed again, in which operation he was killed ; and some time 
elapsed before we could put an end to the straggling fire, 
which was kept up by individuals from the guns from which 
the enemy were driven. The enemy's cavalry also, which 
had been hovering round us throughout the action, were 
still near us. At length, when the last formed body of in- 
fantry gave way, the whole went off, and left in our hands 
ninety pieces of cannon. 

' The victory, which was certainly complete, has, however, 
cost us dear. Your Excellency will perceive by the enclosed 
return,* that our loss in officers and men has been very 
great, and, in that of Lieutenant-Colonel Maxwell and other 
officers whose names are therein included, greatly to be re- 
gretted. 

' I cannot write in too strong terms of the conduct of the 
troops ; they advanced in the best order, and with the 
greatest steadiness, under a most destructive fire, against a 

* A Return of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Detachment of the 
A?- my under the Command of Major-General the Hon. A. We lies ley 
at the Battle of Assy e, against the Army of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, on 
September 23, 1803. 

Europeans. 



H.M.'s 19th Lt. D. ^ 
1 st Batt. Madras Art 
2nd do. do. 

Det. Bombay do. 
H.M.'s 74th Regt. 
H.M.'s 78th do. J 



F. O. Cap. Sub. Serg. Drum. R. & F. Horses. 

Killed - i 6 7 9 — 141 77 

- Wounded 3 6 20 33 6 343 3 

Missing - — — — — — 8 — 



Natives. 



Subi. Jem. Havil. Trum. R. & F. Horses. 

Killed 5 3 13 — 224 228 

Wounded - - - 12 16 39 6 1,138 75 

Missing - - - - - - — — — — J 8 1 

R. Barclay, Dep. Adj. -Gen. 



INDIA 53 

body of infantry far superior in number, who appeared deter- 
mined to contend with them to the last, and who were driven 
from their guns only by the bayonet ; and notwithstanding the 
numbers of the enemy's cavalry, and the repeated demon- 
strations they made of an intention to charge, they were kept 
at a distance by our infantry. 

' I am particularly indebted to Lieutenant-Colonel Harness 
and Lieutenant-Colonel Wallace for the manner in which they 
conducted their brigades, and to all the officers of the staff 
for the assistance I received from them. The officers com- 
manding brigades, nearly all those of the staff, and the 
mounted officers of the infantry, had their horses shot under 
them. . . .' 



A Hot Cannon Fire. 

To Lieutenant-General Stuart. 

' Camp at Assye, 

' September 24, 1803. 

' I marched on the 20th from the ground which I had 
occupied in the neighbourhood, waiting for the junction of 
Major Hill, and on the 21st I was near to, and had a con- 
ference with, Colonel Stevenson, in which I arranged that 
we should attack the enemy this day. But on my arrival on 
my ground yesterday I received accounts that the enemy's 
cavalry had marched off, that their infantry were preparing 
to follow, and that the latter were only six miles from my 
proposed camp. 

' It was so important to our interests at this moment to 
strike a blow, that I thought there was no time to be lost ; 
accordingly, I determined to march on to attack them, and 
I sent notice of this determination to Colonel Stevenson. 

' I found the whole army encamped, and made my arrange- 
ments to attack their infantry, which was upon their left 
flank. The fire from their cannon was the hottest that has 
been known in this country, and we lost a great number of 
officers and men in advancing to the attack ; Colonel Max- 



54 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 



well, among others, killed. At length we drove them off, 
and have taken about sixty pieces of cannon, nearly all brass, 
of the largest calibres. Their infantry, of which there were 
three campoos, fought well, and stood by their guns to the 
last. Their execution, however, was principally by their 
cannon. Colonel Wallace, Colonel Harness and I had 
horses killed under us. I lost two horses, one shot and the 
other piked, and the staff officers have lost one or two each. 

' I believe the enemy did not get away more than two 
guns, and I am doubtful whether they even have that 
number, as the number that we have taken agrees with that 
which my hircarrahs have reported that they had previous to 
the action. 

' Their cavalry did us but little mischief. A body made 
an attempt to charge the 74th, and were cut up by the 19th 
Dragoons. . . .' 

Wounded by Cannon Shot. 

To the Governor of Bombay. 

'Camp, 

' September 27, 1803. 

' As nearly all the men who were wounded in the action 
between the British troops and the united armies of Dowlut 
Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, on the 23rd instant, 
were struck by cannon shot, and it is probable that some of 
them will be disabled entirely, it will be a great convenience 
if an early opportunity is taken of removing those of this 
description from the field hospital to Bombay. From hence 
the Europeans may be sent to England, and the natives to 
the coast of Coromandel, as opportunities may offer. 

' I cannot at present say the number of cases of this 
description which there will be, but I think it almost certain 
that there will not be less than one hundred. . . . 

' I am greatly in want of medical assistants, and I shall 
be much obliged to you if you will give orders that six 
assistant-surgeons may be sent to Ahmednuggur without loss 
of time, to place themselves under my orders. 



INDIA 55 

1 The cavalry lost many horses in the late action, and I 
shall be obliged to you if you will give orders that as many 
as 400 may be purchased at Bombay to remount the 
cavalry.' 

The Fiercest Fight in India. 

To Major Malcolm. 

' Camp, 

' September 28, 1803. 

' Our victory of the 23rd has been vety complete. The 
enemy lost 1,200 men killed, and their wounded and dying 
are on all parts of the road from hence to Adjuntee. They 
marched yesterday morning from the bottom of the ghaut 
towards Burhampoor, and they had not then 200 infantry in 
camp, and their cavalry is dispersed over the country. They 
have plundered their own baggage and bazaars, and the 
Bheels in the ghaut have cut up vast numbers of them. 
Colonel Stevenson is gone after them. 

' I am tied by the heels by the necessity of sending away 
my doolies with my wounded men. . . . 

' As the enemy have still several brigades undefeated, I 
almost doubt the propriety of the expedition into Berar, by 
one of our divisions only. 

' Their infantry is the best I have ever seen in India, 
excepting our own, and they and their equipments far surpass 
Tippoo's. I assure you that their fire was so heavy, that I 
much doubted at one time whether I should be able to pre- 
vail upon our troops to advance, and all agree that the battle 
was the fiercest that has ever been seen in India. Our troops 
behaved admirably ; the sepoys astonished me. 

' These circumstances, and the vast loss which I sustained, 
make it clear that we ought not to attack them again, unless 
we have something nearer an equality of numbers. . . .' 



56 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

The Guns and Colours taken. 
To the Governor -General. 

' Camp, 

' September 30, 1803. 

' I have the honour to enclose an account of the ordnance 
taken from the enemy in the action of the 23rd instant.* I 
have reason to believe that there are still four more guns, 
which were thrown into the river by the enemy in their 
retreat. 

' We have taken seven stand of colours, and the enemy lost 
all their ammunition, although, the tumbrils having blown up, 
some during the preceding night, we have got nothing but 
the shot. The ordnance is very fine, but I have destroyed 
the iron guns, and shall put the brass guns in a place of 
security. 

' The enemy lost 1,200 men killed in the field of battle, and 
their wounded are scattered in all parts of the country. It 
is reported that Jadoon Rao, Scindiah's principal Minister, 
received a wound, of which he died the day before yesterday. 
Their army is in the greatest confusion, and retiring to 
Burhampoor. Colonel Stevenson has followed them down 
the Adjuntee ghaut, and I propose to descend the ghauts as 
soon as I shall have placed the wounded soldiers in security.' 

* A Retttrti of Ordnance of Dijferetit Calibres taken from the Enemy in 
the Battle of September 23, 1803. 







'Camp, 






' September 29, 1803, 


Brass Howitzers. 

7 


Brass Guns. 
69 


Iron Guns. Total. 
22 98 



' The number of tumbrils and quantity of ammunition and stores taken 
cannot be ascertained, as after the action, and during the night, a great 
number of the tumbrils were blown up. 

'M. BEAUMAN, Cap. Com. Artillery? 



INDIA 57 



To the Hon. H. Wellesley. 

'Camp, Fifty Miles North of Aurungabad, 
' October 3, 1803. 

' I wrote to you on September 17, and since that time 
I have completely defeated the enemy, and have taken from 
them ninety-eight pieces of cannon, with their ammunition, 
etc. I enclose a copy of my letter to the Governor-General 
on this subject, which will give you an idea of the action. 

' I have little to add thereto, excepting to tell you that 
Scindiah's French infantry were far better than Tippoo's, his 
artillery excellent, and his ordnance so good, and so well 
equipped, that it answers for our service. We never could 
use Tippoo's. Our loss is great, but the action, I believe, 
was the most severe that ever was fought in this country, 
and I believe such a quantity of cannon and such advan- 
tages have seldom been gained by any single victory in any 
part of the world. 

'The enemy had 1,200 men killed on the field of battle, 
and I suppose about four times that number wounded. They 
plundered one another after the action, and many of their 
troops have deserted ; the whole have fled to Burhampoor, 
about eighty miles from hence, in the greatest confusion. 

' I lost two horses. Diomed (Colonel Aston's horse, who 
has carried me in so many campaigns) piked, and another 
horse shot under me. Almost all the staff had their horses 
either killed or wounded, or were struck in some place or 
other. 

' In the enclosed letter, I only report ninety pieces of 
cannon taken, but when I despatched it I did not know the 
extent of our gains. In fact, I believe we took 102, but we 
destroyed some, and there is a mistake respecting the 
number ; I know there are ninety-eight. . . . 

' I am well supplied with everything. I have already got 
some of the enemy's supplies, and I have great hopes that I 
shall get more.' 



58 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

A Mistake that caused Heavy Loss. 

To Lieutenant-Colonel Munro. 

'Camp at Cheesekair, 

' November i, 1803. 

'As you are a judge of a military operation, and as I am 
desirous of having your opinion on my side, I am about to 
give you an account of the Battle of Assye. . . . 

' It was certainly a most desperate one, but our guns were 
not silenced. Our bullocks, and the people who were em- 
ployed to draw them, were shot, and they could not all be 
drawn on, but some were ; and all continued to fire as long 
as the fire could be of any use. 

' Desperate as the action was, our loss would not have 
exceeded one half of its present amount if it had not been 
for a mistake in the officer who led the pickets which were 
on the right of the first line.*" 

' When the enemy changed their position they threw their 
left to Assye, in which village they had some infantry, and 
it was surrounded by cannon. As soon as I saw that, I 
directed the officer commanding the pickets to keep out of 
shot from that village ; instead of that, he led directly upon 
it. The 74th, which were on the right of the first line, 
followed the pickets, and the great loss we sustained was in 
these two bodies. 

' Another evil which resulted from this mistake was the 
necessity of introducing the cavalry into the cannonade and 
the action long before it was time ; by which that corps lost 
many men, and its unity and efficiency, that I intended to 
bring forward in a close pursuit at the heel of the day. But 
it was necessary to bring forward the cavalry to save the 
remains of the 74th and the pickets, which would otherwise 
have been destroyed. Another evil resulting from it was that 
we had then no reserve left, and a parcel of stragglers cut up 

* One company of the pickets, of one officer and fifty rank and file, 
lost one officer and forty-four rank and file. — W. W. 



INDIA 59 

our wounded; and straggling infantry, who had pretended to 
be dead, turned their guns upon our backs. 

' After all, notwithstanding this attack upon Assye by our 
right and the cavalry, no impression was made upon the 
corps collected there till I made a movement upon it with 
some troops taken from our left, after the enemy's right had 
been defeated, and it would have been as well to have left it 
alone entirely till that movement was made. 

' However, I do not wish to cast any reflection upon the 
officer who led the pickets. I lament the consequences of 
his mistake, but I must acknowledge that it was not possible 
for a man to lead a body into a hotter fire than he did the 
pickets on that day against Assye. 

' After the action there was no pursuit, because our cavalry 
was not then in a state to pursue. It was near dark when 
the action was over, and we passed the night on the field of 
battle. . . . 

' The enemy passed the night of the 23rd at about twelve 
miles from the field of battle, twelve from the Adjuntee 
ghaut, and eight from Bokerdun. As soon as they heard 
that Colonel Stevenson was advancing to the latter place, 
they set off, and never stopped till they had got down the 
ghaut, where they arrived in the course of the night of the 
24th. After his difficulties of the night of the 23rd, Colonel 
Stevenson was in no state to follow them, and did not do so 
until the 26th. The reason for which he was detained till 
that day was that I might have the benefit of the assistance 
of his surgeons to dress my wounded soldiers, many of whom, 
after all, were not dressed for nearly a week, for want of the 
necessary number of medical men. . . .' 

Marching for a Year. 

To Major Kirkpatrick. 

'Camp, 

' February 9, 1804. 

1 My despatch of the 5th will have made you acquainted 
with the destruction of a band of freebooters on that 
day. . . . 



60 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

' I do not propose at present to follow the remains of the 
freebooters towards the Solapoor country. In the first place, 
it has now become a matter of the utmost importance to 
give some rest to the division under my command, who 
have been marching since February, 1803 ; and who, since 
the Battle of Assye, in September, have not halted more 
than one day in any place, excepting during the siege of 
Gawilghur. . . .' 

'The Things called Governments.' 

To Colonel Stevenson. 

' Camp at Adjuntee, 

' October 8, 1803. 

' That plan which, in my opinion, promises the greatest 
and most speedy success, is to carry on offensive operations 
against the enemy's territories ; and it would certainly pro- 
duce a peace if the things called Governments, which depend 
upon us, would do anything for themselves, or were not in a 
state of most deplorable weakness. But it is well known 
that they depend entirely upon us, and yet they thwart us in 
every instance. . . .' 

The Power of the Sword in India. 
To Colonel Murray. 

' Camp at Phoolmurry, 

' October 13, 1803. 

' ... It is necessary that the Political Agents at the 
durbars of the native Princes should be supposed to have a 
considerable degree of power. In this part of the world 
there is no power excepting that of the sword, and it follows 
that if these Political Agents have no authority over the 
military they have no power whatever. 

' The natives would soon find out this state of weakness, 
and the Residents would lose their influence over then- 
councils. It may be argued, if that is the case, the military 
Commanding Officer ought to be the Resident, or Political 
Agent. In answer to this argument, I say that the same 



INDIA 6 1 

reasoning applies to every part of the Executive Government, 
and that, upon this ground, the whole ought to be in the 
hands of the military. In short, the only conclusion to be 
drawn from all reflection and reasoning upon this subject is 
that the British Government in India is a phenomenon, and 
that it will not answer to apply to it, in its present state, 
either the rules which guide other Governments, or the 
reasoning upon which these rules are founded. . . .' 

To Major Shawe. 

1 Camp, 

' February 26, 1804. 

' . . . Bengal, " the paradise of nations," enjoys the advan- 
tage of a civil government, and requires its military force only 
for its protection against foreign enemies. All the other 
barbarous establishments called Governments, without ex- 
cepting even that of Fort St. George, have no power beyond 
that of the sword. Take from them the exercise of that 
power, and they have no other, and can collect no revenue, 
can give no protection, and can exercise no government. 
The native Governments — I mean those of the Nizam and the 
Peshwah — are fifty times worse than ours in this respect. 
They do not choose to keep armies themselves ; their terri- 
tories are overrun by a race of armed men, who are ready to 
enlist with anybody who will lead them to plunder ; and there 
is no power in the country to support the Government and 
give protection to the industrious classes of the inhabitants, 
excepting the British troops. . . .' 

To Lieutenant-General Stuart. 

'July 3, 1804. 

1 ... In respect to the general question of a military 
establishment, it has always appeared to me that Govern- 
ment has made an erroneous calculation of the value 
of their conquests, as those were to tend to the decrease of 
the military establishments and their expense. They have 
adverted only to the fact that, by the success of their arms, 
they have diminished the number of their external enemies ; 



62 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 



and they have imagined that, in proportion as they have 
become secure abroad, they ought to have the means of 
reducing their armies at home. This appears to be particu- 
larly the error of the Court of Directors. 

' They have not adverted to the fact that all government 
in India, excepting, perhaps, that in Bengal, is held by the 
sword ; that, in order to carry on their foreign wars, they 
have been obliged to weaken the means of their internal 
government — that is to say, the power of the sword in their 
own provinces, by which, till this last war, they have invari- 
ably suffered ; and that the conclusion of the most successful 
foreign war in India, that by which the most formidable 
enemy may have been subdued, if it gives an accession of 
territory, must bring with the territory a necessity to increase 
the army ; because the government must be established in 
the new territory, and supported, as well as in the old, by 
the power of the sword. The want of knowledge, or, rather, 
of recollection, of these facts, is the cause of all the com- 
plaints of high military establishments and expenses, and of 
all the difficulties in which you must have found yourself 
from the want of troops. . . . 

' Still, however, the sword is the main support of the 
Government, and it is necessary now to provide a military 
establishment adequate to defend the Peninsula against a 
foreign European enemy, and to preserve the internal 
tranquillity. . . .' 

Attacking Forts. 

To Major Shawe. 

' Camp at Phoolmurry, 

' October 14, 1803. 

'. . . I think that General Lake's capture of Allyghur is 
one of the most extraordinary feats that I have heard of 
in this country. I never attacked a fort that I did not 
attempt the same thing, viz., to blow open the gates, but 
I have never succeeded. I have always taken them by 
escalade, which appears to have been impossible in this 
instance. . , .' 



INDIA 63 



Trouble with the Rupee. 

To Major Kirkpatrick. 

'Camp-at Phoolmurry, 

' October 14, 1803. 

' In addition to the other difficulties I experience in this 
country upon the subject on which I have troubled you 
at different times, the people attached to my camp ex- 
perience one of considerable magnitude in taking gold coins 
in the Soubah's country. The people are willing to take 
them, but at a very depreciated rate of exchange — in some 
instances at the rate of one half, at others of two-thirds of 
their value, and of that rate under which I am under the 
necessity of issuing them to the troops. 

' The consequence is, that the price of every article is much 
increased, and in many instances the dealers have returned 
without loads, rather than submit to this extortion of 
the inhabitants, and thereby a distress is occasioned in 
camp. 

' It is not possible to avoid the issue of these gold coins to 
the troops. Very lately General Stuart sent to Colonel 
Stevenson and me six lacs of pagodas in gold coins of 
different descriptions, and I really believe that at this 
moment there is not a rupee in the camp of either. 

' Under these circumstances I shall be much obliged to 
you if you will request the Soubah's Ministers to issue 
proclamations as soon as possible, requiring the people of 
the country to receive these gold coins in payment of articles 
required for the camp of the British troops, and holding 
forth engagements that those coins will be received in pay- 
ment of the revenue at the same rates of exchange. . . .' 



64 WELLING TON ' 5 DESPA TCHES 

Heart-breaking State of the 65TH.* 

To Colonel Murray. 

'Camp, 

' October 15, 1803. 

'. . . It is heart-breaking to see the state of the 65th. 
I foretold to Mr. Duncan the consequence of sending that 
corps to Surat at that season, and afterwards putting them 
in the field without any means necessary to secure even 
their existence, much less their comfort, during a mon- 
soon. . . .' 

To Major Malcolm. 

' Camp, 

' October 15, 1803. 

'. . . I have received from Colonel Murray a sad account 
of the state of the troops in Guzerat. The 65th Regiment, 
which arrived in India about six months ago, 400 strong, 
has now only 280 in the field ; and the 86th about 500 ; the 
native corps none more than that number, and some only 
200. I foretold to Mr. Duncan the consequence of putting 
the 65th Regiment in the field during the monsoon, without 
any one comfort necessary to their existence. However, 
there was some reason for not employing Colonel Watson ; 
and the 75th, the seasoned corps, was kept in garrison, and 
the 65th, the new corps, sent to the field, and we now feel 
the consequences.' 

Excessive Guards. 

'But Colonel Murray has mentioned another circumstance 
to me which certainly requires a remedy, but to which 
nobody can attempt to apply one, except Mr. Duncan him- 
self. The Rajah, the Minister, and the Resident at Baroda, 
have guards so exceedingly strong as to run away with the 
whole garrison. There is, besides, only a gate guard of 

* Now the 1st Battalion the York and Lancaster Regiment. The 65th 
had only reached India from the Cape of Good Hope in the previous 
May. Many of the soldiers were 'parish-boys' from Scottish poor- 
houses, who had been originally enlisted for life service. — W. W. 



INDIA 65 

sixty men, and, in consequence of the number on duty, the 
men now on those guards will not be relieved at all until 
Colonel Murray quits the field. This is notoriously ruinous 
to discipline, and must in the end operate to the prejudice of 
those very persons for whose safety these strong guards have 
been established. 

' It would be much better to find out the number of 
sentries each party required, and give him a guard in pro- 
portion to that number — viz., three men for every post, and 
to have those men relieved daily, if possible, by the garri- 
son ; if not possible, then weekly. 

' Another circumstance mentioned to me by Colonel 
Murray is, that the Rajah, the Minister, and the Resident, 
have more than half of their guards running after them 
on foot when they go out, whether in a palanquin or on 
horseback. It is very obvious that the consequence of this 
is, that all respect for troops used in this manner must 
be at an end ; and that those troops must lose all respect for 
themselves. It is therefore very desirable that this practice, 
which does not prevail elsewhere, should be stopped at 
Baroda. . . .' 

The Gallows for Thieves. 

To Lieutenant-Colonel Close. 

'Camp at Ferdapoor, 

' October 21, 1803. 

'. . . The Peshwah is too bad : it is really discreditable 
for the British Government to have anything to say to him. 
There is no going on unless thieves are punished, whoever 
they may be, or by whomsoever they may be employed. 
These thieves at Ahmednuggur were plundering in our 
districts, and I shall send orders that they may be 
hanged. . . .' 

To Lieutenant-Colonel Close. 

'Camp at Pamlood, 

' October 26, 1803. 

1 In my opinion, Purneah's thieves ought to be hanged. 
There is no other way of putting a stop to these robberies ; 

5 



66 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

and I am not quite certain that it would not be best to send 
six to be hanged at Sungoly, two at Goorgerry, and two 
at the post on the Kistna, and the remainder at Hurry- 
hur. If you agree in opinion on this subject, I will give 
orders that the thieves may be escorted and executed 
accordingly. . . .' 

Capture of Asseerghur. 

To the Governor-General. 

'Camp, 

' November 6, 1 803. 

' I now proceed to give your Excellency a detailed account 
of Colonel Stevenson's operations against Asseerghur. 

' On October 16 he advanced to Asseerghur, and encamped 
three miles south of the fort. The remains of the enemy's 
infantry had fled towards the Nerbudda on the preceding 
day, in the state in which I reported them to be in my letter 
of October 24 ; and Colonel Stevenson therefore determined 
to attack Asseerghur. 

' On the 18th he reconnoitred the fort, attended by a 
squadron of cavalry and the pickets of the Native Infantry, 
and, having seen a favourite opportunity, attacked the pettah 
and carried it, and made a lodgment within 150 yards of 
the lower wall of the fort. In the evening he reinforced the 
troops in the pettah by a battalion. 

' On the 19th all the preparations were made for carrying 
on the siege, and the two batteries were ready to open 
at two o'clock in the afternoon of the 20th — one to breach 
the upper wall, and another of four brass 12-pounders, to 
destroy the defences of the lower wall. . . . 

' Before opening his batteries, Colonel Stevenson apprised 
the Killadar of the terms on which he should surrender 
the fort, which were, that the garrison should march out 
with their private property, and be allowed to go where 
they might think proper, and that their arrears should be 
paid to the amount of 20,000 rupees. 

' After the batteries had opened about an hour, a white 






INDIA 67 

flag was shown from the walls of the fort, which was the 
signal which had been agreed upon in case the terms should 
be accepted ; hostages were sent down, and an engagement 
made that the fort should be delivered up on the following 
morning. It was accordingly evacuated ; the garrison carried 
off their property in security, and received the sum agreed to 
be paid to them. . . .' 

Needless Correspondence. 
To the Secretary of Government, Bombay. 

' Camp, 

' November 11, 1803. 

'. . . I take the liberty to recommend as a general rule, 
that between those public officers by whom business can 
be done verbally correspondence should be forbidden, as 
having a great tendency to prevent disputes upon trifling 
subjects, and to save the time of the public officers who are 
obliged, some to peruse and consider, and others to copy 
those voluminous documents about nothing. . . .' 

Unfit to Command. 
To Lieutenant-General Stuart. 

' Camp, 

'■November 13, 1803. 

'. . . Lieutenant-Colonel Harness's letter upon the subject 

of Colonel was a public one, which I sent to you in a 

private form, in order that you might do with it what you 

might think proper. Colonel is certainly not a fit 

person to be at the head of a regiment, and so I have 
told him, and I can have no objection to your making use 
of my sentiments on this subject, in any manner that you 
may think proper. . . .' 



5—2 



68 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 



Rule as to Hostilities. 

To Major Shawe. 

' Camp at Rajoora, 

' November 23, 1803. 

'. . . The rule not to cease from hostilities till peace is 
concluded is a good one in general : and I have adhered to 
it in practice at the siege of Ahmednuggur ; and I have 
ordered an adherence to it in all instances of that kind. 
But in this, I think it is a rule, of which the breach is more 
beneficial than the observance. . . .' 

The Battle of Argaum. 

To the Governor-General. 

'Camp at Parterly, 

' November 30, 1803. 

' I have the honour to inform you that I attacked the 
armies of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar 
yesterday afternoon, on the plains of Argaum in this neigh- 
bourhood, with the divisions of the army under my immediate 
command, and the subsidiary force serving with the Soubah 
of the Deccan, under Colonel Stevenson, and completely 
defeated the enemy, having taken from them their cannon, 
ammunition, etc., and destroyed vast numbers of them. 

' I have reason to believe that the loss which I have sus- 
tained upon this occasion has not been great. No officer has 
been killed, and but few wounded. . . .' 

In a letter to the Hon. H. Wellesley, dated January 24, 
1804, Wellesley said : 

' . . . Colonel Stevenson and I joined November 29, 
at Parterly, about seventeen miles north of the Poorna 
River, and I attacked the enemy that afternoon on the 
plains of Argaum, about six miles from that village, and 
gained a complete victory with but small loss on our side, 
having taken from them all their cannon, ammunition, 
etc., numbers of elephants, camels, quantities of baggage, 
etc. From unavoidable circumstances, we did not begin 



INDIA 69 

the action till late in the day, and not more than twenty 
minutes' sun remained when I led on the British cavalry 
to the charge. But they made up for it by continuing the 
pursuit by moonlight ; and all the troops were under arms 
till a very late hour in the night. . . .' 

'Return of the Killed, and Wounded of the Division of the Army 
under Major-General the Hon. A. Wellesley, and of the 
Troops composing the Subsidiary Force. 

Europeans. 

H.M.'s 19th Lt. Dragoons 
The Hon. Company's Artillery 
H.M.'s 74th Regt. 
H.M.'s 78th Regt. 
H.M.'s 94th Regt. 



Cap. Sub. Drum. R. & F. 

Killed — — — 15 

Wounded 3 6 6 145 



Natives. 

Non-commissioned Officers 
and Privates. 

Killed 31 

Wounded - 148 

Missing 5 

' N.B. — The officers, being British, are included under the head of 

Europeans. 

' R. Barclay, Dep. Adj.-Gcn? 

Depredations by Marhattas. 

To Colonel Murray. 

' Camp, 

' December 2, 1803. 

' . . . I am concerned to observe the state of your 
Marhatta cavalry, and the trouble they give you by plunder- 
ing the countty ; there is no remedy for it, but I positively 
forbid it. 

' I recommend to you to have a conference upon this point 
with the Chief of the Guickwar troops, to tell him that this 
practice must be stopped, and that you are determined to 
punish, with the utmost severity, any that might be guilty 
of it. 

• If my Marhatta allies did not know that I should hang 
anyone that might be found plundering, not only I should 
have starved long ago, but most probably my own coat would 
have been taken off my back. . . .' 



7 o WELLINGTON'S DESPA TCHES 



To Major Malcolm. 

' Camp, 

i Ju?ie 20, 1803. 

' . . . The more I see of the Marhattas, the more con- 
vinced I am that they never could have any alliance with 
the French. The French, on their arrival, would want 
equipments, which would cost money, or money to procure 
them ; and there is not a Marhatta in the whole country, 
from the Peshwah down to the lowest horseman, who 
has a shilling, or who would not require assistance from 
them. . . .' 

Riotous Behaviour of Officers. 

To the Secretary of Government, Bombay. 

' Camp at Ellichpoor, 

'•December 5, 1803. 

' I have had the honour of receiving your letter of 
November 23, upon the subject of the conduct of the military 
at Surat. When the residence of officers who have been 
accused of improper and riotous behaviour has been de- 
scribed, names have in some instances been stated, and in 
all a description of their persons, and of their mode of con- 
veyance, has been given, it is scarcely to be credited that 
the Commanding Officer had it not in his power to discover 
those who were accused. At all events, measures might, and 
ought to have been adopted by the Commanding Officer to 
put an end to these disgraceful proceedings, which it appears 
he entirely neglected. 

' Under these circumstances, I take the liberty of re- 
commending, first, that the Commanding Officer of Surat may 
be removed from his situation ; and, secondly, that orders 
may be given to the civil magistrate to seize, and send to 
Bombay for trial in the court of the Recorder, any officer 
who may hereafter be accused of rioting in the streets or city 
of Surat. Of course, the civil magistrate must do everything 
in his power that the person of the officer of whom complaint 



INDIA 71 

may be made may be ascertained, and his name known ; and 
in this respect I have to observe that the civil magistrate 
does not appear to me to have done everything that he could 
do. . . .' 

Unhealthiness of Troops. 

To Captain Armstrong. 

'Camp before Gawilghitr, 
'■December 11, 1803. 

' I have had the honour to receive your letter of 
November 14, conveying the orders of His Excellency the 
Governor-General, that I should order one of the European 
regiments in Guzerat to be sent to Fort William. 

' From the different letters which I have lately addressed 
to him, His Excellency will have observed that the troops in 
that part of India are very unhealthy. There are in Guzerat 
three complete regiments of Europeans, besides detachments, 
which in numbers of companies ought to amount to a fourth ; 
but Colonel Murray has been obliged to draw from the 
garrisons, and from Surat, the troops thought necessary 
and allotted for their defence, in order to reinforce his 
corps in the field. The 65th Regiment, which arrived at 
Bombay 900 strong in May last, has not now 100 men 
for duty ; and the 75th Regiment* is nearly in the same 
state. 

1 Under these circumstances, it does not appear to me that 
it will be practicable to withdraw a regiment of Europeans 
from Guzerat, without exposing to risk all the British in- 
terests in that quarter. 

' The actions in which the troops of this army have been 
engaged, and the general severity of the service, have weak- 
ened the corps to such a degree that none of them would be 
a great acquisition to the army under the Commander-in- 
Chief, or to the garrison of Fort William, even if it was 
practicable to detach a regiment through Berar in either 
direction. But that appears to be impossible, on account of 

* Now the 1st Battalion the Gordon Highlanders. — W. W. 



72 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

the great distance, the natural difficulties of the country 
through which the troops would have to pass, and the savage 
ferocity of the inhabitants. . . .' 

Siege and Storm of Gawilghur. 
To the Governor -General. 

'Camp at Deogaum, 

' December 15, 1803. 

' After the Battle of Argaum, I determined to lose no 
time in commencing the siege of Gawilghur. I accord- 
ingly marched on, and arrived at Ellichpoor on the 5th 
instant, with both divisions, and halted there the 6th, in 
order to establish a hospital for the wounded in the Battle 
of Argaum. 

' The fort of Gawilghur is situated in a range of mountains 
between the sources of the rivers Poorna and Taptee. It 
stands on a lofty mountain in this range, and consists of one 
complete inner fort, which fronts to the south, where the 
rock is most steep, and an outer fort, which covers the inner 
to the north-west and north. This outer fort has a third 
wall, which covers the approach to it from the north by the 
village of Labada. All these walls are strongly built, and 
fortified by ramparts and towers. 

' The communications with the fort are through three 
gates, one to the south with the inner fort, one to the north- 
west with the outer fort, and one to the north with the third 
wall. The ascent to the first is very long and steep, and is 
practicable only for men ; that to the second is by a road 
used for the common communications of the garrison with 
the countries to the southward ; but the road passes round 
the west side of the fort, and is exposed for a great distance 
to its fire ; it is so narrow as to make it impracticable to 
approach regularly by it, and the rock is scarped on each 
side. This road also leads no farther than to the gate. The 
communication with the northern gate is direct from the 
village of Labada, and here the ground is level with that of 
the fort ; but the road to Labada leads through the moun- 



INDIA 73 

tains for about thirty miles from Ellichpoor, and it was 
obvious that the difficulty and labour of moving ordnance 
and stores to Labada would be very great. 

' However, after making inquiry at Ellichpoor, it appeared 
both to Colonel Stevenson and me that this point of attack 
was, upon the whole, the most advantageous, and we accord- 
ingly adopted it. 

1 Colonel Stevenson had equipped his corps at Asseerghur 
for the siege of Gawilghur, for which service it had long 
been destined, and I therefore determined that he should 
make the principal attack by Labada, while I should cover 
his operations with my own division and all the cavalry, and, 
if possible, assist them by other attacks to the southward and 
westward. 

' On the 6th instant the ist Battalion of the 2nd Regiment, 
under Lieutenant-Colonel Chalmers, and two companies of the 
Q4th, and the ist Battalion of the 6th, under Captain Mait- 
land, were detached ; the former to drive in the enemy from 
the ground which they occupied to the southward of the fort, 
and the latter to seize the fortified village of Damergaum, 
which covers the entrance of the mountains by the road by 
which Colonel Stevenson was to pass towards Labada, and 
to protect the parties sent forward to reconnoitre and repair 
the roads in the mountains. Both these detachments 
succeeded.' 

Excessive Work for Troops. 

'On the 7th, both divisions marched from Ellichpoor, 
Colonel Stevenson into the mountains by Damergaum, and 
my division towards the southern face of the fort of Gawil- 
ghur. From that day to the 12th, on which Colonel Steven- 
son broke ground near Labada, the troops in his division 
went through a series of laborious services, such as I never 
before witnessed, with the utmost cheerfulness and per- 
severance. The heavy ordnance and stores were dragged by 
hand over mountains and through ravines for nearly the 
whole distance, by roads which it had been previously neces- 
sary for the troops to make for themselves. 



74 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

' On the 12th, at night, Colonel Stevenson erected two 
batteries in front of the north face of the fort, one consisting 
of two iron 18-pounders, and three iron 12-pounders, to breach 
the outer fort and third wall, and one consisting of two brass 
12-pounders and two 5-inch howitzers, to clear and destroy 
the defences on the point of attack. 

' On the same night the troops of my division constructed 
a battery for two iron and two brass 12-pounders on the 
mountain under the southern gate, with a view, if possible, 
to breach the wall near that gate — or, at all events, to draw 
the enemy's attention to that quarter. Unfortunately, the 
iron guns could not be moved into the battery, notwith- 
standing the utmost exertions of the troops ; and the fire of 
the brass guns produced but little effect. 

' The fire of all these batteries opened on the 13th, in the 
morning ; and on the 14th, at night, the breaches in the walls 
of the outer fort were practicable. All the arrangements 
were then made for storming on this day. Lieutenant- 
Colonel Kenny, of the nth Regiment, commanded the party 
for the storm, consisting of the flank companies of the 94th 
Regiment, and of the native corps in Colonel Stevenson's 
division, supported by the 94th Regiment, and Lieutenant- 
Colonel Halyburton's brigade, with Colonel Maclean's 
brigade in reserve. At the same hour I made two attacks 
from the southward to draw the enemy's attention to that 
quarter. One under Lieutenant-Colonel Wallace, consist- 
ing of the 74th Regiment, five companies of the 78th and 1st 
Battalion of the 8th Regiment, on the southern gate ; and one 
under Lieutenant-Colonel Chalmers, consisting of five com- 
panies of the 78th and 1st Battalion of the 10th Regiment, 
on the north-west gate. These last attacks could be of no 
service, except to draw the enemy's attention from that from 
the north ; unless they should succeed in blowing open the 
gates ; and till they should communicate with detachments 
from Colonel Stevenson's corps, as they had no other means 
of entering the fort. All the troops advanced at about ten 
in the morning. The detachment under Lieutenant-Colonel 
Chalmers arrived at the north-west gate at the moment when 



INDIA 75 

the enemy were endeavouring to escape through it, from the 
detachment of Colonel Stevenson's corps, which had been 
sent to communicate with Colonel Chalmers ; and he entered 
without difficulty. 

' The wall of the inner fort, in which no breach had been 
made, was then to be carried. After some attempts upon 
the gate of communication between the inner and outer fort, 
a place was found at which it was possible to escalade the 
wall. Captain Campbell, with the light infantry of the 94th 
Regiment, fixed the ladders against this place, escaladed the 
wall, opened the gate for the storming party, and the fort 
was shortly in our possession. 

' The enemy's garrison was numerous. It consisted of 
Rajpoots, and of a great part of Beny Sing's regular infan- 
try, which had escaped from the Battle of Argaum, com- 
manded by Beny Sing himself. They were all well armed 
with the Company's new muskets and bayonets. Vast 
numbers of them were killed, particularly at the different 
gates. 

' This service has been performed, I hope, with small 
loss on our side. No officer has been killed ; and but few 
wounded, that I have heard of, excepting Lieutenant- Colonel 
Kenny of the nth Regiment, and Lieutenant Young of the 
2nd of the 7th. 

' In the performance of this service all the good qualities 
of British troops have been conspicuous to a degree which I 
have seldom witnessed. In bringing on their ordnance and 
stores to the point of attack, the troops of Colonel Steven- 
son's division performed the most laborious work with a 
zeal for the service, and patience and perseverance, never 
surpassed ; and when opposed to the enemy, their conduct 
showed the same gallant spirit that has carried the British 
troops through so many difficulties in the course of this 
war. . . .' 



76 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 



To the Governor -General. 

'Camp at Ellichpoor, 

' December 18, 1803. 

' I have the honour to enclose a return of the killed and 
wounded at the siege, and in the storm of Gawilghur.* 
Lieutenant Young died after I addressed your Excellency on 
the 15th. . . .' 

Transportation for Life. 

To Lieutenant-General Stuart. 

' Camp above the Badowly Ghaut, 
i January 11, 1804. 

' I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your 
letter of November 30, on the subject of the trial of private 
William Clarke, of His Majesty's 74th Regiment. The 
reason for which I omitted to apply to you in favour of that 
soldier, at the time the proceedings on his trial were trans- 
mitted to be laid before you was, that Lieutenant-Colonel 
Wallace did not recommend him ; and when I pressed him 
to recommend him, he told me that if he had not been 
tried by a general court-martial for murder, he must have 
been tried by a regimental court-martial for theft. How- 
ever, I think it very desirable to avoid punishing with death 
a man belonging to the 74th Regiment ; and therefore 
I propose to offer to the man to commute his punishment 
to transportation for life to Botany Bay. By this mode the 

Europeans. 

* Artillery "} 

H.M.'S 74th Regt. I Kjlled L ^-C°l- Captains. Lieuts. R. ft F. 

H.M's 78th Regt. I wounded 1 — 1 59 

H.M.'s 94th Regt. J Dy 

Natives. 

Non-commissioned Officers 
and Privates. 

Killed - 8 

Wounded - - - - - - - - - 5 1 

N.13. — The officers of the Native Infantry, being British, are included 
under the head of Europeans. 

R. Barclay, Dep. Adj.-Cen., Mysore. 



INDIA 77 

punishment of death will be avoided, and the 74th Regiment 
will get rid of a bad soldier, of which Colonel Wallace is 
very desirious. . . .' 



Avarice in the Deccan. 

To Major Kirkpatrick. 

' Camp at Warroor, 

'January 16, 1804. 

'. . . The increasing disturbances in all parts of the terri- 
tory of the Soubah of the Deccan are a most serious incon- 
venience, and urgently require a most effectual remedy. 
I am on my march to the southward, and propose to give a 
check to those on the western frontier ; but the whole of the 
army, if scattered and employed in the pursuit of the various 
troops of banditti which infest His Highness's territories, 
would not be able to restore peace for years, without the 
exertion of His Highness's Government. 

' The evil is to be traced to avarice. The Government, or 
rather the mutaseddees of the Government, found that they 
could depend upon the protection of the British troops, and 
they discharged their own. 

' The British troops are employed in an external war ; and 
the consequence is, that His Highness has no troops to sup- 
port his Government and authority, and any other support 
but that of armed men will not answer. 

' This discharge of their own troops has contributed to 
these disturbances in two modes : first, the Government has 
no power to support itself — and this is well known through- 
out the country ; secondly, the people discharged have no 
means of gaining a subsistence, and they are obliged to 
plunder to support life. . . .' 

British Power in India. 

' The British Government has been left by the late war 
in a most glorious situation. They are the sovereigns of a 



78 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 



great part of India, the protectors of the principal powers, 
and the mediators, by treaty, of the disputes of all. 

' The sovereignty they possess is greater, and their power 
is settled upon more permanent foundations, than any before 
known in India : all it wants is the popularity, which from 
the nature of the institutions and the justice of the proceed- 
ings of the Government it is likely to obtain, and which 
it must obtain, after a short period of tranquillity shall have 
given the people time and opportunity to feel the happiness 
and security which they enjoy.' 

Surgeons' Claims. 

To the Secretary of Government, Bombay. 

' Camp, 

1 January 21, 1804. 

' I have had the honour of receiving your letter of the 
12th instant, upon the subject of the claim of the medical 
gentlemen serving in Guzerat to an additional allowance. 

' This subject is one entirely referable to the Bombay 
regulations, upon which I must beg leave to decline 
giving any opinion, excepting that, of all the liberal estab- 
lishments of the Honourable Company, that of the medical 
department is the most so. 

' The custom on the Madras establishment is for a soldier 
to pay the surgeon 3! fanams per diem, when he is in 
hospital, either general or regimental, for his diet. The 
Honourable Company incur no expense whatever on account 
of hospitals for European troops, excepting European 
medicines, and the allowance which they give for attend- 
ance, country medicines, etc., to the surgeons of European 
regiments.' 

An Undignified Durbar. 

In a letter to the Marquis Wellesley, dated January 21, 
1804, the Duke related the following story : 

' Malcolm writes from Scindiah's camp, that at the first 
meeting Scindiah received him with great gravity, which 



INDIA 79 

he had intended to preserve throughout the visit. It rained 
violently; and an officer of the escort, Mr. Pepper, an Irish- 
man (a nephew of old Bective's, by-the-by), sat under a flat 
part of the tent which received a great part of the rain 
that fell. At length it burst through the tent upon the head 
of Mr. Pepper, who was concealed by the torrent that fell, 
and was discovered after some time by an " Oh, Jasus /" and 
a hideous yell. Scindiah laughed violently, as did all the 
others present ; and the gravity and dignity of the durbar 
degenerated into a Malcolm riot — after which they all parted 
upon the best terms.' 

Division of Prize-Money. 
memorandum. 

' i. I recommend that the property captured may be 
divided, by order from the Governor-General, according 
to the plan contained in the annexed paper. . . . 

' 2. I have not allowed the election of any pri;:e agents ; 
I have appointed five officers to take charge of the property, 
and dispose of it on account of Government, to whom I 
should wish the commission to be given. Of course I 
appointed those officers to take charge whom the officers 
of the army would have elected to be agents, if an election 
had been allowed. 

' 3. I am desirous that the Governor-General should order 
the distribution of the prize according to this plan, without 
the intervention of any committee, the assembly of which 
must be attended with delay at all events, and incon- 
veniences, as it is probable that before the committee could 
assemble the corps who have served in the war will have 
separated. 

' 4. It appears to be the Commander-in-Chief's wish that 
the corps only which were actually engaged in particular 
service should enjoy the benefit resulting from it, and I 
am entirely of the same opinion. Accordingly — 

' (i.) I recommend that those officers and corps who were 
present with my division, or the subsidiary force, when the 



WELLINGTON'S DBS PA TCIIES 



former were at the siege of Ahmednuggur, including a 
detachment employed at Toka, under Captain Campbell 
of the 84th Regiment, or at the Battle of Assye, or with 
the subsidiary force employed at Asseerghur, or with either 
at the Battle of Argaum or siege of Gawilghur, shall share 
in all the property captured. 

' (ii.) The troops in Captain Baynes' affair with the 
enemy at Umber, on October 31, and those engaged at 
Korget Coraygaum, on September 27, under Captain 
O'Donnell, to share in all the property captured during 
the war. 

' (N.B. — This arrangement excludes the troops stationed 
at Poonah and Hyderabad, who have incurred no expense, 
and had nothing to do with the service ; and includes every- 
body who had.) 

' 5. In respect to the shares and persons, I recommend 
the following deviations from the plan approved of by the 
Commander-in-Chief : 

' (i.) That Colonel Stevenson, in consideration of there 
being no Major-General with the army, should have 1,000 
shares instead of 600. 

1 (N.B. — When I was in his situation, in the war against 
Tippoo, I received only 600.) 

' (ii.) I recommend that the Governor-General should 
order that, in consideration of the favourable reports made of 
the conduct of the officers on the Staff on all occasions, the 
Deputy Adjutant, and the Deputy Quartermaster-Generals 
of Mysore, and of the subsidiary force, and the Staff 
Surgeons attached to each division, may draw Major's prize- 
money, and that Major Malcolm may have Lieutenant- 
Colonel's. 

' (N.B. — Sir John Kennaway had Lieutenant-Colonel's 
prize-money at Seringapatam.) 

' 6. I have not included the troops of the allies, because 
nothing that they have taken has been carried to account. 
Elephants, camels, and even jewels, to the amount of several 
lacs of rupees, taken in the Battles of Assye and Argaum, 
and upon other occasions, have been disposed of, and 



INDIA 8 1 

the produce given to them by their own chiefs. In the 
Battle of Argaum they got Vincatjee Bhoonslah's jewels, 
which his Vakeel declared to me were worth six lacs of 
rupees.* 

'Arthur Wellesley.' 

* His Excellency General Lake to Major-General Ware, President of the 
Prize Committee. 

'SIR, 

' In compliance with the wishes of the committee, I have the honour 
to communicate the following as my sentiments on the most just and 
equitable appropriation of prize : 

' i. All corps, officers, and soldiers who were present with the army on 
August 29 and September 4, 1803, are entitled to share in prize taken by 
the army during the war, with the exceptions hereafter mentioned. 

'2. All corps, officers, and soldiers who joined the army between 
September 4 and 11 are entitled to share in prize taken subsequent to 
September 1 1 . 

' 3. Corps, officers, and men who joined and shall join the army subse- 
quent to an action or capture of a place are not entitled to share in prize 
which was the immediate consequence of such action or capture. 

'4. Corps, officers, or soldiers are to be entitled to share in prize made 
subsequent to their junction, with the exceptions alluded to in the fore- 
going articles. 

' 5. No officer who quits the army on leave of absence is entitled to 
share in prize made during his absence, unless his absence shall have 
been occasioned by wounds or ill-health. 

'6. Officers transferred from corps with, or which have been with, the 
army to corps in other situations are not entitled to share in prize taken 
after their quitting the army. 

'These appear to me to be the leading principles upon which the 
division of prize ought to be adjusted. I shall, however, with much 
pleasure take into consideration any suggestions which the committee- 
shall offer. 

' I have the honour to be, etc., 

' Major-General Ware.' ' G. Lake. 

Proceedings of the Prize Committee, assembled agreeably to the General 
Order, October 19, 1803. 

'The committee have resolved that all officers shall share according t» 
their rank, viz. : 

'Major-Generals, Colonels, Lieutenant-Colonels, Majors, Captains, 
Majors of Brigade, Aides-de-Camps, Surgeons, Chaplains, and Field 
Paymasters, Lieutenants, Assistant Surgeons, Cornets, Lieutenant Fire- 

6 



82 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

To the Governor -General. 

'Camp at Jaffierabad, 

'■January 17, 1804. 

' I have the honour to enclose the account of the property 
captured during the war by the troops under my command. 

' The articles sold at different times were howdahs, rich 
cloths, etc., which could not be moved away ; and the 
amount of the sales has been paid into the hands of the 
Paymasters of this division of the army and of the subsidiary 
force. The jewels were taken at Asseerghur, and have not 
been sold ; the plate was taken at Gawilghur, and I propose 

Workers, Ensigns, and Veterinary Surgeons, Quartermasters of Cavalry, 
and Conductors of Ordnance. 

' Europeans. 

Shares. 

The committee resolve that Corporals, Gunners, Drum- 
mers, Trumpeters, and Privates shall receive - - 1 
Sergeants ....... 2 

Sergeant-Majors ...... 4 

Conductors and Quartermasters of Cavalry - 12 

Ensigns - - - - - - "5° 

Lieutenants - - - - - - - 70 

Captains - - - - - - - 120 

Majors ....... 240 

Lieutenant-Colonels- ..... 360 

Colonels ....... 600 

Major-Generals ...... 1,500 

'The Commander-in-Chief one-eighth of the whole, after deducting 
Prize Agents' commission. 

' Prize Agents to receive 5 per cent, commission, paying all incidental 
expenses. 

' Natives. 

'Naiks, 2nd Tindals, Troopers, Sepoys, Golandauze, Drummers, 
Trumpeters, Gun Lascars, Pioneers, Puckallies, and Bheesties receive 
two-thirds of a share. 

'Havildars, 1st Tindals, and Native Doctors, one and one-third of a 
share. 

Shares. 

Jemidars of Cavalry and Infantry and Syrarys of Artillery 3 
Subidars - - - - - - .5 

' Prize to be drawn for all officers and soldiers who may have been 
killed in action.' 



INDIA 



83 



to order that it may be sold immediately ; or, if there should 
be no purchasers for it, I shall have it coined, and lodge the 
money in the hands of the Paymasters. 

' 1 beg leave to recommend that the money resulting from 
the sale of this property may be given to the troops. In the 
course of the campaign I have had frequent opportunities of 
reporting their good conduct to your Excellency; and I have 
likewise to report that their patience under fatigue, and the 
persevering activity with which they performed all the duties 
required from them, were equal to their bravery when 
opposed to the enemy in the field ; and the consequence of 
all those good qualities is that, notwithstanding the distance 
and difficulties attending our communication with the sources 
of our supplies, the great bodies of the enemy's horse, and 
the disaffected and disturbed state of the countries under the 
government of the Company's allies, I am enabled to state 
that, throughout the campaign, we did not lose one convoy, 
nor a particle of the Company's property of any description. 
' The troops composing the division under my immediate 
command were assembled from the most distant parts of 
the country, and have been in the field during two mon- 
soons, that on the Eastern coast in the winter of 1802, and 
that on the Western coast in the course of 1803. These 
circumstances, and the exhausted state of the counties from 
the Kistna to the Taptee, have been the cause of the loss of 
equipments of the officers of the army three or four times in 
one year. Those belonging to the subsidiary force were 
equally unfortunate ; and all must have suffered the greatest 
inconveniences from the great advance of price of all the 
necessaries of life, in the countries which have been the 
seat of the war. 

* Besides this property captured, a contribution amount- 
ing to three lacs and twenty-five thousand rupees was levied 
upon the city of Burhampoor. . . .' 



6—2 



WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 



' Little Dirty Passions.' 
To Lieutenant-Colonel Close. 

' Camp at Paunchore, 

'■January 22, 1804. 

' . • . The war will be eternal if nobody is ever to be 
forgiven, and I certainly think that the British Government 
cannot intend to make the British troops the instruments of 
the Peshwah's revenge. You must decide what is to be 
done with this person. I have ordered him to quit the 
Nizam's territories, and not to come near this army. The 
answer of the Vakeel is natural. It is, " Where is a man to 
go, who is not to be allowed to remain in the territories of 
the Company or of the Company's allies?" When the 
empire of the Company is so great, little dirty passions must 
not be suffered to guide its measures. . . .' 

Animosity should cease with War. 

To Mr. Scott Waring, Residency at Poonah. 

' Bombay, 

'•March 12, 1804. 

' . . . When war is concluded, I am decidedly of opinion 
that all animosity should be forgotten, and that all prisoners 
should be released ; but property carried to account cannot 
be restored. . . .' 

The Character of Marhatta Troops. 
To the Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone, with the Rajah of Berar. 

' Camp, 

1 January 26, 1 804. 

' . . . The Marhattas are but little in the habit of adhering 
to truth ; they are generally indistinct in their account of a 
transaction of the nature of that alluded to, and it rarely 
happens that those accounts are found to agree exactly with 
the state of the facts. . . . The Marhatta troops are but 
little under control, and they withdraw from a country, even 
belonging to their own employers, with great reluctance, as 
long as there is anything in it to be plundered. . . .' 



INDIA 85 

The Evils of Inefficiency. 
To Colonel Murray. 

'Camp, 

' January 26, 1804. 

' . . . I have now only to recommend to your attention 
the discipline of the troops under your command, and a 
determined resistance to everything like an abuse in the 
service which can tend to subtract from the efficiency of 
the corps in the field. I have lately written to Mr. Duncan, 
to propose an alteration in the plans which I submitted to 
him on August 2 last, according to which, if he should adopt 
it, your strength in European troops will be diminished, but 
that of native troops will be increased by two battalions. 
This arrangement is advisable, and, indeed, necessary, for 
many reasons not necessary at present to discuss ; but if 
troops in Guzerat are kept in a proper state of discipline and 
efficiency, I do not apprehend any inconvenience from it. 

' Upon this subject, I have to observe that there is a ten- 
dency in the service in this country to admit abuses beyond 
any other that I have met with. I cannot say whether this 
is to be attributed to former habits and example, or to the 
laxity which must attend all distant establishments. But of 
this I am very certain, that it is the first duty of a command- 
ing officer to resist everything of the kind in a most deter- 
mined manner. The want of discipline among troops is 
very bad, and renders them useless ; but the want of effici- 
ency, which is the result of the application to private 
purposes or profit of the persons paid by the public as 
troops, or as the necessary attendants or equipments of 
these troops, is worse, as it may exist with a certain degree 
and appearance of discipline, and Government may be misled 
by the notion that they have an army, whereas they have 
nothing but paper. 

' The troops under your command are in a distant country, 
and they can come but seldom under the view or inspection 
of the Government ; it is therefore particularly incumbent 



86 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

on you to take care that no practice or custom shall exist 
which may destroy their discipline or lessen their efficiency ; 
and I beg leave to assure you that, without the most con- 
stant vigilance on your part, you will not be able to avert 
these evils.' 

Poverty in India. 

To Major Malcolm. 

' Camp, 

'•January 30, 1 804. 

' . . . I have always thought the Rajah of Kolapoor a 
proper instrument for the French. His country is well 
situated for their designs. He has no money, it is true : but 
nobody has in India ; and the choice of allies for the great 
nation must depend upon local situation, and upon means 
in troops, and goodwill or security towards the British 
Government, and the system of order. . . .' 

Wellington's Greatest March. 

To Lieutenant-General Stuart. 

'Camp at Munkaiseer, Fifteen Miles 
' North-East from Perinda, 
''February 5, 1804. 

' I this morning attacked in this neighbourhood, and de- 
feated and dispersed, a formidable band of freebooters, who 
have been for some time on this frontier. 

' I left my camp on the 3rd, about thirty miles south-east 
from Ahmednuggur, and I arrived by forced marches at 
Sailgaon, near Perinda, on the 4th. I there heard that the 
enemy were at this place, twenty-four miles from me, and 
although I had marched twenty miles that morning, I deter- 
mined to march on in the night. The road was very bad, 
and till one o'clock the night was very dark, and we made 
but little progress. The consequence was that we did not 
arrive till nine in the morning, instead of at daylight. The 
enemy had received intelligence of my approach — I believe 
from my own camp. They had struck their camp and had 



INDIA 87 

begun their march, but were still in sight. I pursued them 
with the cavalry, cut up some, and took all their guns, 
baggage, bazaar, etc., and followed them as long as they 
remained collected. I had with me the cavalry, the 74th 
Regiment, the 1st of the 8th, and 500 men from the other 
regiments. 

'The camp is at Nimgaum, where I left it on the 3rd. 
The infantry were up with the cavalry when we advanced 
to the attack. The Marhatta and Mysore Horse were very 
active and got much booty. Our loss is trifling. . . .' 

To the Hon. Henry Wellesley. 

1 BOMIiAY, 

'•March 18, 1804. 

I After I had written to you, in January, a letter which I 
believe is still here, I found that the banditti, who I imagined 
had dispersed, were still assembled in a very formidable body 
on the Nizam's frontier, near Perinda. They had beaten 
one of His Highness's armies, and had taken its guns, and 
they were plundering the country in all directions. I there- 
fore determined to destroy them. With this view, I marched 
from the army on February 3, with all the cavalry, the 74th 
Regiment, and two battalions of sepoys. I marched again 
on the 4th twenty-two miles, again on the 4th at night, 
and came upon them on the 5th in the morning, and 
entirely destroyed them, taking from them the guns which 
they had taken from the Nizam, their camp, baggage, 
camels, and all their plunder. This was the greatest exer- 
tion I ever saw troops make in any country.* The infantry 
was in the attack, although we marched sixty miles between 
the morning of the 4th and twelve o'clock at noon of the 5th 
of February ; and yet I halted from noon till eight at night 
of the 4th. 

I I afterwards pursued them, and run them down to the 
neighbourhood of Beejapoor and the Kistna, where they dis- 
persed entirely. . . .' 

* This expedition was often remarked by the Duke of Wellington as 
the greatest march he ever made. 



WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 



Wounded 

Wounded 
Killed - 


Ran 

Jemidar 
I 


k & File. 
2 
Private. 

I 


Horses. 

3 

Horses. 
I 


ditto 


— 


— 


I 



Return of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Troops under 
the Command of Major-General the Hon. A . Wellesley, in 
the Action near Munkaiseer, on February 5, 1804. 

H.M. 19th Lt. Dragoons. 

4th Regt. Native Cavalry. 
5th Regt. ditto 

7th Regt. ditto 

Totals - - 1 3 5 

N.B. — The man and horse returned killed died of fatigue. 

Colin Campbell, Act. Brigade-Major. 

Great Britain's Skeleton Army. 

To Colonel Stevenson. 

1 Camp, 

1 February 11, 1804. 

' . . . Since I wrote to you last I have seen some English 
papers, and perused debates on the subject of the increase of 
the army. 

' When I first wrote to you on the subject of endeavouring 
to get removed to the King's service, I had reason to believe 
that all parties in England had agreed that it was absolutely 
necessary at last that Great Britain should really have an 
army, and not the skeleton of one, as had been the case 
hitherto. I knew that the object of having an army could 
not be accomplished without a very large increase of the 
number of officers, particularly of high rank ; and it ap- 
peared to me that the services of yourself, and others of 
your description, from the service in this country, would be 
desirable. 

' The plan adopted, however, does not by any means go 
upon the scale that I supposed it would. Everybody ap- 
pears to be convinced of the necessity of having an army, but 
nobody appears to be inclined to adopt the measures which 
are necessary for that purpose. The same little temporary 
expedients are adopted that have been before practised, and 
they will equally fail. . . .' 



INDIA 89 

Bravery of Bengal Troops. 

To Lieutenant-General Stuart. 
' Camp, 

' February 14, 1804. 

' . . . Supposing all consequences to be equally convenient, 
I acknowledge that I should wish to see the Bengal troops 
composing all the subsidiary forces. The men are of a better 
size and description, of a higher caste, and the natives have 
more respect for them than they have for the Coast or 
Bombay troops. They have proved in this campaign that 
they yield to none in bravery, and, I believe, are tolerably 
disciplined, and they have been long notorious for their con- 
tempt of their enemies on horseback. But all these circum- 
stances must yield to others of a more pressing nature ; and 
certainly, in a great military arrangement, the facility of 
relief is an important consideration. . . . 

' While writing upon this subject, there is one convenience 
resulting from the employment of the Bengal troops which, 
in a pecuniary point of view, will more than compensate for 
all the additional expense which may attend it. It is that 
they eat the flour of dry grains, whereas the Coast and 
Bombay troops must have rice. This article will always 
cost much money in this country, but flour of all kinds will 
be cheap. . . .' 

Sale of Captured Property. 

To Major Graham. 

1 Camp, 

'February 17, 1804. 

' I have received your letter of the 13th instant. All the 
property taken from the family of Mulwa Dada must be con- 
sidered as captured property, and must not be restored. It 
would be ridiculous to adhere to the terms of a capitulation 
of which he has broken every stipulation. 

' The 1 ,000 rupees for Ram Rao and the peons, respec- 
tively, must be taken from the property captured. 



90 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

1 1 cannot, and have no inclination to, take any article 
myself, and cannot consent that any article should be taken 
by any other person. Everything that is sold must be put up 
to auction, unless the officers to whom the charge of captured 
property has been given should be of opinion that it can be 
sold to advantage by private contract, under a valuation. 
You will observe that this principle applies to the article 
which you proposed to retain, upon the valuation by the 
shroff. . . . 

' I never had any doubt respecting your sharing, with the 
remainder of the army, in the property captured during the 
war.' 

Duty must be First. 

To Major Graham. 

* POONAH, 

' March 2, 1804. 

' I have received your letter of the 1st instant. It is 
necessary for a man who fills a public situation, and who has 
great public interests in charge, to lay aside all private con- 
siderations, whether on his own account or that of other 
persons. I imagine that you must feel on this subject as 
I do. 

' I am very much distressed on account of the incon- 
veniences which your family suffer in your absence from 
Madras, and equally so that it is not in my power to relieve 
their distress by allowing you to quit your situation. But, 
under present circumstances, it is not in my power to grant 
your request to go to Madras, consistently with the duty 
which both you and I owe to the public, as public men. 

' I shall be much obliged to you if you will not urge me 
again upon this subject.' 

Hanging for Plundering. 

To Lieutenant-Colonel Wallace. 

'Bombay, 

' March 27, 1804. 

1 1 received last night your letter of the 23rd. You must 
have no scruple in acting at once for the benefit and safety 



INDIA 91 

of your corps whenever you are fully convinced, from the 
evidence given to the persons appointed to inquire into the 
circumstances of any robbery, that those attached to your 
camp have been plundered or ill-treated. 

1 In this instance I have no doubt but that Carribul and 
Manygee were both guilty of the murder. Accordingly, I 
request that they may be hanged ; and let the cause of their 
punishment be published in the bazaar by beat of tom-tom, 
or in any other mode by which it may be supposed that it 
will be rendered more public. 

' The Patel of Batculgaum, in the usual style of a Marhatta 
Patel, keeps a band of plunderers for his own profit and 
advantage. You will inform him that if he does not pay 
for the horses, bullocks, and articles plundered he shall be 
hanged also. You will make him acquaint his village with 
this determination, and allow time for the answer to return ; 
and you will hang him if he does not pay the money at the 
time fixed upon. 

' It is impossible to get on without these punishments in 
the Marhatta country. The Peshwah has no authority, and 
if he had he would not exert it for the advantage of our 
troops.' 

Short Shrift for Criminals. 

To Colonel Murray. 

'Bombay, 

'■April 1, 1804. 

' . . . The general rule respecting the trial of criminals, 
for offences committed even in camps in the Company's terri- 
tories, is that they should be made over to the Company's 
civil tribunals ; and I understood from Mr. Duncan, that a 
mode of trying criminals has been ordered by the Government 
of Bombay, and that it will be put in execution whenever any 
criminals shall be arrested and sent to the Resident or 
Collector for trial. 

' According to this mode of procedure, the trial and 
punishment of an offender will not be quite so quick as we 
might wish, but it will be certain and regular ; at all events, 



92 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

it is the mode ordered by Government, and must be put into 
execution. 

' However, I think that bheels, and people of that descrip- 
tion, whose profession is plunder, and who come armed into 
the camp for that purpose, ought not to be considered and 
treated as common robbers. They are public enemies and 
rebels against all authority, and I recommend that when one 
of them is caught in the camp, whether it be situated in the 
Company's territories or in those of the Rajah, he may be 
shot by the nearest rear-guard, if he should be taken in the 
act of robbery. If something of this kind be not done, the 
robberies and outrages of the bheels will reduce the troops to 
the greatest distress. 

' If a robbery should be committed in the camp when it 
is situated in the territories of the Guickwar, Mr. Duncan 
and I are both of opinion that the criminal ought to be tried 
and punished according to military process, under the orders 
of the Commanding Officer. The country is the Rajah's, and 
the Company's civil authority has no power within it. The 
Rajah's civil power, to which, according to our notions, the 
trial of criminals ought to belong, has no authority in our 
camps ; it cannot be admitted there, and therefore can have 
no jurisdiction. 

' Accordingly, if a robbery be committed in the camp, 
when situated in the Rajah's territory, the criminal must be 
tried and punished by military process. Of course, this 
power must be used with discretion ; care must be taken 
not to shock the feelings by violent or unusual punishments, 
nor to interfere in any manner with persons employed in 
the collection of the revenue or the administration of the 
government.' 

'The Demon of Ambition.' 

To Major Malcolm. 

' Bombay, 

'April 13, 1804. 

' . . . I said to Goohparah that I was not aware of the 
treaties which had been made by General Lake, and did not 



INDIA 93 

know in what manner Gwalior and Gohud might be affected 
by them ; that therefore I could give no opinion upon the 
subject, excepting that the Governor-General would strictly 
execute the treaty of peace. 

1 . . . I am disgusted beyond measure with the whole 
concern ; and I would give a large sum to have had nothing 
to do with the treaties of peace, and if I could now get rid 
of all anxiety upon the subject. All parties were delighted 
with the peace, but the demon of ambition appears now to 
have pervaded all ; and each endeavours, by forcing construc- 
tions, to gain as much as he can.' 

Troops wanting Clothing. 

To Lieutenant-General Stuart. 

' Bombay, 

' May 7, 1804. 

' . . . I think I shall be able to send the 2nd of the 12th 
to Hullihall in Soonda, so that the clothing of that corps may 
be sent there. As all the corps are in want of clothing, and 
as I saw clearly that they could not receive their clothing 
probably before the end of the rains, and that, whatever 
might be the result of General Lake's negotiations with 
Holkar, the troops could not get into quarters in this season, 
I applied to Mr. Duncan for cloth from the warehouse here, 
and I have sent up as much as will make a comfortable plain 
jacket for each man. These will be made before the rains 
set in. I hope you will approve of this arrangement, as I 
really could not venture to expose the troops to the rains 
without clothing. Some of them have only white jackets ; 
and to every corps in the line clothing is due from the year 
1800. 

' I have given no cloth to the cavalry, as they have cloaks, 
and are not so much exposed to the weather as the infantry. 
The 74th Regiment have their new clothing, and the 78th 
Regiment are tolerably well off ; and their new clothing is 
making up : so that, upon the whole, I hope that we shall 
do. . . .' 



94 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

To Captain Wilks. 

'Camp at Panowullah, 
' May 30, 1 804. 

' . . . I have clothed, as well as armed and equipped, the 
whole army. They are in high order and in good spirits, and, 
please God, when the rain shall set in I shall commence my 
operations. The rain may do some injury to my cattle, but 
there will be no water in the country for the army till the 
rain shall supply it.' 

Closing People's Mouths. 

To Major Malcolm. 

' Camp at Panowullah, 
1 May 22, 1804. 

' I return Shawe's letter, which has annoyed me as much 
as it can have annoyed you. That plan of abusing and 
bullying the Marhattas will never answer, even supposing it 
should be possible to prevail upon any gentleman to conduct 
the public business in that manner. The fact is, that till 
lately the Governor-General has never read real statements 
of conversations ; and he is exceedingly offended with the 
freedom with which the natives canvass all public subjects, 
and which has now for the first time been brought before 
him. The only remedy is to state to him results of arguments 
instead of their details ; for I must be of opinion with Arsito 
Jah, that " it is not possible to close people's mouths as the 
gates of the city are closed." . . .' 

A Desperate Game. 

To Colonel Murray. 

'Camp at Chinchore, 
'■June 15, 1804. 

' . . . I have long considered our game, as it affected our 
situation at Bombay, to be very desperate ; and particularly 
as we know that the French are strong in European India, 
and their squadron, when joined with that of the Dutch, not 



INDIA 95 

inferior to our own, we ought to beware to weaken that 
settlement too much. 

' The allied troops generally plunder for themselves, and 
carry nothing to account. We carry everything to the 
public account, and Government gives or4er for the disposal 
of the captured property ; and, in consideration of a variety 
of circumstances in the late war affecting the allies as well 
as ourselves, the Governor-General did not order that any- 
thing should be given to the allies. However, this depends 
entirely upon Government. 

' The plan which you must pursue is, to have an account 
taken of every article of property captured, and a valuation 
made. You must report on the subject, and the Govern- 
ment will order the disposal of the property. This is the 
mode in which I have proceeded. . . . 

' I have been obliged to relinquish all hopes of marching 
for some time ; the country is entirely destroyed, and I do 
not think a company would find subsistence in it, much less 
an army.' 

Suppressing Licentiousness. 

To Lieutenant-Colonel Wallace. 

'Camp at Poonah, 

'■June 24, 1804. 

' . . . I cannot close my letter without earnestly recom- 
mending to you the strictest attention to the discipline of the 
troops, and to keep them and their followers in order. In 
this distant station, as the troops can but seldom come under 
the eye of the superior officers of the army, it will require the 
most constant and regular attention to preserve their discip- 
line and order ; and it is certain that in no part of India 
will those qualities be required in a greater degree than in 
the detachment serving with His Highness the Peshwah. 

' The licentiousness of the followers of the troops, par- 
ticularly when those troops have been successful, is an evil 
of the greatest magnitude and of quick growth. I therefore 
anxiously recommend the conduct of these people to your 
attention, and that you should suppress at once, by decided 



96 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

measures, any attempts which they may make to depart from 
the rules of good order, and to shake off the restraint under 
which they have been hitherto held. 

' I also recommend to your attention the state of all the 
public establishments, and the establishments kept by Com- 
manding Officers of corps, for the carriage of the camp equi- 
page and stores. There is a tendency in the service, par- 
ticularly when troops are employed at a distance, to admit 
abuse, which, if not checked in time, must be attended in 
every instance by the most inconvenient consequences, and 
which can be checked only by a constant attention on the 
part of the Commanding Officer.' 

Silence on Public Matters. 

To Lieutenant-Colonel Wallace. 

' Camp at Niggkree, 

l June 28, 1804. 

1 . . . I believe that in my public despatches I have alluded 
to every point to which I should wish to draw your atten- 
tion, excepting one, which I will mention to you — that is, 
the secrecy of all your proceedings. 

1 There is nothing more certain than that, of one hundred 
affairs, ninety-nine might be posted up at the market-cross, 
without injury to the public interests ; but the misfortune is 
that, where the public business is the subject of general con- 
versation, and is not kept secret, as a matter of course, upon 
every occasion, it is very difficult to keep it secret upon that 
occasion on which it is necessary. There is an awkwardness 
in a secret which enables discerning men (of which descrip- 
tion there are always plenty in an army) invariably to find it 
out ; and it may be depended upon that, whenever the public 
business ought to be kept secret, it always suffers when it is 
exposed to public view. 

' For this reason secrecy is always best, and those who 
have been long trusted with the conduct of public affairs are 
in the habit of never making public business of any descrip- 
tion that it is not necessary that the public should know. 



INDIA 97 

The consequence is that secrecy becomes natural to them, 
and as much a habit as it is to others to talk of public 
matters ; and they have it in their power to keep things 
secret or not, as they may think proper. 

' I mention this subject to you because, in fact, I have 
been the means of throwing the public affairs into your 
hands, and I am anxious that you should conduct them 
as you ought. This is a matter which would never occur 
to you, but it is essentially necessary. 

' Remember that what I recommend to you is far removed 
from mystery ; in fact, I recommend silence upon the public 
business upon all occasions, in order to avoid the necessity 
of mystery upon any.' 

Lessons from the Campaign. 

To Lieutenant-Colonel Wallace. 

' Fort William, 

'■September 12, 1804. 

1 . . . We have some important lessons from this 
campaign. 

' First : we should never employ a corps on a service for 
which it is not fully equal. 

' Secondly : against the Marhattas in particular, but against 
all enemies, we should take care to be sure of plenty of pro- 
visions. 

1 Thirdly : experience has shown us that British troops 
can never depend upon Rajahs, or any allies, for their 
supplies. Our own officers must purchase them ; and if we 
should employ a native in such an important service, we 
ought to see the supplies before we venture to expose our 
troops in the situation in which they may want them. 

' Fourthly : when we have a fort which can support our 
operations, such as Rampoora to the northward ; or Ahmed- 
nuggur, or Chandore, in your quarter, we should immediately 
adopt effectual measures to fill it with provisions and stores, 
in case of need. 

' Fifthly : when we cross a river likely to be full in the 

7 



98 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

rains, we ought to have a post and boats upon it ; as I have 
upon all the rivers south of Poonah, and as you have, I hope, 
upon the Beemah and the Godavery. 

' In respect to the operations of a corps in the situation of 
Monson's, they must be decided and quick ; and in all 
retreats it must be recollected that they are safe and easy, 
in proportion to the number of attacks made by the retreat- 
ing corps. But attention to the foregoing observations will, 
I hope, prevent a British corps from retreating. 

' These misfortunes in Hindustan will, I fear, take me back 
to the Deccan. Indeed, I shall leave this immediately, and 
orders have been already given that cavalry may be prepared 
to reinforce the troops with you. 

' P.S. — Of course I mean this letter only for your own 
perusal, and that of your particular friends.' 

Good Appearance of Troops. 
To Major -General Campbell. 

' Seringapatam, 

' Dece7nber I, 1804. 

' I arrived here about ten o'clock last night. . . . 

' When passing Arcot I took an opportunity of looking at 
my old friends, the 19th Light Dragoons* and the 4th Regi- 
ment of Cavalry, and I am happy to tell you that both these 
corps looked remarkably well. The horses of the 4th are 
lean, but their coats were smooth and clean. I acknowledge 
that I should have been much pleased if it had been possible 
to allow this corps to rest and refresh for six months at 
Arcot. I sent them into the Carnatic because I was aware 
that they required rest, and I knew that the men had not 
seen their families since the corps marched with the grand 
army to Seringapatam in February, 1799. . . . 

' Major Walker did me the favour to express a desire that 

I should look at the 8th Regiment at Arcot, with which 

I complied. I never saw a more promising corps, or one so 

perfect in its exercise, or so good in its general appearance, 

* Now the 19th (Princess of Wales's Own) Hussars. — W. W. 



INDIA 99 

for the time during which the corps has been embodied. 
It really does the Major much credit.' 

Desertion of Servants. 

To Major Shawe. 

' Seringapatam, 

' December 8, 1804. 

'. . . I have been sadly annoyed by my servants leaving 
me. Those who have lived with me ever since I arrived in 
India have declared that they will not return again into 
the Deccan. Indeed, if the prevalent reports are founded, 
they are not in the wrong ; the sickness of the army is 
terrible, and must sweep off many who have escaped the 
famine. . . .' 

Undignified Remonstrance. 

To Major Shawe. 

1 Seringapatam, 

'■December 16, 1804. 

' Since I wrote to you on the day before yesterday, it 
has occurred to me that the Governor-General may imagine 
that I wish to recommend to him a violent remonstrance 
to Scindiah. That is far from my intention ; I doubt 
whether any remonstrance is advisable ; at all events, a 
violent one can never be so, and it is certainly very un- 
dignified. . . .' 

'Disgraceful Fraud.' 

To Colonel Stevenson. 

1 Seringapatam, 

1 January 11, 1805. 

'. . . You will have heard of Captain 's disgrace. I 

really had a regard for him, and considered my own credit, 
as well as yours, involved in his character ; and therefore 
I did everything in my power to screen him from an inquiry. 
However, the complaints against him were of a nature so 
serious, and as they had been laid before the Nizam's 

7—2 



ioo WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

durbar, I could do nothing but make the inquiry ; and 
the result has been the discovery of a scene of disgraceful 
fraud, such as I believe has never before been practised. . . .' 

Longing for England. 

To Major Shawe. 

' Seringapatam, 

'■February 23, 1805. 

'. . . I now feel an anxiety only about my departure for 
England, the extent of which I cannot describe. . . . 

' I know that my presence in England would be useful, 
and I am certainly very anxious to go there. The peace 
appears to be established in India. . . . 

' Upon the whole I have determined to take my passage 
in one of the ships to sail from Madras at the end of 
this month ; and as I have been so fortunate hitherto as to 
view everything in the same light with the Governor- 
General, I think that I am not mistaken in this decision. 
I mistrust the judgment of every man in a case in which 
his own wishes are concerned ; and I have not come to this 
determination without consulting Malcolm, who agrees in 
opinion with me upon every part of the subject. 

' At all events, supposing that, after the Governor-General 
shall have perused my letter to you of the 4th of last month, 
he should desire that I should not go to England, the only 
inconvenience which can result from the step which I now 
take is to forfeit my passage-money, and to return from 
Madras.' 

Flagrant Breach of Trust. 

To Lieutenant-General Sir John Cradock, K.B. 

'Fort St. George, 

''February 22, 1805. 

' I have the honour to enclose the proceedings of a 
general court-martial ordered by me, under authority from 
the late Commander-in-Chief, to assemble for the trial of 
Captain . . . . 

' There never was a more flagrant instance of breach of 



INDIA 101 

trust than that of which Captain has been found 

guilty; and there is no crime which more justly deserves 
punishment, or more necessarily requires to be held up 
to the army as obnoxious to every principle of military 
service. 

' He was placed in arrest in consequence of the complaint 
of Rajah Mohiput Ram, the Commanding Officer of the 
troops of the Soubah of the Deccan, who has proved the 

truth of his complaints ; and if Captain should by 

any accident be suffered to escape with impunity, the worst 
impressions will be made on the minds of the natives in 
general, and serious offence will be given to the Soubah 
of the Deccan. 

' Under all these circumstances, I beg leave to recommend 
that the general court-martial of which Colonel Macleane 

is president may be dissolved, and that Captain may 

be suspended from the service till the pleasure of the 
Court of Directors is known, and that the enclosed papers 
may be sent home to show the grounds of this measure.' 

The 33RD Regiment. 

To Major-General the Hon. Sir A. Wellesley, K.B. 

'Headquarters of the 33RD Regiment, 
' Vellore, 

'■February 28, 1805. 

' On hearing that you are about to quit this country, the 
officers of the 33rd Regiment cannot allow you to depart 
without endeavouring to impress on you how sensible they 
are of the very friendly and paternal attention you ever paid 
to the interests of the corps, while it had the honour of being 
under your immediate command, as well as of the unre- 
mitting manner in which you have continued your vigilance 
for its welfare, since you have been removed to a higher 
station. . . . 

' It must ever remain a source of pride to the 
33rd Regiment that the person who has so eminently 



102 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

distinguished himself in every branch of the public service 
intrusted to him, and who has been so deservedly honoured 
by our most gracious Sovereign, was the Commanding Officer 
of the 33rd Regiment. . . .' 

' Sir, your most obedient, etc., 

'Arthur Gore, 
1 Lieut. -Col. 33rd Regiment. 
' Major-General Sir A. Wellesley, K.B.' 

[answer.] 

To Lieutenant-Colonel Gore. 

'Fort St. George, 

i March 2, 1805. 

' Nearly twelve years have elapsed since His Majesty was 
pleased to appoint me to be Lieutenant-Colonel of the 
33rd Regiment, and in the whole course of that period, 
during which I have been either in the exercise of the com- 
mand of the regiment, or in constant communication with 
the actual Commanding Officer, I have had every reason to 
be satisfied with their conduct. . . . 

' It is most gratifying to me to receive this mark of appro- 
bation conveyed by your letter, from officers with whose 
conduct I have so much reason to be pleased, and with 
many of whom I have been so long and intimately 
acquainted. I beg that you will assure them that I shall 
never forget their services, and that I shall always be happy 
to forward their views. 

' I have only to recommend to them to adhere to the 
system of discipline, subordination, and interior economy, 
which they have found established in the regiment, and 
above all to cherish and encourage among themselves the 
spirit of gentlemen and of soldiers. . . .' 



J AD/A 103 



Colin Campbell's Early Career.* 

To Major Shame. 

1 Fort St. George, 

' March 6, 1805. 

1 Upon my departure from hence, I am exceedingly anxious 
about the fate of my Brigade-Major, Lieutenant Colin 
Campbell, of the 78th Regiment, and my Aide-de-Camp, 
Lieutenant Close, of the 4th Regiment of Native Cavalry, 
particularly the former, who has been with me much longer, 
and from whom I have received great assistance. 

' You are aware that he is the nephew of Colonel Camp- 
bell, and he has already interested the Governor-General 
in his favour by the accounts which he laid before him 
of the losses of his family in the sea and land services. To 
my certain knowledge he lost two brothers in the campaign 
against the southern Poligars, and a brother and a cousin 
(Colonel Campbell's son) in the Battle of Assye. I did not 
know him by name when I saw him distinguish himself in 
the storm of Ahmednuggur, and I immediately appointed 
him my Brigade- Major, and in the Battle of Assye he had 
either two or three horses shot under him, and ever since he 
has rendered me most important assistance. 

' He is only a Lieutenant in the 78th Regiment, but I have 
frequently recommended him to General Lake for promotion, 
and he will get it by seniority in his regiment, it is to be 
hoped, before much time shall elapse. . . . 

' He is now going to Vizagapatam to Colonel Campbell, 
and I should be obliged to you if you will write to him what 
may be determined upon this subject. 

1 Lieutenant Close has some hopes that he shall be recom- 
mended to be appointed to the Body-Guard, and I shall 
be very glad indeed if that can be done for him, and the 
Governor-General will take him into his family.' 

* Afterwards Sir Colin Campbell. He died in 1847. Sir Colin Camp- 
bell. Lord Clyde, the saviour of India, died in 1863. Both these officers 
served under Wellington. — W. W. 



io4 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 



A Fervent Hope. 

To Major Shawe. 

' Fort St. George, 

'March 6, 1805. 

'. . . I hope to God we shall be able to avoid a war with 
Scindiah. Take my word for it, we are not now in a state 
to attempt the conquest of Malwa, an operation which 
under other circumstances would be a mere joke. . . .' 

General Order on leaving India. 

'Fort St. George, 

'■March 9, 1805. 

' Major-General Sir Arthur Wellesley informs the troops 
under his command that he has received the permission 
of His Excellency the Governor-General to resign the 
political and military powers with which he had been lately 
entrusted in the Deccan, and the leave of His Excellency 
the Commander-in-Chief to proceed to England. 

' He cannot avoid expressing the regret which he feels 
upon taking leave of officers and troops with whom he 
has served so long. 

' In the course of the period of time which has elapsed 
since Major-General Wellesley was appointed to the com- 
mand of a division of this army, various services have been 
performed by the troops, and great difficulties have been 
surmounted, with a steadiness and perseverance which have 
seldom been surpassed. Upon every occasion, whether in 
garrison or in the field, the Major-General has had reason to 
be satisfied with their conduct, and he once more returns 
them his thanks, and assures them that he shall never forget 
their services, or cease to feel a lively interest in what- 
ever may concern them. 

' He earnestly recommends to the officers of the army, 
never to lose sight of the great principles of the military 
service, to preserve the discipline of the troops, and to 



INDIA 105 

encourage in their respective corps the spirit and senti- 
ments of gentlemen and of soldiers, as the most certain 
road to the achievement of everything that is great in their 
profession. 

' Upon the occasion of taking leave of the troops who 
have been so long under his command, Major-General 
Wellesley cannot avoid noticing and recording the assist- 
ance which he has received from officers commanding 
districts and divisions under his orders, and the officers 
of the staff appointed to assist him : of the former, some 
distinguished characters are now no more, and others are 
gone to Europe, and all are sufficiently known to the troops ; 
but in noticing the assistance he has received from the 
staff, he must record particularly his obligations to Major 
Barclay, Captain Bellingham, and Lieutenant Campbell of 
the 78th Regiment. . . . 

' The troops belonging to the army in the Deccan, entitled 
to share in the prize-money of the late war, are informed 
that measures have been taken to insure, at an early period, 
the division of that part of it not yet divided. 

' R. Barclay, 
1 Deputy Adjutant-General in Mysore. 1 

Sailing for Home. 
To Major Shawe. 

'On Board H.M.S. "Trident," 

' March 29, 1805. 

'Latitude i° 25' S., Long. 83 52' E. 

'The Albion is about to leave us to return to India, and 
although I am very sea-sick, I will not omit to let you know 
how we go on. We have had very fine weather ever since 
we left Madras. Indeed, too much so, as our progress has 
not been what we might have expected. However, the ships 
sail well, and, as we have now got a tolerable breeze, I hope 
that we shall get on. 

' I am very comfortable, and, excepting sea-sickness, in 
good health. . . .' 



WELLESLEY IN DENMARK 

An expedition had been fitted out in the autumn of 1805, to 
proceed to Hanover, under the command of Lord Cathcart ; 
and Major -General Sir Arthur Wellesley, soon after his 
return to England* from India, was appointed to the com- 
mand of a brigade in it. But the consequences of the 
Battle of Austerlitz rendered it prudent to recall this force, 
and the troops composing it were placed on the coast for 
future operations, or for the defence of the country against 
threatened invasion. 

In August, 1807, war was declared against Denmark, and 
on September 8 a combined expedition, under Admiral 
Gambier and Lord Cathcart, took possession of the city 
and citadel of Copenhagen. Wellesley commanded the 
division of reserve, and at Kioge, on August 29, had an 
affair with the army of the enemy. 

On September 7, in conjunction with Captain Sir Home 
Popham, Captain of the Fleet, and Lieutenant - Colonel 
Murray, Deputy Quartermaster-General of the British Forces 
under Lord Cathcart, Wellesley drew up and signed the 
articles of capitulation of the town and citadel of Copen- 
hagen, with the Danish officers deputed by General Pey- 
maun, the Commander-in-Chief of His Danish Majesty's 
forces in Zealand. 

On the return of the expedition from Zealand, Wellesley 
resumed his duties as Secretary for Ireland. 

* He arrived in England in September, 1805. 



THE PENINSULA 



CAMPAIGN IN THE PENINSULA 



In the spring of 1808 a force was assembled at Cork, with 
a view, as it was supposed, to some of the Spanish colonies 
of South America; but from the extraordinary changes which 
had taken place towards the latter end of 1807 and the 
beginning of 1808, in the affairs of Spain and Portugal, by 
the French intervention, or rather invasion, of those countries, 
and the consequent national appeals to Great Britain for aid 
to rescue them from this flagrant usurpation of Bonaparte, 
new fields presented themselves, in which the palm of victory 
was to be disputed with the conquerors of Europe. 

The British army was now successfully to emulate the 
splendid fame of the navy ; and during the seven following 
years, by its discipline and courage under the great General 
who commanded it in the Peninsula, its own former proud 
days of Crecy, Poictiers, Agincourt, Blenheim, Ramillies, 
and Malplaquet,* were to be eclipsed by the still prouder 
successes which nowannuallyt followed, to be finally crowned 
by the most triumphant and decisive victory gained in modern 
times, at the great Battle of Waterloo ! \ 



* Crecy - 1346 


Agincourt - 


1415 


Ramillies - 1701: 


Poictiers - 1356 


Blenheim - 


1704 


Malplaquet 170" 


t 1. Vimeiro - 1808 


6. Ciudad 




11. Nivelle - 1813 


2. Oporto - 1809 


Rodrigo - 


1812 


12. Nive - • 1813 


3. Talavera - 1809 


7. Badajoz 


1812 


13. Orthez - 1814 


4. Busaco - 1810 


8. Salamanca 


1812 


14. Toulouse - 1814 


5. Fuentes de 


9. Vittoria 


1813 


15. Waterloo 181 5 


Onoro - 181 1 


10. Sorauren - 


1813 




| 'Peninsula' heads the list of British 


military] 


|battle-honours, being 


borne by no fewer than 


71 regiments — 20 cavalry 


and 51 infantry. Of 



WELLING TON ' 5 DBS PA TCHES 



His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief to Lieutenant- 
General* the Hon. Sir A. Wellesley, K.B. 

'Horse Guards, 

'■June 14, 1808. 

' His Majesty having been graciously pleased to appoint 
you to the command of a detachment of his army, to be 
employed upon a particular service, I have to desire that 
you will be pleased to take the earliest opportunity to 
assume the command of this force, and carry into effect 
such instructions as you may receive from His Majesty's 
Ministers. . . .' 

Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State, to Lieutenant-General 
the Hon. Sir A. Wellesley, K.B. 

' Downing Street, 

' June 30, 1808. 

' The occupation of Spain and Portugal by the troops of 
France, and the entire usurpation of their respective Govern- 
ments by that Power, has determined His Majesty to direct 
a corps of his troops, as stated in the margin, to be prepared 
for service, to be employed, under your orders, in counter- 
acting the designs of the enemy, and in affording to the 
Spanish and Portuguese nations every possible aid in throw- 
ing off the yoke of France. . . . 

' You are authorized to give the most distinct assurances 
to the Spanish and Portuguese people, that His Majesty, in 
sending a force to their assistance, has no other object in 
view than to afford them the most unqualified and disin- 
terested support ; and in any arrangements that you may be 
called upon to make with either nation, in the prosecution 
of the common cause, you will act with the utmost liberality 
and confidence, and upon the principle that His Majesty's 

the Peninsular honours 'Vittoria' is highest, being borne by 44 regiments 
— 8 cavalry and 36 infantry. Thirty-eight regiments have Waterloo as 
an honour — 15 cavalry and 23 infantry. — W. W. 

* Sir A. Wellesley had been promoted to the rank of Lieutenant- 
General on April 25, 1808. 



THE PENINS ULA n 3 



endeavours are to be directed to aid the people of Spain and 
Portugal in restoring and maintaining against France the 
independence and integrity of their respective monarchies. 

' In the rapid succession in which events must be expected 
to follow each other, situated as Spain and Portugal now 
are, much must be left to your judgment and decision o 
the spot. . . . 

' You will, however, impress upon the minds of persons ii 
authority that, consistently with the effectual assertion ol 
their independence, they cannot possibly acknowledge the 
King or Prince of Asturias as, at present, possessing any 
authority whatever, or consider any act done by them as 
valid until they return within the country, and become 
absolutely free agents. That they never can be considered 
free so long as they shall be prevailed on to acquiesce in the 
continuance of French troops either in Spain or Portugal. 

' The entire and absolute evacuation of the Peninsula, by 
the troops of France, being, after what has lately passed, the 
only security for Spanish independence, and the only basis 
upon which the Spanish nation should be prevailed upon to 
treat or to lay down their arms.' 

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State. 

' Cove, 

'July 10, 1808. 

' The wind is still contrary, but we hope it will change so 
as to sail this evening. We are unmoored, and shall not 
wait one moment after the wind may be fair. 

' I see that people in England complain of the delay which 
has taken place in the sailing of the expedition ; but, in fact, 
none has taken place ; and even if all had been on board, we 
could not have sailed before this day. . . .' 



ii4 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

The British Force. 

'Horse Guards, 

1 July 20, 1808. 

* List of the Several Corps, General and Staff Officers, composing 
a Large Division of His Majesty's Army, to be employed 
upon a Particular Service. 

' His Majesty has been pleased to direct that the under- 
mentioned corps should be formed into one army. . . .* 

' His Majesty has further been pleased to direct that 
Lieutenant -General Sir Hew Dalrymple shall have the 
chief command thereof, and that Lieutenant-General Sir 
Harry Burrard be second in command, when the Staff 
of this army will consist as follows, viz. : 

Lieutenant-General Sir Hew Dalrymple, Commander of the Forces. 

Lieutenant-General Sir Harry Burrard, second in command. 

Lieutenant-Generals Sir John Moore, the Hon. John Hope, Mackenzie 
Fraser, Lord Paget, Sir Arthur Wellesley. 

Major- Generals J. Murray, Lord W. Bentinck, Hon. Edward Paget, 
Spencer, Hill, Ferguson. 

Brigadier-Generals Acland, Nightingall, R. Stewart, the Hon. C. 
Stewart, H. Fane, R. Anstruther, Catlin Craufurd. 

Brigadier-General H. Clinton, 1st Foot Guards, Acting Adjutant- 
General. 

Lieutenant-Colonel Murray, 3rd Foot Guards, Acting Quartermaster- 
General. 

Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel Torrens, 89th Foot, Military Secretary.' 

Arrival off Oporto. 
To Viscount Castlereagh. 

' H.M.S. "CROCODILE,"t OFF OPORTO, 

'Jtdy 25, 1808. 

' I avail myself of the opportunity of the return of the 
Peacock to England to inform you that I sailed from Coruna, 

* These were Sir John Moore's corps of 11,253; Major-General 
Spencer's corps, 4,793 ; Sir Arthur Wellesley's corps, 9,280 ; and a force 
embarking of 4,803 — in all 30,129. — W. W. 

f The Crocodile was commanded by the Hon. G. Cadogan, afterwards 
Earl Cadogan. 



THE PENINSULA 115 



as I told you I should, on the night of the 21st, and joined 
the fleet the next day, and arrived here yesterday in the 
Crocodile. The fleet are now coming on. 

' All the provinces to the north of the Tagus, with the ex- 
ception of the country immediately about Lisbon, are in a 
state of insurrection against the French, and the people are 
ready and desirous to take arms; but, unfortunately, there are 
none in the country — indeed, I may say, none to arm the 
troops which the Bishop of Oporto and the Junta of this 
place have assembled. They have at present a corps of 
about 5,000 men, regular troops and militia, including 300 
cavalry at Coimbra, armed with 1,000 muskets, got from the 
fleet, fowling-pieces, etc., and 12,000 peasantry, mostly un- 
armed, I believe. 

' The regular troops are composed of detachments of 
different corps, and cannot in any respect be deemed an 
efficient force. Besides these, there are 300 Spanish in- 
fantry, about 1,500 regular Portuguese infantry, and some 
militia volunteers and peasantry here. . . . 

' The French corps is concentrated at or about Lisbon, 
and is said to consist of from 13,000 to 14,000 men. Sir 
Charles Cotton says they are adding to the fortifications of 
the town, of a citadel within the town, and of Fort St. Julian. 

' The measures to be adopted for this country are to supply 
it with arms and money. I saw a statement last night, from 
which it appears that they could get together 38,000 men 
with ease, if they had arms or money to pay them. If I 
should find the troops at Coimbra to be worth it, I propose 
to arm them.' 

Bonaparte's Strength. 

To Major-General Spencer. 

'H.M.S. "Crocodile/' off the Tagus, 
'■July 26, 1808. 

' I think there is reason to believe that Bonaparte is 
not now very strong in Spain, and that he has not at his 
command the means of reinforcing his troops sufficiently to 
strike any blow which can have a permanent effect. . . .' 

8—2 



1 16 WELLINGTON'S DESPA TCHES 



Memorandum for Disembarkation. 

' July 29, 1808. 

' In the event of a landing being determined upon in 
Mondego Bay, a signal will be made to Captain Malcolm, 
when it will be settled at what period it may be proper to 
move the horse ships, and the ships having the ordnance on 
board, into the river. 

' The infantry will be directed to be landed from the trans- 
ports in the roads, and to be rowed in the boats up the river, 
and landed on the south bank of it ; General Fane's brigade 
first, excepting the Veteran battalion, which is to remain 
on board ; then General Ferguson's ; then General Crau- 
furd's. . . . 

' The men to land, each with one shirt and one pair of 
hoes, besides those on them, combs, razor, and a brush, 
which are to be packed up in their greatcoats. The knap- 
sacks to be left in the transports, and the baggage of the 
officers, excepting such light articles as are necessary for 
them. A careful sergeant to be left in the headquarter ship 
of each regiment, and a careful private man in each of the 
other ships, in charge of the baggage ; and each officer 
who shall leave any baggage in a transport must take care 
to have his name marked on each package, and each 
numbered, and give a list of what he leaves to the soldier 
in charge of the baggage, in order that he may get what he 
may require. 

' The men will land with three days' bread and two days' 
meat, cooked. 

' The Commanding Officer of artillery is to land the three 
brigades of artillery, each with half the usual proportion of 
ammunition, the forge cart, etc. He will also land 500,000 
rounds of musket ammunition for the use of the troops, for 
which carriage will be provided. 

' Each soldier will have with him three good flints. 

' Besides the bread above directed to be landed with the 
soldiers, three days' bread to be packed up in bags, contain- 



THE PEN INS ULA 117 



ing 100 pounds each, on board each of the transports, for 
the number of soldiers who shall be disembarked from 
it. . . .' 

Portuguese Troops. 

To Viscount Castlereagh. 

'H.M.S. "Donegal," 

'August 1, 1808. 

' . . . My opinion is that Great Britain ought to raise, 
organize, and pay an army in Portugal, consisting of 30,000 
Portuguese troops, which might be easily raised at an early 
period, and 20,000 British, including 4,000 or 5,000 cavalry. 
This army might operate on the frontiers of Portugal in 
Spanish Estremadura, and it would serve as the link 
between the kingdoms of Galicia and Andalusia. It would 
give Great Britain the preponderance in the conduct of the 
war in the Peninsula ; and whatever might be the result of 
the Spanish exertions, Portugal would be saved from the 
French grasp. You know best whether you could bear 
the expense, or what part of it the Portuguese Government 
would or could defray. But if you should adopt this plan, 
you must send everything from England — arms, ammuni- 
tion, clothing, and accoutrements, ordnance, flour, oats, 
etc. . . .' 

Memorandum for the Commissary-General. 

' H.M.S. " Donegal," 

' August 1, 1808. 

' 1st. The troops will land with four days' bread and two 
days' meat ; and it will be necessary to keep up that supply 
at the village of Lavaos, so that, when the army shall march, 
the troops may carry, each man, four days' bread. 

' 2nd. Besides this quantity of bread to be carried by the 
men themselves, a quantity, equal to three days' consump- 
tion for 10,000 men, must be carried, if possible, on the 
backs of mules — viz., two bags, or 224 pounds, on each mule. 
This will require 130 mules. 

' 3rd. Besides these seven days' bread to move with the 



1 1 8 WELLING TON ' 5 BE SPA TCHES 

troops, the Lieutenant-General desires that ten days' bread, 
five days' meat, and ten days' spirits, for 10,000 men, should 
move from Lavaos about the same time, by the carts of the 
country, to be formed into a depot about seventy miles in 
advance. This will require : 

Carts. 

Bread - - - -170 

Meat - 100 

Spirits - - - - 37 

Total - - 307 

These carts must be levied, and will be relieved at Leyria. 

' 4th. The Medical Department will require two carts to 
march with the army, carrying twenty-four bearers for 
wounded men, a case of utensils, and a medicine-chest. 

' 5th. The artillery will require, to move with the army, 
250 mules, each to carry 2,000 rounds of musket ammunition. 

' 6th. The Quartermaster-General's Department will re- 
quire thirty mules to carry entrenching tools. 

' 7th. The Commissary-General will make arrangements 
for supplying the troops at Lavaos with bread, meat, spirits, 
and wood. 

' 8th. The Commissary-General will see in the General 
Orders to what day the troops, as they disembark, will have 
bread and meat, and he will provide accordingly for their 
subsistence. 

' gth. The horses will land, each with three days' forage 
and oats. Provision must be made for them after the 3rd 
instant ; but as the demand must be small, it is concluded 
that the country will experience no difficulty in supplying 
their wants, and therefore no provision is made for carrying 
forward forage or oats. 

' 10th. The muleteers and carmen are to be provisioned 
from this date, and their cattle foraged. 

' nth. Bread, etc., to be handed from the ships accordingly. 

' A. W.' 



THE PENINSULA 119 



Proclamation 

By the Commanders-in-Chief of His Britannic Majesty's Land 
and Sea Forces, employed to assist the Loyal Inhabitants of 
the Kingdom of Portugal. 

' People of Portugal. 

'The time has arrived to rescue your country, and 
restore the government to your lawful Prince. 

' His Britannic Majesty, our most gracious King and 
master, has, in compliance with the wishes and ardent sup- 
plications for succour from all parts of Portugal, sent to 
your aid a British army, directed to co-operate with his 
fleet, already on your coast. 

• The English soldiers who land upon your shore do so 
with every sentiment of friendship, faith, and honour. 

'The glorious struggle in which you are engaged is for 
all that is dear to man — the protection of your wives and 
children ; the restoration of your lawful Prince ; the inde- 
pendence — nay, the very existence — of your kingdom; and 
for the preservation of your holy religion. Objects like 
these can only be obtained by distinguished examples of 
fortitude and constancy. 

' The noble struggle against the tyranny and usurpation 

of France will be jointly maintained by Portugal, Spain, 

and England ; and in contributing to the success of a 

cause so just and glorious, the views of His Britannic 

Majesty are the same as those by which you are yourselves 

animated. 

' Arthur Wellesley. 

' Charles Cotton. 
' Lavaos, 

• August 2, 1808.' 



120 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

Inefficient Commissariat. 
To Viscount Castlereagh. 

1 Lavaos, 

'August 8, 1808. 

My despatch contains the fullest information upon every 
subject, and I have nothing to add to it. I have had the 
greatest difficulty in organizing my commissariat for the 
march, and that department is very incompetent, notwith- 
standing the arrangements which I made with Huskisson 
upon the subject. This department deserves your serious 
attention. The existence of the army depends upon it, and 
yet the people who manage it are incapable of managing 
anything out of a counting-house. 

' I shall be obliged to leave Spencer's guns behind for want 
of means of moving them, and I should have been obliged 
to leave my own, if it were not for the horses of the Irish Com- 
missariat. Let nobody ever prevail upon you to send a corps 
to any part of Europe without horses to draw their guns. 
It is not true that horses lose their condition at sea. . . .' 

Early Obstacles. 

To Lieutenant-General Sir H. Burrard, Bart. 

1 Leyria, 

' August 11, 1808. 

' In my official letters of the 8th and 10th I have apprised 
you of the state of the war in this country and in Spain, and 
I shall adopt this mode of communicating to you what I 
know of the resources of this country, and those matters 
of which it will be convenient to you to be apprised in 
the operations which you will have to conduct. 

' In the first place, in the present season of the year, 
you cannot depend upon the country for bread. Portugal 
never fed itself during more than seven months out of 
twelve. The common consumption of the country is Indian 
corn ; and the little which there is in the country cannot be 
ground at this season of the year, as the mills are generally 
turned by water, and there is now no water in the mill 



THE PENINSULA 



streams ; you must therefore depend upon your transports 
for bread, Wine and beef you will get in the country ; and 
in a short time straw and Indian corn, or barley, for your 
horses ; but the supply of these articles will not last long : 
this, however, is a consideration for a future period. . . . 

' As for mules for carriage, I am afraid you will get none, 
for I believe my corps has swept the country very hand- 
somely of this animal. You must therefore depend for the 
carriage of your bread upon the carts of the country, drawn 
by bullocks ; each of these will carry about 600 pounds, 
and will travel in a day about twelve miles ; but I do not 
believe that any power that you could exert over them, 
particularly when they shall have already made an exertion 
against the enemy, by the assistance which they have given 
to me, would induce the owners of the carts to go from 
their homes a greater distance than to the nearest place 
where you could get carts to relieve them. . . . 

' With a view, therefore, to your first operation in Portu- 
gal, which I will suppose to be to march to Santarem, 
I would recommend to you to form a magazine of ten days' 
bread and five days' meat, in case of accidents, at Leyria; 
and then to keep that quantity up or to increase it as 
you may find it convenient for your purposes at Santarem. 
You will probably find it convenient to increase it, in which 
you will experience no difficulty. 

' You will find the people of this country well disposed to 
assist you with everything in their power, but they have very 
little in their power, and they have been terribly plundered 
by the French. . . .' 

To General Freire, commanding the Portuguese Army. 

' Calvario, 

'■August 13, 1808. 

' Lieutenant-Colonel Trant informed me this morning of 
the distress which your troops were likely to suffer from 
want of bread, and he earnestly urged me, on the part of 
your Excellency, to issue bread to the Portuguese troops 
from the British Commissariat. . . . 



122 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 



' I am really much concerned that your Excellency's 
troops should suffer any distress, but you must be aware 
that the arrangements for providing for them have not 
fallen upon me ; and that I have not required a greater 
proportion of the resources of the country (particularly not 
bread) than is necessary for those of His Majesty; and 
I trust that your Excellency will see the propriety of adopt- 
ing some arrangement which will provide effectually for the 
subsistence of the army which you will march to Lisbon ; 
at the same time, that you will allow His Majesty's troops 
to enjoy such of the resources of the country as I have 
above mentioned, which they require. . . .' 

THE BATTLE OF ROLEIA. 

To Viscount Castlereagh. 

1 Caldas, 

'August 1 6, 1808. 

'. . . I marched from Leyria on the 13th, and arrived 
at Alcobaga on the 14th, which place the enemy had aban- 
doned in the preceding night ; and I arrived here yesterday. 
The enemy, about 4,000 in number, were posted about ten 
miles from hence, at Rolica ; and they occupied Obidos, 
about three miles from hence, with their advanced posts. 
As the possession of this last village was important to 
our future operations, I determined to occupy it, and as 
soon as the British infantry arrived upon the ground I 
directed that it might be occupied by a detachment con- 
sisting of four companies of riflemen of the 60th and 
95th Regiments.* 

' The enemy, consisting of a small picket of infantry and 
a few cavalry, made a trifling resistance and retired ; but 

* The 60th is now the King's Royal Rifle Corps, and the 95th is the 
Rifle Brigade. The sixteen Peninsular honours which the King's Royal 
Rifle Corps possess were won by the famous 5th or Jager Battalion — 
foreigners, mostly Germans, in British pay. The Rifle Brigade has been 
from its origin in 1800 composed entirely of British troops. These two 
bodies of riflemen fired the opening shots of the war. — W. W. 



THE PENINSULA 123 



they were followed by a detachment of our riflemen to 
the distance of three miles from Obidos. The riflemen 
were there attacked by a superior body of the enemy, who 
attempted to cut them off from the main body of the detach- 
ment to which they belonged, which had now advanced to 
their support ; larger bodies of the enemy appeared on both 
the flanks of the detachments, and it was with difficulty 
that Major-General Spencer, who had gone out to Obidos 
when he heard that the riflemen had advanced in pursuit 
of the enemy, was enabled to effect their retreat to that 
village. They have since remained in possession of it, and 
the enemy have retired entirely from the neighbourhood. 

' In this little affair of the advanced post, which was 
occasioned solely by the eagerness of the troops in pursuit 
of the enemy, I am concerned to add that Lieutenant 
Bunbury, of the 2nd Battalion 95th Regiment, was killed, 
and the Hon. Captain Pakenham wounded, but slightly ; 
and we have lost some men, of whose numbers I have not 
received the returns. . . .' 

To Viscount Castlereagh. 

1 Caldas, 

' August 16, 1808. 

'. . . We are going on as well as possible — the army in 
high order and in great spirits. We make long marches, to 
which they are becoming accustomed ; and I make no doubt 
they will be equal to anything when we shall reach Lisbon. 
I have every hope of success. . . . 

' Our artillery horses are not what we ought to have. 
They have great merit in their way as cast horses of 
dragoons, and Irish cart horses, bought for £12 each ! but 
not fit for an army, that, to be successful and carry things 
with a high hand, ought to be able to move.' 

To Viscount Castlereagh. 

'Villa Verde, 

' August 17, 1808. 

' The French General Laborde having continued in his 
position at Rolica, since my arrival at Caldas on the 15th 



124 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

instant, I determined to attack him in it this morning. 
Rolica is situated on an eminence, having a plain in its 
front, at the end of a valley, which commences at Caldas, 
and is closed to the southward by mountains which join the 
hills forming the valley on the left. Looking from Caldas, 
in the centre of the valley and about eight miles from Rolica, 
is the town and the old Moorish fort of Obidos, from whence 
the enemy's pickets had been driven on the 15th ; and from 
that time he had posts in the hills on both sides of the 
valley, as well as in the plain in front of his army, which 
was posted on the heights in front of Rolica, its right 
resting upon the hills, its left upon an eminence on which 
was a windmill, and the whole covering four or five passes 
into the mountains on his rear. 

' I have reason to believe that his force consisted of at 
least 6,000 men, of which about 500 were cavalry, with five 
pieces of cannon ; and there was some reason to believe that 
General Loison, who was at Rio Mayor yesterday, would join 
General Laborde by his right in the course of the night. 

' The plan of attack was formed accordingly, and the 
army, having broken up from Caldas this morning, was 
formed into three columns. The right, consisting of 1,200 
Portuguese infantry, fifty Portuguese cavalry, destined to 
turn the enemy's left, and penetrate into the mountains in 
his rear. The left, consisting of Major-General Ferguson's 
and Brigader- General Bowes's brigade of infantry, three 
companies of riflemen, a brigade of light artillery, and 
twenty British and twenty Portuguese cavalry, was destined, 
under the command of Major-General Ferguson, to ascend 
the hills at Obidos, to turn all the enemy's posts on the left 
of the valley, as well as the right of his post at Rolica. 
This corps was also destined to watch the motions of 
General Loison on the enemy's right, who, I had heard, had 
moved from Rio Mayor towards Alcoentre last night. The 
centre column, consisting of Major-General Hill's, Brigadier- 
General Nightingall's, Brigadier-General C. Craufurd's, and 
Brigadier-General Fane's brigades (with the exception of 
the riflemen detached with Major-General Ferguson), and 



THE PENINSULA 125 

400 Portuguese light infantry, the British and Portuguese 
cavalry, a brigade of g-pounders, and a brigade of 6-pounders, 
was destined to attack General Laborde's position in the 
front. 

' The columns being formed, the troops moved from 
Obidos about seven o'clock in the morning. Brigadier- 
General Fane's riflemen were immediately detached into 
the hills on the left of the valley, to keep up the communica- 
tion between the centre and left columns, and to protect 
the march of the former along the valley, and the enemy's 
posts were successively driven in. Major -General Hill's 
brigade, formed in three columns of battalions, moved on 
the right of the valley, supported by the cavalry, in order to 
attack the enemy's left; and Brigadier-Generals Nightingall 
and Craufurd moved with the artillery along the highroad, 
until at length the former formed in the plain immediately 
in the enemy's front, supported by the light infantry com- 
panies, and the 45th Regiment of Brigadier-General Craufurd's 
brigade ; while the two other regiments of this brigade (the 
50th and 91st), and half of the 9-pounder brigade, were kept 
up as a reserve in the rear. 

' Major- General Hill and Brigadier-General Nightingall 
advanced upon the enemy's position, and at the same 
moment Brigadier-General Fane's riflemen were in the hills 
on his right, the Portuguese in a village upon his left, and 
Major-General Ferguson's column was descending from the 
heights into the plain. From this situation the enemy 
retired by the passes into the mountains with the utmost 
regularity and the greatest celerity; and notwithstanding 
the rapid advance of the British infantry, the want of a 
sufficient body of cavalry was the cause of his suffering but 
little loss on the plain. 

' It was then necessary to make a disposition to attack 
the formidable position which he had taken up. 

' Brigadier-General Fane's riflemen were already in the 
mountains on his right, and no time was lost in attacking 
the different passes, as well to support the riflemen as to 
defeat the enemy completely. 



1 26 WELLINGTON'S DESPA TCHES 

' The Portuguese infantry were ordered to move up a pass 
on the right of the whole. The light companies of Major- 
General Hill's brigade, and the 5th Regiment, moved up a pass 
next on the right ; and the 29th Regiment, supported by the 
9th Regiment, under Brigadier-General Nightingall, a third 
pass ; and the 45th and 82nd Regiments, passes on the left. 

' These passes were all difficult of access, and some of 
them were well defended by the enemy, particularly that 
which was attacked by the 29th and 9th Regiments. These 
regiments attacked with the utmost impetuosity, and reached 
the enemy before those whose attacks were to be made on 
their flanks. 

' The defence of the enemy was desperate ; and it was 
in this attack principally that we sustained the loss which 
we have to lament, particularly of that gallant officer, the 
Hon. Lieutenant-Colonel Lake, who distinguished himself 
upon this occasion. The enemy was, however, driven from 
all the positions he had taken in the passes of the mountains, 
and our troops were advanced in the plains on their tops. 
For a considerable length of time the 29th and 9th Regiments 
alone were advanced to this point, with Brigadier-General 
Fane's riflemen at a distance on the left, and they were 
afterwards supported by the 5th Regiment, and by the light 
companies of Major-General Hill's brigade, which had come 
upon their right, and by the other troops ordered to ascend 
the mountains, who came up by degrees. 

' The enemy here made three most gallant attacks upon 
the 29th and 9th Regiments, supported as I have above 
stated, with a view to cover the retreat of his defeated army, 
in all of which he was, however, repulsed ; but he succeeded 
in effecting his retreat in good order, owing principally to 
my want of cavalry, and, secondly, to the difficulty of bring- 
ing up the passes of the mountains, with celerity, a sufficient 
number of troops and of cannon to support those which had 
first ascended. The loss of the enemy has, however, been 
very great, and he left three pieces of cannon in our hands. 

'I cannot sufficiently applaud the conduct of the troops 
throughout this action. The enemy's positions were formid- 



THE PENINSULA 



127 



able, and he took them up with his usual ability and celerity, 
and defended them most gallantly. But I must observe 
that, although we had such a superiority of numbers em- 
ployed in the operations of this day, the troops actually 
engaged in the heat of the action were, from unavoidable 
circumstances, only the 5th, 9th, 29th, the riflemen of the 
95th and 60th, and the flank companies of Major-General 
Hill's brigade, being a number by no means equal to that 
of the enemy. Their conduct, therefore, deserves the highest 
commendation. . . . 

' I have the honour to enclose herewith a return of killed, 
wounded, and missing.' 

Return of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Army, 
under the Command of Lieutenant-General the Hon. Sir A. 
Wellesley, K.B., on August 17, 1808. 



Killed - 

Wounded 

Missing 



Officers. 



4 
20 

4 



Non-commissioned 
Officers and 
Drummers. 



3 
20 



Rank 


! 


and 


Horses. ! 


File. 




63 


I 


295 


2 


68 


... 



Total Los- of Officers, 

Non-com missioned 

Officer-, and Rank 

and File. 



70 

335 
74 



To Viscount Castlereagh. 

' Lourinha, 

4 August 18, 1808. 

' My despatch of yesterday and of this day will inform 
you of the state of affairs here. I never saw such desperate 
fighting as in the attack of the pass by Lake, and in the 
three attacks by the French on our troops in the mountains. 
These attacks were made in their best style, and our troops 
defended themselves capitally ; and if the difficulties of the 
ground had not prevented me from bringing up a sufficient 
number of the troops and of cannon, we should have taken 
the whole army. 

'They say that the French lost 1,500 men, which is a 
large amount ; but I think they had more than 6,000 men in 
the action. . . .' 



128 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

THE BATTLE OF VIMEIRO. 

To Lieutenant-General Burrard. 

'Vimeiro, 

' August 21, 1808. 

' I have the honour to inform you that the enemy attacked 
us in our position at Vimeiro this morning. 

' The village of Vimeiro stands in a valley, through which 
runs the river Maceira; at the back, and to the westward 
and northward of this village, is a mountain, the western 
point of which touches the sea, and the eastern is separated 
by a deep ravine from the heights, over which passes the 
road which leads from Lourinha, and the northward to 
Vimeiro. The greater part of the infantry — the 1st, 2nd, 
3rd, 4th, 5th, and 8th Brigades — were posted on this moun- 
tain, with eight pieces of artillery, Major-General Hill's 
brigade being on the right, and Major-General Ferguson's 
on the left, having one battalion on the heights separated 
from the mountain. On the eastern and southern side of 
the town is a mill, which is entirely commanded, particularly 
on its right, by the mountain to the westward of the town, 
and commanding all the ground in the neighbourhood to 
the southward and eastward, on which Brigadier-General 
Fane was posted with his riflemen and the 50th Regiment, 
and Brigadier-General Anstruther with his brigade, with 
half a brigade of 6-pounders and half a brigade of g-pounders, 
which had been ordered to the position in the course of last 
night. The ground over which passes the road from Lourinha 
commanded the left of this height, and it had not been 
occupied, excepting by a picket, as the camp had been taken 
up only for one night, and there was no water in the neigh- 
bourhood of this height. 

'The cavalry and the reserve of artillery were in the 
valley, between the hills on which the infantry stood, both 
flanking'and supporting Brigadier-General Fane's advanced- 
guard. 

' The enemy first appeared about eight o'clock in the 



THE PENINSULA 129 



morning, in large bodies of cavalry on our left, upon the 
heights on the road to Lourinha ; and it was soon obvious 
that the attack would be made upon our advanced-guard 
and the left of our position ; and Major-General Ferguson's 
brigade was immediately moved across the ravine to the 
heights on the road to Lourinha, with three pieces of 
cannon ; he was followed successively by Brigadier-General 
Nightingall, with his brigade and three pieces of cannon, 
Brigadier-General Acland and his brigade, and Brigadier- 
General Bowes with his brigade. These troops were formed 
(Major-General Ferguson's brigade in the first line, Brigadier- 
General Nightingall's in the second, and Brigadier-General 
Bowes's and Acland's in columns in the rear) on those 
heights, with their right upon the valley which leads into 
Vimeiro, and their left upon the other ravine, which sepa- 
rates these heights from the range which terminates at the 
landing-place at Maceira. On the last-mentioned heights 
the Portuguese troops, which had been in the bottom near 
Vimeiro, were posted in the first instance, and they were 
supported by Brigadier-General C. Craufurd's brigade. 

' The troops of the advanced-guard, on the heights to the 
southward and eastward of the town, were deemed sufficient 
for its defence, and Major-General Hill was moved to the 
centre of the mountain, on which the great body of the 
infantry had been posted, as a support to these troops, and 
as a reserve to the whole army ; in addition to this support, 
these troops had that of the cavalry in the rear of their 
right. 

' The enemy's attack began in several columns upon the 
whole of the troops on this height ; on the left they advanced, 
notwithstanding the fire of the riflemen close to the 50th Regi- 
ment, and they were checked and driven back only by the 
bayonets of that corps. The 2nd Battalion 43rd Regiment 
was likewise closely engaged with them in the road which 
leads into Vimeiro, a part of that corps having been ordered 
into the churchyard to prevent them from penetrating into 
the town. On the right of the position they were repulsed 
by the bayonets of the 97th Regiment, which corps was 

9 



130 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

successfully supported by the 2nd Battalion 52nd, which, by 
an advance in column, took the enemy in flank. 

1 Besides this opposition given to the attack of the enemy 
on the advanced-guard by their own exertions, they were 
attacked in flank by Brigadier-General Acland's brigade in 
its advance to its position on the heights on the left, and a 
cannonade was kept up on the flank of the enemy's columns 
by the artillery on those heights. 

' At length, after a most desperate contest, the enemy was 
driven back in confusion from this attack, with the loss of 
seven pieces of cannon, many prisoners, and a great number 
of officers and soldiers killed and wounded. He was pursued 
by a detachment of the 20th Light Dragoons, but the enemy's 
cavalry were so much superior in numbers that this detach- 
ment has suffered much, and Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor was 
unfortunately killed. 

' Nearly at the same time the enemy's attack commenced 
upon the heights on the road to Lourinha : this attack was 
supported by a large body of cavalry, and was made with 
the usual impetuosity of French troops. It was received 
with steadiness by Major-General Ferguson's brigade, con- 
sisting of the 36th, 40th, and 71st Regiments, and these 
corps charged as soon as the enemy approached them, who 
gave way, and they continued to advance upon him, sup- 
ported by the 82nd, one of the corps of Brigadier-General 
Nightingall's brigade, which, as the ground extended, after- 
wards formed a part of the first line by the 29th Regiment, 
and by Brigadier-General Bowes's and Acland's brigades ; 
whilst Brigadier - General C. Craufurd's brigade and the 
Portuguese troops, in two lines, advanced along the height 
on the left. In the advance of Major-General Ferguson's 
brigade, six pieces of cannon were taken from the enemy, 
with many prisoners, and vast numbers were killed and 
wounded. 

' The enemy afterwards made an attempt to recover part 
of his artillery by attacking the 71st and 82nd Regiments, 
which were halted in a valley in which it had been taken. 
These regiments retired from the low grounds in the valley 



THE PENINSULA 



13' 



to the heights, where they halted, faced about, and fired, 
and advanced upon the enemy, who had by that time arrived 
in the low ground, and they thus obliged him again to retire 
with great loss. 

' In this action, in which the whole of the French force in 
Portugal was employed, under the command of the Due 
D'Abrantes in person, in which the enemy was certainly 
superior in cavalry and artillery, and in which not more than 
half of the British army was actually engaged, he • has 
sustained a signal defeat, and has lost thirteen pieces of 
cannon, twenty-three ammunition waggons, with powder, 
shells, stores of all descriptions, and 20,000 rounds of musket 
ammunition. One general officer has been wounded 
(Brenier) and taken prisoner, and a great many officers and 
soldiers have been killed, wounded, and taken. 

' The valour and discipline of His Majesty's troops have 
been conspicuous upon this occasion, as j^ou, who witnessed 
the greatest part of the action, must have observed. . . . 

1 In mentioning Colonel Burne and the 36th Regiment* 
upon this occasion, I cannot avoid adding that the regular and 
orderly conduct of this corps throughout the service, and 
their gallantry and discipline in action, have been con- 
spicuous. 

' I must take this opportunity of acknowledging my obliga- 
tions to the general and staff officers of the army. . . .' 



Return of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the A rmy under 
the Command of Lieutenant-General the Hon. Sir A. Wei- 
lesley, K.B., on August 21, il 



Killed - 

Wounded 

Missing 



Officers. 



4 
37 

2 



Non-commissioned 


Rank 




Officers and 


and 


Horses. 


Drummers. 


File. 
128 




3 


30 


3i 


466 


12 


3 


46 


I 



Total Loss of Officers, 

Non-commissioned 

Officers, and Rank 

and File. 



135 

534 
5i 



* Now the 2nd Battalion the Worcestershire Regiment. — W. W. 



9—2 



i 3 2 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

Return of Ordnance and Ammunition taken in the Action of 
August 2r, 1808. 

' One 6-pounder, four 4-pounders, three 2-pounders, six 
5|-inch howitzers, two ammunition waggons, twenty-one 
Portuguese ammunition cars, forty horses, four mules. 

* The above is only the number already arrived in the 
park, but from several accounts there are eight more taken 
from the enemy. The ammunition waggons and cars con- 
tain a portion of powder, shells, and stores of all descriptions, 
and about 20,000 rounds of musket ammunition. 

' William Robe, Lieutenant-Colonel, 
commanding Royal Artillery.' 

To Viscount Castlereagh. 

'Vimeiro, 

' August 22, 1808. 

' After I wrote to you yesterday morning, we were attacked 
by the whole of the French army, Sir Harry Burrard being 
still on board ship, and I gained a complete victory. It was 
impossible for troops to behave better than ours did ; we 
only wanted a few hundred more cavalry to annihilate the 
French army. 

' I have sent my report upon this action to Sir Harry 
Burrard, who will send it home. You will see in it that 
I have mentioned Colonel Burne, of the 36th Regiment, 
in a very particular manner, and I assure you that there 
is nothing that will give me so much satisfaction as to learn 
that something has been done for this old and meritorious 
soldier.* The 36th Regiment are an example to this army. 

' Sir Harry did not land till late in the day in the midst of 
the attack, and he desired me to continue my own opera- 
tions ; and as far as I am personally concerned in the action, 
I was amply rewarded for any disappointment I might have 
felt in not having had an opportunity of bringing the service 

* This officer was shortly afterwards rewarded by the government of 
Carlisle being conferred on him. 



THE PENINSULA 133 



to a close, by the satisfaction expressed by the army that the 
second and more important victory had been gained by their 
old General. I have also the pleasure to add that it has had 
more effect than all the arguments I could use to induce the 
General to move on, and I believe he will march to-morrow. 
Indeed, if he does not we shall be poisoned here by the stench 
of the dead and wounded ; or we shall starve, everything in 
the neighbourhood being already eaten up.' 

To Captain Pulteney Malcolm, H.M.S. Donegal. 

1 Ramalhal, 

' August 23, 1808. 

' Torrens wrote to you on the night of the 21st to apprise 
you of the complete victory which we had gained, one of 
the consequences of which has been a suspension of arms 
between the French and us, preparatory to the evacuation of 
the country by them, the conditions of which I signed last 
night. 

' Although I signed these conditions, I beg that you will 
not believe that I entirely approve of the manner in which 
the instrument is worded. 

' You will receive a public letter from me upon this 
subject this day, in which I have requested you to bring 
the whole of your fleet of transports to the mouth of the 
Tagus, with the exception of the horse ships, which are to 
go to England. 

' P.S. — It would be very convenient to us if you would 
communicate with Captain Bligh as you pass by. I shall be 
much obliged to you if you will have another cask of my 
claret broken up and put in chests such as the last, and leave 
one of them with Bligh for me.' 

Praise of Naval Officers. 

To Lord Mnlgvave, First Lord of the Admiralty. 

* Ramalhal, 

1 August 26, 1808. 

' As my command is at an end, I hope I may be permitted 
to trouble you with a few lines on the co-operation which I 



134 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

have received from the navy. I have long been in the habits 
of friendship and intimacy with Captain Malcolm, of the 
Donegal ; but it is impossible for me to describe the zeal, the 
ardour, and the kindness with which he entered into all my 
views ; and the whole army will bear testimony to the exer- 
tions which he and all the officers of the navy acting under 
him made to provide for their convenience on the passage, 
to land them with celerity, and to provide for all their 
necessities and comforts when they were on shore. His 
views in all these respects were fully carried into execution 
by Captain Adam, of the Resistance, and Captain Cadogan, 
of the Crocodile ; and, after our arrival on the coast of 
Portugal, by Captain Bligh, of the Alfred, from whom we 
received some most essential assistance. There were other 
Captains of the navy with whom we have had at different 
times occasion to communicate, and I must say that the 
same desire to render us every assistance in their power has 
animated them all ; which I attribute in a great degree to 
the disposition which, throughout the service, has been 
manifested by Captain Malcolm, who was principally charged 
with its conduct. 

' I also beg leave to recommend to your lordship's favour 
and protection Lieutenant Fleetwood, the agent of trans- 
ports, who superintended the fleet in which the army under 
my command was embarked. He is the most active, intelli- 
gent, and zealous of all the officers that I have seen in that 
line of the naval profession, and he really deserves promo- 
tion. If his services should be continued in the transport 
line of the profession, benefit will be derived from his 
promotion, as his sphere will be enlarged, and the armies 
to which he may be attached in future will not suffer the 
inconvenience which that under my command did, of having 
him superseded by an officer without any of his qualifications, 
in the midst of the service. I have to add that Captain 
Malcolm is equally satisfied with Lieutenant Fleetwood.' 



THE PENINSULA 135 



Wellesley desires to quit the Army. 
To Viscount Castlereagh. 

' Camp North of Torres Vedras, 
' August 30, 1808. 

1 . . . I assure you, my dear Lord, matters are not 
prospering here, and I feel an earnest desire to quit the 
army. I have been too successful with this army ever to 
serve with it in a subordinate situation, with satisfaction 
to the person who shall command it, and of course not 
to myself. However, I shall do whatever the Government 
may wish.' 

Suspension of Hostilities. 

To Charles Stewart, Esq. 

' Sobral, 

''September 1, 1S08. 

' In the last letter which I wrote to you I believe I 
informed you of our actions on August 17 and 21 ; and that 
the Commander-in-Chief had agreed to a suspension of 
hostilities with the French, with a view to the settlement of 
a Convention for their entire evacuation of Portugal. 

' . . . The agreement for the suspension of hostilities, con- 
cluded on the night of August 22, ended in a Convention for 
the evacuation of Portugal by the French, signed on the 30th 
of that month. As far as I have learnt, the Convention 
contains nothing material, excepting that the French are to 
be taken to a port in France; that they are to embark within 
seven days ; that till they are embarked they are to remain 
in possession of Lisbon and a circuit of two leagues ; and 
we are to have Fort St. Julian, Cascaes, and all the forts on 
the coast and in the interior, upon the ratification of the 
Convention. 

* They are to give up the Spanish prisoners on the General 
engaging to use his good offices that Frenchmen taken in 
Spain, not having engaged in hostilities, should likewise be 
released. 



1 36 WELLINGTON' S DESPA TCHES 

' There is nothing else in the Convention that I have heard 
of that is of any importance. The Russians, Danes, etc., are 
left at our mercy. 

' As far as I have any knowledge of them, I have many 
objections both to the agreement for suspending hostilities, 
and to the Convention for the evacuation of Portugal by the 
French. I approve, however, of the principal point in the 
latter, viz., to allow them to evacuate ; and it is useless to 
trouble you with my objections to the mode in which that 
point has been brought about. . . .' 

A Frank Letter to Sir John Moore. 
To Lieutenant-General Sir John Moore, K.B. 

' Lumiar, 

' September 17, 1808. 

' I write to you on the subject to which this letter relates 
with the same freedom with which I hope you would write 
to me on any point in which you might think the public 
interests concerned. 

' It appears to me to be quite impossible that we can go on 
as we are now constituted ; the Commander-in-Chief must 
be changed, and the country and the army naturally turn 
their eyes to you as their commander. I understand, how- 
ever, that you have lately had some unpleasant discussions 
with the King's Ministers, the effect of which might be to 
prevent the adoption of an arrangement for the command of 
this army, which, in my opinion, would be the best, and 
would enable you to render those services at this moment for 
which you are peculiarly qualified. . . . 

' In these times, my dear General, a man like you should 
not preclude himself from rendering the services of which he 
is capable by any idle point of form. Circumstances may 
have occurred, and might have justified the discussions to 
which I have referred ; but none can justify the continuance 
of the temper in which they are carried on ; and yet, till there 
is evidence that it is changed, it appears to be impossible 
for the King's Ministers to employ you in the high situation 



THE PENINSULA 137 



for which you are the most fit, because during the continu- 
ance of this temper of mind there can be no cordial or confi- 
dential intercourse. 

' In writing thus much I have perhaps gone too far, and 
have taken the permission for which it was the intention of 
this letter to ask ; but I shall send it, as it may be convenient 
for you to be apprised of the view which I have already taken 
of these discussions, as far as I have any knowledge of them, 
in deciding whether you will allow me to talk to you any 
further about them. If you should do so, it would probably 
be most convenient to us both to meet at Lisbon, or I can 
go over to you, if that should suit you better.' 

Wellington and Sir Hew Dalrymple. 
To Lieutenant-Colonel Murray, Quartermaster-General. 

' Lisbon, 

'■September 19, 1808. 

' I am going to-morrow, and I regret that it was so late 
when I reached headquarters yesterday that I could not 
endeavour to find you before I came away. 

1 I do not conceal from you that I am not quite satisfied 
with our situation ; but nothing should have induced me to 
go away if I had thought there was the smallest prospect of 
early active employment for the army. . . . 

' In regard to matters personal to myself, I shall not enter 
into them ; I wish that Sir Hew had given me credit for a 
sincere desire to forward his views, whatever they might be ; 
and I think I could have been of as much use to him as I 
believe I have been to other officers under whose orders I 
have served. He is the only one of whom I have not been 
the right hand for some years past ; and at the same time I 
must say that I felt the same inclination to serve him that I 
had to serve the others. . . .' 



138 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 



The Convention of Cintra.* 

To Viscount Castlereagh. 

' London, 

• October 6, 1808. 

' I have the honour to inform your lordship that I arrived 
in London this day, by leave of the Commander of the Forces 
in Portugal ; and having seen a copy of his Excellency's 
letter to your lordship, dated at Cintra, September 3, 
in which it would appear, from an inaccuracy of 
expression, that I had agreed upon and signed certain 
articles " for the suspension of hostilities on the 22nd of 
August," I beg leave to inform your Lordship that I did not 
negotiate that agreement ; that it was negotiated and settled 
by His Excellency in person, with General Kellermann, in 
the presence of Lieutenant - General Sir Harry Burrard 
and myself, and that I signed it by His Excellency's desire. 
But I could not consider myself responsible in any degree 
for the terms in which it was framed, or for any of its 
provisions. . . .' 



Viscount Castlereagh to H.R.H. the Commander-in-Chief. 

'Downing Street, 

' October 29, 1 808. 

' I am to signify to your Royal Highness His Majesty's 
pleasure, that a full investigation by a Court of Inquiry 
should be made as soon as possible into the late Armistice 
and Convention concluded in Portugal, and into all the 
circumstance connected therewith. 

' It is considered, from the nature of the transaction, that 
the proceeding by a Court of Inquiry, in the first instance, 
will best bring before His Majesty a full explanation of all 
the considerations and causes which may have influenced the 

* The inquiry into the Convention (commonly called the Convention 
of Cintra, although framed and signed at Lisbon) was held at the Royal 
College at Chelsea, from November 14 to December 27, 1808. 



THE PENINSULA 139 



conclusion of the said Armistice and Convention, and 
ultimately lead to a just judgment thereupon. . . .' 

Report. 

1 May it please your Majesty, 

' We, the underwritten general officers of the army, 
in obedience to your Majesty's warrant, which bears date 
November 1, 1808, commanding us strictly to examine 
and inquire into the conditions of a suspension of arms, con- 
cluded on August 22, 1808, between your Majesty's army in 
Portugal and the French force in that country ; and also into 
a definitive Convention, concluded with the French General 
commanding on August 31 following, etc., etc. ; most humbly 
report to your Majesty that it appears that the operations 
of the army under Sir Arthur Wellesley, from his landing in 
Mondego Bay, August 1, until the conclusion of the action 
at Vimeiro, August 21, were highly honourable and success- 
ful, and such as might be expected from a distinguished 
General at the head of a British army of 13,000 men, 
augmented on the 20th and 21st to 17,000, deriving only some 
small aid from a Portuguese corps (1,600 men), and against 
whom an enemy not exceeding 14,000 men in the field was 
opposed ; and this before the arrival of a very considerable 
reinforcement from England under Lieutenant-General Sir 
John Moore, which, however, did arrive, and join the army 
from August 25 to 30. 

' It appears a point on which no evidence adduced can 
enable the Board to pronounce with confidence, whether or 
not a pursuit after the battle of the 21st could have been 
efficacious ; nor can the Board feel competent to determine 
on the expedition of a forward movement to Torres Vedras, 
when Sir Harry Burrard has stated weighty considerations 
against such a measure. Further it is to be observed, that 
so many collateral circumstances could not be known in the 
moment of the enemy's repulse as afterwards became clear 
to the army, and have been represented to the Board. And 
considering the extraordinary circumstances under which 
two new Commanding Generals arrived from the ocean and 



140 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

joined the army (the one during, and the other immediately 
after, a battle, and those successively superseding each other, 
and both the original Commander, within the space of 
twenty-four hours), it is not surprising that the army was not 
carried forward until the second day after the action, from 
the necessity of the Generals being acquainted with the 
actual state of things and of their army, and proceeding 
accordingly. 

' It appears that the Convention of Cintra, in its progress 
and conclusion, or at least all the principal articles of it, were 
not objected toby the five distinguished Lieutenant-Generals 
of that army ; and other general officers who were on that 
service, whom we have had an opportunity to examine, have 
also concurred in the great advantages that were immediately 
gained to the country of Portugal, to the army and navy, 
and to the general service, by the conclusion of the Conven- 
tion at that time. 

' On a consideration of all circumstances, as set forth in 
this report, we most humbly submit our opinion that no 
further military proceeding is necessary on the subject ; 
because, howsoever some of us may differ in our sentiments 
respecting the fitness of the Convention in the relative 
situation of the two armies, it is our unanimous declaration, 
that unquestionable zeal and firmness appear throughout 
to have been exhibited by Lieutenant-Generals Sir Hew 
Dalrymple, Sir Harry Burrard, and Sir Arthur Wellesley, as 
well as that the ardour and gallantry of the rest of the 
officers and soldiers on every occasion during this expedition 
have done honour to the troops, and reflected lustre on your 
Majesty's arms.' 



Viscount Castlereagh to H.R.H. the Commander-in-Chief. 

' Downing Street, 

i Ja7tuary 18, 1809. 

' The King has taken into his consideration the report of 
the Board of Inquiry, together with the documents and 
opinions thereunto annexed. 



THE PENINSULA 141 



' While His Majesty adopts the unanimous opinion of the 
Board, that no further military proceeding is necessary to 
be had upon the transactions referred to their investigation, 
His Majesty does not intend thereby to convey any ex- 
pression of His Majesty's satisfaction at the terms and con- 
ditions of the Armistice or Convention. 

' When those instruments were first laid before His 
Majesty, the King, reserving for investigation those parts of 
the definitive Convention in which His Majesty's immediate 
interests were concerned, caused it to be signified to Sir Hew 
Dalrymple, by His Majesty's Secretary of State, that His 
Majesty, nevertheless, felt himself compelled at once to 
express his disapprobation of those articles in which stipu- 
lations were made directly affecting the interests or feelings 
of the Spanish and Portuguese nations. 

1 At the close of the inquiry, the King (abstaining from 
any observations upon other parts of the Convention) repeats 
his disapprobation of those articles, His Majesty deeming it 
necessary that his sentiments should be clearly understood, 
as to the impropriety and danger of the unauthorized 
admission into military Conventions of articles of such a 
description, which, especially when incautiously framed, may 
lead to the most injurious consequences. 

' His Majesty cannot forbear further to observe, that 
Lieutenant-General Sir Hew Dalrymple's delaying to 
transmit, for his information, the Armistice concluded on 
August 22, until September 4, when he at the same time 
transmitted the ratified Convention, was calculated to 
produce great public inconvenience, and that such public 
inconvenience did, in fact, result therefrom.' 

Sir Arthur Wellesley, on his return from Portugal after 
the Battle of Vimeiro, had resumed the duties of his office 
as Chief Secretary for Ireland ; and the Court of Inquiry 
having concluded, he proceeded in the month of December 
to Dublin. 

Parliament having reassembled in January, 1809, he re- 
turned to London to attend the House of Commons ; and 



1 42 WELLING TON' S DESPA TCHES 

on January 27, when in his place, he received the thanks of 
the House for his conduct at the Battle of Vimeiro, by the 
Speaker. 

According to the stipulations of the Convention of Cintra,* 
the French army under General Junot was embarked in 
British vessels, and landed at La Rochelle in October, 1808. 
The British army being thus left disposable for other services, 
the greater part of it was detached into Castille, under the 
command of Lieutenant-General Sir John Moore, and was 
joined on the Duero in December by an additional force from 
England, which had landed at Coruna. 

In the month of November, the French armies having been 
greatly reinforced, and the Spaniards having been succes- 
sively defeated at Tudela and in other battles, the city of 
Madrid fell again into the hands of the enemy. Buonaparte, 
who had arrived to superintend in person the operations in 
Spain, directed, in the month of December, a combined 
movement of several corps, under the command of Marshal 
Soult, against the army under Sir John Moore, which conse- 
quently retreated into Galicia ; and a battle took place on 
January 16, 1809, at Coruna, where Sir John Moore was 
killed in the hour of victory. 

In the meantime Lieutenant-General Sir John Cradocki 
had been appointed to the command of the British troops 
remaining in Portugal ; and that country, after the Battle of 
Coruna, again became the seat of active military operations, 
Marshal Soult having invaded its northern provinces from 
Galicia, and taken possession of Oporto on March 29, 1809. 
Lisbon was consequently thrown into alarm ; and the 
Regency having urgently implored the aid and protection of 
the British nation, reinforcements were directed to be em- 
barked, and Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Wellesley, 

* It was erroneously called the ' Convention of Cintra,' from that 
document having been forwarded by Lieutenant-General Sir Hew 
Dalrymple to the Secretary of State in a despatch dated Cintra, 
September 3, 1808. The error, however, having become habitual, it has 
been retained. 

f Afterwards General Lord Howden, G.C.B. 



THE PENINSULA 143 



having resigned the office of Chief Secretary in Ireland and 
his seat in Parliament, was again sent to command in 
Portugal. 

Back to Portugal. 
To Viscount Castlereagh. 

' Lisbon, 

' April 27, 1809. 

1 1 arrived here on the 22nd instant, and having communi- 
cated with Lieutenant-General Sir John Cradock to put me 
in orders on the 25th, I have assumed the command of the 
army. 

' The whole of the British army in Portugal are assembled 
at Leyria and Alcobaca, with the exception of the 2nd 
Battalion 30th Regiment, in garrison at Lisbon ; of the 16th 
Light Dragoons, on its march to join the army ; and of the 
2nd Battalion 24th Regiment, the 3rd Dragoon Guards, and 
the 4th Dragoons, just landed. . . .' 

Adverse Criticism. 
To Marshal Beresford. 

' Coimbra, 

' May 6, 1809, 1.30 p.m. 

• . . . Your troops made but a bad figure this morning at 
the review. The battalions very weak, not more than 300 

men ; the body of men, particularly of the regiment, 

very bad ; and the officers worse than anything I have 
seen. . . .' 

A Plot to seize Marshal Soult. 

To Viscount Castlereagh. 

'Lisbon, 

' April 27 , 1809. 

' I have but little to add to my public despatches of this 
date. I fully believe in the intentions of the French officers 
to revolt. The existence of this intention is confirmed by 
the recollection of what dropped from nearly every individual 
of the French army with whom I conversed when I was in 
this country last year, and it is highly probable on other 



i 4 4 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

grounds. I doubt, however, whether it will be quite so easy 
to carry their intentions successfully into execution as their 
emissary appears to imagine. ... It is, however, very certain 
that the succesful revolt of one French army would have a 
great effect, particularly in this part of the world ; and would 
probably do more for Spain than Spain would ever do for 
itself. 

' In case there should be an opportunity, I should not 
wait for a revolt, but shall try my own means of subduing 
Soult. 

' If this army should revolt, or, indeed, at all events, I 
anxiously recommend to you to set all your emissaries to 
work in France. I have no doubt of the detestation of 
Buonaparte by the people of that country. . . .' 

To Viscount Castkreagh. 

' COIMBRA, 

' May 7, 1 809. 

' I met last night , for the first time since I had seen 

him at Lisbon. 

' He told me that the French army was at this time 
divided into two parties — one, which intended to seize Soult 
at all events, and to carry into execution the plan he had 

before communicated to me ; the other, consisting of , 

, and even those connected with Buonaparte, who were 

determined to seize Soult if he should declare himself King 
of Portugal, of which he has manifested an intention. This 
latter party would then lead the army into France, where it 

is understood that Buonaparte wishes to have it. But 

thinks that if Soult was once seized, everything would go on 
as his friends wished. . . . 

' I firmly believe what he says respecting the prevailing 

discontent, and I think it not improbable that , and 

others attached to Buonaparte, aware of it, and apprehensive 
of its effects, would turn it so far to account of Buonaparte 
as to induce the army to seize their General, for being guilty 
of an ambitious abuse of his authority and disobedience of 



THE PENINSULA 145 



the orders of the Emperor. And if they are really in a 
scrape, which I acknowledge I doubt, they would make use 
of this act, if possible, to induce us to allow them to go 
away. . . .' 

The Battle of Oporto. 

To Viscount Castlereagh. 

' Oporto, 

'May 12, 1809. 

' I had the honour to apprise your lordship on the 7th 
instant that I intended that the army should march on the 
9th from Coimbra, to dispossess the enemy of Oporto. 

' The advanced-guard and the cavalry had marched on the 
7th, and the whole had halted on the 8th, to afford time for 
Marshal Beresford with his corps to arrive upon the upper 
Douro. 

' The infantry of the army was formed into three divisions 
for this expedition, of which two, the advanced-guard, con- 
sisting of the King's German Legion, and Brigadier-General 
R. Stewart's brigade, with a brigade of 6-pounders, and a 
brigade of 3-pounders, under Lieutenant-General Paget ; and 
the cavalry under Lieutenant-General Payne; and the 
brigade of Guards, Brigadier-General Campbell's and 
Brigadier -General Sontag's brigades of infantry, with a 
brigade of 6-pounders, under Lieutenant-General Sherbrooke, 
moved by the highroad from Coimbra to Oporto ; and one, 
composed of Major-General Hill's and Brigadier-General 
Cameron's brigades of infantry, and a brigade of 6-pounders, 
under the command of Major- General Hill, by the road from 
Coimbra to Aveiro. 

' On the 10th in the morning, before daylight, the cavalry 
and advanced-guard crossed the Vouga, with the intention 
to surprise and cut off four regiments of French cavalry, and 
a battalion of infantry and artillery, cantoned in Albergaria 
Nova and the neighbouring villages, about eight miles from 
that river, in the last of which we failed; but the superiority 
of the British cavalry was evident throughout the day. We 
took some prisoners and their cannon from them ; and the 
advanced-guard took up the position of Oliveira. 

10 



146 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

1 On the same day Major-General Hill, who had embarked 
at Aveiro on the evening of the gth, arrived at Ovar, in the 
rear of the enemy's right ; and the head of Lieutenant- 
General Sherbrooke's division passed the Vouga on the same 
evening. 

'On the nth the advanced-guard and cavalry continued 
to move on the highroad towards Oporto, with Major- 
General Hill's division in a parallel road which leads to 
Oporto from Ovar. 

' On the arrival of the advanced-guard at Vendas Novas, 
between Souto Redondo and Grijo, they fell in with the out- 
posts of the enemy's advanced-guard, which were immediately 
driven in ; and shortly afterwards we discovered the enemy's 
advanced-guard, consisting of about 4,000 infantry and some 
squadrons of cavalry, strongly posted on the heights above 
Grijo, their front being covered by woods and broken ground. 
The enemy's left flank was turned by a movement well 
executed by Major-General Murray, with Brigadier-General 
Langworth's brigade of the King's German Legion ; while the 
16th Portuguese Regiment of Brigadier-General Richard 
Stewart's brigade attacked their right, and the riflemen of 
the 95th, and the flank companies of the 29th, 43rd, and 52nd 
of the same brigade, under Major Way, attacked the infantry 
in the woods and village in their centre. 

' These attacks soon obliged the enemy to give way, and 
Brigadier -General the Hon. Charles Stewart led two 
squadrons of the 16th and 20th Dragoons, under the 
command of Major Blake, in pursuit of the enemy, and 
destroyed many and took several prisoners. 

' On the night of the nth the enemy crossed the Douro, 
and destroyed the bridge over that river. 

' It was important, with a view to the operations of Marshal 
Beresford, that I should cross the Douro immediately ; and 
I had sent Major-General Murray in the morning with a 
battalion of the King's German Legion, a squadron of 
cavalry, and two 6-pounders, to endeavour to collect boats, 
and, if possible, to cross the river at Avintaf, about four 
miles above Oporto ; and I had as many boats as could be 



THE PENINSULA 147 

collected brought to the ferry, immediately above the towns 
of Oporto and Villa Nova. 

' The ground on the right bank of the river at this ferry 
is protected and commanded by the fire of cannon, placed on 
the height of the Serra Convent at Villa Nova ; and there 
appeared to be a good position for our troops on the opposite 
side of the river, till they should be collected in sufficient 
numbers. 

1 The enemy took no notice of our collection of boats, or 
of the embarkation of the troops, till after the first battalion 
(the Buffs)* were landed, and had taken up their position, 
under the command of Lieutenant-General Paget, on the 
opposite side of the river. 

' They then commenced an attack upon them with a large 
body of cavalry, infantry, and artillery, under the command 
of Marshal Soult, which that corps most gallantly sustained 
till supported successively by the 48th and 66th Regiments, 
belonging to Major-General Hill's brigade, and a Portuguese 
battalion, and afterwards by the first battalion of detach- 
ments belonging to Brigadier-General Richard Stewart's 
brigade. 

' Lieutenant-General Paget was unfortunately wounded 
soon after the attack commenced, when the command of 
these gallant troops devolved upon Major-General Hill. 

' Although the French made repeated attacks upon them, 
they made no impression ; and at last, Major-General Murray 
having appeared on the enemy's left flank on his march from 
Avintas, where he had crossed ; and Lieutenant-General 
Sherbrooke, who by this time had availed himself of the 
enemy's weakness in the town of Oporto, and had crossed 
the Douro at the ferry between the towns of Villa Nova and 
Oporto, having appeared upon their right with the brigade 
of Guards and the 29th Regiment ; the whole retired in the 
utmost confusion towards Amarante, leaving behind them 
five pieces of cannon, eight ammunition tumbrils, and many 
prisoners. 

* The Buffs particularly distinguished themselves. The first of their 
Peninsular honours is ' Douro.' — W. W. 

10 — 2 



148 



WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 



' The enemy's loss in killed and wounded in this action 
has been very large, and they have left behind them in 
Oporto 700 sick and wounded. 

' Brigadier-General the Hon. Charles Stewart then directed 
a charge by a squadron of the 14th Dragoons, under the 
command of Major Hervey, who made a successful attack 
on the enemy's rear-guard. 

' In the different actions with the enemy, of which I have 
above given your lordship an account, we have lost some, 
and the immediate services of other valuable officers and 
soldiers. . . . 

' I cannot say too much in favour of the officers and troops. 
They have marched in four days over eighty miles of most 
difficult country, have gained many important positions, and 
have engaged and defeated three different bodies of the 
enemy's troops. . . .' 

Return of Ordnance captured on May 12, 1809. 

Ten 12-pounders, twelve 8-pounders, eighteen 4-pounders, 
sixteen 3-pounders, two howitzers. 

A bstract of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing in the A rmy under 
the Command of Lieutenant-General the Right Hon. Sir 
A. Wellesley, K.B., in Action with the French Army 
under the Command of Marshal Soult, on March 10, 11, 12, 
1809. 





Officers. 


Sergeants. 


Rank and 
File. 


Horses. 


Total Loss of Officers, 

Non-commissioned 

Officers, and Rank 

and File. 


Killed 
Wounded - 
Missing - 


I 

17 


I 


42 

ISO 

17 


— 


43 
168 

17 



THE PENINSULA 149 



The French Sick and Wounded. 

To Marshal SoulL* 

' Oporto, 

' Ce 12 Mat, 1809. 

' Vous savez que vous avez laisse dans cette ville un grand 
nombre de malades et de blesses, dont vous pouvez etre sur 
que je prendrai le plus grand soin, et qu'autant que je le 
pourrai, personne ne leur fera du mal. Mais vous avez oublie 
de laisser avec eux des Officiers de Sante pour les soigner. 
Je ne crois pas qu'on doive se fier aux Officiers de Sant6 de 
la ville d'Oporto ; et je vous previens que je n'ai pas un plus 
grand nombre d'Officiers de Sante, qu'il ne me faut pour le 
service des troupes qui sont sous mes ordres. 

' Je vous prie done d'en envoyer ici un nombre suffisant 
pour le soin de tous les malades et blesses de l'armee 
Fran9aise que vous avez laisses ici, et je vous promets que 
quand ils auront gueri les malades, ils vous seront renvoyes. 

' Vous avez quelques officiers et soldats de l'armee Anglaise, 
prisonniers de guerre, et je serai bien aise d'etablir avec 
vous un cartel d'echange pour ceux de l'armee Francaise que 
j'ai en mon pouvoir. - ' 

Proclamation. 

'Arthur Wellesley, Commander of the British Army in Por- 
tugal, and Marshal-General of the Armies of H.R.H. the 
Prince Regent. 

1 Inhabitants of Oporto, — The French troops having 
been expelled from this town by the superior gallantry and 
discipline of the army under my command, I call upon the 
inhabitants of Oporto to be merciful to the wounded and 
prisoners. By the laws of war they are entitled to my 
protection, which I am determined to afford them ; and it 
will be worthy of the generosity and bravery of the Portu- 

* On leaving Eton, Wellington went to Brussels and Angers, where 
he gained a knowledge of French, which in after years proved very 
useful.— W. W. 



150 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

guese nation not to revenge the injuries which have been 
done to them on these unfortunate persons, who can only be 
considered as instruments in the hands of the more powerful, 
who are still in arms against us. 

' I therefore call upon the inhabitants of this town to 
remain peaceably in their dwellings. I forbid all persons 
not military to appear in the streets with arms ; and I give 
notice that I shall consider any person who shall injure any 
of the wounded or of the prisoners as guilty of the breach of 
my orders. . . .' 

A Terrible Retreat. 
To Viscount Castlereagh. 

1 MONTEALEGKE, 

' May 1 8, 1809. 

1 1 arrived at Braga on the 15th (General Murray being at 
Guimaraens, and the enemy about fifteen miles in our front), 
and at Salamonde on the 16th. 

' We had there an affair with their rear-guard. The 
Guards, under Lieutenant-General Sherbrooke and Brigadier- 
General Campbell, attacked their position, and having turned 
their left flank by the heights, they abandoned it, leaving 
a gun and some prisoners behind them. This attack was 
necessarily made at a late hour in the evening. 

' On the 17th we moved to Ruivaes (waiting to see whether 
the enemy would turn upon Chaves, or continue his retreat 
upon Montealegre), and on the 18th to this place. . . . 

' The enemy commenced this retreat, as I have informed 
your lordship, by destroying a great proportion of his guns 
and ammunition. He afterwards destroyed the remainder of 
both and a great proportion of his baggage, and kept nothing 
excepting what the soldiers or a few mules could carry. He 
has left behind him his sick and wounded; and the road 
from Penafiel to Montealegre is strewed with the carcases 
of horses and mules, and of French soldiers, who were put 
to death by the peasantry before our advanced-guard could 
save them. 



THE PENINSULA 151 



' This last circumstance is the natural effect of the species 
of warfare which the enemy have carried on in this country. 

' Their soldiers have plundered and murdered the peasantry 
at their pleasure ; and I have seen many persons hanging in 
the trees by the sides of the road, executed for no reason 
that I could learn, excepting that they have not been friendly 
to the French invasion and usurpation of the government 
of their country ; and the route of their column on their 
retreat could be traced by the smoke of the villages to which 
they set fire. 

' We have taken about 500 prisoners. Upon the whole, 
the enemy has not lost less than a fourth of his army, and 
all his artillery and equipments, since we attacked him on 
the Vouga. 

' I hope your lordship will believe that no measure which 
I could take was omitted to intercept the enemy's retreat. 
It is obvious, however, that if an army throws away all its 
cannon, equipments, and baggage, and everything which can 
strengthen it, and can enable it to act together as a body ; 
and abandons all those who are entitled to its protection, 
but add to its weight and impede its progress ; it must be 
able to march by roads through which it cannot be followed, 
with any prospect of being overtaken, by an army which has 
not made the same sacrifices. 

' It is impossible to say too much of the exertions of the 
troops. The weather has been very bad indeed. Since the 
13th the rain has been constant, and the roads in this difficult 
country almost impracticable. . . .' 

English-Portuguese Officers. 
To the Right Hon. J. Villiers. 



' RUIVAES, 

'May 19, 1809. 



'. . . The question of rank between the English and 
English- Portuguese officers is one of a very delicate nature, 
and it arises entirely out of the practice of giving to officers 



1 52 WELLINGTON'S DESPA TCHES 

going into the Portuguese service a step of Portuguese rank 
beyond that which they held in the service of the King. 

' The officers in the two services must rank according to 
the dates of their respective commissions; but English officers 
taking temporary Portuguese commissions must rank, in 
respect to British officers, according to the date of the com- 
mission which they hold in the service of His Majesty. In 
future, I recommend that they should serve in the Portu- 
guese army with the same rank as they have in that of the 
King. It is my opinion, the situation of these officers having 
advanced, Portuguese rank will be an anomaly, but that 
cannot be helped. 

' I wish to God that Beresford would resign his English 
Lieutenant-General's rank. It is inconceivable the em- 
barrassment and ill-blood which it occasions. It does him 
no good ; and if the army was not most successful, this very 
circumstance would probably bring us to a standstill.' 

Salvage. 

To the Right Hon. J. Villiers. 

'Oporto, 

1 May 23, 1809. 

' . . . Upon the capture of Oporto we found here several 
English, some Danish, Swedish, and one or two French 
vessels, and a considerable quantity of property, some of 
which had been loaded in these ships ; and another part, 
principally cotton, which the French had bought in different 
parts of the country, and had collected here in charge of the 
French Consul. . . . 

« The most valuable part of this property is 3,000 tons of 
wine, belonging, I believe, to the English merchants ; upon 
which the Admiral, on the notion that all the property at 
Oporto is liable to be considered and dealt with by the rules 
of prize, thinks us entitled to salvage. My opinion is that, 
if we are entitled to it at all, we are entitled to the whole of 
the property ; but the doubt which I entertain is, whether 
we have a right to any part of this property ; and upon this 
doubt I wish to have your opinion. . . .' 



THE PENINSULA 153 



Lenient Treatment of a Marquis. 
To Brigadier-General Alexander Campbell. 

' Oporto, 

' May 24, 1809. 

' The Adjutant-General has communicated to me your 
letter of the 23rd instant, reporting the conduct of Captain 

the Marquis , in absenting himself from his battalion 

without leave on the 15th instant, and that you had put him 
in arrest. 

' I observe from the date that this offence was aggravated 
by being committed at a moment when the troops were in 
march in pursuit of the enemy. I am not disposed, however, 
to carry matters to extremities with the Marquis ; and I beg 
that you will call him and the officers of the regiment to 
which he belongs before you, and point out to him the 
extreme impropriety of his conduct. . . . 

' You will tell the Marquis that I hope that the lenity with 
which his fault has been treated upon this occasion will 
induce him to be more attentive to his duty ; and that I 
expect from him exertions in the cause of his country, 
patience to bear the hardships of a military life, and sub- 
mission to the rules of military discipline and subordination, 
in proportion as his rank, station, and fortune are superior 
to those of others of his countrymen in the service. You 
will then release the Marquis from his arrest.' 

Plundering. 
To the Right Hon. J . Villiers. 

'COIMBRA, 

' May 31, 1809. 
' I have long been of opinion that a British army could 
bear neither success nor failure, and I have had manifest 
proofs of the truth of this opinion in the first of its branches 
in the recent conduct of the soldiers of this army. They 
have plundered the country most terribly, which has given 
me the greatest concern. The Town Major of Lisbon, if he 



154 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

has the orders, will show you, if you wish to read them, those 
that I have given out upon this subject. 

' They have plundered the people of bullocks, among 
other property, for what reason I am sure I do not know, 
except it be, as I understand is their practice, to sell them 
to the people again. I shall be very much obliged to you if 
you will mention this practice to the Ministers of the Regency, 
and beg them to issue a proclamation forbidding the people, 
in the most positive terms, to purchase anything from the 
soldiers of the British army. . . .' 

Prisoners of War. 
To Lieutenant-Colonel Trant. 

'Thomar, 

' June 7, 1809. 

' I think it probable that the Admiral will immediately 
require all the cavalry ships which he has lately sent to 
Oporto, to receive the prisoners of war to send to England 
without loss of time, in the shape of cavalry ships. You 
will, therefore, immediately discontinue your alteration of 
those ships, if you should have continued ther3 after the 
receipt of Colonel Murray's letter upon this subject. 

' I have requested the Admiral to send you directions 
either to embark the prisoners in the cavalry ships, or not, 
as he may think proper, supposing that he should wish to 
send to England immediately the cavalry ships destined to 
convey the prisoners. You will, therefore, have the prisoners 
in readiness to embark in store-ships at a moment's notice 
if the Admiral should desire it, and, at all events, the ships 
in readiness to sail. 

' You will understand, however, that the prisoners must 
not be unreasonably crowded in these ships, and you will 
report to me what number will remain at Oporto, after you 
shall have sent those whom the Admiral may require you to 
send in the cavalry ships.' 






THE PENINSULA 155 



Hospital Stoppages. 
To the Right Hon. the Secretary at War. 

1 Thomar, 

'June 7, 1809. 

' I had the honour of receiving your letter of May 4 this 
morning, and I beg to inform you that it has been the 
practice hitherto in this army to make the soldiers pay 
tenpence per diem when in hospital, leaving to them a 
residue of twopence per diem, and to other ranks a propor- 
tionate sum. I have ordered that from the 25th instant, 
inclusive, the hospital stoppage shall be for all ranks nine- 
pence, leaving for each rank the daily net sum stated in the 
enclosure No. I. of your letter. I shall be obliged to you if 
you will let me know whether it is your intention that the 
directions contained in your letter of May 4 should have a 
retrospect ; and if so, from what period. The soldiers in 
Portugal receive a full ration from the commissariat, and of 
course are liable to a daily deduction from their pay each of 
sixpence. 

The Army Head over Ears in Debt. 
To the Right Hon. J. Villiers. 

' Abrantes, 

'June 11, 1809. 

' . . . The ball is now at my foot, and I hope I shall have 
strength enough to give it a good kick. I should begin 
immediately, but I cannot venture to stir without money. 
The army is two months in arrears, we are over head and 
ears in debt everywhere, and I cannot venture into Spain 
without paying what we owe, at least in this neighbourhood, 
and giving a little money to the troops. . . .' 



651 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

An Obstinate Spanish General. 

To the Right Hon. J. H. Frere. 

' Abr antes, 

; * ' June 13, 1809. 

' I send you copies of the letters I have received from the 
Spanish headquarters, and of those which I have written to 
General Cuesta and Colonel Bourke this day. 

' Colonel Bourke's letter explains so fully the situation of 
Cuesta's army, and my letter to him is so explicit upon the 
dangers of his position ; the small chance there is that I 
shall be able to serve him, unless he should take up a strong 
position till I can come to his assistance ; and upon the 
advantages of the operation which I had proposed ; that 1 
do not think it necessary to trouble you further upon the 
subject. 

' I can only say that the obstinacy of this old gentleman is 
throwing out of our hands the finest game that any armies 
ever had ; and that we shall repent that we did not cut off 
Victor when we shall have to beat the French upon the 
Ebro. With such a letter, however, as Colonel Bourke's 
before me, I could not but yield the point to General Cuesta, 
which I hope will convince the Spanish Government of my 
sincere desire to be of service to them.' 

To Viscount Castlereagh. 

' Abrantes, 

'•June 17, 1809. 

' . . . My correspondence with General Cuesta has been a 
very curious one, and proves him to be as obstinate as any 
gentleman at the head of any army need be. . . .' 

Disorderly Regiments. 

To Colonel Donkin.* 

• Abrantes, 

'■June 16, 1809. 

' . . . I trouble you now upon a subject which has given 
me the greatest pain — I mean the accounts which I receive 
* Afterwards Lieutenant-General Sir Rufane Donkin, K.C.B. 



THE PENINSULA '57 



from all quarters of the disorders committed by, and the 

general irregularity of, the and regiments. I 

have ordered a provost to Castello Branco to put himself 
under your order^, and I hope you will not fad to make use 

° f ' h l"beg that on the receipt of this letter you will call on 

the Commanding Officers of the and —regiments. 

and apprise them of the concern with which I have heard 
these reports of their regiments; and of my determination, 
if I should hear any more of them, to send then- regiments 
into garrison, and to report them to His Majesty as unfit for 
service in the field, on account of irregularity of conduct and 

disorder. . . , 

' I desire that upon the receipt of this letter the - 

and regiments may be hutted outside of the town of 

Castello Branco, if there should be wood in the neighbour- 
hood, not fruit-trees, and the rolls to be called every hour, 
from sunrise till eight in the evening, all officers, as well as 

soldiers, to attend. . 

'The number of men absent from these regiments in con- 
sequence of their late marches is scandalous and I desire 
that an officer from each of them may go back immediately 
the whole road by which the brigade has moved since 
May 5, in search of the missing men. Those missing on 
the late march and ground between Guarda and Castello 
Branco must be sent on immediately to Castello Branco; 
and those missing on the former march must be collected at 
Guarda, and afterwards brought up by the officers to the 
regiment when they shall return through that town 

<I beg to have reports from you of the state of the arms, 
ammunition, etc., of these regiments, and to hear whether 
the roll-calls above ordered are regular, and are attended by 
all the officers. Non-commissioned officers and soldiers 
absent must be punished. I beg to know whether the 
brigade has received all the orders.' 



158 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

To Viscount Castlereagh. 

1 Abrantes, 

'June 17, 1809. 

' I cannot, with propriety, omit to draw your attention 
again to the state of discipline of the army, which is a subject 
of serious concern to me, and well deserves the consideration 
of His Majesty's Ministers. 

' It is impossible to describe to you the irregularities and 
outrages committed by the troops. They are never out of 
the sight of their officers, I may almost say never out of the 
sight of the Commanding Officers of their regiments, and the 
General Officers of the army, that outrages are not committed ; 
and notwithstanding the pains which I take, of which there 
will be ample evidence in my orderly books, not a post or a 
courier comes in, not an officer arrives from the rear of the 
army, that does not bring me accounts of outrages committed 
by the soldiers who have been left behind on the march, 
having been sick, or having straggled from their regiments, 
or who have been left in hospitals. 

' We have a Provost Marshal, and no less than four 
assistants. I never allow a man to march with the baggage. 
I never leave a hospital without a number of officers and 
non-commanding officers proportionable to the number of 
soldiers ; and never allow a detachment to march, unless 
under the command of an officer ; and yet there is not an 
outrage of any description, which has not been committed 
on a people who have uniformly received us as friends, by 
soldiers who never yet, for one moment, suffered the slightest 
want or the smallest privation. 

' In the first place, I am convinced that the law is not 
strong enough to maintain discipline in an army upon 
service. It is most difficult to convict any prisoner before 
a regimental court-martial, for I am sorry to say that 
soldiers have little regard to the oath administered to them ; 
and the officers who are sworn "well and truly to try and 
determine, according to the evidence, the matter before them," 
have too much regard to the strict letter of that administered 



THE PENINSULA 159 



to them. This oath, to the members of a regimental court- 
martial, has altered the principle of the proceedings of that 
tribunal. It is no longer a court of honour, at the hands of 
which a soldier was certain of receiving punishment if he 
deserved it ; but it is a court of law, whose decisions are to 
be formed according to the evidence, principally of those on 
whose actions it is constituted as a restraint. 

' But, admitting the regimental or detachment court- 
martial, as now constituted, to be a control upon the soldiers 
equally efficient with that which existed under the old con- 
stitution of a court-martial, which my experience tells me it 
is not, I should wish to know whether any British army 
(this army in particular, which is composed of second bat- 
talions, and therefore but ill provided with officers) can 
afford to leave with every hospital, or with every detachment, 
two Captains and four Subalterns, in order to be enabled to 
hold a detachment court-martial. 

' The law in this respect ought to be amended ; and when 
the army is on service in a foreign country, any one, two, or 
three officers ought to have the power of trying criminals, 
and punishing them instanter ; taking down all proceedings 
in writing, and reporting them for the information of the 
Commander-in-Chief on their joining the army. 

1 Besides this improvement of the law, there ought to be 
in the British army a regular provost establishment, of which 
a proportion should be attached to every army sent abroad. 
All the foreign armies have such an establishment : the 
French gendarmerie nationale, to the amount of thirty or forty 
with each of their corps ; the Spaniards their policia militar, 
to a still larger amount ; while we, who require such an aid 
more, I am sorry to say, than any of the other nations of 
Europe, have nothing of the kind, excepting a few sergeants, 
who are taken from the line for the occasion, and who are 
probably not very fit for the duties which they are to per- 
form. 

' The authority and duties of the provost ought, in some 
manner, to be recognised by the law. By the custom of 
British armies, the provost has been in the habit of punish- 



160 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

ing on the spot (even with death, under the orders of the 
Commander-in-Chief) soldiers found in the act of disobedience 
of orders, of plunder, or of outrage. 

' There is no authority for this practice excepting custom, 
which I conceive would hardly warrant it ; and yet I declare 
that I do not know in what manner the army is to be com- 
manded at all, unless the practice is not only continued, but 
an additional number of provosts appointed. 

'There is another branch of this subject which deserves 
serious consideration. We all know that the discipline and 
regularity of all armies must depend upon the diligence of 
the regimental officers, particularly the subalterns. I may 
order what I please ; but if they do not execute what I 
order, or if they execute with negligence, I cannot expect 
that British soldiers will be orderly or regular. 

' There are two incitements to men of this description to 
do their duty as they ought — the fear of punishment, and 
the hope of reward. 

' As for the first, it cannot be given individually ; for I 
believe I should find it very difficult to convict any officer 
of doing this description of duty with negligence, more 
particularly as he is to be tried by others probably guilty 
of the same offence. But these evils of which I complain 
are committed by whole corps ; and the only way in which 
they can be punished is by disgracing them, by sending them 
into garrison and reporting them to His Majesty. I may 
and shall do this by one or two battalions, but I cannot 
venture to do it by more ; and then there is an end to the 
fear of this punishment, even if those who received it were 
considered in England as disgraced persons rather than 
martyrs. 

' As for the other incitement to officers to do their duty 
zealously, there is no such thing. We who command the 
armies of the country, and who are expected to make exer- 
tions greater than those made by the French armies — to 
march, to fight, and to keep our troops in health and in dis- 
cipline — have not the power of rewarding, or promising a 
reward for a single officer of the army ; and we deceive 



THE PENINSULA 161 



ourselves, and those who are placed under us, if we imagine 
we have that power, or if we hold out to them that they 
shall derive any advantage from the exertion of it in their 
favour. 

' You will say, probably, in answer to all this, that British 
armies have been in the field before, and that these com- 
plaints, at least to the same extent, have not existed ; to 
which I answer — first, that the armies are now larger, their 
operations more extended, and the exertions required greater 
than they were in former periods ; and that the mode of 
carrying on war is different from what it was. Secondly, 
that our law, instead of being strong in proportion to the 
temptation and means for indiscipline and irregularity, has 
been weakened ; and that we have not adopted the additional 
means of restraint and punishment practised by other nations, 
and our enemies, although we have imitated them in those 
particulars which have increased and aggravated our irregu- 
larities. And, finally, that it is only within late years that 
the Commanders-in-Chief abroad have been deprived of all 
patronage, and of course of all power of incitement to the 
officers under their command. 

' It may be supposed that I wish for this patronage to 
gratify my own favourites ; but I declare most solemnly that, 
if I had it to-morrow, there is not a soul in the army whon 
I should wish to promote, excepting for services performed. 

' I have thought it proper to draw your attention to thes& 
subjects, which I assure you deserve the serious considera- 
tion of the King's Ministers. We are an excellent army on 
parade, an excellent one to fight ; but we are worse than an 
enemy in a country ; and take my word for it that either 
defeat or success would dissolve us.' 



ii 



162 WELLING TON'S DESPA TCIIES 

Shot in a Duel. 

To the Right Hon. John Villiers. 

' Abrantes, 

'■June 23, 1809. 

' I am sorry to have to inform you that Lieutenant 

B , of the 66th, was shot in a duel some days ago, as is 

supposed, by Lieutenant D , of the same regiment. I 

enclose you the report of persons who viewed the body of 

Lieutenant B after he was dead, and the proceedings of 

a court of inquiry into the circumstances which occasioned 

the duel. Captain M , Lieutenant D , etc., are now in 

arrest ; and if the Government of the country think proper 
to order that they should be tried by the tribunal of the 
country, they shall be given up : if not, I shall give directions 
that they may be tried by a general court-martial.' 

Welcome Ships. 

To the Right Hon. John Villiers. 

' Castello Branco, 

' June 30, 1809. 

' I arrived here this day, and shall go on the day after to- 
morrow. I find that £225,000 have arrived in the Rosamond 
and the Niobe. I have desired that £80,000 of this sum be 
paid to you in the proportions of gold and dollars as they are 
in the military chest at present. I have allotted £50,000 to 
pay part of our debts in the north ; £60,000 to be sent to us 
into Spain, in Spanish doubloons ; and £35,000 to remain 
in the chest in Lisbon.' 

' Horrible Abuses and Hardships.' 
To the Right Hon. John Villiers. 

' Plasencia, 

''July 9, 1809. 

' I have received your letter of the 5th, and I am perfectly 
satisfied with any notice taken by the Government of the 
present acts of enmity committed by the people of Portugal 



THE PENINSULA 163 



on the troops, which I fear that the latter deserve but too 
well. 

' We must have some general rule of proceeding in cases 
of criminal outrages by British officers and soldiers, by which 
the individuals guilty of them may be brought to early 
punishment. As matters are now conducted, the Govern- 
ment and I stand complimenting each other, while no notice 
is taken of the murderer ; and the example of his early trial 
and punishment is lost to the troops. 

' The artilleryman who has committed the murder at 
Cascaes must be tried according to the laws of the country, 
or for a military offence under the Articles of War. My 
opinion is that he, and all guilty of similar offences, ought to 
be tried (I mean tried in earnest, and not as the officers of 

the th were tried) according to the laws of the country ; 

but if the Government prefer that we should take cognizance 
of these offences, as being of a military nature, we will do so 
at once in every case ; but they must assist us in obliging 
the witnesses to come forward and give their testimony on 
oath, to which I find they have great objections. . . . 

• I shall most readily come into any measure proposed by 
Government to remedy the horrible abuses and hardships now 
existing, and occasioned entirely by the mode in which carts 
are taken for the service of the British army. . . .' 

Soldier Servants. 

To Marshal Beresford. 

' Plasencia, 

'July 13, 1809. 

' . . . I am sorry that I cannot allow any officers to take 
soldiers as servants from the British regiments in this 
army. . . .' 



11 — 2 



1 64 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

Striking Officers. 

To Major-General Mackenzie, President of a General Court- 
martial. 

' Plasencia, 

' July 1 6, 1809. 

' I have perused the proceedings and sentence of the 

general court-martial, on the trial of , private in the 

Regiment, for striking Ensign , of the Regi- 
ment, and I am concerned that I cannot agree in opinion 
with the general court-martial in respect to their sentence, 
and that I must request them to revise it. 

' There appears to be no doubt of the guilt of the prisoner 

; and the question remains for consideration whether 

any circumstances have appeared upon the trial which ought 

to prevent the court from passing upon the sentence of 

death. . . . 

' I am the more anxious that the general court-martial 
should revise their sentence upon this occasion, because I am 
concerned to state that several instances have occurred lately 
of soldiers having struck officers and non-commissioned 
officers in the execution of their duty.' 

Spanish Selfishness. 
To the Right Hon. J. H. Frere. 

' Talavera de la Reyna, 
'July 24, 1809. 

' It is ridiculous to pretend that the country cannot supply 
our wants. The French army is well fed, and the soldiers 
who are taken in good health, and well supplied with bread, 
of which, indeed, they left a small magazine behind them. . . . 

' The Spanish army has plenty of everything, and we alone, 
upon whom everything depends, are actually starving. 

' I am aware of the important consequences which must 
attend the step which I shall take in withdrawing from Spain. 
It is certain that the people of England will never hear of 
another army entering Spain after they shall have received 
the accounts of the treatment we have met with ; and it is 



THE PENINSULA 165 



equally certain that without the assistance, the example, and 
the countenance of a British army the Spanish armies, 
however brave, will never effect their object. 

* But no man can see his army perish by want without 
feeling for them, and most particularly must he feel for 
them when he knows that they have been brought into the 
country in which this want is felt by his own act, and on 
his own responsibility, and not by orders from any superior 
authority. . . .' 

THE BATTLE OF TALAVERA. 

To Viscount Castlereagh. 

1 Talavera de la Revna, 
l July 29, 1809. 

' General Cuesta followed the enemy's march with his 
army from the Alberche, on the morning of the 24th, as far 
as Sta. Olalla, and pushed forward his advanced-guard as far 
as Torrijos. For the reasons stated to your lordship in my 
despatch of the 24th, I moved only two divisions of infantry 
and a brigade of cavalry across the Alberche to Cazalegas, 
under the command of Lieutenant-General Sherbrooke, with 
a view to keep up the communication between General 
Cuesta and me, and with Sir Robert Wilson's corps at 
Escalona. 

' It appears that General Venegas had not carried into 
execution that part of the plan of operations which related to 
his corps, and that he was still at Daymiel, in La Mancha ; 
and the enemy, in the course of the 24th, 25th, and 26th, 
collected all his forces in this part of Spain, between Torrijos 
and Toledo, leaving but a small corps of 2,000 men in that 
place. 

' This united army thus consisted of the corps of Marshal 
Victor, of that of General Sebastiani, and of 7,000 or 8,000 
men, the guards of Joseph Buonaparte, and the garrison 
of Madrid ; and it was commanded by Joseph Buonaparte, 
aided by Marshals Jourdan and Victor, and by General 
Sebastiani. 



1 66 WELLINGTON ' 5 DESPA TCHES 

' On the 26th General Cuesta's advanced-guard was 
attacked near Torrijos and obliged to fall back ; and the 
General retired with his army on that day to the left bank of 
the Alberche, General Sherbrooke continuing at Cazalegas, 
and the enemy at Sta. Olalla. 

' It was then obvious that the enemy intended to try the 
result of a general action, for which the best position appeared 
to be in the neighbourhood of Talavera, and General Cuesta 
having consented to take up this position on the morning of 
the 27th, I ordered General Sherbrooke to retire with his 
corps to its station in the line, leaving General Mackenzie 
with a division of infantry and a brigade of cavalry as an 
advanced-post in the wood, on the right of the Alberche, 
which covered our left flank. 

' The position taken up by the troops at Talavera extended 
rather more than two miles : the ground was open upon the 
left, where the British army was stationed, and it was com- 
manded by a height, on which was placed en echelon, as the 
second line, a division of infantry under the orders of Major- 
General Hill. 

' There was a valley between the height and a range of 
mountains still farther upon the left, which valley was not 
at first occupied, as it was commanded by the height before 
mentioned ; and the range of mountains appeared too distant 
to have any influence on the expected action. 

' The right, consisting of Spanish troops, extended im- 
mediately in front of the town of Talavera, down to the 
Tagus. This part of the ground was covered by olive-trees, 
and much intersected by banks and ditches. The highroad 
leading from the bridge over the Alberche was defended by 
a heavy battery in front of a church, which was occupied by 
Spanish infantry. 

' All the avenues of the town were defended in a similar 
manner. The town was occupied, and the remainder of the 
Spanish infantry was formed in two lines behind the banks 
on the road which led from the town and the right to the 
left of oar position. 

' In the centre, between the two armies, there was a com- 



THE PENINSULA 167 



manding spot of ground, on which we had commenced to 
construct a redoubt, with some open ground in its rear. 
Brigadier-General Alexander Campbell was posted at this 
spot with a division of infantry, supported in his rear by 
General Cotton's brigade of dragoons and some Spanish 
cavalry. 

' At about two o'clock on the 27th the enemy appeared in 
strength on the left bank of the Alberche, and manifested 
an intention to attack General Mackenzie's division. The 
attack was made before they could be withdrawn ; but the 
troops, consisting of General Mackenzie's and Colonel 
Donkin's brigades, and General Anson's brigade of cavalry, 
and supported by General Payne with the other four regi- 
ments of cavalry in the plain between Talavera and the wood, 
withdrew in good order, but with some loss, particularly by 
the 2nd Battalion 87th Regiment and the 2nd Battalion 
31st Regiment in the wood. 

1 Upon this occasion the steadiness and discipline of the 
45th Regiment and the 5th Battalion 60th Regiment were 
conspicuous, and I had particular reason for being satisfied 
with the manner in which Major-General Mackenzie withdrew 
this advanced-guard. 

' As the day advanced, the enemy appeared in larger 
numbers on the right of the Alberche, and it was obvious 
that he was advancing to a general attack upon the combined 
armies. General Mackenzie continued to fall back gradually 
upon the left of the position of the combined armies, where 
he was placed in the second line in the rear of the Guards, 
Colonel Donkin being placed in the same situation farther 
upon the left, in the rear of the King's German Legion. 

' The enemy immediately commenced his attack, in the 
dusk of the evening, by a cannonade upon the left of our 
position, and by an attempt with his cavalry to overthrow 
the Spanish infantry, posted, as I have before stated, on the 
right. This attempt entirely failed. 

' Early in the night he pushed a division along the valley 
on the left of the height occupied by General Hill, of which 
he gained a momentary possession ; but Major-General Hill 



i68 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

attacked it instantly with the bayonet, and regained it. 
This attack was repeated in the night, but failed ; and again, 
at daylight on the morning of the 28th, by two divisions of 
infantry, and was repulsed by Major-General Hill. 

' Major-General Hill has reported to me, in a particular 
manner, the conduct of the 29th Regiment, and of the 
1st Battalion 48th Regiment, in these different affairs, as 
well as that of Major-General Tilson and Brigadier-General 
R. Stewart. 

' We lost many brave officers and soldiers in the defence 
of this important point in our position ; among others, I 
cannot avoid mentioning Brigade - Major Fordyce and 
Brigade-Major Gardner, and Major-General Hill was himself 
wounded, but, I am happy to say, but slightly. 

' The defeat of this attempt was followed about noon by a 
general attack with the enemy's whole force upon the whole 
of that part of the position occupied by the British army. 

' In consequence of the repeated attempts upon the height 
upon our left, by the valley, I had placed two brigades of 
British cavalry in that valley, supported in the rear by the 
Duque de Alburquerque's division of Spanish cavalry. 

' The enemy then placed light infantry in the range of 
mountains on the left of the valley, which were opposed by 
a division of Spanish infantry, under Lieutenant-General 
Bassecourt. 

' The general attack began by the march of several columns 
of infantry into the valley, with a view to attack the height 
occupied by Major-General Hill. These columns were im- 
mediately charged by the 1st German Hussars and 23rd Light 
Dragoons, under Brigadier-General Anson, directed by Lieu- 
tenant-General Payne, and supported by Brigadier-General 
Fane's brigade of heavy cavalry ; and although the 
23rd Dragoons suffered considerable loss, the charge had 
the effect of preventing the execution of that part of the 
enemy's plan. 

' At the .same time he directed an attack upon Brigadier- 
General Alexander Campbell's position in the centre of the 
combined armies, and on the right of the British. This 



THE PENINSULA 169 



attack was most successfully repulsed by Brigadier-General 
Campbell, supported by the King's regiment of Spanish 
cavalry and two battalions of Spanish infantry, and Brigadier- 
General Campbell took the enemy's cannon. 

'The Brigadier- General mentions particularly the conduct 
of the 97th, the 2nd Battalion 7th, and of the 2nd Battalion 
of the 53rd Regiment ; and I was highly satisfied with the 
manner in which this part of the position was defended. 

' An attack was also made at the same time upon Lieu- 
tenant-General Sherbrooke's division, which was in the left 
and centre of the first line of the British army. This attack 
was most gallantly repulsed by a charge with bayonets by 
the whole division ; but the brigade of Guards, which were 
on the right, having advanced too far, they were exposed on 
their left flank to the fire of the enemy's batteries, and of 
their retiring columns, and the division was obliged to retire 
towards the original position, under cover of the second line 
of General Cotton's brigade of cavalry, which I moved from 
the centre, and of the 1st Battalion 48th Regiment. I had 
moved this last regiment from its position on the heights as 
soon as I observed the advance of the Guards, and it was 
formed in the plain, and advanced upon the enemy, and 
covered the formation of Lieutenant-General Sherbrooke's 
division. 

' Shortly after the repulse of this general attack, in which, 
apparently, all the enemy's troops were employed, he com- 
menced his retreat across the Alberche, which was conducted 
in the most regular order, and was effected during the night, 
leaving in our hands twenty pieces of cannon, ammunition, 
tumbrils, and some prisoners. 

' Your lordship will observe, by the enclosed return, the 
great loss which we have sustained of valuable officers and 
soldiers in this long and hard-fought action with more than 
double our numbers. That of the enemy has been much 
greater. I have been informed that entire brigades of 
infantry have been destroyed ; and, indeed, the battalions 
which retreated were much reduced in numbers. 

' I have particularly to lament the loss of Major-Geueral 



i 7 o WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

Mackenzie, who had distinguished himself on the 27th, and 
of Brigadier-General Langwerth, of the King's German 
Legion, and of Brigade- Major Beckett of the Guards. 

' Your lordship will observe that the attacks of the enemy 
were principally, if not entirely, directed against the British 
troops. The Spanish Commander-in-Chief, his officers and 
troops, manifested every disposition to render us assistance, 
and those of them who were engaged did their duty ; but the 
ground which they occupied was so important, and its front 
at the same time so difficult, that I did not think it proper 
to urge them to make any movement on the left of the enemy 
while he was engaged with us. 

' I have reason to be satisfied with the conduct of all the 
officers and troops. I am much indebted to Lieutenant- 
General Sherbrooke for the assistance I received from him, 
and for the manner in which he led on his division to the 
charge with bayonets ; to Lieutenant-General Payne and 
the cavalry, particularly Brigadier-General Anson's brigade ; 
to Major-Generals Hill and Tilson, Brigadier-Generals Alex- 
ander Campbell, Richard Stewart, and Cameron, and to the 
divisions and brigades of infantry under their command 
respectively, particularly to the 29th Regiment, commanded 
by Colonel White ; to the 1st Battalion 48th, commanded 
by Colonel Donellan, afterwards, when that officer was 
wounded, by Major Middlemore; to the 2nd Battalion 7th, 
commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Sir W. Myers ; to the 
2nd Battalion 53rd, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel 
Bingham ; to the 97th, commanded by Colonel Lyon ; to 
the 1st Battalion of detachments, commanded by Lieutenant- 
Colonel Bunbury ; to the 2nd Battalion 30th, commanded 
by Major Watson ; the 45th, commanded by Lieutenant- 
Colonel Guard ; and to the 5th Battalion 60th, commanded 
by Major Davy. 

' The advance of the brigade of Guards was most gallantly 
conducted by Brigadier-General H. Campbell ; and, when 
necessary, that brigade retired and formed again in the best 
order. 

' The artillery, under Brigadier-General Howorth, was also 



THE PENINSULA 



171 



throughout these days of the greatest service; and I had 
every reason to be satisfied with the assistance I received 
from the Chief Engineer, Lieutenant-Colonel Fletcher ; the 
Adjutant-General, Brigadier-General the Hon C. Stewart ; 
the Quartermaster-General, Colonel Murray; and the 
officers of those departments respectively ; and from Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel Bathurst and the officers of my personal 
staff. 

' I also received much assistance from Colonel O'Lalor, 
of the Spanish service, and from Brigadier-General Whit- 
tingham, who was wounded in bringing up the two Spanish 
battalions to the assistance of Brigadier-General Alexander 
Campbell.' 



Return of Ordnance captured from the Enemy at the Battle of 
Talavera de la Reyna. 

1 5 pieces of cannon of various calibre. 
2 howitzers. 
2 tumbrils, with ammunition complete. 

Return of the Numbers of Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the 
Army under the Command of Lieutenant-General the Hon. 
Sir Arthur Wellesley, K.B., in Action with the French 
Army commanded by King Joseph Buonaparte in Person, 
at Talavera de la Reyna, on July 27, 28, 1809. 



Killed 

Wounded 

Missing 



Officers. 



40 
195 

9 



Sergeants. 



28 

165 

15 



Rank 




and 


Horses. 


File. 




789 


211 


3,553 


71 


629 


159 



Total Loss of Officers, 

Non-commissioned 

Officers, and Rank 

and File. 



857 

3,913 

653 



Memorandum upon the Battle of Talavera. 

1 The position was well calculated for the troops which 
were to occupy it. The ground in front of the British army 
was open, that in front of the Spanish army covered with 
olive-trees, intersected by roads, ditches, etc. The Spanish 



172 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

infantry was posted behind the bank of the road leading from 
Talavera to the left of the position. 

' The German Legion were on the left of the position in 
the first line. I had intended this part for the Guards ; but 
I was unfortunately out, employed in bringing in General 
Mackenzie's advanced-guard, when the troops took up their 
ground. The 5th and 7th Battalions of the legion did not 
stand their ground on the evening, and in the beginning of 
the night of the 27th, which was the cause of the momentary 
loss of the height in the second line. 

' General Sherbrooke moved his division, which was the 
left of the first line, to support General Hill's attack, in 
order to regain the height ; and it was difficult to resume in 
the night the exact position which had been first marked 
out ; and in fact, on account of these circumstances, we had 
not that precise position till after the enemy's attack upon 
the height at daylight in the morning had been repulsed. 

' The advance of the Guards to the extent to which it was 
carried was nearly fatal to us, and the battle was certainly 
saved by the advance, position, and steady conduct of the 
48th Regiment,* upon which General Sherbrooke's division 
formed again. 

' The ground in front of the Spanish troops would not 
have been unfavourable to an attack upon the enemy's flank, 
while they were engaged with us, as there were broad roads 
leading from Talavera and different points of their position, 
in a direct line to the front, as well as diagonally to the left. 
But the Spanish troops are not in a state of discipline to 
attempt a manoeuvre in olive grounds, etc., and if they had 
got into confusion all would have been lost. 

' Arthur Wellesley.' 

To the Right Hon. John Villiers. 

' Talavera de la Reyna, 

' July 29, 1809. 

' The enemy, having collected all the troops he had in this 
part of Spain, attacked us here on the 27th. The battle 
* Now the 1st Battalion Northamptonshire Regiment. — W. W. 



THE PENINSULA 173 



lasted till yesterday evening, when we beat him in all parts 
of our line ; and he retreated in the evening and night, 
leaving in our hands twenty pieces of cannon, ammunition, 
waggons, prisoners, etc. The battle was a most desperate 
one. Our loss has been very great, that of the enemy larger. 
The attack was made principally upon the British, who were 
on the left ; and we had about two to one against us — fearful 
odds ! but we maintained all our positions, and gave the 
enemy a terrible beating. 

' The Spanish troops that were engaged behaved well ; 
but there were very few of them engaged, as the attack was 
made upon us. . . .' 

To the Right Hon. J. H. Frere. 

' Talavera de la Reyna, 

* July 29, 1809. 

' I have to inform you that the enemy, having collected 
all their forces in this part of Spain, made an attack upon the 
combined armies on the day before yesterday, which lasted 
till a late hour yesterday. Their principal efforts were 
directed against the British troops, which were upon the left 
of our position ; but they were repulsed in all their attacks 
with considerable loss, and they retreated during the night, 
leaving in our hands twenty pieces of cannon, some ammu- 
nition, tumbrils, prisoners, etc. 

' Our loss has been very large indeed, as may well be 
imagined, considering that, during two days and a night, we 
were attacked by a body of French troops of more than 
double our strength. 

' But a reinforcement of 3,000 men has joined the army 
this morning, which will, I hope, make up in some degree 
for our loss of men ; that of officers is, I am afraid, irre- 
parable. 

' I am well satisfied with the conduct of the Spanish 
officers and troops who had an opportunity of assisting us.' 



1 74 WELLINGTON'S DESPA TCIIES 

Plain Words to a Don. 
To the Right Hon. J. H. Frere. 

' Talavera de la Reyna, 

"July 31, 1809. 

' I have the honour to enclose the copy of a letter which 
I have received from Don Martin de Garay, upon which I 
request of you to convey to him the following observa- 
tions. . . . 

' It is not a difficult matter for a gentleman in the situation 
of Don Martin de Garay to sit down in his cabinet and write 
his ideas of the glory which would result from driving the 
French through the Pyrenees ; and I believe there is no man 
in Spain who has risked so much, or who has sacrificed so 
much, to effect that object as I have. 

' But I wish that Don Martin de Garay, or the gentlemen 
of the Junta, before they blame me for not doing more, or 
impute to me beforehand the probable consequences of the 
blunders or the indiscretion of others, would either come or 
send here somebody to satisfy the wants of our half-starved 
army, which, although they have been engaged for two days, 
and have defeated twice their numbers, in the service of 
Spain, have not bread to eat. It is positively a fact that, 
during the last seven days, the British army have not received 
one third of their provisions ; that at this moment there are 
nearly 4,000 wounded soldiers dying in the hospital in this 
town from want of common assistance and necessaries, 
which any other country in the world would have given even 
to its enemies ; and that I can get no assistance of any 
description from the country. I cannot prevail upon them 
even to bury the dead carcases in the neighbourhood, the 
stench of which will destroy themselves as well as us. 

' I cannot avoid feeling these circumstances ; and the 
Junta must see that, unless they and the country make a 
great exertion to support and supply the armies, to which 
the invariable attention and the exertion of every man and 
the labour of every beast in the country ought to be directed, 



THE PENINSULA 175 



the bravery of the soldiers, their losses and their success, 
will only make matters worse and increase our embarrassment 
and distress. 

' I positively will not move — nay, more, I will disperse my 
army — till I am supplied with provisions and means of trans- 
port as I ought to be.' 

More Complaints. 
To Major-General O'Donoju. 

'Talavera de la Reyna, 

'•August 1, 1809. 

' . . . During the action of the 28th many of the horses of 
our dragoons and of the artillery strayed, and were taken pos- 
session of by the stragglers from the Spanish army who were 
in the rear of the town. I see English horses, with short 
tails, in possession of many of the Spanish troops ; and I 
shall be very much obliged to you if you will urge General 
Cuesta to give an order that all persons having in their 
possession English horses, or horse appointments, such as 
saddles, bridles, etc., should take them to the English cavalry 
lines forthwith. 

' I also understand that on the morning of the 29th, when 
our officers and soldiers were engaged in collecting the 
wounded and in burying the dead, the arms and accoutre- 
ments of both were collected and carried away by the Spanish 
troops. The consequence is that, as our soldiers recover in 
the hospital, we shall have no arms or accoutrements for 
them. I shall be very much obliged to General Cuesta if 
he will give orders that all English arms and accoutrements 
of infantry may be lodged at the convent of San Geronimo. 

' We are much in want of medical assistance for the 
attendance of the wounded in the hospital ; and I have been 
obliged to send there all those who ought properly to do 
duty with the regiments in the field. This cripples our 
operations much.' 



176 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 



' Horribly distressed for Provisions.' 
To Viscount Castlereagh. 

' Talavera de la Reyna, 

' August i, 1809. 

1 . . . We are miserably supplied with provisions, and I 
do not know how to remedy this evil. The Spanish armies 
are now so numerous that they eat up the whole country. 
They have no magazines, nor have we, nor can we collect 
any ; and there is a scramble for everything. 

' I think the battle of the 28th is likely to be of great use 
to the Spaniards ; but I do not think them yet in a state of 
discipline to contend with the French ; and I prefer infinitely 
to endeavour to remove the enemy from this part of Spain by 
manoeuvre to the trial of another pitched battle. . . .' 

To Marshal Beresford. 

' Oropesa, 

' August 3, 1809. 

' . . . We are miserably off for provisions, and it is possible 
that I may be obliged to halt a day, to endeavour to procure 
a day's bread for the men. . . .' 

To the Right Hon. J. H. Frere. 

' Oropesa, 

' August 3, 1809. 

' In the meantime, with all these movements, we are 
horribly distressed for provisions. The soldiers seldom get 
enough to eat, and what they do get is delivered to them 
half mouldy, and at hours at which they ought to be at rest.' 

To the Right Hon. J. H. Frere. 

'PUENTE DEL ARZOBISBO, 

' August 4, 1809. 

' ... In order that these operations and battles should 

be successful, it was necessary that the marches to be made 

should be long, and made with great celerity. I am sorry to 

say that, from the want of food, the troops are now unequal 



THE PENINSULA 177 



to either the one or the other ; and it is more than probable 
that Victor would have been upon our backs before the 
first action between Soult and me could have been con- 



cluded. 



Chasing Soult. 



To His Grace the Duke of Richmond. 

' Oporto, 

' May 22, 1809. 

' I have just returned from the most active and severe 
service. I have been on the pursuit, or rather chase, of 
Soult out of Portugal. We should have taken him if 
Silveira had been one or two hours earlier at the bridge of 
Melgaco, or if the Captain of militia of the province had 
allowed the peasants, as they wished, to destroy it. We 
should have taken his rear-guard on the 16th, if we had had 
a quarter of an hour's more daylight ; but in the dark our 
light infantry pursued by the road to Ruivaes instead of by 
that of Melgago. But as it is, I think the chase out of 
Portugal is a pendant for the retreat to Coruna. It answers 
completely in weather ; it has rained in torrents since the 
12th. . . .' 

Wellington's Escape at Talavera. 
To the Duke of Richmond. 

'Talavera de la Reyna, 

i July 29, 1809. 

' You will see the account of the great battle we fought 
yesterday. Our loss is terribly great. Your nephew is 
safe. His horse was shot under him on the 27th. Almost 
all my staff are either hit or have lost their horses, and how 
I have escaped unhurt I cannot tell. I was hit in the 
shoulder at the end of the action, but not hurt, and my 
coat shot through. . . .' 



12 



i 7 8 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

Dire Effects of Starvation. 
To the Duke, of Richmond. 

'Truxillo, 

' August 21, 1809. 

' Starvation has produced such dire effects upon the army, 
we have suffered so much, and have received so little assist- 
ance from the Spaniards, that I am at last compelled to 
move back into Portugal to look for subsistence. There is 
no enemy in our front of any consequence : Ney is gone back 
into Castille ; Soult is at Plasencia ; Mortier at Oropesa, 
Arzobispo, and Navalmoral ; Victor's corps is divided, being 
half of it at Talavera, and half in La Mancha with Sebastiani. 
They cannot say we were compelled to go, therefore, by the 
enemy, but by a necessity created by the neglect of the 
Spaniards of our wants.' 

To His Excellency Marquis Wellesley, K.P. 

' Deleytosa, 

' August 8, 1809. 

' . . . I wish I could see you, or could send somebody to 
you ; but we are in such a situation that I cannot go to you 
myself, and I cannot spare the only one or two people, to 
converse with whom would be of any use to you. I think, 
therefore, that the best thing you can do is to send somebody 
to me as soon as you can — that is to say, if I remain in 
Spain, which I declare I believe to be almost impossible, not- 
withstanding that I see all the consequences of withdrawing. 
But a starving army is actually worse than none. The 
soldiers lose their discipline and their spirit. They plunder 
even in the presence of their officers. The officers are dis- 
contented, and are almost as bad as the men ; and with the 
army which a fortnight ago beat double their numbers, I 
should now hesitate to meet a French corps of half their 
strength. . . .' 



THE PENINSULA 179 



To Captain-General Don Gregorio Cucsta. 

' Deleytosa, 

' August ii, 1809. 

' I have had the honour of receiving your Excellency's letter 
of the 10th instant, and I am concerned that you should con- 
ceive that you have any reason to complain of the conduct of 
the British troops ; but when troops are starving, which those 
under my command have been, as I have repeatedly told 
your Excellency since I joined you on the 22nd of last month, 
and particularly had no bread whatever from the 3rd to the 
8th instant, it is not astonishing that they should go to the 
villages, and even to the mountains, and look for food where 
they think they can get it. 

1 The complaints of the inhabitants, however, should not 
have been confined to the conduct of the British troops ; in 
this very village I have seen the Spanish soldiers, who ought 
to have been elsewhere, take the doors off the houses which 
were locked up, in order that they might plunder the houses, 
and they afterwards burnt the doors. 

' I absolutely and positively deny the assertion that any 
thing going to the Spanish army has been stopped by the 
British troops or Commissaries. 

' . . . I also declare to your Excellency most positively, on 
the honour of a gentleman, that the British army has received 
no provisions since it has been at Deleytosa, excepting some 
sent from Truxillo, by Senor Lozano de Torres ; and I call 
upon the gentleman who has informed his friend that biscuit 
addressed to the Spanish army has been taken by my Com- 
missaries to prove the truth of his assertion. . . . 

' In regard to the assertion in your Excellency's letter that 
the British troops sell their bread to the Spanish soldiers, it 
is beneath the dignity of your Excellency's situation and 
character to notice such things, or for me to reply to them. 
I must observe, however, that the British troops could not 
sell that which they had not, and that the reverse of the 
statement of your Excellency upon this subject is the fact, at 

12 — 2 



WELLING TON' S DESPA TCHES 



the time the armies were at Talavera, as I have myself wit- 
nessed frequently in the street of that town.' 



To the Right Hon. J. Villiers. 



'Jaraicejo, 

1 August 12, 1809. 

' We are starving, and are ill-treated by the Spaniards in 
every way : but more of this hereafter. There is not a man 
in the army who does not wish to return to Portugal.' 

Starved out of Spain. 

To Marshal Beresford. 

' Jaraicejo, 

' Angus t 19, 1809. 

' . . . After having made an effort to maintain myself here, 
I find it quite impossible. We are starving, our men falling 
sick, and we have nothing to give them in the way of comfort 
for their recovery ; and our horses are dying by hundreds in 
the week. We have not had a full ration of provisions ever 
since the 22nd of the last month ; and I am convinced that 
in that time the men have not received ten days' bread, and 
the horses not three regular deliveries of barley. We have 
no means of transport, and I shall be obliged to leave my 
ammunition on the ground, on quitting this place. We now 
want 1,800 horses to complete the cavalry, and 200 or 300 
for the artillery. 

' Under these circumstances, and seeing no prospect of an 
amelioration of our situation, which gets worse and worse 
every day, I have determined to withdraw towards the 
frontiers of Portugal, and I shall begin my march to- 
morrow. . . .' 

To His Excellency General Eguia. 

'Jaraicejo, 

'■August 19, 1809. 

' I have had the honour of receiving your Excellency's letter 
cf this day's date, and I feel much concerned that anything 
should have occurred to induce your Excellency to express 



THE PENINSULA 



a doubt of the truth of what I have written to you. As, 
however, your Excellenc}' entertains that doubt, any further 
correspondence between us appears unnecessary ; and, ac- 
cordingly, this is the last letter which I shall have the honour 
of addressing to you. 

' Although your Excellency has expressed a doubt of the 
truth of what I have written to you, I entertain none of what 
your Excellency has written to me ; and I am well convinced 
that your Excellency has given orders, and that all the con- 
tents of the magazine at Truxillo will be given to the British 
troops, even though the Spanish troops should want food. 

' But, notwithstanding these orders, and an obedience to 
them, the British troops are still in want. Yesterday they 
received but one third of a ration, and that was in flour ; this 
day they received only half a ration, likewise in flour. . . . 

' Whatever your Excellency may think of the truth or 
falsehood of my assertion, I repeat that want and the appre- 
hension of its further consequences, are the only reasons for 
my quitting Spain. . . .' 

To Viscount Castlereagh. 

' Truxillo, 

'August 21, 1S09. 

' ... In my former despatches I have informed your 
lordship of our distress for the want of provisions and means 
of transport. These wants, which were the first cause of the 
loss of many advantages after July 22, which were made 
known to the Government, and were actually known by them 
on the 20th of last month, still exist in an aggravated degree, 
and have produced all the evil effects upon the health and 
efficiency of the army which might have been expected from 
them. 

' Since the 22nd of last month, when the Spanish and 
British armies joined, the troops have not received ten days' 
bread ; on some days they have received nothing, and for 
many days together only meat, without salt ; frequently 
flour instead of bread, and scarcely ever more than one- 



182 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

third, or at most half, of a ration. The cavalry and the 
horses of the army have not received, in the same time, 
three regular deliveries of forage, particularly of barley, the 
only wholesome subsistence for a horse in this country ; and 
the horses have been kept alive by what they could pick 
up for themselves, for which they have frequently been 
obliged to go from twelve to twenty miles' distance, par- 
ticularly lately. 

' During a great part of this time, at least till the 4th or 
5th of this month, I know that the Spanish army received 
their regular rations daily. After they lost the bridge of 
Arzobispo, I believe they were in want for some days ; but 
since they have come through the passes of the mountains 
I know, from the best authority, that of General Eguia, 
that the Spanish cavalry have been supplied daily with at 
least half a ration of barley, and I believe the troops have 
received their regular allowance of bread. 

' The consequence of these privations upon the British 
army has been the loss of many horses of the cavalry and 
artillery. We lost 100 in the cavalry last week ; and we 
now want 1,000 horses to complete the six regiments 
of dragoons, besides about 700 that are sick, and will 
probably be fit for service only after a considerable period 
of rest and good food. The horses of the artillery are also 
much diminished in numbers, and are scarcely able to draw 
the guns. 

' The sickness of the army, from the same cause, has 
increased considerably, particularly among the officers, who 
have fared no better than the soldiers, and have had nothing 
but water to drink, and frequently nothing but meat without 
salt to eat, and seldom any bread, for the last month. 

' Indeed, there are few, if any, officers or soldiers of the 
army who, although doing their duty, are not more or less 
affected by dysentery, and the whole lie out, and nothing can 
be got for them in this part of the country. 

' To these circumstances I must add that I have not been 
able to procure means of transport of any description since 
my arrival in Spain. I was obliged to employ the largest 



THE PENINSULA l8 3 



proportion of the carts in the army, whether they carried 
money or ammunition, to convey the wounded soldiers to 
the hospital at Elvas ; and the ammunition which was laid 
down at Mesa de Ibor and Deleytosa was delivered to the 
Spanish General. The few carts which remained in the 
army were required to move the sick we have at present, 
and I have been obliged to leave behind me the remainder 
of the reserve ammunition, which I have also given to the 
Spanish troops; and if I had waited longer, I should not 
have been able to move at all without leaving the sick 
behind. . . .' 

Refusal to divide the British Army. 

To Viscount Castlereagh. 

' Deleytosa, 

'Augusts, 1809. 

General Cuesta proposed that half of the army 
should move to the rear to oppose the enemy, while the 
other half should maintain the post at Talavera My 
answer was that, if by half the army he meant half of each 
army, I could only answer that I was ready either to go or to 
stay with the whole British army, but that I could not divide 
it He then desired me to choose whether I would go or 
stay ; and I preferred to go, from thinking that the British 
troops were most likely to do the business effectually, and 
without contest ; and from being of opinion that to open the 
communication through Plasencia was more important to 
us than to the Spanish army, although very important to 
them. With this decision General Cuesta appeared per- 
fectly satisfied. . . .' 

Cowardice of Spanish Troops. 

To Marquis Wellesley. 

' Merida, 

' August 24, 1809. 

I come now to another topic, which is one of serious 
consideration, and has considerable weight in my judgment 



184 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

upon this whole subject, and that is the frequent, I ought to 
say constant, and shameful misbehaviour of the Spanish 
troops before the enemy. We in England never hear of 
their defeats and flights ; but I have heard of Spanish officers 
telling of nineteen and twenty actions of the description of 
that at the bridge of Arzobispo, an account of which has, I 
believe, never been published. 

' In the battle of Talavera, in which the Spanish army, 
with very trifling exceptions, was not engaged, whole corps 
threw away their arms, and ran off in my presence, when they 
were neither attacked nor threatened with an attack, but 
frightened, I believe, by their own fire. 

' I refer your Excellency for evidence upon this subject to 
General Cuesta's orders, in which, after extolling the gallantry 
of his army in general, he declares his intention to decimate 
the runaways, an intention which he afterwards carried into 
execution. 

' When these dastardly soldiers run away, they plunder 
everything they meet ; and in their flight from Talavera they 
plundered the baggage of the British army, which was at the 
moment bravely engaged in their cause. . . .' 

To Viscount Castlereagh. 

' Merida, 

' August 25, 1809. 

' . . . I come now to the description of the troops, and 
here I am sorry to say that our allies fail us still more than 
they do in numbers and composition. 

' The Spanish cavalry are, I believe, nearly entirely without 
discipline. They are in general well clothed, armed and 
accoutred, and remarkably well mounted, and their horses 
are in good condition — I mean those of Eguia's army, which 
I have seen. But I have never heard anybody pretend that 
in any one instance they have behaved as soldiers ought to 
do in presence of an enemy. They make no scruple of 
running off, and after an action are to be found in every 
village, and every shady bottom within fifty miles of the field 
of battle. 



THE PENINSULA 185 



' The Spanish artillery are, as far as I have seen of them, 
entirely unexceptionable, and the Portuguese artillery ex- 
cellent. 

' In respect to the great body of all armies — I mean the 
infantry — it is lamentable to see how bad that of the Spaniards 
is, and how unequal to a contest with the French. They are 
armed, I believe, well ; they are badly accoutred, not having 
the means of saving their ammunition from the rain ; not 
clothed in some instances at all, in others clothed in such a 
manner as to make them look like peasants, which ought of 
all things to be avoided ; and their discipline appears to me 
to be confined to placing them in the ranks, three deep at 
very close order, and to the manual exercise. 

' It is impossible to calculate upon any operation with 
these troops. It is said that sometimes they behave well ; 
though I acknowledge that I have never seen them behave 
otherwise than ill. Bassecourt's corps, which was supposed 
to be the best in Cuesta's army, and was engaged on our left 
in the mountains, at the battle of Talavera, was kept in 
check throughout the day by one French battalion ; this 
corps has since run away from the bridge of Arzobispo, 
leaving its guns ; and many of the men, according to the 
usual Spanish custom, throwing away their arms, accoutre- 
ments and clothing. It is a curious circumstance respecting 
this affair at Arzobispo (in which Soult writes that the French 
took thirty pieces of cannon), that the Spaniards ran off in 
such a hurry that they left their cannon loaded and un- 
spiked; and that the French, although they drove the 
Spaniards from the bridge, did not think themselves strong 
enough to push after them ; and Colonel Waters, whom I 
sent in with a flag of truce on the 10th, relating to our 
wounded, found the cannon on the road, abandoned by the 
one party, and not taken possession of, and probably not 
known of, by the other. 

' This practice of running away, and throwing off arms, 
accoutrements, and clothing, is fatal to everything, except- 
ing a re-assembly of the men in a state of nature, who as 
regularly perform the same manoeuvre the next time an 



1 86 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

occasion offers. Nearly 2,000 ran off on the evening of the 
27th from the battle of Talavera (not 100 yards from the 
place where I was standing), who were neither attacked nor 
threatened with an attack, and who were frightened only by 
the noise of their own fire : they left their arms and accoutre- 
ments on the ground, their officers went with them ; and they, 
and the fugitive cavalry, plundered the baggage of the British 
army which had been sent to the rear. Many others went 
whom I did not see. 

' Nothing can be worse than the officers of the Spanish 
army ; and it is extraordinary that when a nation has 
devoted itself to war, as this nation has, by the measures it 
has adopted in the last two years, so little progress has been 
made in any one branch of the military profession by any 
individual, and that the business of an army should be so 
little understood. They are really children in the art of war, 
and I cannot say that they do anything as it ought to be 
done, with the exception of running away and assembling 
again in a state of nature. 

' I really believe that much of this deficiency of numbers, 
composition, discipline, and efficiency, is to be attributed to 
the existing government of Spain. They have attempted to 
govern the kingdom in a state of revolution, by an adherence 
to old rules and systems, and with the aid of what is called 
enthusiasm ; and this last is, in fact, no aid to accomplish 
anything, and is only an excuse for the irregularity with 
which everything is done, and for the want of discipline and 
subordination of the armies. . . . 

' I now come to another branch of the subject, which is 
Portugal itself. I have not got from Beresford his report 
upon the present and the probable future state of the Por- 
tuguese army ; and therefore I should wish to be understood 
as writing, upon this part of the subject, liable to corrections 
from him.' 

Portuguese Troops. 

' My opinion is, and always has been, that the mode of 
applying the services of the English officers to the Portu- 



THE PENINSULA 187 



guese army has been erroneous. I think that Beresford 
ought to have had the temporary assistance of the ablest 
officers the British service could afford, that these officers 
ought not to have been posted to regiments in the Portu- 
guese army, but under the title of Adjutants to the Field- 
Marshal, or any other, they ought to have superintended dis- 
cipline, military movements, and arrangements of all descrip- 
tions, wherever they might be : fewer officers would then 
have answered his purpose, and every one given to him would 
have been useful ; whereas many (all in the inferior ranks) 
are under existing arrangements useless. 

' Besides this, the selection of officers sent out to 
Portugal for this service has been unlucky, and the decision 
on the questions which I sent to England on June 7, has 
been made without reference to circumstances or to the 
feelings or opinions of the individuals on whom it was to 
operate, and, just like every other decision I have ever seen 
from the same quarter, as if men were stocks and stones. 

' To this, add that rank (Portuguese rank, I mean) has been 
given in the most capricious manner. In some instances, 
a man not in the army at all is made a Brigadier-General ; 
in others, another who was the senior of the Brigadier- 
General when both were in the army is a Lieutenant- 
Colonel ; then a junior Lieutenant-Colonel is made a Brig- 
adier-General, his senior a Colonel, and his senior a junior 
Colonel ; and there are instances of juniors being preferred to 
seniors in every rank ; in short, the Prince Regent of Por- 
tugal is a despotic Prince, and his commissions have been 
given to British officers and subjects in the most arbitrary 
manner at the Horse Guards ; and the answer to all these 
complaints at the Horse Guards must be uniform, nobody 
has any right to complain ; the Prince Regent has a right 
to give to anybody any commission he pleases, bearing any 
date he chooses to assign to it. The officers of this army 
have to a man quitted the Portuguese service, as I said they 
would, and there is not an officer who has joined it from 
England who would not quit it if we would allow him ; but 
here we keep them : so much for that arrangement. 



WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 



' The subject upon which particularly I wished Beresford 
to report was the state of the Portuguese army in respect 
to its numbers. The troops have lately deserted to an 
alarming degree, and, in fact, none of the regiments are 
complete. The Portuguese army is recruited by conscrip- 
tion constitutionally, very much in the same manner with the 
French army ; but then it must be recollected that, for the 
last fifty years nearly, the troops have never left their pro- 
vince, and scarcely ever their native town ; and their dis- 
cipline, and the labours and exertion required from them, 
were nothing. 

' Things are much altered lately, and, notwithstanding that 
the pay has been increased, I fear that the animal is not of 
the description to bear up against what is required of him, 
and he deserts most terribly. . . .' 

Soldiers and Religious Worship. 

To the Right Hon. John Villiers. 

' Badajoz, 

1 September Z, 1809. 

' The soldiers of the army have permission to go to Mass, 
so far as this : they are forbidden to go into the churches 
during the performance of Divine service, unless they go to 
assist in the performance of the service. I could not do 
more, for, in point of fact, soldiers cannot by law attend the 
celebration of Mass, excepting in Ireland. The thing now 
stands exactly as it ought ; any man may go to Mass who 
chooses, and nobody makes any inquiry about it. The con- 
sequence is that nobody goes to Mass, and although we have 
whole regiments of Irishmen, and of course Roman Catholics, 
I have not seen one soldier perform any one act of religious 
worship in these Catholic countries, excepting making the 
sign of the cross to induce the people of the country to give 
them wine. 

' Although, as you will observe, I have no objection, and 
they may go to Mass if they choose it, I have great objections 
to the inquiries and interference of the priests of the country 



THE PENINSULA 



to induce them to go to Mass. The orders were calculated 
to prevent all intrigue and interference of that description ; 
and I was very certain that, when the Irish soldiers were left 
to themselves either to go or not, they would do as their 
comrades did, and not one of them would be seen in a 
church. 

' I think it best that you should avoid having any further 
discussion with the priests on this subject; but if you should 
have any, it would be best that you should tell them what 
our law is, and what the order of this army. Prudence may 
then induce them to refrain from taking any steps to induce 
the Roman Catholic soldiers to attend Mass; but if it should 
not, and their conduct should be guided by religious zeal, I 
acknowledge that, however indifferent I should have been at 
seeing the soldiers flock to the churches under my orders, I 
should not be very well satisfied to see them filled by the in- 
fluence of the priests, taking advantage of the mildness and 
toleration which is the spirit of that order. . . .' 

Withholding the Death Punishment. 

' It is a curious circumstance, that notwithstanding I have 
been aware of the necessity, and have determined to execute 
any man found guilty or in the act of plunder, I have not yet 
executed one ; although I really believe that more plunder 
and outrage have been committed by this army than by any 
other that ever was in the field : to this add, that I have 
not less than seven or eight Provosts, other armies having 
usually two. . . .' 

Women and Children's Rations. 

To Colonel Peacocke. 

' Badajoz, 

'■September 12, 1809. 

1 . . . The women and children of the officers and soldiers 
of the army are entitled, the former each to half a ration, the 
latter to a quarter of a ration daily ; and I see no objection 
to extending these allowances to the wives and children of 
clerks and others employed in the public departments, pro- 



i9o WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

vided they are English born. If the clerk be Portuguese, it 
may be very necessary and proper to give him his rations, but 
it cannot be necessary to his wife and children, and I desire 
that this practice may be discontinued. 

' I conclude that the rations drawn by the lady, to whom 
you refer as an officer's wife, are for the wives of other 
officers or soldiers, and if so they are perfectly regular ; if 
not, they must be discontinued ; and, at all events, forage 
must not be allowed to the horse of an officer's lady residing 
at Lisbon. 

' I beg that you will understand that I am desirous of 
giving to the wives of the officers and soldiers of the army 
every indulgence to the fullest extent allowed by His 
Majesty's regulations ; but I can suffer no abuse, and every 
appearance of abuse must be checked immediately. 

' The officers of the army are allowed to draw rations in 
the field for servants not soldiers, paying for the same ; and 
I conceive the same indulgence may be extended to their 
families residing at Lisbon for English servants, but not for 
Portuguese.' 

Praise for the 29TH Regiment.* 
To Viscount Castlereagh. 

' Badajoz, 

' September 12, 1809. 

' I wish very much that some measures could be adopted 
to get some recruits for the 29th Regiment. It is the best 
regiment in this army, has admirable internal system, 
and excellent non-commissioned officers ; but for the want of 
a second battalion, and somebody to attend to its recruiting, 
it is much reduced in numbers, by losses in the action of 
Rolica and Vimeiro, in the expedition to the north of Por- 
tugal and at Talavera. . . .' 

* Now the 1st Battalion the Worcestershire Regiment. The 29th bore 
the brunt of the fight at Rolica, and was the last regiment of the famous 
Peninsular Army to retain the pigtail and hair-powder. — W. W. 



THE PENINSULA 19 1 



First Use of the Name ' Wellington.' 

To the Right Hon. John Villicrs. 

' Badajoz, 

' September 16, 1809. 

' My dear Villiers, 

' . . . The sum of money received in the last month of 
August for bills, and in all modes, amounts to £158,000, of 
which sum the fifth, or about £32,000, are at your disposal, 
at the Commissary General's officer. Of this sum you have 
already, I understand, received a part. This sum of £158,000 
is exclusive of the money arrived in the Fylla, amounting to 
£150,000 and more, the silver belonging, I understand, 
exclusively to the Portuguese Government. 

' Believe me, etc., 

' Wellington. 

' This is the first time I have signed my new name. 
Would the Regency give me leave to have a Chasse at Villa 
Vicosa ?' 

The Care of Kettles. 

To Brigadier-General Robert Cranfurd. 

' Badajoz, 

' Septetnber 29, 1809. 

' I have been for some time very anxious respecting a part 
of what forms the subject of your letter of the 26th — I mean 
the camp kettles ; and I am much obliged to you for your 
opinions on the subject. Faulty as is the existing mode of 
carrying the camp kettles, it is more efficient than that of 
which it is the substitute in this country. 

' There is much to be said on both sides of the question 
respecting the description of kettle which the soldiers ought 
to have, and as the iron kettle is the best for cooking, and 
lasts longest, and, moreover, as the use of that description 
and size of kettle requires the employment of fewest men in 
cooking, the choice between them resolves itself into this 
point, which is most likely to be carried with certainty, so as 
to give the soldier at all times the use of a kettle. . . . 



192 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 



' Upon the whole, therefore, I prefer the iron kettles to the 
tin for general purposes ; but I have no objection to try the 
latter in some of our best regiments, in order to see how the 
experiment may answer. . . .' 

The ist Dragoons. 

To Lieutenant-General Payne. 

' Lisbon, 

' October ii, 1809. 

' I arrived here yesterday, and I saw the ist Dragoons in 
the streets, and I think that in my life I have never seen 
a finer regiment. They were very strong, the horses in 
very good condition, and the regiment apparently in high 
order.' 

German Deserters from the French Service. 
Memorandum. 

' A ccording to the desire expressed by Mr. Villiers, I proceed to 
give my opinion on the points referred to in his despatch to 
the Secretary of State, dated October 2, 1809. 

' October 1 1 , 1 809. 
' . . . I rather believe Mr. Villiers is misinformed respect- 
ing the desertion of the German troops in the French 
service ; they do desert, certainly, when the British army is 
near them, and so do the French, but not in the numbers 
supposed. I believe, however, that they would desert in 
greater numbers if the Spanish peasants did not murder 
everything in the shape of a French soldier found at any 
distance from the lines ; and General Cuesta had already 
adopted measures to encourage desertion, by preventing these 
murders, by offering and giving a reward for every soldier 
belonging to the enemy brought in alive. . . .' 

To the Earl of Liverpool. 

' Badajoz, 

' November 27, 1809. 

' I have had the honour of receiving your lordship's letter 
of the 2nd instant, in which you have enclosed the copy of 



THE PENINSULA 193 



one from Mr. Villiers ; and in case I should have any 
opportunity of communicating with the German corps in the 
service of the enemy, I shall attend to your lordship's in- 
structions. 

' It is impossible for me to say what number of Germans 
were enlisted at Oporto and Ciudad Rodrigo from the 
enemy's troops, because I did not command His Majesty's 
troops in this country at the time ; but I did in the months 
of July and August last, and I have no recollection of the 
arrival of any German deserters from the Escurial, much 
less of 160. Neither do I recollect the circumstance of a 
battalion being in treaty to join us, when the British army 
was in the neighbourhood of that of the enemy in July and 
August. 

'The German troops were at and in the neighbourhood 
of Toledo, with few exceptions ; some few then deserted, but 
not in such numbers as to deserve serious attention ; and 
adverting to the encouragement they had from the Com- 
mander-in-Chief of the Spanish army, and to the facilities 
afforded to them by our neighbourhood and their own 
position, I was rather inclined to be of opinion that as a 
body, or even in very large numbers, they were not desirous 
of quitting the French service. At the same time, the com- 
manding officers of the German regiments in the British 
service were not anxious to receive them as recruits, in which 
they were not wrong, as most of the few they did receive 
have since deserted from them ; and, upon the whole, I did 
not think there was any ground for a belief that any measures 
which I might adopt to encourage or facilitate desertion from 
the enemy's German troops would have an effect at all pro- 
portionate to the expense of them.' 



13 



194 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 



Officer's Unbecoming Conduct. 

To Brigadier-General Slade, President of a General Court- 
martial. 

' Lisbon, 

' October 12, 1809. 

' I have perused the proceedings of the general court- 
martial, of which you are President, on the trial of Lieutenant 

, of the Regiment, for " most unofficerlike and 

ungentlemanlike conduct, in being concerned in an affray 
which took place in the city of Lisbon on the night of 
the 3rd of March last, 1809," of which crime the court have 
honourably acquitted him ; and I request you to reassemble 
the general court-martial, and to desire them to revise this 
sentence. 

' It appears that the affray in which the court have found 

that Lieutenant was concerned originated in a brothel, 

in which Lieutenant was with other officers ; and 

although his conduct in the affray might have been distin- 
guished by his activity to quell it, and merits the acquittal 
which the court have sentenced, I should not do my duty by 
them or by His Majesty, who has entrusted me with the 
power of confirming their sentence, if I did not draw 
their attention to the use of the term honourably, which it 
contains. 

' It is difficult and needless at present to define in what 
cases an honourable acquittal by a court-martial is peculiarly 
applicable ; but it must appear to all persons to be objec- 
tionable in a case in which any part of the transaction, 
which has been the subject of investigation before the court- 
martial, is disgraceful to the character of the party under 
trial. 

' A sentence of honourable acquittal by a court-martial 
should be considered by the officers and soldiers of the army 
as a subject of exultation ; but no man can exult in the ter- 
mination of any transaction a part of which has been dis- 
graceful to him ; and although such a transaction may be 



THE PENINSULA 195 



terminated by an honourable acquittal by a court-martial, it 
cannot be mentioned to the party without offence, or without 
exciting feelings of disgust in others : these are not the feel- 
ings which ought to be excited by the recollection and 
mention of a sentence of honourable acquittal. 

' I believe that there is no officer upon the general court- 
martial who wishes to connect the term honour with the act 
of going to a brothel ; the common practice forbids it, and 
there is no man who, unfortunately, commits this act who 
does not endeavour to conceal it from the world and his 

friends. But the honourable acquittal of Lieutenant , as 

recorded in this sentence, which states that he was concerned 
in an affray which is known to have originated in a brothel, 
will have the effect of connecting with the act of going to a 
brothel the honourable distinction which it is in the power 
of a court-martial to bestow on those brought before them on 
charges of a very different nature, by the sentence which it 
may pass upon them. 

' I therefore anxiously recommend to the general court- 
martial to omit the word honourably in their sentence.' 

Officers' Misbehaviour in Theatres. 

To Colonel Peacocke. 

' Lisbon, 

' October 26, 1809. 

' I am concerned to be obliged to inform you that it has 
been mentioned to me that the British officers who are in 
Lisbon are in the habit of going to the theatres, where some 
of them conduct themselves in a very improper manner, much 
to the annoyance of the public, and to the injury of the 
proprietors and of the performers. I cannot conceive for 
what reason the officers of the British army should conduct 
themselves at Lisbon in a manner which would not be 
permitted in their own country, is contrary to rule and custom 
in this country, and is permitted in none when there is any 
regulation or decency of behaviour. 

' The officers commanding regiments and the superior 
officers must take measures to prevent a repetition of the 

13—2 



196 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

conduct adverted to, and of the consequent complaints which 
I have received ; or I must take measures which shall effec- 
tually prevent the character of the army and of the British 
nation from suffering by the misconduct of a few. 

' The officers of the army can have nothing to do behind 
the scenes, and it is very improper that they should appear 
upon the stage during the performance. They must be 
aware that the English public would not bear either the one 
or the other, and I see no reason why the Portuguese public 
should be worse treated. 

' I have been concerned to see officers in uniform, with 
their hats on, upon the stage during the performance, and 
to hear of the riots and outrages which some of them have 
committed behind the scenes ; and I can only repeat that, if 
this conduct should be continued, I shall be under the 
necessity of adopting measures to prevent it, for the credit 
of the army and of the country. 

1 I beg you to communicate this letter to the Commanding 
Officers of the regiments in the garrison of Lisbon, and to the 
Commanding Officer of the detachments of convalescents, and 
desire them to communicate its contents to the officers under 
their command respectively. 

' Indeed, officers who are absent from their duty on account 
of sickness might as well not go to the playhouse, or at all 
events upon the stage and behind the scenes. I beg you 
also to take such measures as may appear to you to be 
necessary to prevent a repetition of this conduct.' 

Cartel of Exchange. 

'Headquarters of the British Army, 
' October 20, 1 809. 

' Cartel of exchange between Lieutenant Cameron of the 
79th Regiment, taken by the French army at Talavera (and 
sent into the British army, on a cartel of exchange with Lieut- 
enant de Turenne, Aide-de-Camp to General Kellermann), 
and Lieutenant Louis Vernon de Farincourt, of the 2nd Light 
Infantry of the French army, taken by the Portuguese army 
at Chaves, and now in confinement at Lisbon. 



THE PENINSULA 197 



' The above-mentioned exchange with Lieutenant de 
Turenne not taking effect, Lieutenant Cameron of the 79th 
is exchanged for Lieutenant Louis Vernon de Farincourt. 
In consequence thereof, Lieutenant Louis Vernon de Farin- 
court is authorized to join the French army ; and all officers 
commanding English, Portuguese, and Spanish troops are 
requested to allow him to pass to the French army without 
molestation. 

' Lieutenant Vernon de Farincourt will show this cartel of 
exchange to the Commander-in-Chief of the French army. 

' Wellington.' 

The Talavera Club. 

To the Right Hon. John Villiers. 
1 Badajoz, 

' November 20, 1809. 

' ... In respect to the Talavera Club, before I consent to 
belong to it I must see who are the society ; and possibly it 
might be well to look a little into the character of those who 
constituted it at Lisbon. If the officers who first went down 
to Lisbon from the army, they are people who ought not to 
be countenanced on any account, as they in fact deserted ; 
and each of them, as he comes up, is in arrest, and he is 
obliged to give an account of himself. . . .' 

Injudicious News. 

To the Earl of Liverpool. 

' Badajoz, 

' November 21, 1809. 

' I beg to draw your lordship's attention to the frequent 
paragraphs in the English newspapers, describing the 
position, the numbers, the objects, and the means of attain- 
ing them, possessed by the armies in Spain and Portugal. 

' In some instances the English newspapers have accurately 
stated, not only the regiments occupying a position, but the 
number of men fit for duty of which each regiment was 
composed ; and this intelligence must have reached the enemy 



WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 



at the same time it did me, at a moment at which it was 
most important that he should not receive it. 

' The newspapers have recently published an account of 
the defensive positions occupied by the different English and 
Portuguese corps, which certainly conveyed to the enemy the 
first knowledge he had of them ; and I enclose a paragraph 
recently published, describing the line of operation which I 
should follow in case of the occurrence of a certain event, the 
preparations which I had made for that operation, and where 
I had formed my magazines. 

' It is not necessary to inquire in what manner the news- 
papers acquire this description of information ; but if the 
editors really feel an anxiety for the success of the military 
operations in the Peninsula, they will refrain from giving 
this information to the public, as they must know that their 
papers are read by the enemy, and that the information 
which they are desirous of conveying to their English readers 
is mischievous to the public, exactly in proportion as it is 
well founded and correct. 

' Your lordship will be the best judge whether any and 
what measures ought to be adopted to prevent the publica- 
tion of this description of intelligence. I can only assure you 
that it will increase materially the difficulty of all operations 
in this country.' 

Recommending a Brave Officer. 

To Lieutenant-Colonel Torrens. 

'Badajoz, 

' November 30, 1809. 

' I have to request that you will submit the enclosed 
memorial to the favourable consideration of the Commander- 
in-Chief; and I beg leave to recommend Major Coghlan, 
61st Regiment,* in the strongest manner, as an officer most 
deserving of the promotion he solicits.' 

* Major Coghlan had been wounded and left at Talavera, and had 
escaped from prison on his march towards France. He was soon after- 
wards promoted to be Lieutenant- Colonel of the 61st, in the command of 
which regiment he was shot through the heart at the Battle of Toulouse, 



THE PENINSULA 199 



' An Unanimous Army.' 

To Colonel Malcolm. 

1 Badajoz, 

' December 3, 1809. 

' I have in hand a most difficult task, from which I may 
not extricate myself; but I must not shrink from it. I 
command an unanimous army; I draw well with all the 
authorities in Spain and Portugal, and I believe I have the 
good wishes of the whole world. In such circumstances one 
may fail, but it would be dishonourable to shrink from the 
task. . . .' 

Ignorant Spanish Officers. 

To B. Frere, Esq. 

' Badajoz, 

' December 6, 1 809. 

' I shall not detain the messenger by any addition to my 
official letters of this day, excepting to lament that a cause 
which promised so well a few weeks ago should have been so 
completely lost by the ignorance, presumption, and mis- 
management of those to whose direction it was intrusted. 

1 I declare that if they had preserved their two armies, or 
even one of them, the cause was safe. The French could 
have sent no reinforcements which could have been of any 
use ; time would have been gained ; the state of affairs would 
have improved daily ; all the chances were in our favour ; and 
in the first moment of weakness occasioned by any diversion 
on the Continent, or by the growing discontent of the French 
themselves with the war, the French armies must have been 
driven out of Spain. 

' But no ! Nothing will answer excepting to fight great 
battles in plains, in which their defeat is as certain as is the 
commencement of the battle. They will not credit the 

on April 10, 1814. He was buried, under fire, in a temporary grave, on 
the position captured from the enemy ; but on the 12th was removed 
to the Protestant cemetery in Toulouse, where all the officers of the army 
then in Toulouse paid the last tribute of respect to his remains. 



200 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

accounts I have repeatedly given them of the superior 
number even of the French ; they will seek them out, and 
they find them invariably in all parts in numbers superior to 
themselves. 

' I am only afraid, now, that I shall be too late to save 
Ciudad Rodrigo ; the loss of which will secure for the French 
Old Castille, and will cut off all communication with the 
northern provinces, and leave them to their fate. 

' I wonder whether the Spanish officers ever read the 
history of the American war, or of their own war in the 
Dutch provinces, or of their own war in Portugal.' 

A Too Zealous Reformer. 

To the Right Hon. John Villiers. 

' Badajoz, 

1 December 22, 1 809. 

' I am concerned to be obliged to make any complaint of 
a protege" of yours, but I must say that I think I have some 
cause to complain of Mr. . 

' He was appointed by me to the Commissariat in June, 
and on July 11 he writes a letter to the Lords of the 
Treasury, in which he gives them to understand neither 
more nor less than that the Commissary-General and all his 
officers, as well as myself, are either knaves or fools ; and 
that he can save thousands upon thousands to the public, by 
some new mode he has discovered of supplying the troops 
with bread. He disclaims, at the same time, any intention 
of making a charge against any of us ! 

'Now, I must say that, if Mr. has made any discovery 

upon this subject, it was his duty to apprise me of it; and 
at least to try whether our failure to save the public these 
thousands upon thousands was to be attributed to knavery 
or folly, before he wrote to the Treasury upon the subject.' 



THE PENINSULA 201 



Assailed by Common Councilmen. 

To the Right Hon. John Villiers. 

' Pombal, 

1 January 2, 18 10. 

'. . . You see the dash which the Common Council of the 
city of London have made at me ! I act with a sword hang- 
ing over me, which will fall upon me whatever may be the 
result of affairs here ; but they may do what they please, 
I shall not give up the game here as long as it can be 
played.' 

Eight Months' Loss in Dead. 

To the Earl of Liverpool. 

'Pombal, 

'January 2, 18 10. 

'. . . I have lately had a return made out showing the 
total loss of the army in dead since I took the command 
in April last ; which is only 4,500 men, including the Battle 
of Talavera, etc. Besides which, there are 1,500 prisoners. 
This is about one third of the loss which the French 
compute that they suffered in about the same period of 
time. . . .' 

Faithful to the 33RD. 

To Lieutenant-Colonel Torrens, Military Secretary to the 
Commander-in-Chief. 

' Viseu, 

1 January 30, 18 10. 

' I shall esteem it a great favour if you will tell Sir David 
Dundas that I am very much obliged to him, but that I have 
no wish to be removed from the 33rd Regiment, of which I 
was Major, and Lieutenant-Colonel, and then Colonel.* 

' I must say, however, that my friend, the late Secretary 
at War, made it the least profitable of all the regiments 
of the army, and, I believe, a losing concern, having reduced 
the establishment at once from 1,200 to 800, when it con- 
sisted of above 750 men ; and I had to pay the freight of 

* An offer had been made to remove Lord Wellington to a regiment 
with two battalions. 



202 



WELLINGTON'S DESPA TCHES 



the clothing to the East Indies, and its carriage to Hyder- 
abad, about 500 miles from Madras. With all this, I have 
the reputation of having a good thing in a regiment in the 
East Indies !' 

Military Stores. 
To the Earl of Liverpool. 

' VlSEU, 

''January 30, 18 10. 

' I have the honour to enclose the returns of stores in His 
Majesty's magazines in Portugal up to January 1, 1810.' 

1 Commissary-General's Office, 

'VlSEU, January 1, 1810. 
Return of Provisions, Wine, Spirits, and Forage remaining in His 
Majesty's Magazi?ies i?i Portugal on January 1, 18 10. 
Biscuit - - 1,792,160] 



Provisions, 

Wine, and- 

Spirits. 



Flour 
Salt meat 
Wine - 

I Rum 

/Oats 
Barley 
Wheat - 
Forage I Indian corn 
Beans 
Bran 

VHay 



- 1,099,134 -Pounds. 

- i,797,i9°J 
26 Pipes. 

113,990 Gallons. 

- 1,444,640) 

- 1,286,385 
87,070 

212,551 [Pounds. 
1,660 
5,100 

- 1,372,304- 
' J. Murray, Commissary-General.' 

1 Commissary-General's Office, 

1 VlSEU, January 1, 1810. 
Pet urn of Quartermaster-General 's Stores remaining in His Majesty's 
Magazines in Portugal. 



Soldiers' 
tents. 



1,900 Flanders tents 

1,900 Flanders poles 

1,838 Iron collars 

6,000 Mallets 

124,600 Pins 

724 Poles and cases') Camp 

431 Flags j colours. 

595 Powder bags. 

1,060 Drum cases. 

698 Hatchets. 



785 Bill-hooks. 

3,493 Flanders kettles. 

264 Picket ropes. 

5 Pickaxes. 

453 Hair nose bags. 

461 Packsaddles with crooked 

haucums. 

264 Bridles and chain collars. 

167 Ammunition boxes. 

19 Medicine panniers. 



THE PENINSULA 203 



16 Tarpaulins. 


106 


Bundles of blankets. 


1 5^ Vals marq. tents\ 


735 


Picket poles. 


14! Sets of poles [ Hos- 


1 


Knapsack. 


70 Bags of mallets f pital. 


618 


Sets of bedding. 


and pins 1 


5 


Shovels. 


3 Reels and lines. 


5 


Spades. 


200 Langrels. 


149 


Casks of accoutrements. 


626 Tin kettles. 


2 


Cases of nails. 


335 Kettle bags. 


75 


Mule halters. 


604 Tin canteens. 


34 


French tent poles. 


6,699 Wood canteens. 


20 


Small water casks. 


5,286 Canteen straps. 


13 


Cases of buttons. 


43 Felling axes. 


9 


Cases of officers' swords. 


14,020 Haversacks. 


99,062 


Pairs of shoes. 


2,235 Blankets. 


45 


Bales of army clothing. 


542I Sets of forage cords, four 


10 


Baskets. 


to a set. 


400 


Palliasses. 


'J- 


Murray, Commissary-Genera/.' 



Continued Outrages.* 
To Charles Stuart, Esq. 

' VlSEU, 

' March 6, 18 10. 

'. . . It is unfortunately but too true that outrages of all 
descriptions are committed by the British soldiers in this 
country, notwithstanding the pains taken by me and the 
General and other superior officers of the army, to prevent 
them, and to punish those who commit them. 

' It is useless to trouble you with a description of the 
causes of these evils, upon which I have written fully to 
the King's Ministers. One of them, undoubtedly, is the 
disinclination of the people of this country to substantiate 
upon oath, before a court-martial, their complaints of the 
conduct of the soldiers, without which it is well known that 
it is impossible for me to punish them : the consequence 
is that the criminals are tried and acquitted for want of 
evidence ; for it is vain to expect evidence of an outrage 
from the comrades of the soldier who has committed it. 

* Written in connection with an allegation that a British soldier had 
murdered a man because the deceased had refused to mend his boots.— 
W. W. 



204 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

' The records of the embassy at Lisbon must be filled with 
complaints of the same general nature as that which I now 
return to you, and with demands from me of evidence on 
the facts stated ; the result of which has invariably been, 
that no evidence has been adduced to substantiate the com- 
plaints made, and those who have committed the outrages 
complained of have remained unpunished. 

' I am concerned to add that I know of no means which 
have not already been adopted to endeavour to keep the 
British soldiers in order. Detachments are never allowed 
to march, excepting under the command of an officer ; and 
the most strict orders have been given for the regulation 
of the conduct of the soldiers when so employed ; and an 
officer of the Provost Marshal establishment is employed 
whenever the numbers of any detachment will justify such 
an appointment. 

' But all has hitherto been in vain ; the outrages com- 
plained of are still perpetrated, and they will continue until 
the Government and people see the necessity of doing their 
utmost to convict, before a court-martial, those soldiers 
of the crimes of which, I am sorry to say, I am too well 
convinced they have reason to complain.' 

Vagabonds from Hospital. 

To Brigadier-General R. Craufurd. 

' Viseu, 

' March 20, 18 10. 

'. . . I shall speak to the Commissary-General about your 
wine, and I shall send you some shoes. We have, however, 
very few in this neighbourhood, as the vagabonds who come 
from the hospital sell everything upon the road, and it is 
generally necessary to supply them with all the requisites for 
a soldier as they pass through this place. I have, however, 
ordered forward a large supply, of which you shall have 
your share.' 



THE PENINSULA 205 



The Third Year of the Contest. 

To Major-General the Hon. W. Stewart. 

'Viseu, 

' March 27, 18 10. 

'. . . The affairs of the Peninsula have invariably had the 
same appearance since I have known them ; they have 
always appeared to be lost ; means have always appeared 
inadequate to objects, and the sole dependence of the whole 
has apparently been upon us. The contest, however, still 
continues, and is in its third year, and we must continue 
it as long as we can with the means which the country 
affords, improving them as much as the people will allow us, 
as it is obvious that Great Britain cannot give us larger 
means than we have. . . .' 

The Affair at Barba de Puerco. 

To the Earl of Liverpool. 

'Viseu, 

' March 28, 18 10. 

'. . . The French attacked the post at Barba de Puerco, 
which was occupied by four companies of the 95th Regiment 
under Lieutenant-Colonel Beckwith, on the night of the 
19th instant. 

' Immediately opposite to Barba de Puerco, on the other 
side of the river, is San Felices, and between these two 
villages the only bridge on the Agueda below Ciudad Rodrigo, 
and the recent fall of rain had filled the river, which was 
nowhere fordable. 

' The enemy had collected a brigade of infantry at San 
Felices, and crossed the bridge with 600 men after dark, 
keeping the remainder on the other side. These followed 
the picket of the 95th up from the bridge, and immediately 
made their attack ; but they were repulsed with the loss 
of two officers and seven men killed, six prisoners, and 
thirty firelocks. 

' I am sorry to add that Lieutenant Mercer of the 95th 



206 WELLINGTON'S DESPA TCHES 

and three men were killed, and ten were wounded, in this 
affair, which was highly creditable to Colonel Beckwith, and 
displayed the gallantry and discipline of the officers and 
troops under his command. The Adjutant, Lieutenant 
Stewart, distinguished himself.'* 

Mutual Hatred. 
To the Earl of Liverpool. 

' Viseu, 

' March 30, 18 10. 

' . . . I am fully aware of the mutual hatred of the Spanish 
and Portuguese people towards each other ; and you may 
depend upon it that I adverted to that circumstance when I 
considered of the propriety of sending to Cadiz a Portuguese 
regiment. From experience of the manner in which the 
service of Portuguese troops was received in other Spanish 
garrisons, I did not consider it probable that this hatred was 
likely to affect the reception of the Portuguese regiment at 
Cadiz ; and having that regiment at my disposal at the 
moment a garrison was wanted for Cadiz, I did not think 
it proper to allow the consideration of the hatred of these 
nations towards each other to deprive the cause of this timely 
assistance. . . .' 

Unfaltering Confidence. 
To Lieutenant-Colonel Torrens. 

' Viseu, 

' March 31, 1810. 

' . . . I am in a situation in which no mischief can be done 
to the army, or to any part of it ; I am prepared for all 
events ; and if I am in a scrape, as appears to be the general 
belief in England, although certainly not my own, I'll get 
out of it.' 

* This affair of posts is one of the most memorable incidents in the 
annals of the Rifle Brigade — the old 95th. Wellington issued a special 
complimentary Order in which he said that the action reflected great 
honour on the regiment. — W. W. 



THE PENINSULA 207 



To Encourage French Desertion 
To Brigadier-General Cox, Governor of Almeida. 

' Viseu, 

"■April 1, 1 8 10. 

' I request you to pay Seiior Echevarria all the expenses 
which he has incurred for the encouragement of desertion 
from the French army, and for the support of deserters, and 
to tell him that I request him to encourage desertion by 
the following measures. Let him send trusty persons to 
assure soldiers in the French army, induced to desert, that 
they shall be received here and treated in every respect as 
British soldiers ; that their arms and horses, if they should 
bring them, shall be bought from them and paid for ; that 
they shall have their option of enlisting into the British 
service or not ; that if they choose to enlist they shall receive 
a bounty and shall have the choice of enlisting into any of 
the foreign corps with this army, or in England ; and that, 
if they do not choose to enlist, measures shall be taken to 
send them out of the Peninsula, and to facilitate their return 
to their own country. 

' I request that all deserters may be sent to the head- 
quarters of the army, and all expenses incurred on their 
account shall be paid.' 

To Major-General Doyle. 

'Celorico, 

' May 3, 1810. 
' . . . I have received an answer to the reference which I 
had made to the Secretary of State on the subject of your 
raising a regiment from the deserters of the French army ; 
and his lordship not only objects to your proposal, but 
objects to admitting deserters into the British service in any 
manner or upon any terms. However, any engagements 
into which you may have entered, under any former orders, 
shall be carried into execution, and the men shall be treated 
as British soldiers, shall be sent to England, and, if then 
discharged from the service, they shall have the means 
facilitated to them of returning to their own countries.' 



2 o8 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 



Wellington and Sir John Moore. 

To the Earl of Liverpool. 

' Viseu, 

1 April 2, 1810. 

' . . . The great disadvantage under which I labour is, 
that Sir John Moore, who was here before me, gave an 
opinion that this country could not be defended by the army 
under his command ; and, although it is obvious that the 
country was in a very different situation at that time from 
what it is at present ; that I am in a very different situation 
from that in which he found himself; and that, moreover, it 
can be proved, from the marches and operations of the army 
under Sir John Moore, and his despatches, that little was 
known of Portugal at that time ; yet persons, who ought to 
be acquainted with these facts, entertain a prejudice against 
the adoption of any plans for opposing the enemy, of which 
Portugal is to be the theatre, or its means the instrument, 
and will not even consider them. 

' I have as much respect as any man can have for the 
opinion and judgment of Sir John Moore ; and I should 
mistrust my own, if opposed to his, in a case which he had 
had an opportunity of knowing and considering. But he 
positively knew nothing of Portugal, and could know nothing 
of its existing state. Besides this prejudice, founded on Sir 
John Moore's opinion, there is another very general prejudice 
against any military opinion in the Peninsula. 

' My opinion is that, as long as we shall remain in a state 
of activity in Portugal, the contest must continue in Spain ; 
that the French are most desirous that we should withdraw 
from the country, but know that they must employ a very 
large force indeed in the operations which will render it 
necessary for us to go away ; and I doubt whether they can 
bring that force to bear upon Portugal without abandoning 
other objects, and exposing their whole fabric in Spain to 
great risk. If they should be able to invade it, and should 
not succeed in obliging us to evacuate the country, they will 
be in a very dangerous situation; and the longer we can 



THE PENINSULA 209 



oppose them, and delay their success, the more likely are 
they to suffer materially in Spain. 

' All the preparations for embarking and carrying away 
the army, and everything belonging to it, are already made, 
and my intention is to embark it, as soon as I find that 
a military necessity exists for so doing. I shall delay the 
embarkation as long as it is in my power, and shall do every- 
thing in my power to avert the necessity of embarking at all. 

' If the enemy should invade this country with a force less 
than that which I should think so superior to ours as to create 
the necessity for embarking, I shall fight a battle to save the 
country, for which I have made the preparations ; and if the 
result should not be successful, of which I have no doubt, I 
shall still be able to retire and embark the army. 

' In short, the whole of my conduct shall be guided by a 
fair and cool view of the circumstances of our situation at 
the momeiii 1 , and a reference to your lordship's instructions 
of February 27. . . .' 

Anxious to leave by the Hall Door. 

' When we do go, I feel a little anxiety to go, like gentle- 
men, out of the hall door, particularly after the preparations 
which I have made to enable us to do so, and not out of the 
back-door, or by the area. 

' I am willing to be responsible for the evacuation of 
Portugal, under your lordship's instructions of February 27. 
Depend upon it, whatever people may tell you, I am not so 
desirous as they imagine of fighting desperate battles ; if I 
was, I might fight one any day I please. But I have kept 
the army for six months in two positions, notwithstanding 
their own desire, and that of the allies, that I should take 
advantage of many opportunities which the enemy apparently 
offered of striking a blow against them ; in some of which 
the single operation would certainly have been successful. 
But I have looked to the great result of our maintaining our 
position on the Peninsula, and have not allowed myself to 
be diverted from it by the wishes of the allies, and probably 
of some of our own army, that I should interfere more 

14 



2io WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 



actively in some partial affairs ; or by the opinion of others, 
that we ought to quit the country prematurely ; and I have 
not harassed my troops by marches and counter-marches, in 
conformity to the enemy's movements. I believe that the 
world in the Peninsula begin to believe that I am right. 

' I am convinced that, if the Spaniards had followed my 
advice, Spain would now have been out of danger, and that 
the conduct which I have pursued has given us at this 
moment an efficient army, which is the only hope of the 
Peninsula. I am perfectly aware of the risks which I incur 
personally, whatever may be the result of the operations in 
Portugal. All I beg is that, if I am to be responsible, I may 
be left to the exercise of my own judgment ; and I ask for 
the fair confidence of Government upon the measures which 
I am to adopt. 

' If Government take the opinions of others upon the situa- 
tion of affairs here, and entertain doubts upon the measures 
which I propose to adopt, then let them give me their 
instructions in detail, and I will carry them strictly into 
execution. I may venture, however, to assure you that, 
with the exception of Marshal Beresford, who I believe 
concurs entirely in all my opinions respecting the state of 
the contest, and the measures to be adopted here, there is 
noman in the army who has taken half the pains upon the 
subject that I have.' 

The Hollowness of the Bonaparte System. 
To Brigadier-General R. Craufurd. 

' Viseu, 

' April 4, i8ic. 

1 . . . The Austrian marriage is a terrible event, and must 
prevent any great movement on the Continent for the pre- 
sent. Still, I do not despair of seeing at some time or other 
a check to the Bonaparte system. Recent transactions in 
Holland show that it is all hollow within, and that it is so 
inconsistent with the wishes, the interests, and even the 
existence, of civilized society, that he cannot trust even his 
brothers to carry it into execution. . . .' 



THE PENINSULA 



Desertion and Crime.* 
To the Adjutant-General of the Forces. 

' VlSEU, 

' April 6, 1810. 

' I have had the honour of receiving your letters of 
March 2, relative to the desertion in the 2nd Battalion — th 
Regiment, appearing on the return of that regiment, to 
January 25 ; and I enclose the reports which I have received 
from Major-General Picton and Major Young upon that 
subject. 

' The desertion from nearly all the regiments in this army 
must have appeared extraordinary to the Commander-in- 
Chief, and must have given him as much concern as it has 
to me. Till lately desertion from a British army on service 
was a crime almost unknown ; and I am concerned to add 
that I have reason to believe that many of those who have 
deserted have been guilty of the worst description of that 
offence, and have gone over to the enemy. 

1 1 attribute the prevalence of this crime in a great measure 
to the bad description of men, of which many of the regiments- 
are composed almost entirely, and who have been received 
principally from the Irish militia. A sufficient time has not 
elapsed, since these men have entered the regiments of the 
line, to form their habits to regularity and discipline ; the 
non-commissioned officers, in the second battalions princi- 
pally, are very bad ; and I am sorry to add that the subaltern 
officers are not of the best description ; and that I do not 
think so much attention has been given by them as might 
have been expected, to form either the non-commissioned 
officers or the soldiers to those habits of regularity which a 
soldier ought to have. 

' I attribute the desertion from this army likewise, in some 
degree, to the irregular and predatory habits which those 
soldiers had acquired, who, having straggled from their 

* In his evidence before the Royal Commission for inquiring into 
Military Punishments, Wellington emphatically said that drunkenness was 
•nvariably the great parent of all crime in the British army. — W. W. 

14 — 2 



WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 



regiments during the late service under the command of 
Sir John Moore, were some of them taken prisoners by the 
French, and have since escaped from them ; and others, after 
having wandered in different parts of Portugal and Spain, 
have returned to the army. All these men have shifted for 
themselves in the country, by rapine and plunder, since they 
quitted their regiments in 1808; and they have informed 
others of their modes of proceeding, and have instilled a 
desire in others to follow their example, and live in the same 
mode and by the same means, free from the restraints of 
discipline and regularity. 

' I can assure the Commander-in-Chief that I know of no 
cause for the desertion of the soldiers from this army, except- 
ing those to which I have above referred. They have in 
general but little duty, and since the month of August no 
fatigue. Their quarters are, without exception, good ; the 
inhabitants of the country are invariably kind to them ; and 
not only has there been no distress for provisions since the 
month of August, but I really believe that there is not a 
soldier in the army who is not as well fed, and does not 
receive his food as regularly as he could in barracks in 
England. 

' Their pay is also regularly given to them, and their 
accounts regularly settled, and the balances paid, although 
one month later than the period fixed by His Majesty's 
regulations, on account of the difficulty of procuring money 
in this country for the army. 

' While writing upon this subject, it is proper that I should 
inform the Commander-in-Chief that desertion is not the 
only crime of which the soldiers of this army have been 
guilty to an extraordinary degree. A detachment seldom 
marches, particularly if under the command of a non-com- 
missioned officer (which rarely happens), that a murder or a 
highway robbery, or some act of outrage, is not committed by 
the British soldiers composing it. They have killed eight 
people since the army returned to Portugal in December ; 
and I am sorry to add that a convoy has seldom arrived with 
money that the chests have not been broken open, and some 



THE PENINSULA 213 



of the money stolen by the soldiers in whose charge it was 
placed, although invariably under the command of an officer ; 
and they have never brought up either shoes or other neces- 
saries which could be of use to them, or which they could 
sell, that they have not stolen some of the articles committed 
to their charge. 

' The orders to the army, and the Provost's establishment, 
which is larger than was ever known with any British army, 
will show the pains which the general officers, the Com- 
manding Officers of regiments, and I, have taken to prevent 
the commission of these crimes, which, indeed, are not very 
frequent at the regiments, although they are committed 
sometimes even there : and the general courts - martial 
which have been assembled, and sitting almost constantly 
while the army has been halted, and sometimes as many as 
three sitting at the same time in the different cantonments 
of the army, will show the pains which have been taken to 
convict and punish those who have been guilty of these 
crimes. But the inhabitants of the country have such a re- 
spect and affection for the British nation, and particularly 
for the military qualities of the soldier (who presumes upon 
his military reputation to commit many of the crimes of 
which he is guilty), that it is most difficult to prevail upon 
the inhabitants to give testimony of the injuries they have 
received, and they will rarely point out the person who has 
committed the offence ; and the soldiers themselves will 
rarely tell the truth before a court-martial. The sentences 
of the courts-martial are also carried into execution ; so 
that everything that precaution and discipline could do to 
prevent crimes, and that trial and execution of sentences 
could do to punish those who have been guilty of them, has 
been done, but hitherto without much success. 

' I am concerned to be obliged to make to the Com- 
mander-in-Chief so unfavourable a report of an army which 
has shown that it possesses many excellent qualities ; but it 
contains facts which ought not to be concealed from his 
knowledge.' 



214 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

Wrongful Enlistment. 
To Brigadier-General Alex Campbell. 

' VlSEU, 

' April 8, 1810. 

' I sent you a warrant for £150, for bounty for your re- 
cruits, three or four days ago ; but are you aware that your 
recruiting officer takes men (Frenchmen) from the prisons, 
who were made prisoners of war, some of them under a 
capitulation ? No wonder that he has enlisted 150 men, 
and that Colonel Peacocke has approved of them. This 
positively must not be done. I write by this post to Colonel 
Peacocke upon the subject, and I beg you to lose no time 
in writing to the officer whom you employ.' 

Irish Deserters from the French. 
To Vice- Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley. 

' VlSEU, 

' April 9, 18 10. 

' Twenty seamen, who had belonged to an Irish regiment 
in the French service, and had deserted, have lately come in 
here, and I shall forward them to Lisbon, to be delivered 
over to your orders, as soon as the weather shall clear up a 
little. They all wish to enter the navy. . . .' 

An Army spoiled by Plunder. 
To the Earl of Liverpool. 

' VlSEU, 

'■April 11, 1810. 

' . . . I enclose the Inspector-General's returns of April 1, 
from which you will see the number actually sick, of those 
on the military returns "sick absent." The others are either 
convalescent, out of the hospitals, or on the road to join, and 
your lordship will be glad to observe how efficient and healthy 
the army is becoming. Indeed, it would now be an excellent 
army if the soldiers did not plunder. 

' Several have lately been convicted before general courts- 



THE PENINSULA 215 



martial, and have been executed, an example which I hope 
will have effect, as well upon the officers as the men. Upon 
the former I hope it will operate to induce them to take 
more pains to keep their men in order, and support the 
authority of the non-commissioned officers, and to instil into 
them a proper sense of their situation and duty; and I 
hope it will convince the latter that I possess the power, 
and am determined to exert it, to punish those who are 
guilty of those disgraceful outrages. I am still apprehensive 
of the consequence of trying them in any nice operation 
before the enemy, for they really forget everything when 
plunder or wine is within their reach. . . .' 

A Definition of Military Law. 
To Charles Stuart, Esq. 

' VlSEU, 

' April 19, 1 8 10. 

' I think it would be desirable to define with precision our 
ideas respecting the establishment of military lav/, before we 
determine to alter the established law of the country in any 
case. 

' The following questions are worth consideration and de- 
cision on this topic. What is military law ? Military law 
as applied to any persons, excepting the officers, soldiers, 
and followers of the army, for whose government there are 
particular provisions of law in all well-regulated countries, is 
neither more nor less than the will of the General of the 
army. He punishes, either with or without trial, for crimes 
either declared to be so, or not so declared by any existing 
law, or by his own orders. This is the plain and common 
meaning of the term military law. . . . 

' Let us define our notions ; and, depend upon it, we shall 
find that the establishment of military law will only increase 
our difficulties.' 



216 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

Murder of Deserters. 
To the Earl of Liverpool. 

' Celorico, 

' May I, 1810. 

' I enclose a copy of the letter which I wrote on April 1 to 
Brigadier-General Cox, containing the terms on which I was 
disposed to receive deserters from the French army. I have 
been particularly cautious respecting the enlistment of persons 
of this description in the corps of this army ; and none are 
taken who, or their families, are not known to some of the 
officers, non-commissioned officers, or privates already in the 
different corps. . . . 

' The great impediment to desertion is the danger of 
being murdered, which all soldiers of the French army incur 
in Spain, when they wander from their quarters, and are 
found singly, or in small bodies, by the inhabitants of the 
country. . . . 

' But this is a service of serious danger to the person who 
undertakes it. I do not think the employment of officers in 
the manner proposed by your lordship would answer, as the 
enemy would immediately discover their stations, and would 
cut off all communication between their foreign corps and 
the stations in which these agents should have fixed them- 
selves. 

' It is best that the deserters should be received wherever 
they can reach a post of the allied armies, and be conveyed 
from thence to the sea-coast, which is the mode at present 
arranged for the conduct of this business. . . .' 

Prejudice against German Troops. 
To His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge. 

' Celorico, 

' May 7, 1 8 10. 

' . . . A very general prejudice against German officers and 
troops prevails throughout the Peninsula ; and I think it 
very doubtful whether I shall be able to prevail upon any of 
the Spanish authorities to employ these officers ; and if I 



THE PENINSULA 217 



should, I fear that the officers will have but too much reason 
to complain of the treatment which they will receive. I there- 
fore considered it advisable to endeavour in the first instance 
to employ them in the Portuguese service, and I communi- 
cated with Marshal Beresford upon the subject, and I now 
enclose his answer. I must add to it that I am perfectly 
aware of the objections to which he refers, in giving employ- 
ment to any foreign officers in the Portuguese service, and I 
have already been obliged to send some back to England. 

' Your Royal Highness may depend upon my doing every- 
thing in my power to prevail upon the Spanish Government 
to employ these officers, and to make their situation as 
advantageous and agreeable to them as circumstances will 
admit.' 

Deeds, not Words, required. 

To Charles Stuart, Esq. 

' Celorico, 

' May 13, 1 8 10. 

' ... In my opinion the fault of all these proclamations 
in the Peninsula has been that the writers of them have 
followed the example of those published by the French 
during the Revolution ; and they have invariably flattered and 
deceived the people. What we want is : First, an exposition 
of their danger ; secondly, a reference to the existing means 
of resistance ; thirdly, an exposition of their own duties ; 
fourthly, an exhortation to perform them ; and, lastly, a 
declaration by the Government that those who should not 
perform their duty would be punished without distinction of 
persons. 

' This ought to be stated in plain language, without bom- 
bast, and ought, above all, to be short. But these " Corir 
sobre os nossos Inimigos" will only tend to increase the exist- 
ing evils. Every man in Portugal is sufficiently alive to the 
danger, and is very anxious to avert it; there is plenty of 
enthusiasm, there are cries of " Viva ! " and illuminations and 
patriotic songs and feasts everywhere ; but that which is 



218 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

wanting is the plain simple performance of his duty, each in 
his station, and obedience to order . . . .' 

British Troops in Time of War. 
To Brigadier-General Cox, Governor of Almeida. 

' Celorico, 

'■May 14, 1810. 
' War is a terrible evil, particularly to those who reside in 
those parts of the country which are the seat of the opera- 
tions of hostile armies ; but I believe it will be found, upon 
inquiry, and will be acknowledged by the people of Portugal, 
that it is inflicted in a less degree by the British troops 
than by the others ; and that eventually all they get from 
the country is paid for, and that they require only what is 
necessary. . . .' 

Soldiers' Funeral Expenses. 
To the Right Hon. the Secretary at War. 

' Celorico, 

'June 10, 1 8 10. 

' I have the honour to transmit a statement of funeral 
expenses of men who have died in general hospital in this 
country, and which cannot be recovered from the circum- 
stance of the regiments having left the country, or from 
the accounts of the men having been closed and sent to 
England previous to the charge having been received by 
the regiments. 

' I have authorized the purveyor to enter these expenses 
in his accounts until he shall receive orders respecting them 
from England, and I request that your lordship will be 
pleased to give directions accordingly.' 

Capitulation of Ciudad Rodrigo. 
To Brigadier-General A . Campbell. 

' Alverca, 

'July 11, 1810, 6 p.m. 
' The enemy got possession of Ciudad Rodrigo by capitu- 
lation yesterday evening, and this morning there was an 



THE PENINSULA 219 



affair with our pickets, of which I have not received the 
details, in which we lost Lieutenant-Colonel Talbot, 14th 
Light Dragoons, and 8 men killed and 23 men wounded ; we 
have taken 31 men and 29 horses. General Craufurd has 
occupied Fuentes.' 

Party Spirit the Bane of Armies. 

To Brigadier-General R. Craufurd. 

' Alverca, 

''July 23, 1 8 10. 

' I have been much annoyed by the foolish conversa- 
tions and reports and private letters about the 16th Light 
Dragoons. . . . 

' I can only say that I have never seen an attack by our 
troops in which similar, if not greater, accidents and mis- 
takes have not occurred, and in which orders have not been 
given, for which no authority had proceeded from the 
Commander, and in which there were not corresponding 
accidents and failures. This is to be attributed to the in- 
experience of our officers, and, I must add, to some good 
qualities in them, as well as in the troops. 

' All this would not much signifiy if our staff and other 
officers would mind their business, instead of writing news 
and keeping coffee-houses. But as soon as an accident 
happens, every man who can write, and who has a friend 
who can read, sits down to write his account of what he 
does not know, and his comments on what he does not 
understand ; and these are diligently circulated and exag- 
gerated by the idle and malicious, of whom there are plenty 
in all armies. The consequence is that officers and whole 
regiments lose their reputation ; a spirit of party, which 
is the bane of all armies, is engendered and fomented; 
a want of confidence ensues, and there is no character, 
however meritorious, and no action, however glorious, which 
can have justice done to it. I have hitherto been so for- 
tunate as to keep down this spirit in this army, and I am 
determined to persevere. . . .' 



220 



WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 



Affair at the Coa. 

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley. 

'Alverca, 

' July 27, 1810. 

' The enemy obliged us to evacuate Fort Concepcion 
on the 21st, which we destroyed ; and on the morning of the 
24th they attacked General R. Craufurd's advanced-guard 
close to Almeida, and obliged him to retire across the Coa 
with the loss of 4 officers killed, 25 wounded ; and 28 men 
killed and 218 wounded. . . . 

' The enemy's numbers were about four times his in 
cavalry, and at least three times in infantry. We hear 
that their loss has been great. They made three attempts 
afterwards to storm the bridge of the Coa, in all of which 
they failed. . . .' 

Return of the Number of Killed, Wounded, and Missing, of a 
Division of the Army tinder the Command of His Excellency 
Lieutenant-General Viscount Wellington, K.B., in an Action 
with the French Army near Almeida, on July 24, 1810. 



1 

j Officers. 


Sergeants. 


Drummers. 


Rank 
and 
File. 


Troop 
Horses. 


Total Loss of Officers, 

Non-commissioned 

Officers, and Rank and 

File. 


Killed - 4 
Wounded 23 
Missing- 1 


3 

10 

1 


2 
I 


29 

164 

80 


3 
12 


36 
199 

83 



The French Force in Spain. 

To Admiral Sir Richard Keats, K.B. 

1 Celorico, 

1 August 2, 1 8 10. 

' The enemy's force in Spain consists of 250,000 men, 
according to the best accounts I can make of it. Of this 
force above one third is engaged in the operations against 
this army. About 50,000 or 60,000 men, in three corps, are 
in Andalusia, of which 20,000 are engaged in the operations 



THE PENINSULA 221 

at Cadiz; 15,000 or 16,000 about Seville, etc., protecting 
their rear, and Sebastiani, with the remainder, towards 
Granada, etc. There are two strong corps in Catalonia and 
Aragon, but most of these troops are in the garrisons; 
and there are about 20,000 or 30,000 men about Madrid, 
in the Asturias, Biscay, Navarre, and keeping up the com- 
munication by the highroad from France. . . .' 

Stern Warnings. 

To Lieutenant-General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart. 

' Celorico, 

'August 4, 18 10, ip.m. 

1 Send round to the people that they must retire from the 
villages, and let the magistrates know that if any of them 
stay, or if any of the inhabitants have any communication 
with the enemy, they shall be hanged.' 

To Major-General the Hon. L. Cole. 

' Celorico, 

'■August 11, 1 8 10, ip.m. 

' Tell Captain Cocks to inform the inhabitants of Richosa 
that I will not pardon them till they give up those who 
committed the outrage on the troops, and that if they delay 
it much longer I will destroy their village. Let them give 
up those who committed the outrage, and trust to my 
mercy. . . . 

Promotion in the Army. 

To Lieutenant-Colonel Torrens. 

'Celorico, 

' August 4, 1 8 10. 

' . . . I have never been able to understand the principle 
on which the claims of gentlemen of family, fortune, and in- 
fluence in the country, to promotion in the army, founded on 
their military conduct, and character, and services, should be 
rejected, while the claims of others, not better founded on 



222 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 



military pretensions, were invariably attended to. It would 
be desirable, certainly, that the only claim to promotion 
should be military merit ; but this is a degree of perfection 
to which the disposal of military patronage has never been, 
and cannot be, I believe, brought in any military establish- 
ment. The Commander-in-Chief must have friends, officers 
on the staff attached to him, etc., who will press him to 
promote their friends and relations, all doubtless very meri- 
torious, and no man can at all times resist these applications ; 
but if there is to be any influence in the disposal of military 
patronage, in aid of military merit, can there be any in our 
army so legitimate as that of family connection, fortune, and 
influence in the country ? . . . 

' While writing upon this subject, I am also tempted to 
communicate to you my opinion upon another branch of it, 
viz., the disposal of the patronage of the troops serving on 
foreign service. In all services, excepting that of Great 
Britain, and in former times in the service of Great Britain, 
the Commander-in-Chief of an army employed against the 
enemy in the field had the power of promoting officers, at 
least to vacancies occasioned by the service, in the troops 
under his own command ; and in foreign services the 
principle is carried so far, as that no person can venture to 
recommend an officer for promotion belonging to an army 
employed against the enemy in the field, excepting the com- 
mander of that army. 

' It was pretty nearly the case formerly in our own service ; 
and I believe the greater number of the general officers of the 
higher ranks of the present day were made Lieutenant- 
Colonels by Sir W. Howe, Sir Henry Clinton, Lord Corn- 
wallis, General Burgoyne, Lord Dorchester, etc. But how is it 
now ? The form remains still in some degree the same ; that 
is to say, my secretary keeps the register of the applications, 
memorials, and regimental recommendations, a trouble which, 
by-the-by, might as well be saved ; but the substance is 
entirely altered ; and I, who command the largest British army 
that has been employed against the enemy for many years, 
and who have upon my hands certainly the most extensive 



THE PENINSULA 223 



and difficult concern that was ever imposed upon any British 
officer, have not the power of making even a corporal ! It 
is impossible that this system can last. It will do very 
well for trifling expeditions and short services, etc., but 
those who are to superintend the discipline, and to excite 
and regulate the exertions of the officers of the army, 
during a long-continued service, must have the power of re- 
warding them by the only mode in which they can be 
rewarded — that is, by promotion. 

' It is not known to the army and to strangers, and I am 
almost ashamed of acknowledging, the small degree (I ought 
to say nullity) of power of reward which belongs to my 
situation ; and it is really extraordinary that I have got on so 
well hitherto without it ; but the day must come when this 
system must be altered. 

' I do not entertain these opinions, and communicate them 
to you, because there are any officers attached to me in the 
service for whom I desire promotion. All my Aides-de-Camp, 
respecting whom I do feel an interest, have been promoted 
in their turn in their regiments, or are to be promoted, for 
carrying home the accounts of victories. The only person 
respecting whose promotion I ever interested myself person- 
ally was that of Colin Campbell, which the Duke of York 
had promised him, in consequence of his having brought 
home the accounts of two victories at the same time ; and 
the difficulty which I experienced in obtaining his promotion, 
notwithstanding that promise, is a strong practical proof of 
the effects of the system to which I have adverted. 

' The consequence of the change of the system in respect 
to me would be only to give me the power of rewarding the 
services of those who have exerted, or should exert, them- 
selves zealously in the service, and thus to stimulate others 
to similar exertions. 

' Even admitting that the system of promotion by 
seniority, exploded in other armies, is the best for that of 
Great Britain, it would still be an advantage that those who 
become entitled to it should receive it immediately, and from 
the hand of the person who is obliged to expose them to 



224 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 



danger, to enforce discipline, and to call for their exertions. 
I would also observe that this practice would be entirely con- 
sistent with the unvaried usage of the British navy. 

' I admit that it ma)' be urged with truth that a larger 
view may be taken of the interests of the public, in the mode 
of promoting officers of the army, than I am capable of 
taking ; and this view may have suggested the expediency 
of adopting and adhering to the mode now in use ; at the 
same time I must say that the public can have no greater 
interest than in the conduct and discipline of an army em- 
ployed against the enemy in the field ; and I am thoroughly 
convinced that, whatever may be the result in my hands, a 
British army cannot be kept in the field for any length of 
time, unless the officers composing it have some hope that 
their exertions will certainly be rewarded by promotion ; 
and that to be abroad on service, and to do their duty with 
zeal and intelligence, afford prospects of promotion not 
afforded by the mere presence of an officer with his regiment, 
and his bearing the King's commission for a certain number 
of years. 

' I have been induced to communicate these opinions to 
you, from the consideration of the claims of those officers to 
which I have drawn your attention at the commencement of 
this letter, from a strong conviction of their truth, and not, 
I assure you, from any interest I feel in the result. I would 
not give one pin to have the disposal of every commission in 
the army.' 

Mutual Good Treatment of the Wounded. 

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley. 

' Celorico, 

'•August 8, 1810. 

' Since I have commanded the troops in this country, I 
have always treated the French officers and soldiers who have 
been made prisoners with the utmost humanity and atten- 
tion ; and in numerous instances I have saved their lives. 
The only motive which I have had for this conduct has been 



THE PENINSULA 225 



that they might treat our officers and soldiers well who might 
fall into their hands, and I must do the French the justice 
to say that they have been universally well treated, and in 
recent instances the wounded prisoners of the British army 
have been taken care of before the wounded of the French 
army. . . .' 

Officers' Private Correspondence. 

To Lieutenant-General Graham. 

1 Celorico, 

1 August 10, 1 8 10. 

' I beg to draw your attention to the orders which I have 
given this day respecting the private correspondence of the 
officers of the army. I was astonished some time ago to see 
in the English newspapers an accurate account of the bat- 
teries and works erecting at Cadiz and on the Isla, with the 
number of guns, and of what calibre each was to contain, and 
their distance from each other, and from the enemy's works. 
This information must have been extracted from the letter 
of an officer. If officers wish to give their friends this de- 
scription of information, they should request them not to 
publish their letters in the newspapers.' 

Desertion of a Portuguese Regiment. 

To Charles Stuart, Esq. 

1 Celorico, 

' August 31, 1810. 

' . . . I am sorry to add that the whole of the 24th Regi- 
ment, with the exception of the Major and of the English 
officers, have gone into the French service. It is said that 
their object is to have an opportunity of deserting from it, 
which is well enough for the private soldiers, but is highly 
disgraceful to the character of the officers. 

' The Major commanding the artillery was the person em- 
ployed by Cox to settle the capitulation for him. He went 
out and informed the French of the exact state of the place 

15 



226 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

after the explosion, and never returned ! ! Massena has 
made him a Colonel !!...' 

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley. 

' GOUVEA, 

' September J ', 1810. 

' Seventeen officers and 500 men of the 24th Portuguese 
Regiment have already deserted from the French, and have 
come in at one place, and others have come into Braganza.' 

To Charles Stuart, Esq. 

Gouvea, 

' September 1 1 , 1 8 1 o. 

' ... I do not recollect a circumstance which made such 
an impression on the British army, and upon the English 
officers serving with the Portuguese army, as the account of 
the conduct of the officers of the 24th Regiment ; and after 
full consideration, the measure which I recommended, and 
the distinct statement of the principle on which it was recom- 
mended, appeared the only means of reconciling the minds 
of the officers of the British army to what had occurred, and 
to further service with the Portuguese — at the same time 
that it held out a standard of sentiment and principle for the 
officers of the Portuguese service on similar occasions. I 
wished to avail myself of this opportunity of showing them 
what the principles of men of honour, and the sentiments of 
officers and gentlemen, ought to induce them to do on similar 
occasions. I am sorry to say that this object is defeated by 
the publication of the notice of the Government ; and it 
would have been accomplished if the Government would 
have waited for the official communication of the circum- 
stances on which they have decided, as I am convinced that 
you would have seen at once my object in the measure which 
I recommended, and would have supported it with all your 
influence. . . .' 



THE PENINSULA 227 



To the Earl of Liverpool. 

1 GOUVEA, 

' September 13, 18 10. 

' I understand that, with the exception of about 200 men, 
the whole of the 24th Portuguese Regiment have quitted the 
enemy ; and that they have relinquished their intention of 
making this regiment the foundation of their Portuguese 
levy, and have sent these men prisoners to France. I have 
every reason to believe that these men likewise would have 
returned to Portugal, if it had been in their power.' 

Croaking in the Army. 
To Marshal Beresford. 

1 GOUVEA, 

'September 8, 18 10. 

' Upon considering the subject which you mentioned to 
me last night, I do not think it so important as it appeared 
to me upon first hearing it. The remedy which we agreed 
upon will answer some purpose, and I have it in my power 
to make some arrangements immediately, and others here- 
after, which will effectually prevent all mischief of the 
description supposed in that quarter. 

' I beg you, however, not to mention the subject to any- 
body. The croaking which already prevails in the army, 
and particularly about headquarters, is disgraceful to us as 
a nation, and does infinite mischief to the cause ; and it 
would become much worse if this story were known. . . .' 

THE BATTLE OF BUSACO. 

To Charles Stuart, Esq. 

• Convent of Busaco, 

1 September 27, 18 10. 

' We have been engaged with the enemy for the last three 
days, and I think we shall be attacked again to-morrow ; as I 
understand they must carry our position, on which, however, 
they have as yet made no impression, or starve. Our loss 

15—2 



228 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

has been trifling : that of the British troops about 300 men ; 
that of the Portuguese, who have conducted themselves re- 
markably well in several brisk attacks, rather greater ; the 
loss of the French must have been very large indeed, and 
we hear from deserters that they are much discouraged. Our 
position is an excellent one, and it is certainly no easy task 
to carry it ; but I think they will make another trial. . . .' 

To the Earl of Liverpool. 

' COIMBRA, 

1 September 30, 18 10. 

' While the enemy was advancing from Celorico and 
Trancoso upon Viseu, the different divisions of militia and 
ordenanza were employed upon their flanks and rear ; and 
Colonel Trant with his division attacked the escort of the 
military chest and reserve artillery near Tojal, on the 
20th instant. He took two officers and eighty prisoners, but 
the enemy collected a force from the front and rear, which 
obliged him to retire again towards the Douro. I under- 
stand that the enemy's communication is completely cut off, 
and he possesses only the ground upon which his arnry 
stands. 

' My despatch of the 20th instant will have informed you 
of the measures which I had adopted and which were in 
progress to collect the army in this neighbourhood, and, 
if possible, to prevent the enemy from obtaining possession 
of this town. 

' On the 21st the enemy's advanced-guard pushed on to 
Sta. Combadao, at the junction of the rivers Criz and Dao ; 
and Brigadier-General Pack retired across the former and 
joined Brigadier -General Craufurd at Mortagoa, having 
destroyed the bridges over those two rivers. 

' The enemy's advanced-guard crossed the Criz, having 
repaired the bridge, on the 23rd, and the whole of the 6th 
Corps was collected on the other side of the river. I therefore 
withdrew the cavalry through the Serra de Busaco, with the 
exception of three squadrons, as the ground was unfavourable 
for the operation of that arm. 



THE PENINSULA 229 



1 On the 25th, the whole of the 6th and of the 2nd Corps 
crossed the Criz in the neighbourhood of Sta. Combadao ; and 
Brigadier -General Pack's brigade and Brigadier- General 
Craufurd's division retired to the position which I had fixed 
upon for the army on the top of the Serra de Busaco. These 
troops were followed in this movement by the whole of the 
corps of Ney and Regnier (the 6th and the 2nd) ; but it was 
conducted by Brigadier-General Craufurd with great regu- 
larity, and the troops took their position without sustaining 
any loss of importance. 

' The 4th Portuguese Cacadores, which had retired on 
the right of the other troops, and the pickets of the 3rd Divi- 
sion of Infantry, which were posted at St. Antonio de Cantaro, 
under Major Smyth of the 45th Regiment, were engaged with 
the advance of Regnier's corps in the afternoon, and the 
former showed that steadiness and gallantry which others of 
the Portuguese troops have since manifested. 

' The Serra de Busaco is a high ridge which extends from 
the Mondego in a northerly direction about eight miles. At 
the highest point of the ridge, about two miles from its ter- 
mination, is the convent and garden of Busaco. The Serra 
de Busaco is connected by a mountainous tract of country 
with the Serra de Caramula, which extends in a north-easterly 
direction beyond Viseu, and separates the valley of the Mon- 
dego from the valley of the Douro. On the left of the 
Mondego, nearly in a line with the Serra de Busaco, is 
another ridge of the same description, called the Serra da 
Murcella, covered by the river Alva, and connected by other 
mountainous parts with the Serra d'Estrella. 

' All the roads to Coimbra from the eastward lead over the 
one or the other of these Serras. They are very difficult for 
the passage of an army, the approach to the top of the ridge 
on both sides being mountainous. 

'As the enemy's whole army was on the right of the 
Mondego, and it was evident that he intended to force our 
position, Lieutenant-General Hill crossed that river by a 
short movement to his left, on the morning of the 26th, 
leaving Colonel Le Cor with his brigade on the Serra da 



230 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

Murcella, to cover the right of the army, and Brigadier- 
General Fane, with his division of Portuguese cavalry and 
the 13th Light Dragoons, in front of the Alva, to observe 
and check the movements of the enemy's cavalry on the 
Mondego. 

' With this exception, the whole army was collected upon 
the Serra de Busaco, with the British cavalry observing the 
plain in the rear of its left, and the road leading from 
Mortagoa to Oporto, through the mountainous tract which 
connects the Serra de Busaco with the Serra de Caramula. 

' The 8th Corps joined the enemy in our front on the 26th, 
but he did not make any serious attack on that day. The 
light troops on both sides were engaged throughout the line. 

' At six in the morning of the 27th the enemy made two 
desperate attacks upon our position, the one on the right, the 
other on the left of the highest part of the Serra. The attack 
upon the right was made by two divisions of the 2nd Corps, 
on that part of the Serra occupied by the 3rd Division of 
Infantry. One division of French infantry arrived at the 
top of the ridge, where it was attacked in the most gallant 
manner by the 88th Regiment, under the command of Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel Wallace ; the 45th, under the command of 
Lieutenant- Colonel the Hon. R. Meade; and by the 8th 
Portuguese Regiment, under the command of Lieutenant- 
Colonel Douglas, directed by Major-General Picton. These 
three corps advanced with the bayonet, and drove the enemy's 
division from the advantageous ground which they had 
obtained. The other division of the 2nd Corps attacked 
farther on the right by the road leading by St. Antonia de 
Cantaro, also in front of Major-General Picton's division. 
These were repulsed before they could reach the top of the 
ridge, by the 74th, under the command of Lieutenant- 
Colonel the Hon. R. Trench, and the brigade of Portuguese 
infantry of the 9th and 21st Regiments, under the command 
of Colonel Champelmond, directed by Colonel Mackinnon. 
Major-General Leith also moved to his left to the support of 
Major-General Picton, and aided in the defeat of the enemy 
by the 3rd Battalion of Royals, the 1st Battalion of the 9th, 



THE PENINSULA 231 



and the 2nd Battalion of the 38th Regiments. In these 
attacks Major-Generals Leith and Picton, Colonels Mac- 
kinnon and Champelmond, of the Portuguese service, who 
was wounded, Lieutenant-Colonel Wallace, Lieutenant- 
Colonel the Hon. R. Meade, Lieutenant-Colonel Sutton, 
of the gth Portuguese, Major Smyth of the 45th, who was 
afterwards killed, Lieutenant-Colonel Douglas, and Major 
Birmingham, of the 8th Portuguese Regiment, distinguished 
themselves. 

' Major-General Picton reports the good conduct of the 
9th and 2 rst Portuguese Regiments, commanded by Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel Sutton and Lieutenant-Colonel A. Bacellar, 
and of the Portuguese artillery, under the command of 
Major Arentschildt. I have also to mention, in a particular 
manner, the conduct of Captain Dansey of the 88th. 

' Major-General Leith reports the good conduct of the 
Royals, 1st Battalion, and gth, and 2nd Battalion of the 
38th Regiments ; and I beg to assure your lordship that I 
have never witnessed a more gallant attack than that made 
by the 88th, 45th, and 8th Portuguese Regiments, on the 
enemy's division which had reached the ridge of the Serra. 

' On the left the enemy attacked with three divisions of 
infantry of the 6th Corps, on the part of the Serra occupied 
by the light division of infantry commanded by Brigadier- 
General Craufurd, and by the brigade of Portuguese infantry 
commanded by Brigadier-General Pack. 

' One division of infantry only made any progress to the 
top of the hill, and they were immediately charged with the 
bayonet by Brigadier-General Craufurd, with the 43rd, 52nd, 
and 95th,* and the 3rd Portuguese Cacadores, and driven 
down with immense loss. 

' Brigadier-General Coleman's brigade of Portuguese in- 
fantry, which was in reserve, was moved up to the right 
of Brigadier-General Craufurd's division, and a battalion 
of the 19th Portuguese Regiment, under the command of 
Lieutenant-Colonel MacBean, made a gallant and successful 

* The 43rd, the 52nd, and the 95th formed the famous Light Division 
which Craufurd so often led to victory. — W. W. 



232 WELLING TON ' S DESPA TCIIES 



charge upon a body of another division of the enemy, which 
was endeavouring to penetrate in that quarter. 

' In this attack, Brigadier-General Craufurd, Lieutenant- 
Colonels Beckwith, of the 95th, and Barclay, of the 52nd, 
and the Commanding Officers of the regiments, distinguished 
themselves. 

' Besides these attacks, the light troops of the two armies 
were engaged throughout the 27th ; and the 4th Portuguese 
Cacadores, and the 1st and 16th Regiments, directed by 
Brigadier- General Pack, and commanded by Lieutenant- 
Colonel Hill, Lieutenant-Colonel Luis de Regoa, and Major 
Armstrong, showed great steadiness and gallantry. 

' The loss sustained by the enemy in his attack of the 27th 
has been enormous. I understand that the Generals of 
Division, Merle, Loison, and Maucune, are wounded, and 
General Simon was taken prisoner by the 52nd Regiment ; 
and 3 Colonels, — officers, and 250 men. 

' The enemy left 2,000 killed upon the field of battle, and 
I understand from the prisoners and deserters that the loss 
in wounded is immense. 

' The enemy did not renew his attack, excepting by the 
fire of his light troops on the 28th ; but he moved a large 
body of infantry and cavalry from the left of his centre to the 
rear, from whence I saw his cavalry in march on the road 
from Mortagoa over the mountains towards Oporto. 

' Having thought it probable that he would endeavour to 
turn our left by that road, I had directed Colonel Trant, 
with his division of militia, to march to Sarda5, with the in- 
tention that he should occupy the mountains, but, unfortu- 
nately, he was sent round by Oporto, by the General Officer 
commanding in the north, in consequence of a small detach- 
ment of the enemy being in possession of S. Pedro do Sul ; 
and, notwithstanding the efforts which he made to arrive in 
time, he did not reach Sardao till the 28th at night, after the 
enemy were in possession of the ground. 

' As it was probable that, in the course of the night of the 
28th, the enemy would throw the whole of his army upon 
the road, by which he could avoid the Serra de Busaco and 



THE PENINSULA 233 



reach Coimbra by the high road of Oporto, and thus the 
army would have been exposed to be cut off from that town 
or to a general action in less favourable ground, and as I had 
reinforcements in my rear, I was induced to withdraw from 
the Serra de Busaco. 

' The enemy did break up in the mountains at eleven at 
night of the 28th, and he made the march I expected. His 
advanced-guard was at Avelans, on the road from Oporto to 
Coimbra, yesterday, and the whole army was seen in march 
through the mountains. That under my command, however, 
was already in the low country, between the Serra de Busaco 
and the sea ; and the whole of it, with the exception of the 
advanced-guard, is this day on the left of the Mondego. 

' Although, from the unfortunate circumstance of the delay 
of Colonel Trant's arrival at Sardao, I am apprehensive that 
I shall not succeed in effecting the object which I had in 
view in passing the Mondego and in occupying the Serra de 
Busaco, I do not repent my having done so. This move- 
ment has afforded me a favourable opportunity of showing 
the enemy the description of troops of which this army is 
composed ; it has brought the Portuguese levies into action 
with the enemy for the first time in an advantageous situa- 
tion ; and they have proved that the trouble which has been 
taken with them has not been thrown away, and that they 
are worthy of contending in the same ranks with British 
troops in this interesting cause, which they afford the best 
hopes of saving. 

'Throughout the contest on the Serra, and in all the 
previous marches, and those which we have since made, the 
whole army have conducted themselves in the most regular 
manner. Accordingly, all the operations have been carried 
on with ease ; the soldiers have suffered no privations, have 
undergone no unnecessary fatigue, there has been no loss of 
stores, and the army is in the highest spirits. . . . 

' I should not do justice to the service, or to my own feel- 
ings, if I did not take this opportunity of drawing your 
lordship's attention to the merits of Marshal Beresford. To 
him exclusively, under the Portuguese Government, is due 



234 



WELLINGTON ' S DESPA TCHES 



the merit of having raised, formed, disciplined, and equipped 
the Portuguese army, which has now shown itself capable of 
engaging and defeating the enemy. . . .' 

Return of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the A rmy under 
the Command of Lieutenant-General Viscount Wellington, 
K.B., on September 25 and 26, and in the Action with the 
French Army, commanded by Marshal Massena, at Busaco, 
on September 27, 1810. 





Officers. 


Sergeants. 


Rank 

and 
File. 


Horses. 


Total Loss of Officers, 

Non-commissioned 

Officers, and Rank 

and File. 


Killed 
Wounded - 
Missing 


II 

62 

I 


6 

32 
3 


l8o 
920 

54 


5 

12 
10 


197 

I,OI4 

58 



The Portuguese loss is included in the above numbers. 

An Absurd and Odious Transaction. 
To Charles Stuart, Esq. 

' Pero Negro, 

' October 21, 1810. 

' I enclose you a newspaper, which contains a paragraph 
which I have marked, to which I request you to draw the 
attention of the Government. I have sins enough of my 
own to answer for ; and it is rather hard upon me to incur 
the odium of having recommended acts to this Government, 
which they committed without my knowledge, and of which 
I could not approve. 

' I must request that they will publish my letter to them 
upon the absurd and odious transaction to which this para- 
graph refers.' 

A Satisfactory Situation. 

To the Earl of Liverpool. 

'Pero Negro, 

' October 27, 18 10. 

' My despatches of this date will give you an idea of our 
situation, which I hope will be satisfactory to you. In my 
opinion the enemy ought to retire, for he has no chance of 



THE PENINSULA 235 



annoying our position ; and delay will only aggravate his 
distress, and make his retreat more difficult. 

' I calculate that a reinforcement of 15,000 men would not 
give him so good an army as he had at Busaco. He had 
2,000 men killed there : Trant took 5,000 prisoners at 
Coimbra : above 1,000 prisoners have gone through this 
army : many men have been killed by the peasantry, and in 
the skirmishes with our different detachments ; and they had 
200 or 300 men wounded in the affair with our outposts 
about Sobral. They cannot have less than 4,000 sick, after 
the march they have made, the distress they have suffered, 
and the weather to which they were exposed. Indeed, the 
deserters and prisoners tell us that almost everybody is 
sick. . . . 

' We have an excellent position, which we are improving 
every day ; and the army is in good order and spirits, and 
not sickly. By the last returns, we had 4,200 in hospital, 
and no serious disorder. We had 8,500 sick in the military 
returns, but these include convalescents at Belem, of whom, 
I hope, under better regulations, not to have quite so 

many. . . .' 

The Evils of Wine. 

To Lieutenant-Colonel Torrens. 

' Pero Negro, 

' November 2, 18 10. 

' . . . No soldier can withstand the temptation of wine. 
This is constantly before their eyes in this country, and they 
are constantly intoxicated when absent from their regiments, 
and there is no crime which they do not commit to obtain 
money to purchase it ; or if they cannot get money, to obtain 
it by force. . . .' 

A Hearty Wish. 

To Major-General Fane. 

1 Pero Negro, 

1 November 3, 18 10. 

' . . . I wish I had it in my power to give you well-clothed 
troops, or to hang those who ought to have given them their 
clothing. . . .' 



236 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

Strength of the Opposing Forces. 
To the Earl of Liverpool. 

' Pero Negro, 

'■November 3, 18 10. 

1 I enclose your lordship an account of the number of 
battalions, squadrons, etc., which entered Portugal with 
Massena, and I cannot believe that they composed an army 
of less than 70,000 men at the Battle of Busaco. I calculate 
their loss, including sick, since that time, at 15,000 men, 
which would leave them with 55,000 men, of which 6,000 or 
7,000 are cavalry, at the present moment. 

' The effective strength of the British army, according to 
the last returns, was 29,000 infantry, cavalry, and artillery, 
and one regiment at Lisbon, and one at Torres Vedras, which, 
in the view of the contest, ought not to be taken into the 
account ; and I enclose a statement of the Portuguese force, 
according to the last returns. 

' Besides this force, the Marques de la Romana's corps 
consists of about 5,000 men ; making a total of 58,615, of 
which I could command the services, in case I should act 

offensively against the enemy, of which about would be 

cavalry. . . .' 

The Wearing of Ribands. 

To Lieutenant-Colonel Torrens. 

1 Cartaxo, 

'■December 11, 1810. 

' . . . Some of the General Officers have applied to me to 
know whether, upon ordinary occasions, they might not wear 
the riband of the medal at the buttonhole, instead of round 
the neck. This would be a more convenient way of wearing 
it, and they would wear it consequently more frequently, 
which would be desirable ; and I shall be obliged to you if 
you will let me know whether there is any objection to what 
is proposed. . . .'* 

* Honours and medals for the Peninsular War were long withheld. 
Honours were granted for eighteen of the battles, sieges, and stormings ; 



THE PENINSULA 237 



One of the Causes of Sickness. 

To the Earl of Liverpool. 

' Cartaxo, 

'■December 15, 18 10. 

1 1 enclose the weekly state of the 8th, and the weekly 
return of the sick to the 9th instant. 

' I am concerned to add that, since this report has been 
made, an increased degree of sickness has appeared in the 
3rd Battalion of the Royals, the 4th and gth Regiments, all 
of which had been in Walcheron. But I attribute the sick- 
ness of these regiments not to that cause alone, but to the 
irregularity of the soldiers ; who, contrary to repeated orders, 
have burnt as firewood the doors and windows, and in some 
instances the roofs, of the houses in which they have been 
cantoned ; and they have been, consequently, exposed to the 
weather. 

' The troops of the 5th Division, to which these regiments 
belong, have been less exposed by their duty than any others 
in the army ; and yet they are now the only division in which 
there is any appearance of sickness.' 

Wellington and Newspapers. 

To Dr. Frank. 

' Cartaxo, 

' January 7, 181 1. 

' . . . I hope that the opinions of the people in Great 
Britain are not influenced by paragraphs in newspapers, and 
that those paragraphs do not convey the public opinion or 
sentiment upon any subject. Therefore I (who have more 
reason that any other public man of the present day to com- 
plain of libels of this description) never take the smallest 
notice of them ; and have never authorized any contradiction 

but it was not until 1848 that Queen Victoria distributed medals for the 
Pyrenees. There were then 690 survivors who were entitled to the 
medal. There are in existence Peninsular medals with fourteen clasps. 
At a London sale in 1901 a group of Peninsular decorations, awarded to 
Colonel Galiffe, 60th Foot, realised ^500. — W. W. 



238 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 



to be given, or any statement to be made in answer to the 
innumerable falsehoods, and the heaps of false reasoning, 
which have been published respecting me and the operations 
which I have directed. . . .' 

The History of the War. 

To Dr. H alii day. 

' Cartaxo, 

''January 15, 181 1. 

1 I have received your letter of the 13th instant, and I am 
highly flattered by your desire to write the history of the war 
in Portugal. 

'The events in this country of the three last years are fit 
subjects for the historian, and, if well and truly related, may 
be deemed deserving the consideration of politicians and 
military men. But I am apprehensive that the time is not 
yet arrived in which either the facts themselves can be 
stated with accuracy or truth, or the motives for the different 
occurrences be stated. 

' I feel that I could not give an answer to many of the 
questions which it is probable you would be desirous of 
asking, without disclosing facts, opinions, and reasonings, 
which are not yet before the public, and which could not be 
disclosed by me without a breach of confidence. I would 
therefore recommend to you to postpone the execution of 
your design to some future period.' 

Admiration of the French Army. 

To the Marquis Wellesley. 

• Cartaxo, 

' January 26, 181 1. 

' . . . The French army is certainly a wonderful machine ; 
but if we are to form such a one, we must form such a 
Government as exists in France, which can with impunity 
lose one half of the troops employed in the field every year, 
only by the privations and hardships imposed upon them. 
Next, we must compose our army of soldiers drawn from all 



THE PENINSULA 239 



classes of the population of the country ; from the good and 
middling, as well as in rank as in education, as from the bad, 
and not as all other nations, and we in particular, do, from 
the bad only. 

' Thirdly, we must establish such a system of discipline as 
the French have — a system founded upon the strength of 
the tyranny of the Government, which operates upon an 
army composed of soldiers, the majority of whom are sober, 
well disposed, amenable to order, and in some degree 
educated. 

' When we shall have done all this, and shall have made 
these armies of the strength of those employed by the French, 
we may require of them to live as the French do, viz., by 
authorized and regulated plunder of the country and its in- 
habitants, if any should remain ; and we may expose them to 
the labour, hardships, and privations which the French 
soldier suffers every day ; and we must expect the same pro- 
portion of loss every campaign, viz., one half of those who 
take the field. 

' This plan is not proposed for the British army, nor has 
it yet been practised in any great degree by the Portuguese ; 
but I shall state the effect which, in my opinion, the attempt 
has had upon the Spaniards. 

1 There is neither subordination nor discipline in the army, 
among either officers or soldiers ; and it is not even 
attempted (as, indeed, it would be in vain to attempt) to 
establish either. It has, in my opinion, been the cause of 
the dastardly conduct which we have so frequently witnessed 
in the Spanish troops ; and they have become odious to their 
country ; and the peaceable inhabitants, much as they detest 
and suffer from the French, almost wish for the establishment 
of Joseph's Government, to be protected from the outrages 
of their own troops. These armies, therefore, must be paid 
and supported, if any service is expected from them ; and at 
present, at least, I see no chance of their being paid, except 
by British assistance. . . .' 



240 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 



Misery in Badajoz. 

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley. 

' Cartaxo, 

''February 3, 181 1. 

' . . . I have a miserable account of affairs from Badajoz. 
There is not a grain of provision in the public magazines : 
the town is full of women and children, and refugees of all 
descriptions, and nothing can be in a worse state than the 
public mind in that place. There is no chance, I fear, of ever 
opening a communication, excepting by British troops, and 
those I cannot send. Unfortunate cause! how has it been 
frittered away ! . . .' 

Chaplains for the Army. 

To Lieutenant-General Calvert, Adjutant-General of the Forces.. 

1 Cartaxo, 

' February 6, 181 1. 

' I believe that you have attended a good deal to the 
establishment of the chaplains to the army, upon which I 
am now about to trouble you. 

' Notwithstanding all that has been done upon the subject, 
with a view to making their situation such as to induce re- 
spectable persons to accept of them, I fear that they are not 
yet sufficiently advantageous to insure the object. I believe 
the income, while they are employed abroad, to be sufficiently 
good, but that of retired chaplains, after service, is not ; and 
the period of service required of them is too long. You will 
observe that a man can scarcely be eligible to be an army 
chaplain till he is six or eight and twenty, after an expensive 
education ; and it can scarcely be said that the pay of a 
retired chaplain, at thirty-six years of age, is what a respect- 
able person would have acquired if he had followed any other 
line of the clerical profession besides the army. 

' In my opinion, the period of service ought to be reduced 
from ten to six years ; but they ought to be years of 
service, without leave of absence, excepting on account of 



THE PENINSULA 241 



health, and the pay of the retired chaplain ought to be 
augmented. 

' My reason for making these suggestions is that really we 
do not get respectable men for the service. I have one 
excellent young man in this army, Mr. Briscall,* who is 
attached to headquarters, who has never been one moment 
absent from his duty ; but I have not yet seen another 
who has not applied and made a pitiable case for leave of 
absence immediately after his arrival ; and, excepting 
Mr. Dennis at Lisbon, who was absent all last year, I believe 
Mr. Briscall is the only chaplain doing duty. 

' I am very anxious upon this subject, not only from the 
desire which every man must have that so many persons as 
there are in this army should have the advantage of religious 
instruction, but from a knowledge that it is the greatest 
support and aid to military discipline and order.' 

The Duke and Methodism. 

' It has, besides, come to my knowledge that Methodism 
is spreading very fast in the army. There are two, if not 
three, Methodist meetings in this town, of which one is in 
the Guards. The men meet in the evening, and sing 
psalms ; and I believe a sergeant (Stephens) now and then 
gives them a sermon. Mr. Briscall has his eye upon these 
transactions, and would give me notice were they growing 
into anything which ought to be put a stop to ; and the 
respectability of his character and conduct has given him an 
influence over these people which will prevent them from 
going wrong. 

' These meetings likewise prevail in other parts of the 
army. In the 9th Regiment there is one, at which two 

officers attend, Lieutenant and Dr. ; and the 

commanding officer of the regiment has not yet been able to 
prevail upon them to discontinue this practice. Here, and 

* Mr. Briscall remained with the army till the end of the war. He 
was also with the army in the Low Countries and France from 181 5 to 
1 81 8, and was afterwards curate at Strathfieldsaye. 

16 



242 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

in similar circumstances, we want the assistance of a re- 
spectable clergyman. By his personal influence and advice, 
and by that of true religion, he would moderate the zeal 
and enthusiasm of these gentlemen, and would prevent their 
meetings from being mischievous, if he did not prevail upon 
them to discontinue them entirely. 

' This is the only mode in which, in my opinion, we can 
touch these meetings. The meeting of soldiers in their 
cantonments to sing psalms or hear a sermon read by one 
of their comrades is, in the abstract, perfectly innocent, 
and it is a better way of spending their time than many 
others to which they are addicted ; but it may become 
otherwise, and yet, till the abuse has made some progress, 
the commanding officer would have no knowledge of it, 
nor could he interfere. Even at last his interference must 
be guided by discretion, otherwise he will do more harm 
than good ; and it can in no case be so effectual as that 
of a respectable clergyman. 

' I wish, therefore, you would turn your mind a little more 
to this subject, and arrange some plan by which the number 
of respectable and efficient clergymen with the army may be 
increased.' 



1 I HAVE DONE WITH THE PORTUGUESE ARMY.' 

To Charles Stuart, Esq. 

' Cartaxo, 

'•February 16, 1811. 

' . . . I am exceedingly hurt at the contents of Dom Miguel 
Forjaz's note, marked B in your letter. It contains state- 
ments which are absolutely false, and attributes to me and 
the British commissariat the distresses of the Portuguese 
army, which Dom Miguel Forjaz knows ought to be attri- 
buted to the want of arrangement by the Junta de Viveres, 
and to the want of money by the Government ; and he also 
knows that if I had not relieved those distresses the army 
would have disbanded. In the present situation of affairs I 
shall give no answer to this note, as I could not answer it 



THE PENINSULA 243 



without detailing facts which, under existing circumstances, 
I do not think proper to detail officially. But I have done 
with the Portuguese army. They shall starve before they 
receive any further assistance from me.' 

Desertion of a Mad Officer. 

To Marshal Beresford. 

' Cartaxo, 
'■March 1, 181 1, 12 at noon. 

' . . . I am sorry to tell you that an officer, Lieutenant 
Burke,* 45th, has deserted to the enemy, and has arrived at 
Santarem. . . .' 

Barbarity of French Troops. 

To the Earl of Liverpool. 

'Villa Seca, 

' March 14, 181 1. 

' The enemy retired from the position which they had 
occupied at Santarem and the neighbourhood on the night of 
the 5th instant. I put the British army in motion to follow 
them on the morning of the 6th. . . . 

' The whole country affords many advantageous positions 
to a retreating army, of which the enemy have shown that 
they know how to avail themselves. They are retreating 
from the country, as they entered it, in one solid mass, 
covering their rear on every march by the operations of 
either one or two corps d'armee in the strong positions which 
the country affords, which corps d'armee are closely 
supported by the main body. Before they quitted their 
position they destroyed a part of their cannon and ammuni- 
tion, and they have since blown up whatever the horses were 
unable to draw away. They have no provisions, excepting 
what they plunder on the spot, or, having plundered, what 
the soldiers carry on their backs, and live cattle. 

* This officer was mad, and was left behind by Marshal Massena when 
he retreated. 

16 — 2 



244 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 



' I am concerned to be obliged to add to this account that 
their conduct throughout this retreat has been marked by a 
barbarity seldom equalled, and never surpassed. Even in 
the towns of Torres Novas, Thomar, and Pernes, in which 
the headquarters of some of the corps had been for four 
months, and in which the inhabitants had been invited, by 
promises of good treatment, to remain, they were plundered, 
and many of their houses destroyed, on the night the enemy 
withdrew from their position, and they have since burnt 
every town and village through which they have passed. 
The convent of Alcobaca was burnt by order from the French 
headquarters. The Bishop's palace and the whole town of 
Leyria, in which General Drouet had had his headquarters, 
shared the same fate ; and there is not an inhabitant of the 
country of any class or description who has had any dealing 
or communication with the French army who has not had 
reason to repent of it and to complain of them. This is the 
mode in which the promises have been performed and the 
assurances have been fulfilled which were held out in the 
proclamation of the French Commander-in-Chief, in which 
he told the inhabitants of Portugal that he was not come to 
make war upon them, but with a powerful army of 110,000 
men to drive the English into the sea. 

' It is to be hoped that the example of what has occurred 
in this country will teach the people of this and of other 
nations what value they ought to place on such promises 
and assurances ; and that there is no security for life, or for 
anything which makes life valuable, excepting in decided 
resistance to the enemy. . . .' 

Heavy Spanish Losses. 

' . . . The Spanish nation have lost Tortosa, Olivenca, and 
Badajoz, in the course of two months, without sufficient 
cause ; and in the same period Marshal Soult, with a corps 
never supposed to be more than 20,000 men, has taken, 
besides the last two places, or destroyed above 22,000 Spanish 
troops.' 



THE PENINSULA 245 



A Plea for the British Soldier. 

To Charles Stuart, Esq. 

' Louzao, 

' March 16, 181 1. 

1 1 have had the honour of receiving your letter of the gth 
instant, on a complaint said by Dom Miguel Forjaz to be 
made of the conduct of the British troops at Salvaterra, 
which complaint you will observe refers not to the conduct 
of the British troops, but to that of the Portuguese regiments 
Nos. 4 and 10. 

' In respect to the charge of cutting barren wood in the 
royal parks for firewood, I have to reply that I suppose His 
Royal Highness does not propose that His Majesty's troops 
shall want firewood in Portugal. It is reasonable that 
His Royal Highness, as well as other proprietors, should be 
paid for the wood cut upon his demesnes ; but either the 
troops must be allowed to cut firewood, paying for the same, 
wherever the defence of His Royal Highness's dominions 
renders it necessary that they should be stationed, or they 
must be removed to the places where they can cut firewood, 
by which His Royal Highness's interests must suffer. 

' I cannot avoid adverting to the disposition recently 
manifested by the Government to complain of the conduct 
of the British troops, certainly, in this instance, without 
foundation. 

' Acts of misconduct, and even outrage, I admit, have 
been committed, but never with impunity in any instance in 
which the complaint could be substantiated ; and I have not 
yet been able to obtain the punishment of any individual of 
this country, be his crimes what they may. 

' If the British soldiers have committed, as all soldiers do 
commit, acts of misconduct, they have at least fought bravely 
for the country. They have, besides, recently shown that 
commiseration for the misfortunes of the people of this 
country which I am convinced will be equally felt by their 
countrymen at home, and actually fed the poor inhabitants 
of all the towns in which they were cantoned on the Rio 



246 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

Mayor River. Yet I have not heard that the Portuguese 
Government have expressed their approbation of this conduct, 
very unusual in people of this class and description ; nor do 
I find that either their bravery in the field, or their humanity, 
or their generosity, can induce those whom they are serving 
to look with indulgence at their failings, or to draw a veil 
over the faults of the few, in consideration of the military and 
other virtues of the many.' 

Bungling the Commissariat. 

To Charles Stuart, Esq. 

'Oliveira do Hospital, 

' March 22, 181 1. 

' I have just heard that the vessels arrived for the Portu- 
guese troops at Figueira contained, one sardinias, one bacalao, 
the third rice ! ! !' 

' GOUVEA, 

' March 27, 181 1. 

' . . . Since writing the other side, I have heard that 
Colonel Ashworth's brigade of Portuguese infantry are as 
badly off as General Pack's ; they have nothing to eat and 
have sent here for it, having before sent to Coimbra and 
Figueira, where they found nothing ! ! So much for rice, 
bacalao, and sardinias !' 

The Horrors of War. 

To the Earl of Liverpool 

'Sta. Marinha, 

' March 23, 181 1. 

' . . . I shall be sorry if Government should think them- 
selves under the necessity of withdrawing from this country 
on account of the expense of the contest. From what I have 
seen of the objects of the French Government, and the sacri- 
fices they make to accomplish them, I have no doubt that if 
the British army were for any reason to withdraw from the 
Peninsula, and the French Government were relieved from 
the pressure of military operations on the Continent, they 



THE PENINSULA 247 



would incur all risks to land an army in His Majesty's 
dominions. Then, indeed, would commence an expensive 
contest ; then would His Majesty's subjects discover what 
are the miseries of war, of which, by the blessing of God, 
they have hitherto had no knowledge ; and the cultivation, 
the beauty, and prosperity of the country, and the virtue and 
happiness of its inhabitants, would be destroyed, whatever 
might be the result of the military operations. God forbid 
that I should be a witness, much less an actor in the scene ; 
and I only hope that the King's Government will consider 
well what I have above stated to your lordship ; will ascer- 
tain as nearly as is in their power the actual expense of em- 
ploying a certain number of men in this country beyond that 
of employing them at home or elsewhere ; and will keep up 
their force here on such a footing as will at all events secure 
their possession without keeping the transports, if it does not 
enable their Commander to take advantage of events and 
assume the offensive. 



THE BATTLE OF BARROSA. 

To Lieutenant-General Sir Brent Spencer, K.B. 

'Sta. Marinha, 

'March 25, 181 1. 

' The French retired from Celorico yesterday, and they 
appear to intend to take up a line on the Coa. Their left 
has gone by Guarda, apparently for Sabugal. 

' I enclose Graham's despatches* on his action.' 

* ' Lieutenant- General Graham to the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of 

State. 

' Isla de Leon, 

' March 6, 1811. 

' Captain Hope, my first Aide-de-Camp, will have the honour of 
delivering this despatch, to inform your lordship of the glorious issue of 
an action fought yesterday by the division under my command against 
the army commanded by Marshal Victor, composed of the two divisions, 
Rutin's and Laval's. 

'The circumstances were such as compelled me to attack this very 



24S WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

To Lieutenant-General Graham. 

'Sta. Marinha, 

' March 25, 181 1. 

' I beg to congratulate you and the brave troops under 
your command on the signal victory which you gained on 
the 5th instant. I have no doubt whatever that their 
success would have had the effect of raising the siege of 



superior force. . . . The allied army, after a night march of sixteen 
hours from the camp near Veger, arrived in the morning of the 5th on the 
low ridge of Barrosa, about four miles to the southward of the mouth of 
the Santi Petri River. This height extends inland about a mile and a 
half, continuing on the north the extensive heathy plain of Chiclana. 
A great pine forest skirts the plain, and circles round the height at 
some distance, terminating down to Santi Petri, the intermediate space 
between the north side of the height and the forest being uneven and 
broken. . . . 

'Trusting to the known heroism of British troops, regardless of the 
numbers and position of their enemy, an immediate attack was deter- 
mined on. . . . 

' In less than an hour and a half from the commencement of the action 
the enemy was in full retreat. . . . 

'The exhausted state of the troops made pursuit impossible. . . . 

'An eagle,* six pieces of cannon, the General of Division Rufin, and 
the General of Brigade Rousseau, wounded and taken ; the Chief of the 
Staff, General Bellegarde, an Aide-de-Camp of Marshal Victor, and the 
Colonel of the 8th Regiment, with many other officers, killed, and 
several wounded and taken prisoners ; the field covered with the dead 
bodies and arms of the enemy attests that my confidence in this division 
was nobly repaid. 

' Where all have so distinguished themselves, it is scarcely possible to 
discriminate any as the most deserving of praise. Your lordship will, 
however, observe how gloriously the brigade of Guards maintained the 
high character of His Majesty's household troops. . . . 

'The animated charges of the 87th Regimentt were most con- 
spicuous. . . .' 

* This was the first eagle captured by the British in action in the 
Peninsula. It belonged to the 8th Regiment of Light Infantry, and was 
captured by the Royal Irish Fusiliers, whose badge is inscribed ' 8.' 
— W. W. 

+ Now the 1st Battalion Princess Victoria's (Royal Irish Fusiliers). 
— W. W. 



THE PENINSULA 



249 



Cadiz if the Spanish corps had made any effort to assist 
them ; and I am equally certain, from your account of the 



'■Lieutenant-General Graham to the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of 

State. 

' Isla de Leon, 

' March 10, 181 1. 

' I have the honour to transmit to your lordship the return of the killed 
and wounded in the action of the 5th instant, and I have the satisfaction 
to add that the wounded in general are doing well. 

' By the best account that can be collected from the wounded French 
officers, the enemy had about 8,000 men engaged. Their loss, by 
reports from Chiclana, in killed, wounded, and prisoners, is supposed to 
amount to 3,000 ; I have no doubt of its being very great. 

' I transmit, too, a return of the ordnance in our possession, and also 
the most accurate note that can be obtained of prisoners, most of whom 
are wounded. They are so dispersed in different hospitals that an exact 
return has not yet been obtained. 

' P.S. Detachments of cavalry and infantry have been daily employed 
in carrying off the wounded and burying the dead, till the evening of the 
8th instant, by which time all the enemy's wounded that could be found 
among the brushwood and heath were brought in. 

' Return of the Nature and Number of Pieces of Ordnance taken in the 

Action of Barrosa, on March 5, 181 1. 
'Two 7-inch howitzers, three heavy 8-pounders, one 4-pounder, with 
their ammunition waggons, and a proportion of horses. 

1 Return of Prisoners of War taken in the Action of Barrosa, on 
March 5, 181 1. 
' Two General Officers, 1 Field Officer, 9 Captains, 8 Subalterns, 
420 rank and file. 

'N.B. The General of Brigade Rousseau and 2 Captains since dead of 
their wounds. 

' Return of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Troops under the 
Command of Lieutenant-General Graham, in the Action of Barrosa, 
with the French Corps d^Armee commanded by Marshal Victor, on 
March 5, 181 1. 





Officers. 


Non-commissioned 
Officers and 
Drummers. 


Rank 
and 
File. 


Horses. 

24 

42 


Total Loss of Officers, 

Non-commissioned 

Officers, and Rank 

and File. 


Killed 

Wounded 

Missing 


7 

55 


6 

45 


189 

940 


202 
1,040 



250 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 



ground, that if you had not decided with the utmost promp- 
titude to attack the enemy, and if your attack had not been 
a most vigorous one, the whole allied army would have been 
lost. . . . 

' The conduct of the Spaniards throughout this expedition 
is precisely the same as I have ever observed it to be. They 
march the troops night and day, without provisions or rest, 
and abusing everybody who proposes a moment's delay to 
afford either to the famished and fatigued soldiers. They 
reach the enemy in such a state as to be unable to make any 
exertion, or to execute any plan, even if any plan had been 
formed ; and then, when the moment of action arrives, they 
are totally incapable of movement, and they stand by to see 
their allies destroyed, and afterwards abuse them because 
they do not continue, unsupported, exertions to which human 
nature is not equal. . . .' 

To Marshal Bcrcsford. 

'Sta. Marinha, 

' March 25, 181 1. 

' General Graham has returned to the Isla, after having 
fought the hardest action that has been fought yet. The 
Spaniards left him very much to his own exertions. The 
Spanish General is to be brought to a court-martial. Graham 
took two General Officers, six pieces of cannon, an eagle, and 
500 prisoners. He lost 1,100, principally wounded. The 
two Portuguese companies of the 20th behaved remarkably 
well ; Bushe is wounded. I will send you the despatches 
as soon as Sir Brent shall return them. 

' I am sorry to tell you that the Portuguese troops here 
are diminishing in numbers terribly. Pack's brigade has 
only 1,700; the 21st Regiment but little more than 500; 
Pakenham tells me either the 3rd or 15th only 300, but 
I have not seen this return. They are fed, and, indeed, have 
been ever since they marched, by our Commissaries, except 
Pack's, Ashworth's, and Barbacena's cavalry.' 



THE PENINSULA 251 



A Handsome Dressing for the French. 

To Captain Chapman, Royal Engineers. 

'Villar Mayor, 

' April 8, 181 1. 

1 . . . We have given the French a handsome dressing, 
and I think they will not say again that we are not a 
manoeuvring army. We may not manoeuvre so beautifully 
as they do ; but I do not desire better sport than to meet one 
of their columns en masse with our lines. The poor 2nd 
Corps received a terrible beating from the 43rd and 52nd on 
the 3rd.' 

Violating Hospitality. 

To Charles Stuart, Esq. 

'Villar Mayor, 

'Aprils, 181 1. 

' I have had the honour of receiving your letter of 

March 16, regarding a complaint of Captain of the , 

forwarded by the Governors of the Kingdom. 

' I enclose a letter of March 5, which Captain 

had written to his Commanding Officer, under the expecta- 
tion that his conduct might be complained of; and another 
letter of March 31, written in answer to one which I 
desired might be sent to him, to inquire whether he wrote 
the letters enclosed in yours of the 16th instant. 

' Excepting in cases in which it appears that there has 
been some gross and flagrant departure from the laws of 
hospitality, or violence has been used, or gross fraud prac- 
tised, it does not answer to bring cases of seduction under 
the cognizance of the military tribunals. It is probable that 

Captain would be acquitted, and the young lady and 

family would be disgraced by the sentence. 

' I acknowledge that, from what I have heard upon this 
subject, I would recommend to the family to drop it entirely. 
If, however, they should determine to bring it forward in 
the Portuguese civil courts, it will be necessary that the 



252 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

Government should apply to me to have Captain made 

over to them to answer for his conduct.' 

Immense French Losses. 
To the Earl of Liverpool. 

'Villa Fermosa, 

' April 9, 1811. 

' The enemy's loss in this expedition to Portugal is 
immense ; I should think not less than 45,000 men including 
the sick and wounded ; and I think that, including the gth 
Corps, they may have 40,000 on this frontier. 

' I enclose a letter which I have received this day from 
one of my correspondents at Salamanca, which shows the 
state in which they are. The whole army is dispirited and 
dissatisfied. Ney left them about a fortnight ago, it is said, 
in arrest ; and I understand that the other Generals are 
equally dissatisfied with Massena's operations. . . .' 

The French Defeats. 

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley. 

' Villa Fermosa, 

1 April 10, 181 1. 

' . . . We have given the French some terrible beatings, 
and they are completely dispirited and disorganized. . . .' 

FUENTES DE ONORO. 

To the Earl of Liverpool. 

'Villa Fermosa, 

'May 8, 181 1. 

' . . . The allied army had been cantoned along the river 
Dos Casas, and on the sources of the Azava, the Light 
Division at Gallegos and Espeja. This last fell back upon 
Fuentes de Ofioro, on the Dos Casas, with the British cavalry, 
in proportion as the enemy advanced, and the 1st, 3rd, and 7th 
Divisions were collected at that place ; the 6th Division, 
under Major-General Campbell, observed the bridge at 
Alameda ; and Major- General Sir William Erskine, with the 



THE PENINSULA 253 



5th Division, the passages of the Dos Casas at Fort Concep- 
cion and Aldea del Obispo. Brigadier-General Pack's brigade, 
with the Queen's Regiment from the 6th Division, kept the 
blockade of Almeida ; and I had prevailed upon Don Julian 
Sanchez to occupy Nave d'Aver with his corps of Spanish 
cavalry and infantry. 

' The Light Division were moved in the evening to join 
Major-General Campbell, upon finding that the enemy were 
in strength in that quarter ; and they were brought back 
again to Fuentes de Onoro on the morning of the 5th, when 
it was found that the 8th Corps had joined the 6th on the 
enemy's left. 

' Shortly after the enemy had formed on the ground on 
the right of the Dos Casas, on the afternoon of the 3rd, they 
attacked with a large force the village of Fuentes de Onoro, 
which was defended in a most gallant manner by Lieutenant- 
Colonel Williams, of the 5th Battalion 60th Regiment, 
in command of the light infantry battalion belonging to 
Major-General Picton's division, supported by the light 
infantry battalion in Major-General Nightingall's brigade, 
commanded by Major Dick of the 42nd Regiment, and 
the light infantry battalion in Major-General Howard's 
brigade, commanded by Major M'Donnell of the 92nd, and 
the light infantry battalion of the King's German Legion, 
commanded by Major Aly, of the 5th Battalion of the Line, 
and by the 2nd Battalion 83rd Regiment, under Major 
Carr. 

' The troops maintained their position ; but having observed 
the repeated efforts which the enemy were making to obtain 
possession of the village, and being aware of the advantage 
which they would derive from the possession in their subse- 
quent operations, I reinforced the village successively with 
the 71st Regiment under Lieutenant-Colonel the Hon. H. 
Cadogan, and the 79th under Lieutenant-Colonel Cameron, 
and the 24th under Major Chamberlain. The former, at the 
head of the 71st Regiment, charged the enemy, and drove 
them from a part of the village of which they had obtained 
a momentary possession. 



254 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 



' Nearly at this time Lieutenant-Colonel Williams was un- 
fortunately wounded, but I hope not dangerously, and the 
command devolved upon Lieutenant-Colonel Cameron of the 
79th. 

' The contest continued till night, when our troops re- 
mained in possession of the whole. 

' I then withdrew the light infantry battalions and the 
83rd Regiment, leaving the 71st and 79th Regiments only in 
the village, and the 2nd Battalion 24th Regiment to support 
them. 

' On the 4th the enemy reconnoitred the position which we 
had occupied on the Dos Casas River; and during that night 
they moved the Due d'Abrantes' corps from Alameda to the 
left of the position occupied by the 6th Corps, opposite to 
Fuentes de Onoro. 

' From the course of the reconnaissance on the 4th I had 
imagined that the enemy would endeavour to obtain possession 
of Fuentes de Onoro, and of the ground occupied by the 
troops behind that village, by crossing the Dos Casas at Pozo 
Velho ; and in the evening I moved the 7th Division, under 
Major-General Houstoun, to the right, in order, if possible, 
to protect that passage. 

' On the morning of the 5th the 8th Corps appeared in two 
columns, with all the cavalry, on the opposite side of the 
valley of the Dos Casas and Pozo Velho ; and as the 6th and 
9th Corps also made a movement to their left, the Light 
Division, which had been brought back from the neighbour- 
hood of Alameda, were sent with the cavalry, under Sir 
Stapleton Cotton, to support Major-General Houstoun ; 
while the 1st and 3rd Divisions made a movement to their 
right, along the ridge between the Turon and Dos Casas 
rivers, corresponding to that of the 6th and 9th Corps, on the 
right of the Dos Casas. 

' The 8th Corps attacked Major-General Houstoun's ad- 
vanced guard, consisting of the 85th Regiment, under Major 
Macintosh, and the 2nd Portuguese Caeadores, under Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel Nixon, and obliged them to retire ; and they 
retired in good order, although with some loss. The 8th 



THE PENINSULA 255 



Corps being thus established in Pozo Velho, the enemy's 
cavalry turned the right of the 7th Division, between Pozo 
Velho and Nave d'Aver, from which last place Don Julian 
Sanchez had been obliged to retire, and the cavalry charged. 

' The charge of the advanced guard of the enemy's cavalry 
was met by two or three squadrons of the different regiments 
of British Dragoons, and the enemy were driven back ; 
and Colonel La Motte, of the 13th Chasseurs, and some 
prisoners taken. 

' The main body were checked and obliged to retire by 
the fire of Major-General Houstoun's division, and I par- 
ticularly observed the Chasseurs Britanniques, under Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel Eustace, as behaving in the most steady 
manner ; and Major-General Houstoun mentions in high 
terms the conduct of a detachment of the Duke of Brunswick's 
Light Infantry. 

' Notwithstanding that this charge was repulsed, I deter- 
mined to concentrate our force towards the left, and to move 
the 7th and Light Divisions and the cavalry from Pozo Velho 
towards Fuentes de Onoro and the other two Divisions. 

' I had occupied Pozo Velho and that neighbourhood in 
hopes that I should be able to maintain the communication 
across the Coa by Sabugal, as well as provide for the 
blockade, which objects it was now obvious were incompatible 
with each other ; and I therefore abandoned that which was 
the least important, and placed the Light Division in reserve 
in the rear of the left of the 1st Division, and the 7th Division 
on some commanding ground beyond the Turon, which pro- 
tected the right flank and rear of the 1st Division, and covered 
the communication with the Coa, and prevented that of the 
enemy with Almeida by the roads between the Turon and 
that river. . . . 

' Our position thus extended on the high ground from the 
Turon to the Dos Casas. The 7th Division, on the left of 
the Turon, covered the rear of the right ; the 1st Division, 
in two lines, were on the right ; Colonel Ashworth's brigade, 
in two lines, in the centre ; and the 3rd Division, in two 
lines, on the left ; the Light Division and British Artillery 



2 56 WELLINGTON ' 5 DESPA TCHES 



in reserve ; and the village of Fuentes in front of the left. 
Don Julian's infantry joined the 7th Division in Freneda, 
and I sent him with his cavalry to endeavour to intercept 
the enemy's communication with Ciudad Rodrigo. 

' The enemy's efforts on the right part of our position, after 
it was occupied as I have above described, were confined to 
a cannonade, and to some charges with his cavalry upon 
the advanced posts. The regiments of the 1st Division, 
under Lieutenant-Colonel Hill of the 3rd Regiment of Guards, 
repulsed one of these ; but as they were falling back they 
did not see the direction of another in sufficient time to form 
to oppose it, and Lieutenant-Colonel Hill was taken prisoner, 
and many men were wounded and some taken, before a 
detachment of the British cavalry could move up to their 
support. 

' The 2nd Battalion 42nd Regiment, under Lord Blantyre, 
also repulsed a charge of the cavalry directed against them. 

' The enemy's principal effort was throughout this day 
again directed against Fuentes de Oiioro ; and, notwith- 
standing that the whole of the 6th Corps were at different 
periods of the day employed to attack this village, they could 
never gain more than a temporary possession of it. It was 
defended by the 24th, 71st, and 79th Regiments, under the 
command of Lieutenant-Colonel Cameron ; and these troops 
were supported by the light infantry battalions of the 3rd 
Division, commanded by Major Woodgate ; the light infantry 
battalions of the 1st Division, commanded by Major Dick, 
Major M'Donald, and Major Aly ; the 6th Portuguese 
Cacadores, commanded by Major Pinto ; by the light com- 
panies in Colonel Champelmond's Portuguese brigade, under 
Colonel Sutton ; and those in Colonel Ashworth's Portu- 
guese brigade, under Lieutenant-Colonel Pynn, and by the 
piquets of the 3rd Division, under the command of Colonel the 
Hon. R. Trench. Lieutenant-Colonel Cameron was severely* 
wounded in the afternoon, and the command in the village 
devolved upon Lieutenant-Colonel the Hon. H. Cadogan. 

' The troops in Fuentes were besides supported, when 
* Mortally. 



THE PENINSULA 257 



pressed by the enemy, by the 74th Regiment, under Major 
Russell Manners, and the 1st Battalion 88th Regiment, under 
Lieutenant-Colonel Wallace, belonging to Colonel Mac- 
kinnon's brigade ; and on one of these occasions, the 88th, 
with the 71st and 79th, under the command of Colonel 
Mackinnon, charged the enemy, and drove them through the 
village ; and Colonel Mackinnon has reported particularly 
the conduct of Lieutenant-Colonel Wallace, Brigade-Major 
Wilde, and Lieutenant and Adjutant Stewart. 

' The contest again lasted in this quarter till night, when 
our troops still held their post, and from that time the enemy 
have made no fresh attempt on any part of our position. 

' The enemy manifested an intention to attack Major- 
General Sir William Erskine's post at Aide del Obispo on the 
same morning, with a part of the 2nd Corps, but the Major- 
General sent the 2nd Battalion Lusitanian Legion across the 
ford of the Dos Casas, which obliged them to retire. 

' In the course of last night the enemy commenced retiring 
from their position on the Dos Casas, and this morning, at 
daylight, the whole was in motion. I cannot yet decide 
whether this movement is preparatory to some fresh attempt 
to raise the blockade of Almeida, or is one of decided retreat ; 
but I have every reason to hope that they will not succeed 
in the first, and that they will be obliged to have recourse to 
the last. Their superiority in cavalry is very great, owing 
to the weak state of our horses from recent fatigue and 
scarcity of forage, and the reduction of numbers in the Por- 
tuguese brigade of cavalry with this part of the army, in ex- 
change for a British brigade sent into Estremadura with 
Marshal Sir William Beresford, owing to the failure of the 
measures reported to have been adopted to supply horses and 
men with food on the service. 

' The result of a general action, brought on by an attack 
upon the enemy by us, might, under those circumstances, 
have been doubtful ; and if the enemy had chosen to avoid it, 
or if they had met it, they would have taken advantage of 
the collection of our troops to fight this action, and throw 
relief into Almeida. 

17 



!5 8 



WELLINGTON'S DESPA TCHES 



' From the great superiority of force to which we have 
been opposed upon this occasion your lordship will judge of 
the conduct of the officers and troops. The actions were 
partial, but very severe, and our loss has been great. The 
enemy's loss has also been very great, and they left 400 
killed in the village of Fuentes, and we have many 
prisoners. . . .' 

Return of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Army 
under the Command of Lieutenant-General Viscount Wel- 
lington, K.B., in the Affairs at Fuentes de Ofwro, on 
May 3 and 5, 1811. 



Officers. 



Non-commissioned 
Officers and 
Drummers. 



Killed 

Wounded 

Missing 



11 

8 ; 



16 

72 
10 



Rank 
and 
File. 



208 

I,o8l 

3OO 



Horses. 



Total Loss of Officers, 

Non-commissioned 

Officers, and Rank 

and File. 



49 
101 

5 



235 

1,234 

3'7 



The Portuguese killed, wounded, and missing are included in the above 
numbers. 

To the Right Hon. Henry Wclleslcy. 

'Villa Fermosa, 

'May 8, 181 1. 

' . . . We have had warm work in this quarter, but I hope 
we shall succeed in the end. The French, it is said, lost 
5,000 men, we 1,200, in the affair of the 5th ; on the 3rd we 
lost about 250 ; the French left 400 dead in the village of 
Fuentes de Onoro. We lost the prisoners by the usual dash 
and imprudence of the soldiers.' 

OVER-ZEALOUS LEADERS. 

To Major-General Alexander Campbell. 

'Villa Fermosa, 

' May 15, 181 1. 

' . . . The frequent instances which have occurred lately 
of severe loss, and, in some instances, of important failure, by 
officers leading the troops beyond the point to which they 
are ordered and beyond all bounds, such as the loss of the 



THE PENINSULA 259 



prisoners taken in front of the village of Fuentes, on the 
3rd and 5th instant ; the loss incurred by the 13th Light 
Dragoons, near and at Badajoz, on March 25 ; the severe 
loss incurred by the troops in the siege of Badajoz on the 
right of the Guadiana on the 10th instant ; and the loss 

incurred by Lieutenant-Colonel on the nth instant, 

have induced me to determine to bring before a general 
court-martial, for disobedience of orders, any officer who 
shall, in future, be guilty of this conduct. 

' I entertain no doubt of the readiness of the officers and 
soldiers of the army to advance upon the enemy ; but it is 
my duty, and that of every General and other officer in 
command, to regulate this spirit, and not to expose the 
soldier to contend with unequal numbers in situations dis 
advantageous to them, and, above all, not to allow them to 
follow up trifling advantages to situations in which they 
cannot be supported, from which their retreat is not secure, 
and in which they incur the risk of being prisoners to the 
enemy they had before beaten. 

' The desire to be forward in engaging the enemy is not 
uncommon in the British army; but that quality which I 
wish to see the officers possess, who are at the head of the 
troops, is a cool, discriminating judgment in action, which 
will enable them to decide with promptitude how far they 
can and ought to go with propriety, and to convey their 
orders, and act with such vigour and decision that the 
soldiers will look up to them with confidence in the moment 
of action, and obey them with alacrity. 

' The officers of the army may depend upon it that the 
enemy to whom they are opposed are not less prudent than 
they are powerful. Notwithstanding what has been printed 
in gazettes and newspapers, we have never seen small 
bodies, unsupported, opposed to large ; nor has the experience 
of any officer realized the stories, which all have read, of 
whole armies being driven by a handful of light infantry or 
dragoons. 

' I trust that this letter, copies of which I propose to 
circulate to the General Officers commanding divisions, with 

17 — 2 



2 6o WELLINGTON'S DESPA TCHES 

directions to circulate it among the officers of the army, will 
have the effect of inducing them to reflect seriously upon the 
duties which they have to perform before the enemy, and to 
avoid the error which is the subject of it, which is really 
become one of serious detriment to the army and to the 
public interests.' 

THE BATTLE OF ALBUERA. 

To Charles Stuart, Esq. 

' Elvas, 

'•May 20, 181 1. 

' . . . I think it very desirable that, if possible, no flying 
details of the battle of Albuera should go home till Sir 
"William Beresford's report shall be sent. I conclude that 
the account that there had been a battle went by the mail 
yesterday, which is of no importance ; but where there are 
many killed and wounded the first reports are not favourable, 
and it is not doing justice to the Marshal to allow them to 
circulate without his.' 

To Lieutenant-General Sir Brent Spencer. 

' Elvas, 

' May 22, 181 1. 

' I went yesterday to Albuera, and saw the field of battle. 
"We had a very good position, and I think should have 
gained a complete victory in it, without any material loss, 
if the Spaniards could have manoeuvred ; but unfortunately 
they cannot. 

' The French are retiring, but I do not think it clear that 
they are going beyond the Sierra Morena. As I know you 
have plenty of correspondents, I do not give you any details 
of the action here, or of our loss. I think the action, upon 
the whole, to be the most honourable to the troops that they 
have been engaged in during the war. 

' P.S — I received your letter of the 20th this morning ; I 
think it appears that the enemy's loss cannot be less than 
between 8,000 and 9,000 men. . . .' 



THE PENINSULA 261 



To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley. 

'Elvas, 

1 May 22, 181 1. 

' We have had warm work here ; however, I hope that the 
French have suffered more than we have. I mean, if Soult 
goes far enough from me, to renew the operations of the 
siege of Badajoz ; but he will soon have a large reinforcement 
from Castille, and another such battle would ruin us. 

' The Spanish troops, I understand, behaved admirably ; 
they stood like stocks, both parties at times firing on them, 
but they were quite immovable ; and this is the great cause 
of all our losses. After they had lost their position, the 
natural thing to do would have been to attack it with the 
nearest Spanish troops, but they could not be moved ; the 
British troops were the next, and they were brought up, and 
must always in these cases be brought up, and they suffered 
accordingly. 

' The battle of Talavera was an example of the same defect 
in the Spanish troops ; they could not be moved, however 
advantageous this movement might have been ; and I suspect 
that the battle of Barrosa was something of the same kind. 

' It is scarcely to be believed that any officer, who could 
depend upon the discipline of his troops in their movements, 
would have remained the quiet spectator of such an action 
at such a moment. 

' From these circumstances you will believe that I am not 
very easy about the result of another action, if we should be 
obliged to fight one. What a pity it is that the Spaniards 
will not set to work seriously to discipline their troops ! We 
do what we please now with the Portuguese troops ; we 
manoeuvre them under fire equally with our own, and have 
some dependence on them ; but these Spaniards can do 
nothing, but stand still, and we consider ourselves fortunate 
if they do not run away. . . .' 



262 WELLING TON ' 5 DESPA TCHES 

To the Earl of Liverpool. 

' Elvas, 

1 May 22, i8n. 

' On the night of the 15th instant I received from Marshal 
Sir William Beresford letters of the 12th and 13th instant, 
which reported that Marshal Soult had broken up from 
Seville and had advanced towards Estremadura about the 
10th, notwithstanding the reports which had been previously 
raised that he was busily occupied in strengthening Seville, 
and the approaches to that city, by works, and that all his 
measures indicated an intention to remain on the defensive 
in Andalusia. 

' I therefore set out on the following morning from Villa 
Fermosa, and having received further information of the 
14th from Sir William Beresford of the enemy's movements, 
I hastened my progress, and arrived here on the 19th, and 
found that Sir William Beresford had raised the siege of 
Badajoz without the loss of ordnance or stores of any de- 
scription, had collected the troops under his command, and 
had formed a junction with Generals Castailos and Blake 
at Albuera in the course of the 15th instant. He was 
attacked there on the 16th by the French army under the 
command of Marshal Soult, and, after a most severe engage- 
ment, in which all the troops conducted themselves in the 
most gallant manner, Sir William Beresford gained the 
victory. The enemy retired in the night of the 17th instant, 
leaving between 900 and 1,000 wounded on the ground. Sir 
William Beresford sent the allied cavalry after them, and on 
the 19th in the morning reinvested Badajoz. 

' I enclose the reports of Sir William Beresford of the 16th 
and the 18th instant, on the operations of the siege to the 
moment of raising it, and on the battle at Albuera*, and I 

* Marshal Sir IV. C. Beresford, K.B., to Lieutenant-General Viscount 
Wellington, K.B. 

'Albuera, 

'May 18, 181 1. 

' I have infinite satisfaction in communicating to your lordship that the 
allied army, united here under my orders, obtained, on the 16th instant, 



THE PENINSULA 263 



beg to draw your lordship's attention to the ability, the firm- 
ness, and the gallantry manifested by Marshal Sir William 
Beresford throughout the transaction on which he has written. 

after a most sanguinary conquest, a complete victory over that of the 
enemy, commanded by Marshal Soult. 

' In a former report I have informed your lordship of the advance of 
Marshal Soult from Seville, and I had in consequence judged it wise 
entirely to raise the siege of Badajoz, and prepare to meet him with our 
united forces, rather than, by looking to two objects at once, to risk the 
loss of both. 

' Marshal Soult, it appears, had been long straining every nerve to 
collect a force which he thought fully sufficient to his object for the 
relief of Badajoz, and for this purpose he had drawn considerable 
numbers from the corps of Marshal Victor and General Sebastiani, and 
also, I believed, from the French army of the centre. Having thus 
completed his preparations, he marched from Seville on the 10th instant 
with a corps then estimated at 15,000 or 16,000 men, and was joined, on 
descending into Estremadura, by the corps under General Latour 
Maubourg, stated to be 5,000 men. . . . 

'As remaining at Valverde, though a stronger position, left Badajoz 
entirely open, I determined to take up a position (such as could be got in 
this widely open country) at this place, thus standing directly between the 
enemy and Badajoz. 

'The army was assembled here on the 15th instant. The corps of 
General Blake, though making a forced march to effect it, only joined in 
the night, and could not be placed in its position till the morning of the 
1 6th instant, when General Cole's division, with the Spanish Brigade 
under Don Carlos de Espaha, also joined, and a little before the com- 
mencement of the action. Our cavalry had been forced on the morning 
of the 15th instant to retire from Santa Marta, and joined here. 

' In the afternoon of that day the enemy appeared in front of us. 
The next morning our disposition for receiving the enemy was made, 
being formed in two lines, nearly parallel to the river Albuera, on the 
ridge of the gradual ascent rising from that river, and covering the 
roads to Badajoz and Valverde, though your lordship is aware that 
the whole face of this country is everywhere passable for all arms. 
General Blake's corps was on the right in two lines ; its left, on the 
Valverde road, joined the right of Major-General the Hon. William 
Stewart's division, the left of which reached the Badajoz road, where 
commenced the right of Major-General Hamilton's division, which 
closed the left of the line. General Cole's division, with one brigade of 
General Hamilton's, formed the second line of the British and Portuguese 
army. 



264 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

I shall add nothing to what he has said of the conduct of all 
the officers and troops, excepting to express my admiration 

'The enemy, on the morning of the 16th, did not long delay his 
attack. At eight o'clock he was observed to be in movement, and 
his cavalry was seen passing the rivulet of Albuera, considerably above 
our right ; and shortly after he marched out of the wood opposite to 
us a strong force of cavalry, and two heavy columns of infantry, point- 
ing them to our front, as if to attack the bridge and village of Albuera. 
During this time, under cover of his vastly superior cavalry, he was 
filing the principal body of his infantry over the river beyond our right, 
and it was not long before his intention appeared to be to turn us by that 
flank, and to cut us off from Valverde. . . . 

'The enemy commenced his attack at nine o'clock, not ceasing at the 
same time to menace our left, and after a strong and gallant resistance of 
the Spanish troops, he gained the heights upon which they had been 
formed. . . . 

' As the heights the enemy had gained raked and entirely commanded 
our whole position, it became necessary to make every effort to retake and 
maintain them, and a noble one was made by the division of General 
Stewart, headed by that "gallant officer. 

' Nearly at the beginning of the enemy's attack a heavy storm of rain 
came on, which, with the smoke from the firing, rendered it impossible to 
discern anything distinctly. This, with the nature of the ground, had 
been extremely favourable to the enemy in forming his columns, and in 
his subsequent attack. 

'The right brigade of General Stewart's division, under Lieutenant- 
Colonel Colborne, first came into action, and behaved in the most gallant 
manner, and finding that the enemy's column could not be shaken by fire, 
proceeded to attack it with the bayonet ; and, while in the act of 
charging, a body of Polish lancers (cavalry), which the thickness of the 
atmosphere and the nature of the ground had concealed (and which was, 
besides, mistaken by those of the brigade, when discovered, for Spanish 
cavalry, and therefore not fired upon), turned it, and, being thus attacked 
unexpectedly in the rear, was unfortunately broken, and suffered im- 
mensely. The 31st Regiment, being the left one of the brigade, alone 
escaped this charge, and, under the command of Major L'Estrange, kept 
its ground until the arrival of the 3rd Brigade, under Major- General 
Houghton. The conduct of this brigade was most conspicuously 
gallant, and that of the 2nd Brigade, under the command of Lieutenant- 
Colonel the Hon. A. Abercrombie, was not less so. Major-General 
Houghton, cheering on his brigade to the charge, fell pierced by wounds. 

'Though the enemy's principal attack was on this point of the right, 
he also made a continual attempt upon that part of our original front at 



THE PENINSULA 265 



of it and my cordial concurrence in the favourable reports 
made by Sir William Beresford of the good conduct of 
all. . . .' 

the village and bridge, which were defended in the most gallant manner 
by Major-General Baron Alten, and the light infantry brigade of the 
German Legion, whose conduct was, in every point of view, con- 
spicuously good. This point now formed our left, and Major-General 
Hamilton's division had been brought up there ; and he was left to direct 
the defence of that point, whilst the enemy's attack continued on our 
right, a considerable proportion of the Spanish troops supporting the 
defence of this place. 

' The enemy's cavalry, on his infantry attempting to force our right, had 
endeavoured to turn it, but, by the able manoeuvres of Major-General the 
Hon. William Lumley, commanding the allied cavalry, though vastly 
inferior to that of the enemy in number, his endeavours were foiled. 
Major-General Cole, seeing the attack of the enemy, very judiciously 
bringing up his left a little, marched in line to attack the enemy's left, 
and arrived most opportunely to contribute, with the charges of the 
brigades of General Stewart's division, to force the enemy to abandon 
his situation, and retire precipitately, and to take refuge under his reserve. 
Here the fusilier brigade particularly distinguished itself. 

' He was pursued by the allies to a considerable distance, and as far as 
I thought it prudent, with his immense superiority of cavalry, and I con- 
tented myself to see him driven across the Albuera. . . . 

' It is impossible to enumerate every instance of discipline and valour 
shown on this severely contested day, but there never were troops that 
more valiantly or more gloriously maintained the honour of their re- 
spective countries. I have not been able to particularize the Spanish 
divisions, brigades, or regiments, that were particularly engaged, because 
I am not acquainted with their denominations or names, but I have great 
pleasure in saying that their behaviour was most gallant and honourable, 
and though, from the superior number and weight of the enemy s force, 
that part of them that were in the position attacked were obliged to cede 
the ground, it was after a gallant resistance, and they continued in good 
order to support their allies ; and I doubt not His Excellency General 
Blake will do ample justice on this head by making honourable mention 
of the deserving. 

'The battle commenced at nine o'clock, and continued without inter- 
ruption till two in the afternoon, when, the enemy having been driven 
over the Albuera, for the remainder of the day there was but cannonading 
and skirmishing. 

' It is impossible by any description to do justice to the distinguished 
gallantry of the troops, but every individual most nobly did his duty, 



266 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

To the Earl of Liverpool. 

' Elvas, 

1 May 22, 1 8i I. 

' I enclose a letter of the 2ist instant, which I have re- 
ceived from Marshal Sir William Beresford, containing a 

which will be well proved by the great loss we have suffered, though repuls- 
ing the enemy ; and it was observed that our dead, particularly the 57th 
Regiment, were lying as they had fought in ranks, and every wound was 
in front.* . . . 

' I annex the return of our loss in this hard contested day— it is very 
severe ; and in addition to it is the loss of the troops under His Excellency 
General Blake, who are killed, missing, and wounded, but of which I have 
not the return. The loss of the enemy, though I cannot know what it is, 
must be still more severe. He has left on the field of battle about 2,000 
dead, and we have taken from 900 to 1,000 prisoners. He has had five 
Generals killed and wounded ; of the former, Generals of Divisions Werle 
and Pesim ; and Gazan and two others amongst the latter. His force 
was much more considerable than we had been informed of, as I do not 
think he displayed less than from 20,000 to 22,000 infantry, and he 
certainly had 4,000 cavalry, with a numerous and heavy artillery. His 
overbearing cavalry cramped and confined all our operations, and, with 
his artillery, saved his infantry after its rout. 

' He retired after the battle to the ground he had been previously on, 
but occupying it in position ; and on this morning, or rather during the 
night, commenced his retreat on the road he came, towards Seville, and 
has abandoned Badajoz to its fate. He left a number of his wounded on 
the ground he had retired to, and to whom we are administering what 
assistance we can. I have sent our cavalry to follow the enemy, but in 
that arm he is too powerful for us to attempt anything against him in the 
plains he is traversing. 

' Thus we have reaped the advantage we proposed from our opposition 
to the attempts of the enemy, and, whilst he has been forced to abandon 
the object for which he has almost stripped Andalusia of troops, instead 
of having accomplished the haughty boasts with which Marshal Soult 
harangued his troops on leaving Seville, he returns there with a curtailed 



* Albuera gave to the 57th, now the 1st Battalion the Duke of 
Cambridge's Own (Middlesex Regiment), its famous nickname of 'the 
Die Hards.' The regiment have a badge in the shape of a laurel leaf, 
inscribed 'Albuhera.' The 57th went into action 570 strong, and of that 
number 22 officers and more than 400 men were killed or wounded. 
The King's colour was shot through by thirty bullets, but in spite ol its 
heavy losses the regiment never flinched. Colonel Inglis repeatedly 
inspired his men by shouting, ' Die hard, my men, die hard !' — W. W. 



THE PENINSULA 



267 



letter from General Gazan to Marshal Soult, which had been 
intercepted by some of our parties. 

' General Gazan, wounded himself, was marching with the 
wounded, and from his account of those with him, from the 
account of those at Almendralejo, and those left on the 
ground at Albuera, from the number found dead on the 
field, and the prisoners, the Marshal computes the enemy's 
loss not to fall short of 9,000 men.' 



Raising of the Siege of Badajoz. 
To the Earl of Liverpool. 

' QUINTA DE GRANICHA, 

"■Jutie 13, 181 1. 

' In consequence of a report from the Chief Engineer, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Fletcher, that the fire from San 
Christoval might occasion the loss of many lives in the 
operations on the left of the Guadiana, and the breach in 
that outwork having been apparently much improved by the 
fire throughout the 6th, I directed that an attempt might be 
made to carry San Christoval by storm that night. Major- 
General Houstoun, who conducted the operations of the 
siege on the right of the Guadiana, accordingly ordered a 
detachment under Major Macintosh, of the 85th Regiment, 



army, and, what perhaps may be still more hurtful to him, with a 
diminished reputation. . . .' 

Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Corps of the Army under 
the Command of Lieutenant- General Viscount Wellington, K.B., 
under the Immediate Orders of Marshal Sir William Carr Beres- 
ford, K.B., in the Battle with the French Army, commanded by 
Marshal Soult, at Albuera, on May 16, 181 1. 



Killed 

Wounded 

Missing 



Officers. 



34 
181 

14 



Non-commissioned 
Officers and 
Drummers. 



33 

146 

28 



Rank 




and 


Horses. 


File. 




917 


63 


2,666 


35 


528 


17 



Total Loss of Officers, 

Non-commissioned 

Officers, and Rank 

and File. 

984 

2,993 
570 



The Portuguese loss, but not the Spanish, is included in this return. 



263 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

to make the attempt. The men advanced under a very 
heavy fire of musketry and hand grenades from the outworks, 
and of shot and shells from the town, with the utmost intre- 
pidity, and in the best order, to the bottom of the breach, 
the advanced-guard being led by Ensign Dyas, of the 51st 
Regiment, who volunteered to perform this duty ; but they 
found that the enemy had cleared the rubbish from the 
bottom of the escarp, and, notwithstanding that they were 
provided with ladders, it was impossible to mount it. They 
retired with some loss. 

' The fire upon San Christoval, as well as upon the place, 
continued on the 7th, 8th, and 9th, on which day the breach 
in the wall of San Christoval appeared practicable, and I 
directed that a second attempt should be made on that night 
to obtain possession of that outwork. Major-General Hous- 
toun ordered another detachment for this service, under the 
command of Major M'Geechy, of the 17th Portuguese Regi- 
ment, who, with the officers destined to command the 
different parties composing the detachment, had been em- 
ployed throughout the 8th and gth in reconnoitring the breach 
and the different approaches to it. 

' They advanced at about nine at night, in the best order, 
though opposed by the same means, and with the same de- 
termination as had been opposed to the detachment which 
had made the attempt on the 6th. 

' Ensign Dyas again led the service, and the storming 
party arrived at the foot of the breach ; but they found it 
impossible to mount it, the enemy having again cleared the 
rubbish from the bottom of the escarp. The detachment 
suffered considerably, and Major M'Geechy, the Com- 
manding Officer, was unfortunately killed, and others of 
the officers fell ; but the troops continued to maintain 
their station till Major-General Houstoun ordered them to 
retire. 

' When the reinforcements had arrived from the frontiers 
of Castille, after the battle of Albuera, I undertook the 
siege of Badajoz, entertaining a belief that the means of 
which I had the command would reduce the place before 



THE PENINSULA 269 



the end of the second week in June, at which time I ex- 
pected that the reinforcement for the enemy's southern army, 
detached from Castille, would join Marshal Soult. I was, 
unfortunately, mistaken in my estimate of the quality of these 
means. 

' The ordnance belonging to the garrison of Elvas is very 
ancient and incomplete, unprovided with the improvements 
adopted by modern science to facilitate and render more 
certain the use of cannon ; and although classed generally 
as 24-pounders, the guns were found to be of a calibre larger 
than the shot in the garrison of that weight. The fire from 
this ordnance was therefore very uncertain, and the carriages 
proved to be worse even than we supposed they were ; and 
both guns and carriages were rendered useless so frequently 
by the effect of our own fire as to create delay, in conse- 
quence of the necessity which existed for exchanging both in 
the advanced batteries. 

' Those who are accustomed to observe the effect of the fire 
of artillery will be astonished to learn that fire was kept up 
from the 2nd to the 10th instant from fourteen 24-pounders, 
upon the wall of the castle of Badajoz, constructed of rammed 
earth and loose stones, of which the foot was seen at the 
distance of from 400 to 600 yards, and that it had not at last 
effected a practicable breach. It was impossible to estimate 
the length of time which would elapse before a practicable 
breach could have been effected in this wall ; and, even if 
one had been effected, it was the opinion of the engineers and 
others, as well as my own, that although the breach could 
have been stormed, we could not have formed our troops to 
attack the enemy's intrenchment within unless we had posses- 
sion of Fort San Christoval. 

' We had failed in two attempts to obtain possession of 
Fort San Christoval, and it was obvious to me that we could 
not obtain possession of that outwork without performing a 
work which would have required the labour of several days to 
accomplish it. 

• On the morning of the 10th instant I received the en- 
closed intercepted despatch, from the Duke of Dalmatia to 



lyo 



WELLINGTON'S DESPA TCHES 



the Duke of Rogusa, which pointed out clearly the enemy's 
design to collect in Estremadura their whole force, and I 
had reason to believe that Bonet's corps, which had marched 
from Toledo on the 28th and 29th of May, and was expected 
at Cordova on the 5th and 6th instant, would have joined the 
southern army by the 10th ; and it was generally expected in 
the country that the southern army would have moved by 
that time. 

' The movement of this army alone would have created a 
necessity for raising the siege ; but on the same morning I 
received accounts from the frontiers of Castille, which left 
no doubt of the destination of the army of Portugal to the 
southward, and gave ground for belief that they would arrive 
at Merida on the 15th instant. 

' I therefore ordered that the siege should be raised. 

' I am concerned to add that this measure was rendered 
expedient, not only by the military considerations to which 
I have above referred, but by others relative to the security 
of Elvas. . . . 

' I enclose a return of the killed and wounded throughout 
the siege, from which your lordship will observe that, ex- 
cepting in the attempts to obtain possession of San Christo- 
val, our loss has not been severe. We still maintain the 
blockade of Badajoz ; and I know from an intercepted letter 
that the enemy had in the place, on the 28th of May, only 
three weeks' provisions.' 

Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Army under the 
Command of Lieutenant-General Lord Viscount Wellington, 
K.B., in the Several Affairs with the French Army, from 
May 30 to June 11, 1811, inclusive. 

Headquarters, Quinta de St. Joao, 

June 13, 181 1. 





Officers. 


Non-commissioned 
Officers and 
Drummers. 


Rank 
and 

File. 


Horses. 


Total Loss of Officers, 

Non-commissioned 

Officers, and Rank 

and File. 


Killed 

Wounded 
Missing 


9 

22 

3 


3 

17 


106 
315 

6 




Il8 

354 
9 



THE PENINSULA 271 



The Grant of Medals. 

To the Earl of Liverpool. 

' Quinta DE St. Joao, 

' July 11, 1 8 1 1 . 

' I have had the honour of receiving your lordship's letter 
of June 22, in which your lordship desires to have my 
opinion as to the restrictions which it may be expedient to 
put upon the grant of medals to British officers, for distin- 
guished merit displayed upon such occasions as the battles of 
Vimeiro, Corufia, Talavera, and Barrosa. 

' My opinion has always been that the grant of a medal 
to an individual officer ought to have been founded originally, 
partly on the importance of the occasion or action which it 
was intended to commemorate, and partly on the share 
which the individual officer had had in the action to be com- 
memorated ; and that medals should have been granted for 
important actions only, and to those engaged in them in a 
conspicuous manner, whatever might be their rank in the 
service. 

' It was decided, however, that medals should be granted 
on the same principle only, but following strictly the ex- 
ample of the grant of medals to the navy, notwithstanding 
that an action on shore is very different from an action at sea ; 
and the merits of the different classes of individuals are like- 
wise entirely different. At the same time, this principle was 
departed from in some of the grants made. 

' If the principle adopted in the grant of medals to the 
navy is adhered to in the grant of medals to Officers of the 
army, and that medals are to be granted to General Officers, 
and Lieutenant-Colonels commanding regiments, on an 
occasion to be commemorated, because, on a similar occasion, 
they would be granted to Admirals and Captains of ships of 
the line, it is difficult to restrict the grant, or to make a 
selection of officers to whom they should be granted, to com- 
memorate the battles at Busaco and Fuentes de Onoro, if 
Government determine that these actions should be com- 
memorated in that manner. If, however, that principle is 



272 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

departed from, it is not difficult to make out a list of the 
names of officers already reported to your lordship, who were 
at the head of corps or detachments upon these occasions, 
and who had a conspicuous share in the event which it is 
the intention of the Government to commemorate in this 
manner. It is not probable, however, that the adoption of 
this principle will decrease the number of those to whom the 
honour would be granted ; but, as I have already represented 
to your lordship, I do not think this important : that which 
is important in the establishment of the principle on which 
the grant of this honour should be made, is, that every 
officer should feel that he shall receive the mark of distinction, 
if he should be in the place to distinguish himself, and should 
act in the manner to deserve to be distinguished, whatever 
may be his military rank. It may be contended by me that 
the officers of the British army do not require an honour of 
this description to stimulate their exertions, and that the 
grant of the medal is therefore useless ; but, however, those 
who contend for this principle must admit that a selection of 
those who have had an opportunity of distinguishing them- 
selves in an action is a less objectionable mode of granting 
it than the grant of it by classes, whether the individuals com- 
posing those classes have distinguished themselves or not. 

' I have now the honour to enclose lists of the names of the 
officers who, on the principle of selection, ought, in my 
opinion, to receive medals for the battles of Busaco and 
Fuentes de Oiioro, if Government think proper to distinguish 
these battles by medals. 

' In respect to the Battle of Albuera, I was not there,* and 
I am not able to give an opinion upon it. One brigade of 
the 4th Division of Infantry, however, was not in the action, 
nor Brigadier-General Madden's brigade of cavalry. The 
brunt of the action was on the right ; but some of the corps 
of infantry, I believe, and certainly General Otway's brigade 
of cavalry, on the left, were not engaged. At all events, 
these troops were not engaged, as far as I understand, in a 

* Wellington was too late for Albuera because he waited to see if 
Almeida would be repaired after it was blown up. — W. W. 



THE PENINSULA 273 



greater degree than the whole army were at Busaco, and 
every corps on the field at Fuentes de Onoro. 

' I mention these circumstances only to point out to your 
lordship that in every action on shore, however severe, 
there must be some to whose lot it does not fall to have an 
opportunity to distinguish themselves ; and that the prin- 
ciple of selection, without reference to ranks, ought to be 
adopted in every instance of the grant of medals to the 
army.' 

Astonishing Numbers of the French. 
To Marshal Beresford. 

' QUINTA DE ST. JOAO, 

'July 12, 181 1. 

' The devil is in the French for numbers ! A deserter 
came in yesterday, and told me he heard Broissard say to 
another officer that the two armies had 60,000 infantry and 
nearly 10,000 cavalry ! I made them from 48,000 to 50,000 
infantry, without the garrison of Badajoz, and 7,000 
cavalry. . . .' 

This Extraordinary War. 

To Major-General the Hon. G. L. Cole. 

' PORTALEGRE, 

' July 26, 181 1. 

' The scene shifts in this extraordinary war so frequently, 
and so many unexpected circumstances occur affecting our 
situation, that it is difficult to say at what period it is pos- 
sible to allow an officer to quit the army. . . .' 

An Incorrigible Boy. 

To Vice-Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley. 

' Porta leg re, 

''July 29, 181 1. 

' Lord Blantyre has written to me to propose to transfer 
to the navy a boy by the name of John Fraser, who is so 
prone to desertion that they cannot keep him with the 42nd 



274 WELLINGTON'S DESPA TCHES 

Regiment. I have sent him to the Provost at Lisbon, and, 
if you have no objection to taking him, I request you to 
desire General Peacocke to send him on board any ship you 
please, and I will discharge him from the 42nd. He will not 
be at Lisbon for some days.' 

Friendly British and Portuguese. 

To the Earl of Liverpool. 

' Pedrogao, 

'■August 4, 181 1. 

' . . . The people of Portugal agree remarkably well with 
the British soldiers. I have never known an instance of the 
most trifling disagreement among the soldiers or officers of 
the two nations. The Portuguese soldiers eat the same food, 
and, as military men, adopt the same habits as our soldiers, 
including, in some instances, their disposition to intoxica- 
tion ; and therefore I should think it a preferable mode of 
introducing them into the British service, to place them in- 
discriminately in the same companies with recruits raised in 
His Majesty's dominions. Each individual would then be 
more likely to conduct himself on every occasion, and in all 
circumstances, as a British soldier. . . .' 

' Hell to Pay.' 
To Marshal Beresford. 

'FUENTE GUINALDO, 

'■August 28, 181 1. 
' . . . You will see the despatches to Government, but I 
have no doubt that, unless the design has been altered since 
the end of June and beginning of July we shall have the 
Emperor in Spain and hell to pay before much time 
elapses. . . .' 



THE PENINSULA 275 



Absurd Enough for an Encyclopaedia. 
To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley. 



1 FUENTE GUINALDO, 

' September 4, 1 8 1 1 . 



' . . . I have not often seen so absurd a paper as 's. 

It would do very well for the Encyclopaedia ; but there is 
not one word in the whole paper applicable to the present 
situation of Valencia.' 



Buonaparte and his Fleet. 

To His Excellency Charles Stuart. 

' Quadraseis, 

' September 29, 1 8 1 1 . 

' . . . I recommended the measure of arming the forts, not 
on any suspicion of the enemy's intentions founded on intelli- 
gence, but from the suggestions of my own mind, reflecting 
upon what it was probable the enemy might attempt. I am 
certain, that if Buonaparte does not remove us from the 
Peninsula he must lower his tone with the world ; and I 
am equally certain that he will make every effort to avoid 
this necessity. He has a fleet, and does not want for armies ; 
and he is just the man to sacrifice his ileet, and to make a 
great effort with his armies to effect this object. I fear the 
results of neither the one nor the other if we are prepared. 
But as we are not prepared with a fleet at Lisbon, which, in 
my opinion, we ought always to be, I thought it proper to 
desire that the sea forts might be armed, as the only measure 
in my power at the time it was supposed probable that he 
was coming himself to take command of his armies. 

1 The mail was robbed by some of my vagabond soldiers.' 



276 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

THE AFFAIR AT EL BODON.* 

To the Earl of Liverpool. 

' QUADRASEIS, 

' September 29, 1 8 1 1 . 

' The enemy commenced their movements towards Ciudad 
Rodrigo with the convoys of provisions from the Sierra de 
Bejar, and from Salamanca on the 21st instant, and on the 
following day I collected the British army in positions, from 
which I could either advance or retire without difficulty, and 
which would enable me to see all that was going on, and the 
strength of the enemy's army. . . . 

' On the morning of the 25th the enemy sent a reconnais- 
sance of cavalry towards the Lower Azava, consisting of 
about fourteen squadrons of the cavalry of the Imperial 
Guard. . . . 

' But the enemy's attention was principally directed during 
this day to the position of the 3rd Division, in the hills 
between Fuente Guinaldo and Pastores. About eight in the 
morning they moved a column, consisting of between thirty 
and forty squadrons of cavalry, and fourteen battalions of 
infantry, and twelve pieces of cannon, from Ciudad Rodrigo, 
in such a direction that it was doubtful whether they would 
attempt to ascend the hills by La Encina, or by the direct 
road of El Bodon, towards Fuente Guinaldo : and I was not 
certain by which road they would make their attack till they 
actually commenced it upon the last. 

' As soon as I saw the direction of their march, I had 
reinforced the 2nd Battalion 5th Regiment, which occupied 
the post on the hill over which the road passes to Guinaldo, 
by the 77th Regiment and the 21st Portuguese Regiment, 
under the command of Major-General the Hon. C. Colville, 
and Major-General Alten's brigade, of which only three 
squadrons remained which had not been detached, drawn 

* This celebrated affair, with which the 5th Regiment, now the 
Northumberland Fusiliers, are particularly associated, was stated by the 
Marquis of Londonderry to be the first instance on record of a charge by 
the bayonet being made upon cavalry by infantry in line. — W. W. 



THE PENINSULA 277 



from El Bodon ; and I ordered there a brigade of the 
4th Division from Fuente Guinaldo, and afterwards, from 
El Bodon, the remainder of the troops of the 3rd Division, 
with the exception of those at Pastores, which were too 
distant. 

' In the meantime, however, the small body of troops in 
this post sustained the attack of the enemy's cavalry and 
artillery. One regiment of French dragoons succeeded in 
taking two pieces of cannon which had been posted on a 
rising ground on the right of our troops ; but they were 
charged by the 2nd Battalion 5th Regiment, under the 
command of Major Ridge, and the guns were immediately 
retaken. 

' While this operation was going on on the flank, an attack 
was made on the front by another regiment, which was 
repulsed in a similar manner by the 77th Regiment ; and the 
three squadrons of Major-General Alten's brigade charged 
repeatedly different bodies of the enemy which ascended 
the hill on the left of the two regiments of British infantry, 
the Portuguese regiment being posted in the rear of their 
right. 

' At length, the division of the enemy's infantry, which had 
marched with the cavalry from Ciudad Rodrigo, were brought 
up to the attack on the road of Fuente Guinaldo, and seeing 
that they would arrive and be engaged before the troops could 
arrive either from Guinaldo or El Bodon, I determined to 
withdraw our post, and to retire with the whole on Fuente 
Guinaldo. The 2nd Battalion 5th Regiment and the 
77th Regiment were formed into one square, and the 
21st Portuguese Regiment into another, supported by Major- 
General Alten's small body of cavalry and the Portuguese 
artillery. 

1 The enemy's cavalry immediately rushed forward, and 
obliged our cavalry to retire to the support of the Portuguese 
regiment, and the 5th and 77th Regiments were charged 
on three faces of the square by the French cavalry ; but they 
halted, and repulsed the attack with the utmost steadiness 
and gallantry. We then continued the retreat, and joined 



278 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

the remainder of the 3rd Division, also formed in squares, 
on their march to Fuente Guinaldo ; and the whole retired 
together in the utmost order, and the enemy never made 
another attempt to charge any of them, but were satisfied 
with firing upon them with their artillery, and with following 
them. . . . 

' The enemy brought up a second division of infantry from 
Ciudad Rodrigo in the afternoon of the 25th ; and in the 
course of that night, and of the 26th, they collected their 
whole army in front of our position at Guinaldo, and, not 
deeming it expedient to stand their attack in that position, I 
retired about three leagues. . . . 

' On the 28th, I formed the army on the heights behind 
Soito, having the Serra de Meras on their right, and the left 
at Rendo, on the Coa, about a league in rear of the position 
which they had occupied on the 27th. The enemy also 
retired from Aldea da Ponte, and had their advanced posts 
at Albergueria ; and as it appears that they are about to 
retire from this part of the country, and as we have already 
had some bad weather, and may expect more at the period 
of the equinoctial gales, I propose to canton the troops in 
the nearest villages to the position which they occupied 
yesterday. 

' I cannot conclude this report of the occurrences of the 
last week without expressing to your lordship my admiration 
of the conduct of the troops engaged in the affairs of the 
25th instant. The conduct of the 2nd Battalion 5th Regi- 
ment, commanded by Major Ridge, in particular, affords a 
memorable example of what the steadiness and discipline of 
the troops, and their confidence in their officers, can effect 
in the most difficult and trying situations. The conduct of 
the 77th Regiment, under the command of Lieutenant- 
Colonel Bromhead, was equally good, and I have never seen 
a more determined attack than was made by the whole of 
the enemy's cavalry, with every advantage of the assistance 
of a superior artillery, and repulsed by these two weak 
battalions. I must not omit also to report the good conduct 
on the same occasion of the 21st Portuguese Regiment. 



THE PENINSULA 



279 



' Your lordship will have observed, by the details of the 
action which I have given you, how much reason I had to 
be satisfied with the conduct of the ist Hussars and the 
i ith Light Dragoons of Major-General Alten's brigade. There 
were not more than three squadrons of the two regiments on 
the ground, this brigade having for some time furnished 
the cavalry for the outposts of the army, and they charged 
the enemy's cavalry repeatedly ; and notwithstanding the 
superiority of the latter, the post would have been maintained 
if I had not preferred to abandon it to risking the loss of 
these brave men by continuing the unequal contest under 
additional disadvantages, in consequence of the immediate 
entry of fourteen battalions of infantry into the action before 
the support which I had ordered up could arrive.' 

Return of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Army under 
the Command of General Viscount Wellington, K.B., in an 
affair with the Enemy on the Heights of El Bodon, on the 
25th, and near Aldea da Ponte, on September 27, 1811. 



Killed 

Wounded 

Missing 



Officers. 



I 
16 



Non-commissioned 
Officers and 
Drummers. 



I 

13 



Rank 




and 


Horses. 


File. 




40 


40 


156 


63 


33 


9 



Total Loss of Officers, 

Non-commissioned 

Officers, and Rank 

and File. 

42 
185 

34 



The Walcheren Fever.* 

To the Earl of Liverpool. 

1 Freneda, 

' October 2, 181 1. 
' I enclose the last morning state. 

' Your lordship will be concerned to observe the number 
of sick it contains ; but I am happy to say that there is no 

* This disease, to which Wellington often referred, was contracted in 
the disastrous expedition against Antwerp in 1809. In fourteen days 
more than 12,000 soldiers were in hospital on board ship or sent to 
England, and the malady eventually destroyed thousands of the men who 
had been sent to the Peninsula and elsewhere. — W. W. 



28o WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

serious disorder, and that that which prevails is principally 
a return of the Walcheren fever, or a disorder of the same 
description produced among the newly-arrived troops by 
previous derangement of their bowels, in consequence of their 
eating unripe fruit and drinking to excess on their arrival 
in this country. 

' I yesterday saw the 4th Dragoon Guards. Of 470 men, 
they could produce only 230 mounted, and these looked 
more like men come out of the hospitals than troops just 
arrived from England. 

' These men have to take care of the horses of the whole 
regiment, and allowing that one man can take care of three 
horses, they could not produce in the field for any service at 
this moment above no men. 

' All the newly-arrived regiments of cavalry are in nearly 
the same state.' 

Changes in General Officers. 

To Lieutenant-Colonel Torrens. 

' Freneda, 

' October 30, 1 8 1 1 . 

' I am sorry to tell you that Dr. Frank, the Inspector ot 
Hospitals, is so unwell as to be obliged to go home ; and 
the department under him is so important, that if, as I fear, 
he should not be able to come out again, it will be necessary 
that we should have the most active and intelligent person 
that can be found to fill his station. 

' I am very unlucky in this respect. Excepting in the 
Quartermaster-General's department, I have had two, and 
in some instances three, different persons at the head of every 
department in the army. Here have been three officers 
second in command, and General Officers commanding 
divisions and brigades, and officers, have been changed 
repeatedly ; and there is not one General Officer now with the 
army who came out with it, excepting Hill, and he was at 
home for six months last year ; and Campbell, and he was 
at home for the same period the year before last, and is now 



THE PENINSULA 281 



going again ; and General Henry Campbell, who was at home 
for two years.' 

Changes in Uniform. 
To Lieutenant-Colonel Torrens. 

'Freneda, 

''November 6, 181 1. 

' I hear that measures are in contemplation to alter the 
clothing, caps, etc., of the army. 

1 There is no subject of which I understand so little, and, 
abstractedly speaking, I think it indifferent how a soldier is 
clothed, provided it is in a uniform manner, and that he is 
forced to keep himself clean and smart, as a soldier ought to 
be. But there is one thing I deprecate, and that is any 
imitation of the French in any manner. 

' It is impossible to form an idea of the inconveniences and 
injury which result from having anything like them either 

on horseback or on foot. and his piquet were taken 

in June because the 3rd Hussars had the same caps as the 
French Chasseurs a Cheval and some of their hussars, and 
I was near being taken on September 25 from the same 
cause. 

' At a distance or in an action colours are nothing : the 
profile and shape of the man's cap, and his general appear- 
ance, are what guide us ; and why should we make our 
people look like the French ? A cocked-tailed horse is a good 
mark for a dragoon, if you can get a side view of him ; but 
there is no such mark as the English helmet, and, as far 
as I can judge, it is the best cover a dragoon can have for 
his head. 

1 I mention this because in all probability you may have 
something to say to these alterations, and I only beg that 
we may be as different as possible from the French in every- 
thing. 

1 The narrow top caps of our infantry, as opposed to their 
broad top caps, are a great advantage to those who are to 
look at long lines of posts opposed to each other.' 



282 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

ARROYO DOS MOLINOS. 

To the Earl of Liverpool. 

'Freneda, 

' November 6, 1 8 1 1 . 

' I informed your lordship, in my despatches of October 
23 and 30, of the orders which I had given to Lieutenant - 
General Hill to move into Estremadura with the troops 
under his command, and with his progress to October 26. 

' He marched on the 27th by Aldea del Cano to Alcuescar, 
and, on the 28th, in the morning, surprised the enemy's 
troops under General Girard at Arroyo Molinos, and dis- 
persed the division of infantry and the cavalry which had 
been employed under the command of that General, taking 
General Brun, the Prince d'Aremberg, and above 1,300 
prisoners, three pieces of cannon, etc., and having killed 
many in the action with the enemy and in the subsequent 
pursuit. General Girard escaped wounded, and, by all the 
accounts which I have received, General Dombrowski was 
killed. 

' I beg to refer your lordship, for the details of Lieutenant- 
General Hill's operations to October 30, to his despatch* 

* Lieutenant- General R. Hill to General Viscount Wellington, K.B. 

' Merida, 

' October 30, 181 1. 

' In pursuance of the instructions which I received from your Ex- 
cellency to drive the enemy out of that part of Estremadura which lies 
between the Tagus and the Guadiana, and to replace the corps under the 
command of Brigadier-General the Conde de Penne Villemur in 
Carceres (from which town it had been obliged to retire by the superior 
force of the enemy), I put a portion of the troops under my orders 
in motion on the 22nd instant from their cantonments in the neigh- 
bourhood of Portalegre, and advanced with them towards the Spanish 
frontier. . . . 

' Having received certain information that the enemy had marched on 
Torremocha, I put the troops at Malpartida in motion on the morning of 
the 27th, and advanced by the road leading to Merida, through Aldea del 
Cano and Casas de don Antonio, being a shorter route than that followed 
by the enemy, and which afforded a hope of being able to intercept and 



THE PENINSULA 283 



to me of that date from Merida, a copy of which I 
enclose. . . .' 

bring him to action, and I was here joined by the Spaniards from Caceres. 
On the march I received information that the enemy had only left Torre- 
mocha that morning, and that he had again halted his main body at 
Arroyo Molinos, leaving a rear guard at Albala, which was a satisfactory 
proof that he was ignorant of the movements of the troops under my 
command. I therefore made a forced march to Alcuescar that evening, 
where the troops were so placed as to be out of sight of the enemy, and no 
fires were allowed to be made. 

'On my arrival at Alcuescar, which is within a league of Arroyo 
Molinos, everything tended to confirm me in the opinion that the enemy 
was not only in total ignorance of my near approach, but extremely off 
his guard, and I determined upon attempting to surprise, or at least to 
bring him to action. 

' The town of Arroyo Molinos is situated at the foot of one extremity 
of the Sierra de Montanches, the mountain running from it to the rear 
in the form of a crescent, almost everywhere inaccessible, the two points 
being about two miles asunder. The Truxillo road runs round that to 
the eastward. 

' The road leading from the town to Merida runs at right angles with 
that from Alcuescar, and the road to Medellin passes between those to 
Truxillo and Merida, the grounds over which the troops had to manoeuvre 
being a plain thinly scattered with oak and cork trees. My object, of 
course, was to place a body of troops so as to cut off the retreat of the 
enemy by these roads. 

' The troops moved from their bivouac near Alcuescar about two o'clock 
in the morning of the 28th, in one column, right in front, direct on Arroyo 
Molinos. . . . 

' As the day dawned a violent storm of rain and thick mist came on, 
under cover of which the columns advanced in the direction and in the 
order which had been pointed out to them. The left column, under 
Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart, marched direct upon the town, the 71st, 
one company of the 60th, and 92nd Regiments, at quarter distance, 
and the 50th in close column, somewhat in the rear with the guns as a 
reserve. . . . 

' The advance of our column was unperceived by the enemy until they 
approached very near, at which moment he was filing out of the town 
upon the Merida road, the rear of his column, some of his cavalry, 
and part of his baggage being still in it. One brigade of his infantry had 
marched for Medellin an hour before daylight. 

'The 71st and 92nd Regiments charged into the town with cheers, and 
drove the enemy everywhere at the point of the bayonet, having a few 
men cut down by the enemy's cavalry. 



284 WEL LINGTON ' S DESPA TCHES 



Shameful Treatment of British Prisoners. 

To Li cut en ant -General Hill. 

'Freneda, 

' November 8, 1811, 10 p.m. 

1 1 beg you to inform the Comte d'Erlon that I have 
received with the greatest concern the accounts which have 

' The enemy's infantry, which had got out of the town, had, by the time 
these regiments arrived at the extremity of it, formed into two squares, 
with the cavalry on their left ; the whole were posted between the 
Merida and Medellin roads, fronting Alcuescar, the right square being 
formed within half musket-shot of the town, the garden walls of which 
were promptly lined by the 71st Light Infantry, while the 92nd Regiment 
filed out and formed line on their right, perpendicular to the enemy's right 
flank, which was much annoyed by the well-directed fire of the 71st. In 
the meantime, one wing of the 50th Regiment occupied the town and 
secured the prisoners, and the other wing, along with the three 6-pounders, 
skirted the outside of it, the artillery as soon as within range firing with 
great effect upon the squares. 

'Whilst the enemy was thus occupied on his right, Major-General 
Howard's column continued moving round his left, and our cavalry, 
advancing and crossing the head of the column, cut off the enemy's 
cavalry from his infantry, charging it repeatedly and putting it to the 
rout. The 13th Light Dragoons at the same time took possession of 
the enemy's artillery ; one of the charges made by two squadrons of the 
2nd Hussars and one of the 9th Light Dragoons was particularly gallant, 
the latter commanded by Captain Gore and the whole under Major 
Busche, of the Hussars. I ought previously to have mentioned that 
the British cavalry having, through the darkness of the night and the 
badness of the roads, been somewhat delayed, the Spanish cavalry 
under the Conde de Penne Villemur was on this occasion the first to 
form upon the plain and engage the enemy until the British was enabled 
to come up. 

'The enemy was now in full retreat, but Major-General Howard's 
column, having gained the point to which it was directed, and the left 
column gaining fast upon him, he had no resource but to surrender, 
or to disperse and ascend the mountain. He preferred the latter, and 
ascending near the eastern extremity of the crescent, and which might 
have been deemed inaccessible, was followed closely by the 28th and 
34th Regiments,* whilst the 39th Regiment and Colonel Ashworth's 

* The 34th, now the 1st Battalion the Border Regiment, is the only 
regiment in the British army bearing the honour of ' Arroyo dos Molinos.' 



THE PENINSULA 285 



reached me of the ill-treatment of the prisoners of the allied 
British and Portuguese army taken by the French army of 
the South. He who has served in the French army of Por- 
tugal knows how I have treated the French officers and 



brigade of Portuguese infantry followed round the foot of the mountain 
by the Truxillo road to take him again in flank. At the same time 
Brigadier-General Morillo's infantry ascended at some distance to the left 
with the same view. 

'As may be imagined, the enemy's troops were by this time in the 
utmost panic; his cavalry was flying in every direction, the infantry threw 
away their arms, and the only effort of either was to escape. The troops 
under Major-General Howard's immediate command, as well as those he 
had sent round the point of the mountain, pursued them over the rocks, 
making prisoners at every step, until his own men became so exhausted 
and few in number that it was necessary for him to halt and secure the 
prisoners, and leave the further pursuit to the Spanish infantry. 

' The ultimate consequences of these operations I need not point out 
to your lordship ; their immediate result is the capture of one General of 
cavalry (Brun), one Colonel of cavalry (the Prince d'Arembeig), one Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel {Chef dEtat Major), one Aide-de-Camp of General Girard, 
two Lieutenant-Colonels, one Commissaire de Guerre, thirty Captains 
and inferior officers, and upwards of 1,000 men, already sent off under an 
escort to Portalegre ; the whole of the enemy's artillery, baggage, and 
commissariat, some magazines of corn which he had collected at Caceres 
and Merida, and the contribution of money which he had collected on 
the former town, besides the total dispersion of General Girard's corps. 
The loss of the enemy in killed must also have been severe, while that on 
our side was comparatively trifling. . . . 

' Thus has ended an expedition which, although not bringing into play 
to the full extent the gallantry and spirit of those engaged, will, I trust, 
give them a claim to your lordship's approbation. No praise of mine 
can do justice to their admirable conduct, the patience and good-will 
shown by all ranks during forced marches in the worst weather, their 
strict attention to the orders they received, the precision with which 
they moved to the attack, and their obedience to command during the 
action. . . .' 



The 34th cut off and captured the French 34th Regiment of the Line, 
and made prisoners of a large number of officers. For a long time the 
34th used the brass drum, and drum-major's staff which they took in 
the action. When ' Arroyo dos Molinos ' was granted, it was a unique 
honour, only general actions having been previously inscribed on colours 
and appointments. — W. W. 



286 



WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 



soldiers who have fallen into my hands, and how many of 
them I have saved ; indeed, nobody ought to know this 
better than Marshal Soult, yet I am sorry to say that the 
officers and soldiers who have been taken by the army of 
the South have been treated most shamefully.' 

A Garbled Version. 

To Major-General Alexander Campbell. 

' Freneda, 

' November 13, 1 8 1 1 . 

' I see that Colonel has published his letter in answer 

to mine on the affair of the Barba de Puerco, I imagine 
garbled in the usual Jacobin style, and preceded by a state- 
ment the meaning of which is (as far as I can understand 
it) to insinuate that I, or my friends, have published my 
letter. I write in hopes that this will catch you at Lisbon, 
to intreat you on no account to be drawn into a war in the 
newspapers with this fellow.' 

The Enmity of Marshals. 
To the Earl of Liverpool. 

' Freneda, 

''November 13, 181 1. 

' I enclose a very curious intercepted letter, which was in 
cipher, from Marmont to Foy, which shows how these gentry 
are going on ; in fact, each Marshal is the natural enemy of 



Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Corps of the Army under 
the Command of General Viscount Wellington, K.B., wider the 
Immediate Orders of Lieutenant-General R. Hill, i?i the action with 
the French Army near Arroyo Mo linos, on October 28, 181 1. 



Officers. 


Non-commissioned 
Officers and 
Drummers. 


Rank 
and 
File. 


Horses. 


Total Loss of Officers, 

Non-commissioned 

Officers, and Rank 

and File. 


Killed - - — 
Wounded - | 7 
Missing - 1 


4 


53 


6 
u 

4 


7 

64 

1 



The Portuguese loss, but not the Spanish, is included in this return. 



THE PENINSULA 287 

the King and of his neighbouring Marshal. Pray take care 
that this letter is not made public, as it would disclose that 
we have the key of the cipher. . . .' 

An Affectionate Letter. 
To Major-General Alexander Campbell. 

' Freneda, 

' November 22, 1 8 1 1 . 

' I was very much obliged to you for the kindness of the 
letter which you wrote to me on your departure from this 
part of the world, and I assure you that I lament the 
chance which certainly exists that I may never meet you 
again. I acknowledge that, with this chance before your 
eyes, I am astonished that you should think, at your time 
of life, of returning to the East Indies. With the income of 
your regiment, and on the staff in England or Ireland, or at 
Gibraltar, or Malta, or Sicily, or in America, you might live 
with your family. I do not think that any man's family 
have a right to expect that he should die a few years sooner 
to put a little more money in their pockets after his death ; 
and I should think that your wife, who, in a pecuniary way, 
would be the person most interested in your return to the 
East Indies, would prefer your prolonged life to increase of 
pounds. 

' God bless you, my dear Campbell.' 

Dubious Officers. 

To Lieutenant-Colonel Torrens. 

' Freneda, 

' December 2, 1 8 1 1 . 

' . . . I am obliged to you for attending to our wants of 

General Officers. did not succeed very well when he 

was here before, but I dare say he will do so now. I have 
a high opinion of General Kempt from all that I have heard 
of him. We have now more than we can well dispose of, 
particularly if Beckwith comes out again, and there are two 
with whom we could dispense with advantage, and . 



WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 



They are both respectable officers as commanders of regi- 
ments, but they are neither of them very fit to take charge 

of a large body. I understand that wishes to return home 

to unite himself with a lady of easy virtue, and has been 

very ill lately, and I think might be induced to go. I shall 
try if I can get them away in this manner, as I would not on 
any account hurt the feelings of either.' 

Retaliation. 

To Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Howard Douglas, Bart. 

'Freneda, 

' December 7, 181 1. 

' . . . Before the allies are called upon to protect the 
guerrillas by retaliating upon the enemy the injuries they do 
to those who are prisoners, it is proper that the Spanish 
Government and the regular Spanish armies should protect 
them and that the several guerrilla parties should protect 
each other. 

' We have frequently heard of declarations that injuries 
should be retaliated, and but few instances of those declara- 
tions being carried into execution, notwithstanding that the 
French murder the Spanish prisoners every day. When 
the Spanish Government and armies shall take up this subject 
as they ought, it will rest with the British Government (not 
me) to determine whether they will enter into this system of 
retaliation in favour of the Spaniards. . . .' 

The Tyranny of Buonaparte. 
To Lieutenant-General Lord William Bentinck. 

' Freneda, 

' Deceniber 24, 1 8 1 1 . 

' . . . I have long considered it probable that even we 
should witness a general resistance throughout Europe to 
the fraudulent and disgusting tyranny of Buonaparte, created 
by the example of what has passed in Spain and Portugal ; 
and that we should be actors and advisers in these scenes, 



THE PENINSULA 2S9 



and I have reflected frequently upon the measures which 
should be pursued to give a chance of success. 

' Those who embark in projects of this description should 
be made to understand, or to act as if they understood, that 
having once drawn the sword they must not return it till they 
shall have completely accomplished their object. They 
must be prepared and must be forced to make all sacrifices 
to the cause. Submission to military discipline and order is 
a matter of course ; but when a nation determines to resist 
the authority, and to shake off the Government of Buona- 
parte, they must be prepared and forced to sacrifice the 
luxuries and comforts of life, and to risk all in a contest 
which, it should be clearly understood before it is under- 
taken, has for its object to save all or nothing. . . .' 

A Year's Casualties. 

To Dr. Frank. 

' Gallegos, 

' January 7, 18 12. 

' I am very much obliged to you for your account of my 
little boy, and for your kindness in going to see him. I trust 
that your own health is re-established. 

' You will be glad to hear that the health of the troops is 
much improved, though not yet what I could wish it to be. 
We lost a great many men upon the change from warm to 
cold weather ; but the whole of our casualties in this year, 
including some bloody affairs, amounts only to 6,000 men.' 

STORM OF CIUDAD RODRIGO. 

To the Earl of Liverpool. 

' Gallegos, 

' January 9, 18 12. 

' According to the intention which I informed your 
lordship that I entertained, I invested Ciudad Rodrigo 
yesterday. 

' Since the enemy have had possession of the place, they 
have constructed a palisaded redoubt on the hill of San 

19 



290 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

Francisco, and have fortified three convents in the suburbs, 
the defences of which are connected with the work on the 
hill of San Francisco, and with the old line by which the 
suburb was surrounded. By these means the enemy have 
increased the difficulty of approaching the place ; and it was 
necessary to obtain possession of the work on the hill of San 
Francisco before we could make any progress in the attack. 
Accordingly, Major-General Craufurd directed a detachment 
of the Light Division, under the command of Lieutenant- 
Colonel Colborne of the 52nd, to attack the work, shortly 
after it was dark. The attack was very ably conducted by 
Lieutenant-Colonel Colborne, and the work was taken by 
storm in a short time. Two Captains and forty-seven men 
were made prisoners, the remainder of the garrison being 
put to the sword in the storm. We took three pieces of 
cannon. 

' I cannot sufficiently applaud the conduct of Lieutenant- 
Colonel Colborne, and of the detachment under his command, 
upon this occasion. I am happy to add that our loss in this 
affair has not been severe. . . .' 

To the Earl of Liverpool. 

' Gallegos, 

'January 20, 1 81 2. 

' I informed your lordship in my despatch of the gth that 
I had attacked Ciudad Rodrigo, and in that of the 15th of 
the progress of the operations to that period, and I have 
now the pleasure to acquaint your lordship that we took the 
place by storm yesterday evening after dark. 

' We continued, from the 15th to the 19th, to complete the 
second parallel, and the communications with that work, and 
we had made some progress by sap towards the crest of the 
glacis. On the night of the 15th we likewise advanced, from 
the left of the first parallel down the slope of the hill towards 
the Convent of San Francisco, to a situation from which the 
walls of the faussc braie and of the town were seen, on which 
a battery for seven guns was constructed, and these com- 
menced their fire on the morning of the 18th. 



THE PENINSULA 291 



' In the meantime the batteries in the first parallel con- 
tinued their fire ; and yesterday evening their fire had not 
only considerably injured the defences of the place, but had 
made breaches in the fausse braie wall, and in the body of 
the place, which were considered practicable ; while the bat- 
tery on the slope of the hill, which had been commenced on 
the night of the 15th, and had opened on the 18th, had been 
equally efficient still farther to the left, and opposite to the 
suburb of San Francisco. 

' I therefore determined to storm the place, notwithstand- 
ing that the approaches had not been brought to the crest 
of the glacis, and the counterscarp of the ditch was still 
entire. The attack was accordingly made yesterday evening, 
in five separate columns, consisting of the troops of the 3rd 
and Light Divisions, and of Brigadier-General Pack's brigade. 
The two right columns, conducted by Lieutenant-Colonel 
O'Toole of the 2nd Cacadores, and Major Ridge of the 5th 
Regiment, were destined to protect the advance of Major- 
General Mackinnon's brigade, forming the 3rd, to the top of 
the breach in the fausse braie wall ; and all these, being com- 
posed of troops of the 3rd Division, were under the direction 
of Lieutenant-General Picton. 

' The fourth column, consisting of the 43rd and 52nd 
Regiments, and part of the 95th Regiment, being of the Light 
Division, under the direction of Major-General Craufurd, 
attacked the breaches on the left in front of the suburb of 
San Francisco, and covered the left of the attack of the 
principal breach by the troops of the 3rd Division ; and 
Brigadier-General Pack was destined, with his brigade, form- 
ing the fifth column, to make a false attack upon the southern 
face of the fort. 

' Besides these five columns, the 94th Regiment, belonging 
to the 3rd Division, descended into the ditch in two columns, 
on the right of Major-General Mackinnon's brigade, with a 
view to protect the descent of that body into the ditch and 
its attack of the breach in the fausse braie, against the 
obstacles which it was supposed the enemy would construct 
to oppose their progress. 

19 — 2 



292 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

' All these attacks succeeded, and Brigadier-General Pack 
even surpassed my expectations, having converted his false 
attack into a real one ; and his advanced-guard, under the 
command of Major Lynch, having followed the enemy's 
troops from the advanced works into the fausse braie, where 
they made prisoners all opposed to them. 

' Major Ridge, of the 2nd Battalion 5th Regiment, having 
escaladed the fausse braie wall, stormed the principal breach 
in the body of the place, together with the 94th Regiment, 
commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell, which had 
moved along the ditch at the same time, and had stormed 
the breach in the fausse braie, both in front of Major-General 
Mackinnon's brigade. Thus, these regiments not only 
effectually covered the advance from the trenches of Major- 
General Mackinnon's brigade by their first movements and 
operations, but they preceded them in the attack. 

' Major-General Craufurd, and Major-General Vandeleur, 
and the troops of the Light Division, on the left, were like- 
wise very forward on that side ; and in less than half an 
hour from the time the attack commenced our troops were 
in possession, and formed on the ramparts of the place, each 
body contiguous to the other. The enemy then submitted, 
having sustained a considerable loss in the contest. 

' Our loss was also, I am concerned to add, severe, parti- 
cularly in officers of high rank and estimation in this army. 
Major-General Mackinnon was unfortunately blown up by 
the accidental explosion of one of the enemy's expense 
magazines close to the breach, after he had gallantly and 
successfully led the troops under his command to the attack. 
Major-General Craufurd likewise received a severe wound 
while he was leading on the Light Division to the storm, and 
I am apprehensive that I shall be deprived for some time of 
his assistance. . . . 

' I have already reported, in my letter of the gth instant, 
my sense of the conduct of Major-General Craufurd, and of 
Lieutenant-Colonel Colborne, and of the troops of the Light 
Division, in the storm of the redoubt of San Francisco, on 
the evening of the 8th instant. The conduct of these troops 



THE PENINSULA 



293 



was equally distinguished throughout the siege ; and, in the 
storm, nothing could exceed the gallantry with which these 
brave officers and troops advanced and accomplished the 
difficult operation allotted to them, notwithstanding that all 
their leaders had fallen. . . . 

' The conduct of Captain Duffy, of the 43rd, and that of 
Lieutenant Gurwood,* of the 52nd Regiment, who was 
wounded, have likewise been particularly reported to 
me. . . . 

' I shall hereafter transmit to your lordship a detailed 
account of what we have found in the place ; but I believe 
that there are 153 pieces of ordnance, including the heavy 
train belonging to the French army, and great quantities of 
ammunition and stores. We have the Governor, General 
Barrie, about 78 officers, and 1,700 men prisoners. . . .' 

Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Army under 
the Command of General Viscount Wellington, K.B., during 
the Siege and in the Assaidt of Ciudad Rodrigo, from 
January 8 to 19, 181 2. 



Killed - 

Wounded 

Missing 



Officers. 



9 
70 



Non-commissioned 
Officers and 
Drummers. 



II 

35 



| Rank 


i 


and 


Horses. J 


File. 


1 


158 


— 


713 


— 


7 





Total Loss of Officers, 

Non-commissioned 

Officers, and Rank 

and File. 



178 
8l8 

7 



* Lieutenant-Colonel Gurwood, the compiler of this work. Lieutenant 
Gurwood, 52nd Regiment, led the 'forlorn hope' of the Light Division in 
the assault of the lesser breach. He afterwards took the French 
Governor, General Barrie - , in the citadel, and, from the hands of Lord 
Wellington, on the breach by which he had entered, he received the 
sword of his prisoner. The permission accorded by the Duke of 
Wellington to compile this work has doubtless been one of the dis- 
tinguished consequences resulting from this service, and Lieutenant- 
Colonel Gurwood feels pride, as a soldier of fortune, in here offering 
himself as an encouraging example to the subaltern in future wars. 



294 WELLINGTON ' 5 DESPA TCHES 

To the Earl of Liverpool. 

' Gallegos, 

''January 20, 1 81 2. 

' You will receive with this the account of the successful 
termination of our operation, in half the time that I told you 
it would take, and less than half that which the French spent 
in taking the same place from the Spaniards, as you will see 
by referring to the despatches of that period. . . .' 

Death of General Craufurd. 
To the Earl of Liverpool. 

' Gallegos, 

1 January 29, 1812. 

' Major-General Craufurd* died on the 24th instant, of 
the wounds which he received on the 19th, while leading 
the Light Division of this army to the assault of Ciudad 
Rodrigo. . . .' 

A New Principle in Sieges. 
To the Duke of Richmond. 

' Gallegos, 

' January 29, 1812. 

' . . . We proceeded at Ciudad Rodrigo on quite a new prin- 
ciple in sieges. The whole object of our fire was to lay open 
the walls. We had not one mortar, nor a howitzer, except- 
ing to prevent the enemy from clearing the breaches, and 
for that purpose we had only two ; and we fired upon the 
flanks and defences only when we wished to get the better 
of them, with a view to protect those who were to storm. 
This shows the kind of place we had to attack, and bow 
important it is to cover the works of a place well by a 
glacis. The French, however, who are supposed to know 
everything, could not take this place in less than forty days 

* He was buried at the foot of the little breach. The Commander of 
the Forces and all the officers of the besieging army attended the funeral, 
which, from place and circumstances, was more than usually impressive. 



THE PENINSULA 295 

after it was completely invested, or than twenty-five days 
after breaking ground. . . .' 

Superiority of French Tools. 
To the Earl of Liverpool. 

'Freneda, 

' February 11, 1812. 

' . . . The cutting tools which we have found in Ciudad 
Rodrigo belonging to the French army are infinitely better 
than ours. Is it not shameful that they should have better 
cutlery than we have ?' 

Poor Artillery Practice. 
To Lieutenant-General Graham. 

' Freneda, 

' February 18, 18 12, 9 a.m. 

1 . . . Some of our concerns to the south are going on well. 
I am not quite so certain of others. Those to whom I was 
obliged to have recourse to get the ordnance I wanted seem 
to be of opinion that there is no more occasion for precision 
in the fire of artillery in a siege than there is in an action at 
sea ! . . .' 

Spanish Selfishness. 
To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley. 

' Freneda, 

' February 19, 1 8 1 2 . 

' Extravagant as we are, there is no officer with us 
who draws more than one ration, the same as a soldier. 
He besides draws a ration for every servant not a soldier. 
Just observe that, for 123 artillerymen and 22 pioneers, 
making 145 troops, and some of the staff of the garrison, 
the Spaniards draw 269 rations, each officer drawing three, 
five, six, seven, and as far as sixteen rations.' 



296 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

Shrapnell's Shells. 

To the Earl of Liverpool. 

' Elvas, 

1 March 12, 1812. 

' . . . I have spoken to Sir William Beresford, and shall 
speak to General Graham, respecting Shrapnell's shells. I 
have seen our artillery produce great effect on the enemy, 
and I have been induced to attribute this effect to the use of 
Shrapnell's shells. But my opinion in favour of these shells 
has been much shaken lately. First, I have reason to be- 
lieve that their effect is confined to wounds of a very trifling 
description, and they kill nobody. I saw General Simon, 
who was wounded by the balls from Shrapnell's shells, of 
which he had several in his face and head ; but they were 
picked out of his face as duck-shot would be out of the face 
of a person who had been hit by accident while out shooting, 
and he was not much more materially injured. 

' Secondly, from the difficulty of judging of direct distances 
and in knowing whether the shell has burst in the air in the 
proper place, I suspect that an original error in throwing the 
shells is seldom corrected ; and that if the shell is not effectual 
the first shot, the continuance of the fire of these shells 
seldom becomes more effectual. 

' I can entertain no doubt, however, that if the shell should 
be accurately thrown, and burst as it is intended, it must 
wound a great number of men, but probably none very 
materially.' 

STORM OF BADAJOZ. 

Memorandum for the Attack of Badajoz. 

' Camp, 

' April 6, 1812. 

' 1. The Fort of Badajoz is to be attacked at ten o'clock 
this night. 

' 2. The attack must be made on three points : the castle, 
the face of the bastion of La Trinidad, and the flank of the 
bastion of Sta. Maria. 



THE PENINSULA 297 



' 3. The attack of the castle to be by escalade ; that of the 
two bastions by the storm of the breaches. . . .' 

To the Earl of Liverpool. 

4 Camp before Badajoz, 

1 April 7, 18 1 2. 

' My despatch of the 3rd instant will have apprised your 
lordship of the state of the operations against Badajoz to 
that date, which were brought to a close on the night of the 
6th by the capture of the place by storm. 

' The fire continued during the 4th and 5th against the 
face of the bastion of La Trinidad, and the flank of the 
bastion of Sta. Maria, and on the 4th, in the morning, we 
opened another battery of six guns in the second parallel 
against the shoulder of the ravelin of San Roque, and the 
wall in its gorge. 

' Practicable breaches were effected in the bastions above 
mentioned on the evening of the 5th, but as I had observed 
that the enemy had entrenched the bastion of La Trinidad, 
and the most formidable preparations were making for the 
defence as well of the breach in that bastion, as of that in 
the bastion of Sta. Maria, I determined to delay the attack 
for another day, and to turn all the guns in the batteries 
in the second parallel on the curtain of La Trinidad, in 
hopes that by effecting a third breach the troops would 
be enabled to turn the enemy's works for the defence of 
the other two, the attack of which would besides be con- 
nected by the troops destined to attack the breach in the 
curtain. 

* This breach was effected in the evening of the 6th, and 
the fire of the face of the bastion of Sta. Maria, and of the 
flank of the bastion of La Trinidad, being overcome, I deter- 
mined to attack the place that night. 

1 I had kept in reserve in the neighbourhood of this camp 
the 5th Division, under Lieutenant-General Leith, which 
had left Castille only in the middle of March, and had but 
lately arrived in this part of the country, and I brought 



WELL ING TON' S DESPA TCHES 



them up on that evening. The plan for the attack was that 
Lieutenant -General Picton should attack the Castle of 
Badajoz by escalade with the 3rd Division, and a detach- 
ment from the guard in the trenches, furnished that evening 
by the 4th Division, under Major Wilson, of the 48th 
Regiment, should attack the ravelin of San Roque upon 
his left ; while the 4th Division, under Major-General the 
Hon. C. Colville, and the Light Division, under Lieutenant- 
Colonel Barnard, should attack the breaches in the bastions 
of La Trinidad and Sta. Maria, and in the curtain by which 
they are connected. The 5th Division were to occupy the 
ground which the 4th and Light Divisions had occupied 
during the siege, and Lieutenant-General Leith was to make 
a false attack upon the outwork called the Pardaleras, and 
another on the works of the fort towards the Guadiana, with 
the left brigade of the division, under Major -General 
Walker, which he was to turn into a real attack if circum- 
stances should prove favourable; and Brigadier -General 
Power, who invested the place with his Portuguese brigade 
on the right of the Guadiana, was directed to make false 
attacks on the tete-de-pont, the Fort San Christoval, and 
the new redoubt called Mon Cceur. 

' The attack was accordingly made at ten at night, Lieu- 
tenant-General Picton preceding by a few minutes the 
attacks by the remainder of the troops. Major-General 
Kempt led this attack, which went out from the right of 
the first parallel. He was unfortunately wounded in 
crossing the river Rivillas below the inundation, but not- 
withstanding this circumstance, and the obstinate resistance 
of the enemy, the castle was carried by escalade, and the 
3rd Division established in it at about half-past eleven. 

' While this was going on, Major Wilson, of the 48th, 
carried the ravelin of San Roque by the gorge, with a 
detachment of 200 men of the guard in the trenches, and 
with the assistance of Major Squire, of the Engineers, 
established himself within that work. 

' The 4th and Light Divisions moved to the attack from 
the camp along the left of the river Rivillas, and of the 



THE PENINSULA 299 



inundation. They were not perceived by the enemy till 
they reached the covered-way ; and the advanced guards of 
the two divisions descended without difficulty into the ditch, 
protected by the fire of the parties stationed on the glacis 
for that purpose ; and they advanced to the assault of the 
breaches, led by their gallant officers, with the utmost in- 
trepidity. But such was the nature of the obstacles pre- 
pared by the enemy at the top and behind the breaches, and 
so determined their resistance, that our troops could not 
establish themselves within the place. Many brave officers 
and soldiers were killed or wounded by explosions at the 
top of the breaches; others who succeeded to them were 
obliged to give way, having found it impossible to penetrate 
the obstacles which the enemy had prepared to impede their 
progress. These attempts were repeated till after twelve at 
night, when, finding that success was not to be attained, and 
that Lieutenant-General Picton was established in the castle, 
I ordered that the 4th and Light Divisions might retire to 
the ground on which they had been first assembled for the 
attack. 

' In the meantime Lieutenant-General Leith had pushed 
forward Major-General Walker's brigade on the left, sup- 
ported by the 38th Regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel 
Nugent, and the 15th Portuguese Regiment, under Colonel 
'Do Rego, and he had made a false attack upon the 
Pardaleras with the 8th Cacadores, under Major Hill. 
Major-General Walker forced the barrier on the road of 
Olivenca, and entered the covered-way on the left of the 
bastion of San Vicente, close to the Guadiana. He there 
descended into the ditch, and escaladed the face of the 
bastion of San Vicente. Lieutenant-General Leith sup- 
ported this attack by the 38th Regiment and 15th Portu- 
guese Regiment; and our troops being thus established in 
the castle, which commands all the works of the town, and 
in the town, and the 4th and Light Divisions being formed 
again for the attack of the breaches, all resistance ceased ; 
and at daylight in the morning the Governor, General 
Philippon, who had retired to Fort San Christoval, sur- 



300 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

rendered, together with General Vielande, and all the staff, 
and the whole garrison. I have not got accurate returns of 
the strength of the garrison, or of the number of prisoners ; 
but General Philippon has informed me that it consisted of 
5,000 men at the commencement of the siege, of which 1,200 
were killed or wounded during the operations, besides those 
lost in the assault of the place. There were five French 
battalions, besides two of the regiment of Hesse Darmstadt, 
and the artillery, engineers, etc., and I understand there are 
4,000 prisoners. 

' It is impossible that any expressions of mine can convey 
to your lordship the sense which I entertain of the gallantry 
of the officers and troops upon this occasion. The list of 
killed and wounded will show that the General Officers, 
the staff attached to them, the commanding and other 
officers of the regiments, put themselves at the head of the 
attacks which they severally directed, and set the example of 
gallantry which was so well followed by their men. . . . 

1 The officers and men of the corps of engineers and artil- 
lery were equally distinguished during the operations of the 
siege and in its close. . . . 

' It would be very desirable that I should have it in my 
power to strike a blow against Marshal Soult before he could 
be reinforced ; but the Spanish authorities having omitted to 
take the necessary steps to provision Ciudad Rodrigo, it is 
absolutely necessary that I should return to the frontiers 
of Castille within a short period of time. It is not very 
probable that Marshal Soult will risk an action in the 
province of Estremadura, which it would not be difficult 
for him to avoid, and it is very necessary that he should 
return to Andalusia, as General Ballesteros was in movement 
upon Seville on the 29th of last month, and the Conde de 
Penne Villemur moving on the same place from the Lower 
Guadiana. 

' It will be quite impossible for me to go into Andalusia 
till I shall have secured Ciudad Rodrigo. I therefore pro- 
pose to remain in the positions now occupied by the troops 
for some days ; indeed, a little time is required to take care 



THE PENINSULA 



301 



of our wounded ; and if Marshal Soult should remain in 
Estremadura I shall attack him ; if he should retire into 
Andalusia, I must return to Castille. 

' I have the honour to enclose returns of the killed and 
wounded from March 31, and in the assault of Badajoz, and 
a return of the ordnance, small arms, and ammunition 
found in the place. I shall send the returns of pro- 
visions in the place by the next despatch. This despatch 
will be delivered to your lordship by my Aide-de-Camp 
Captain Canning, whom I beg leave to recommend to your 
protection. 

' He has likewise the colours of the garrison, and the 
colours of the Hesse Darmstadt's regiment, to be laid at the 
feet of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent. The French 
battalions in the garrison had no eagles.' 

Return of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the A rmy under 
the Command of General the Earl of Wellington, K.B., at the 
Siege and Capture of Badajoz, from March 18 to April 7, 
1812, inclusive. 



Killed 

Wounded 

Missing 



Officers. 



72 
306 



Sergeants. 



51 
2l6 



Rank 




and 


Horses. 


File. 




912 





3,265 


— 


62 


— 



Total Loss of Officers, 

Non-commissioned 

Officers, and Rank 

and File. 



1 »°3 5 

3,787 

63 



The Portuguese loss is included in the above numbers. 



Ill Equipped for Sieges. 

To Colonel Torrens. 

'Camp at Badajoz, 

'April 7, 181 2. 

' . . . Our loss has been very great ; but I send you a 
letter to Lord Liverpool which accounts for it. The truth 
is that, equipped as we are, the British army are not capable 
of carrying on a regular siege. 



3 o2 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

To Major-General George Murray. 

'FUENTE GUINALDO, 

'May 28, 1812. 

' . . . You will have appreciated the difficulty and im- 
portance of our late operations. The siege of Badajoz was a 
most serious undertaking, and the weather did not favour us. 
The troops were up to their middles in mud in the trenches, 
and in the midst of our difficulties the Guadiana swelled and 
carried away our bridge, and rendered useless for a time our 
Flying bridge. However, we never stopped, and a fair day 
or two set all to rights. The assault was a terrible business, 
of which I foresaw the loss when I was ordering it. But we 
had brought matters to that state that we could do no more, 
and it was necessary to storm or raise the siege. I trust, 
however, that future armies will be equipped for sieges, with 
the people necessary to carry them on as they ought to be ; 
and that our engineers will learn how to put their batteries 
on the crest of the glacis, and to blow in the counterscarp, 
instead of placing them wherever the wall can be seen, 
leaving the poor officers and troops to get into and cross the 
ditch as they can. . . .' 

A Brilliant Exploit. 
To the Earl of Liverpool. 

'FUENTE GUINALDO, 

1 May 28, 1812. 

' When I found that the enemy had retired from this 
frontier on April 24, and that I was enabled to make 
a disposition of the army, to give me the command of the 
means of transport attached to the troops, and to enable me 
to throw provisions into the fortresses of Ciudad Rodrigo 
and Almeida, and to move up the magazines of the army, 
with a view to the further operations of the campaign, I 
directed Lieutenant-General Sir Rowland Hill to carry into 
execution the operations against the posts and establishments 
of the enemy at the passage of the Tagus, at Almaraz, which 



THE PENINSULA 



303 



I had in contemplation before the siege of Badajoz, and 
which I had then delayed for reasons into which it is not 
now necessary to enter. 

' Owing to the necessary preparations for this expedition, 
and to the unexpected delays of the repairs of the bridge 
over the Guadiana at Merida, which I had destroyed during 
the siege of Badajoz, Lieutenant-General Sir R. Hill could 
not begin his operation with part of the 2nd Division till the 
12th instant ; and he attained the object of his expedition on 
the 19th instant, by taking by storm Forts Napoleon and 
Ragusa, and the t&tes-de-pont, and other works by which 
the enemy's bridge was guarded, by destroying those forts 
and works, and the enemy's bridge and establishments, and 
by taking their magazines, and about 259 prisoners, and 
18 pieces of cannon. 

' I have the honour to enclose Sir R. Hill's report of this 
brilliant exploit ; and I beg to draw your lordship's attention 
to the difficulties with which he had to contend, as well from 
the nature of the country as from the works which the enemy- 
had constructed, and to the ability and characteristic qualities 
displayed by Lieutenant-General Sir R. Hill, in persevering 
in the line, and confining himself to the objects chalked 
out by his instructions, notwithstanding the various obstacles 
opposed to his progress. . . .' 

Return of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Army under 
the Command of His Excellency General the Earl of Welling- 
ton, K.B., under the Immediate Orders of Lieutenant-General 
Sir R. Hill, K.B., at the Storm and Capture of Fart 
Napoleon, and the Enemy's other Works in the Neighbour- 
hood of Almaraz, on the morning of May 19, 1812. 



Killed 
Wounded • 
Missing 



Officers. 


Sergeants. 


Rank and 1 u 

File. Horses - 


2 
13 


I 
IO 


30 
121 — 



Total Loss of Officers, 

Non-commissioned 

Officers, arid Rank 

and File. 



33 
144 



304 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

Spanish Volunteers for British Regiments. 
To the General Officers commanding Divisions. 

' FUENTE GUINALDO, 

'May 18, 1812. 

' The Spanish Government having been pleased to allow 
a limited number of the natives of Spain to serve His 
Majesty in the British regiments composing this army, I 
have to request that you will authorize the regiments named 
in the margin to enlist and bear on their strength 100 Spanish 
volunteers. . . .' 

Form of the A ttestation. 

' I, A. B., do make oath that I will serve His Majesty the King of 
Great Britain and Ireland in the — Battalion of the — Regiment of Foot, 
during the existing war in the Peninsula, if His Majesty should so long 
require my services, and provided that the — Battalion of the — Regi- 
ment of Foot shall continue in the Peninsula during that period. . . .' 

' In communicating this arrangement to the several regi- 
ments, I request you to point out to the Commanding 
Officers of regiments how desirable it is that these volunteers 
should be treated with the utmost kindness and indulgence, 
and brought by degrees to the system of discipline of the 
army.' 

Unfit for Service. 

To Major-General Peacock. 

' FUENTE GUINALDO, 

' May 19, 1812. 

' I enclose a letter which has been put into my hands by 
the Inspector-General of Hospitals, and I beg that, accord- 
ing to the recommendation which it contains, the — th 
Regiment may be removed to the seaside as soon as possible. 

' I beg that you will inform the commanding and other 
officers of the — th Regiment that they have been sent, and 
are detained at Lisbon, because their regiment is unfit for 
service — a circumstance not very creditable to any regiment, 
and that I trust that by their attention to the discipline as 



THE PENINSULA 305 



well as the health and necessary comfort of the soldiers, 
by their obedience to orders, and by their endeavours to 
establish in the regiment a system of order and subordina- 
tion, they will render their regiment fit to belong to this 
army.' 

No Second in Command desired. 

To the Earl of Liverpool. 

' FUENTE GUINALDO, 

'■June 3, 1 812. 

' . . . There are few officers who understand the situation 
of the officer second in command of these armies. Unless 
he should be posted to command a division of cavalry or 
infantry, and perform that duty, he has really, on ordinary 
occasions, nothing to do, and at the same time that his 
opinion relieves me but little from responsibility, and that 
after all I must act according to my own judgment in case 
of a difference of opinion ; there are but few officers who 
should be sent from England as second in command who 
would not come here with opinions formed, probably on very 
bad grounds, and with very extravagant pretensions. To 
this add that, when necessary to detach a body of troops in 
any situation, but few would be satisfied to remain with the 
detachment, unless indeed it should consist of nearly the 
whole army. . . .' 

To Earl Bathuvst. 

' Freneda, 

'January 26, 1 8 13. 

' In my opinion the office of second in command of an 
army in these days, in which the use of councils of war has 
been discontinued, and the chief in command is held severely 
responsible for everything that passes, is not only useless, 
but injurious to the service. A person without denned 
duties, excepting to give flying opinions from which he may 
depart at pleasure, must be a nuisance in moments of 
decision ; and whether I have a second in command or not, 
I am determined always to act according to the dictates of 

20 



306 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

my own judgment, being quite certain that I shall be 
responsible for the act, be the person who he may, according 
to whose opinion it has been adopted.' 

Continued Outrages. 
To the Earl of Liverpool. 

'FUENTE GUINALDO, 

' June 10, 1812. 

' The outrages committed by the British soldiers belonging 
to this army have become so enormous, and they have 
produced an effect upon the minds of the people of the 
country so injurious to the cause, and likely to be so 
dangerous to the army itself, that I request your lordship's 
early attention to the subject. 

' I am sensible that the best measures to be adopted on 
this subject are those of prevention, and I believe there are 
few officers who have paid more attention to the subject in 
this view of it than I have done ; and I have been so far 
successful, that few outrages are committed by the soldiers 
who are with their regiments, after the regiments have been 
a short time in this country. But in the extended system 
on which we are acting, small detachments of soldiers must 
be marched long distances through the country, either as 
escorts or returning from being escorts to prisoners, or 
coming from hospitals, etc. ; and notwithstanding that none 
of these detachments are ever allowed to march excepting 
under the command of an officer, or more, in proportion to 
its size, and that every precaution is taken to provide for 
the regularity of their subsistence, there is no instance of 
the march of one of these detachments that outrages of every 
description are not committed, and, I am sorry to say, with 
impunity. 

' The foundation of every system of discipline which has 
for its object the prevention of crimes must be the non- 
commissioned officers of the army. But I am sorry to say 
that, notwithstanding the encouragement which I have given 
to this class, they are still as little to be depended upon as 



THE PENINSULA 307 



the private soldiers themselves ; and they are just as ready- 
to commit irregularities and outrages. I attribute this 
circumstance very much to the lowness of their pay in 
comparison with that of the soldiers. 

' Within my recollection, the pay of the soldiers of the 
army has been increased from sixpence to one shilling per 
diem, with other advantages, while that of the corporals, 
which was eightpence, has in the same period been raised 
only to one shilling and twopence, and that of the sergeants, 
which was one shilling, has been raised only to one shilling 
and sixpence, both with the same advantages as the private 
soldiers. 

' Your lordship will observe that the old proportions have 
not been preserved, and the non-commissioned officers of the 
army not only feel no inclination to preserve a distinction 
between them and the private soldiers, but they feel no 
desire to incur the responsibility, and take the trouble, and 
submit to the privations of their situation for so trifling a 
difference in their pay as that of twopence in fourteen pence 
to corporals, and that of sixpence in eighteen pence to 
sergeants, and they are indifferent whether they continue 
non-commissioned officers or not. 

' The remedy for this evil is to increase the pay of the 
corporals and sergeants, so as at least to restore the old 
proportions between non-commissioned officers and soldiers 
before the first increase of pay to the army at the commence- 
ment of the last war. This measure becomes particularly 
necessary in consequence of the opinions generally prevalent 
in respect to the punishment of soldiers, which are certainly 
so far well founded that it must be admitted by all that the 
best mode of insuring regularity among soldiers is to prevent 
the commission of crimes. 

' Then, not only is it difficult, if not impossible, to preserve 
order in one of these detachments upon a march, owing to 
the badness of the non-commissioned officers of the army, 
but the crimes which the soldiers commit remain un- 
punished. 

' It is impossible to try these offences while the soldiers 

20—2 



308 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

are on the march, from the want of a sufficient number of 
officers to constitute a court, and I refer your lordship to 
my letter to the Judge Advocate-General of November 13, 
181 1, for a detail of the difficulties attending the procuring 
evidence against them when they join the army. I pro- 
posed remedies for this evil which have not been entirely 
adopted. . . . 

' The guard-rooms are therefore crowded with prisoners, 
and the offences of which they have been guilty remain 
unpunished, to the destruction of the discipline of the 
army, and to the injury of the reputation of the country 
for justice. 

' I have thought it proper to lay these circumstances 
before your lordship. I am about to move the army further 
forward into Spain, and I assure your lordship that I have 
not a friend in that country who has not written to me in 
dread of the consequences which must result to the army, 
and to the cause, from a continuance of these disgraceful 
irregularities, which I declare I have it not in my power to 
prevent.' 

A Regrettable Affair. 

To Lieutcnant-Gmcral Sir R. Hill, K.B. 

' Salamanca, 

'June 18, 1812. 

' I have received your letters of the 13th and 14th. I 

have never been more annoyed than by 's affair, 

and I entirely concur with you in the necessity of inquiring 
into it. It is occasioned entirely by the trick our officers of 
cavalry have acquired of galloping at everything, and their 
galloping back as fast as they gallop on the enemy. They 
never consider their situation, never think of manoeuvring 
before an enemy — so little that one would think they cannot 
manoeuvre, excepting on Wimbledon Common — and when 
they use their arm as it ought to be used — viz., offensively — 
they never keep or provide for reserve. 

' All cavalry should charge in two lines, of which one 
should be in reserve ; if obliged to charge in one line, part 



THE PENINSULA 



3^9 



of the line, at least one-third, should be ordered beforehand 
to pull up and form in second line as soon as the charge 
should be given, and the enemy has been broken and has 
retired. The Royals and the 3rd Dragoon Guards were the 
best regiments in the cavalry in this country, and it annoys 
me particularly that the misfortune has happened to them. 
I do not wonder at the French boasting of it ; it is the 
greatest blow they have struck.' 

To the Earl of Liverpool. 

' Salamanca, 

' June 18, 18 1 2. 

' . . . I enclose a letter from Lieutenant-General Sir Row- 
land Hill, and its enclosures, being two from Major-General 
Slade, giving an account of an affair which he had with the 
enemy on the nth instant, in which, owing to the eager- 
ness and impetuosity of the soldiers, considerable loss was 
sustained. . . .' 

Return of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing, in the Affair near 
Maguilla, on June n, 18 12. 



Killed - 
Wounded 
Missing - 



Officers. 


Sergeants. 


Rank and 
File. 


1 
Horses. ' 





2 


20 


6 


— 


— 


26 


14 


2 


IO 


I06 


127 



Total Loss of Officers, 

Non-commissioned 

Officers, and Rank and 

File. 



22 

26 

Il8 



BATTLE OF SALAMANCA. 

To the Earl of Liverpool. 

' FUENTE LA PENA, 

'■June 30, 1 8 12. 

' The ammunition to enable us to carry on the attack of 
the forts having arrived at Salamanca in the afternoon of the 
26th, the fire was immediately recommenced upon the gorge 
of the redoubt of Los Cayetanos, in which a practicable 
breach was effected at about ten o'clock in the morning of 



WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 



the 27th ; and we had succeeded nearly about the same time 
in setting fire to the buildings in the large fort of San Vicente, 
by the fire from which the approach to Los Cayetanos by its 
gorge was defended. 

' Being in Salamanca at this moment, I gave directions 
that the forts of Los Cayetanos and La Merced should be 
stormed, but some little delay occurred in consequence of 
the Commanding Officer of these forts in the first instance, 
and afterwards the Commanding Officer of San Vicente, 
having expressed a desire to capitulate after the lapse of a 
certain number of hours. 

' As it was obvious that these propositions were made in 
order to gain time till the fire in San Vicente should be 
extinguished, I refused to listen to any terms unless the 
forts should be instantly surrendered ; and having found 
that the Commanding Officer of Los Cayetanos, who was the 
first to offer to surrender, was entirely dependent upon the 
Governor of San Vicente, and could not venture to carry into 
execution the capitulation which he had offered to make, I 
gave directions that his fort and that of La Merced might be 
stormed forthwith. 

' These operations were effected in the most gallant 
manner by a detachment of the 6th Division, under the 
command of Lieutenant-Colonel Davis, of the 36th Regi- 
ment, under the direction of Major-General Clinton. 

' The troops entered the fort of Los Cayetanos by the 
gorge, and escaladed that of La Merced, and I am happy to 
add that our loss was but trifling. 

' The Governor of San Vicente then sent out a flag of truce 
to ratify the surrender of that fort on the terms I had offered 
him — viz., the garrison to march out with the honours of 
war, to be prisoners of war, and the officers to retain their 
personal military baggage, and the soldiers their knapsacks — 
and notwithstanding that the 9th Regiment of Cacadores had 
actually stormed one of the outworks of San Vicente, and 
were in possession of it, I deemed it expedient to accept the 
fort by capitulation on those terms, and to stop the attack. 

' The enemy had been employed for nearly three years in 



THE PENINSULA 



3ir 



constructing these works, but with increased activity for the 
last eight or nine months. A large expense had been in- 
curred, and these works, sufficiently garrisoned by about 
800 men, and armed with 30 pieces of artillery, were of a 
nature to render it quite impossible to take them, except- 
ing by a regular attack ; and it is obvious that the enemy 
relied upon their strength, and upon their being sufficiently 
garrisoned and armed, as they had left in San Vicente large 
depots of clothing, and military stores of every description. 

' I was mistaken in my estimate of the extent of the means 
which would be necessary to subdue these forts, and I was 
obliged to send to the rear for a fresh supply of ammunition. 
This necessity occasioned a delay of six days. 

' The enemy withdrew their garrison from Alba de Tormes 
as soon as they heard of the fall of the forts of Salamanca, 
and I have ordered that the works at both places may be 
destroyed. 

'The operations against the forts of Salamanca were 
carried on in sight of Marshal Marmont's army, which 
remained in its position, with the right at Cabeza Vellosa, 
and the left at Huerta, till the night of the 27th instant, 
when they broke up and retired in three columns towards 
the river Duero, one of them directing its march upon Toro, 
and the others upon Tordesillas. 

' The allied army broke up the following day, and are this 
day encamped upon the Guarena. . . .' 

Return of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Army 
under the Command of General the Earl of Wellington, K.B., 
in the Siege of the Forts of San Vicente, Los Cayetanos, and 
La Merced, and in the Position on the Heights of Villares, 
from June 16 to June 27, 1812, inclusive. 





Officers. 


Sergeants. 


Rank and 
File. 


Horses. 


Total Loss of Officers, 

Non-commissioned 

Officers, and Rank 

and File. 


Killed - 
Wounded 
Missing - 


6 
28 

2 


5 
44 


104 

340 
II 


28 

5 


us 

412 

13 



3 i2 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

To the Earl of Liverpool. 

' Fuente la Pen A, 

'June 30, 18 12. 

' I omitted to report to your lordship in my last despatch 
the particulars of a very gallant affair of the cavalry in 
Estremadura, under the command of Lieutenant Strenuwitz, 
the Aide -de -Camp of Lieutenant -General Sir William 
Erskine. Lieutenant -General Sir Rowland Hill having 
learnt that the enemy had left at Maguilla a great propor- 
tion of the soldiers who had been taken prisoners in Major- 
General Slade's affair of the nth instant, sent Lieutenant 
Strenuwitz on the 13th with a detachment consisting of 50 
men of the 3rd Dragoon Guards and Royal Dragoons, under 
the command of Lieutenant Bridges, of the Royal Dragoons, 
to bring them in. On his arrival there he found a detach- 
ment of French Dragoons, consisting of 80 men, whom 
he attacked with such conduct and effect as to kill many, 
and to take prisoners 1 officer, 20 men, and 25 horses, with 
the loss of 1 man of his detachment killed. . . .' 

To Earl Bathurst. 

' Cahkeuizos, near Salamanca, 
'July 21, 1812. 

' In the course of the 15th and 16th the enemy moved all 
their troops to the right of their position on the Duero, and 
their army was concentrated between Toro and San Roman. 
A considerable body passed the Duero at Toro on the 
evening of the 16th, and I moved the allied army to their 
left on that night, with an intention to concentrate on the 
Guareiia. 

' It was totally out of my power to prevent the enemy from 
passing the Duero at any point at which he might think it 
expedient, as he had in his possession all the bridges over 
that river and many of the fords ; but he recrossed that 
river at Toro in the night of the 16th, moved his whole army 
to Tordesillas, where he again crossed the Duero on the 
morning of the 17th, and assembled his army on that day at 



THE PENINSULA 313 



La Nava del Rey, having marched not less than ten leagues 
in the course of the 17th. 

'The 4th and Light Divisions of infantry, and Major- 
General Anson's brigades of cavalry, had marched to Cas- 
trejon on the night of the 16th, with a view to the assembly 
of the army on the Guarena, and were at Castrejon under 
the orders of Lieutenant-General Sir Stapleton Cotton on 
the 17th, not having been ordered to proceed further, in con- 
sequence of my knowledge that the enemy had not passed 
the Duero at Toro, and there was not time to call them in 
between the hour at which I received the intelligence of the 
whole of the enemy's army being at La Nava and daylight 
on the morning of the 18th. I therefore took measures to 
provide for their retreat and junction by moving the 
5th Division to Torrecilla de la Orden, and Major-General 
Le Marchant's, Major-General Alten's, and Major-General 
Bock's brigades of cavalry to Alaejos. 

' The enemy attacked the troops at Castrejon at the dawn 
of day of the 18th, and Sir Stapleton Cotton maintained the 
post without suffering any loss till the cavalry had joined 
him. Nearly about the same time the enemy turned, by 
Alaejos, the left flank of our position at Castrejon. 

' The troops retired in admirable order to Torrecilla de la 
Orden, having the enemy's whole army on their flank, or in 
their rear, and thence to the Guarena, which river they 
passed under the same circumstances, and effected their 
junction with the army. 

'The Guarena, which runs into the Duero, is formed by 
four streams, which unite about a league below Canizal, and 
the enemy took a strong position on the heights on the right 
of that river ; and I placed the 5th, 4th, and Light Divisions 
on the opposite heights, and had directed the remainder of 
the army to cross the Upper Guarena at Vallesa, in conse- 
quence of the appearance of the enemy's intention to turn 
our right. 

' Shortly after his arrival, however, the enemy crossed the 
Guarena at Castrillo, below the junction of the streams, and 
manifested an intention to press upon our left, and to enter 



314 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 



the valley of Cafiizal. Major-General Alten's brigade of 
cavalry, supported by the 3rd Dragoons, were already 
engaged with the enemy's cavalry, and had taken, among 
other prisoners, the French General de Carrie ; and I 
desired Lieutenant-General the Hon. L. Cole to attack 
with Major-General William Anson's and Brigadier-General 
Harvey's brigades of infantry, the latter under the command 
of Colonel Stubbs, the enemy's infantry, which were support- 
ing their cavalry. He immediately attacked and defeated 
them with the 27th and 40th Regiments, which advanced 
to the charge with bayonets, Colonel Stubbs' Portuguese 
brigade supporting, and the enemy gave way. Many were 
killed and wounded, and Major-General Alten's brigade of 
cavalry having pursued the fugitives, 240 prisoners were 
taken. . . . 

' The enemy did not make any further attempt on our left, 
but, having reinforced their troops on that side, and with- 
drawn those which had moved to their left, I brought back 
ours from Vallesa. 

' On the 19th, in the afternoon, the enemy withdrew all 
the troops from their right, and marched to their left by 
Tarazona, apparently with an intention of turning our right. 
I crossed the Upper Guarena at Vallesa and El Olmo, with 
the whole of the allied army, in the course of that evening 
and night, and every preparation was made for the action 
which was expected on the plain of Vallesa on the morning 
of the 20th. 

' But shortly after daylight the enemy made another 
movement, in several columns, to his left, along the heights 
of the Guarena, which river he crossed below Cantalapiedra, 
and encamped last night at Babila-fuente and Villoruela; 
and the allied army made a corresponding movement to its 
right to Cantalpino, and encamped last night at Cabeza 
Vellosa, the 6th Division and Major-General Alten's brigade 
of cavalry being upon the Tormes at Aldea Lengua. 

' During these movements there have been occasional 
cannonades, but without loss on our side. 

' I have this morning moved the left of the army to the 



THE PENINSULA 315 



Tormes, where the whole are now concentrated, and I 
observe that the enemy have also moved towards the same 
river near Huerta. 

1 The enemy's object hitherto has been to cut off my com- 
munication with Salamanca and Ciudad Rodrigo, the want 
of which, he knows well, would distress us very materially. 
The wheat harvest has not yet been reaped in Castille, and, 
even if we had money, we could not now procure anything 
from the country, unless we should follow the example of 
the enemy, and lay waste whole districts, in order to procure 
a scanty subsistence of unripe wheat for the troops. 

' It would answer no purpose to attempt to retaliate upon 
the enemy, even if it were practicable. The French armies 
in Spain have never had any secure communication beyond 
the ground which they occupy, and provided the enemy 
opposed to them is not too strong for them, they are in- 
different in respect to the quarter from which their operations 
are directed, or on which side they carry them on. 

' The army of Portugal has been surrounded for the last 
six weeks, and scarcely even a letter reaches its commander ; 
but the system of organized rapine and plunder, and the 
extraordinary discipline so long established in the French 
armies, enable it to subsist at the expense of the total ruin 
of the country in which it had been placed, and I am not 
certain that Marshal Marmont has not now at his command 
a greater quantity of provisions and supplies of every descrip- 
tion than we have. Any movement upon his flank, there- 
fore, would only tend to augment the embarrassments of our 
own situation, while it would have no effect whatever upon 
that of the enemy, even if such a movement could have been 
made with advantage as an operation purely military. This, 
however, was not the case, and when the French attempted 
to turn our right, I had the choice only of marching towards 
Salamanca, or of attacking the enemy in a position highly 
advantageous to him, which, for several reasons, I did not 
think expedient. 

1 I have invariably been of opinion that, unless forced to 
fight a battle, it is better that one should not be fought by 



3i6 



WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 



the allied army, unless under such favourable circumstances 
as that there would be reason to hope that the allied army 
would be able to maintain the field, while those of the enemy 
should not. 

' Your lordship will have seen by the returns of the two 
armies that we have no superiority of numbers, even over 
that single army immediately opposed to us ; indeed, I 
believe that the French army is of the two the strongest, 
and it is certainly equipped with a profusion of artillery 
double ours in numbers, and of larger calibres. It cannot be 
a-ttacked, therefore, in a chosen position without considerable 
loss on our side. 

' To this circumstance add that I am quite certain that 
Marshal Marmont's army is to be joined by the King's, 
which will be 10,000 or 12,000 men, with a large proportion 
of cavalry, and that troops are still expected from the army 
of the north, and some are ordered from that of the south ; 
and it will be seen that I ought to consider it almost im- 
possible to remain in Castille after an action, the circum- 
stances of which should not have been so advantageous as 
to have left the allied army in a situation of comparative 
strength, while that of the enemy should have been much 
weakened. 

' I have, therefore, determined to cross the Tormes, if the 
enemy should, to cover Salamanca as long as I can ; and 
above all, not to give up our communication with Ciudad 
Rodrigo, and not to fight an action unless under very 
advantageous circumstances, or it should become absolutely 
necessary. . . .' 

Return of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Army 
under the Command of General the Earl of Wellington, KB., 
near Castrejon, on July 18, 1812. 





Killed. : Wounded. ' Missing. 


British - 
Portuguese - 


6l 297 27 

34 96 1 27 


Total - 


95 393 ! 54 



THE PENINSULA 3*7 



To Lieutenant-General Hill. 

' On the Heights near Alba de Tormes, 
'■July 23, 18 1 2. 

' I write to let you know that we beat Marshal Marmont's 
army yesterday evening, near Salamanca, and they are now 
in full retreat, and we are following them. . . . 

' We have taken a good many prisoners and cannon — above 
3,000 of the former, and I should think 20 of the latter, and, 
I understand, two eagles. All the troops behaved admir- 
ably.' 

To Earl Bathnrst. 

' Flores de Avila, 

'■July 24, 1812. 

< My Aide-de-Camp, Captain Lord Clinton, will present to 
your lordship this account of a victory which the allied 
troops under my command gained in a general action fought 
near Salamanca on the evening of the 22nd instant, which 
I have been under the necessity of delaying to send till now, 
having been engaged ever since the action in the pursuit of 
the enemy's flying troops. 

In my letter of the 21st I informed your lordship that 
both armies were near the Tormes, and the enemy crossed 
that river with the greatest part of his troops in the after- 
noon, by the fords between Alba de Tormes and Huerta, 
and moved by their left towards the roads leading to Ciudad 
Rodrigo. 

' The allied army, with the exception of the 3rd Division 
and General D'Urban's cavalry, likewise crossed the Tormes 
in the evening by the bridge of Salamanca and the fords in 
the neighbourhood, and I placed the troops in a position, of 
which the right was upon one of the two heights called Dos 
Arapiles, and the left on the Tormes, below the ford of Sta. 

Marta. 

'The 3rd Division and Brigadier - General D'Urban's 
cavalry were left at Cabrerizos, on the right of the Tormes, 
as the enemy had still a large corps on the heights above 



318 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

Babila-fuente, on the same side of the river, and I considered 
it not improbable that, finding our army prepared for them in 
the morning on the left of the Tormes, they would alter their 
plan and manoeuvre by the other bank. 

' In the course of the night of the 21st I received intelli- 
gence, of the truth of which I could not doubt, that General 
Clausel had arrived at Polios on the 20th with the cavalry 
and horse artillery of the army of the north, to join Marshal 
Marmont ; and I was quite certain that these troops would 
join him on the 22nd or 23rd at latest. 

' There was no time to be lost therefore, and I determined 
that, if circumstances should not permit me to attack him on 
the 22nd, I would move towards Ciudad Rodrigo without 
further loss of time, as the difference of the numbers of 
cavalry might have made a march of manoeuvre, such as we 
have had for the last four or five days, very difficult, and its 
result doubtful. 

' During the night of the 21st the enemy had taken pos- 
session of the village of Calvarassa de Arriba, and of the 
heights near it called Nuestra Sefiora de la Pena, our cavalry 
being in possession of Calvarassa de Abaxo ; and shortly 
after daylight detachments from both armies attempted to 
obtain possession of the more distant from our right of the 
two hills called Dos Arapiles. 

' The enemy, however, succeeded, their detachments being 
the strongest, and having been concealed in the woods nearer 
the hill than we were, by which success they strengthened 
materially their own position, and had in their power in- 
creased means of annoying ours. 

' In the morning the light troops of the 7th Division and 
the 4th Cacadores belonging to General Pack's Brigade 
were engaged with the enemy on the height called Nuestra 
Sefiora de la Pena, on which height they maintained them- 
selves with the enemy throughout the day. The possession 
by the enemy, however, of the more distant of the Arapiles 
rendered it necessary for me to extend the right of the army 
en potence to the height behind the village of Arapiles, and 
to occupy that village with light infantry ; and here I placed 



THE PENINSULA 319 



the 4th Division, under the command of Lieutenant-General 
the Hon. L. Cole, and although, from the variety of the 
enemy's movements, it was difficult to form a satisfactory 
judgment of his intentions, I considered that upon the whole 
his objects were upon the left of the Tormes. I therefore 
ordered Major-General the Hon. E. Pakenham, who com- 
manded the 3rd Division in the absence of Lieutenant-General 
Picton, on account of ill-health, to move across the Tormes 
with the troops under his .command, including Brigadier- 
General D'Urban's cavalry, and to place himself behind Aldea 
Tejada — Brigadier-General Bradford's brigade of Portuguese 
infantry and Don Carlos de Espana's infantry having been 
moved up likewise to the neighbourhood of Las Torres, 
between the 3rd and 4th Divisions. 

' After a variety of evolutions and movements the enemy 
appears to have determined upon his plan about two in the 
afternoon, and, under cover of a very heavy cannonade, 
which, however, did us but very little damage, he extended 
his left, and moved forward his troops apparently with an 
intention to embrace, by the position of his troops, and by 
his fire, our post on that of the two Arapiles which we pos- 
sessed, and from thence to attack and break our line, or, at 
all events, to render difficult any movement of ours to our 
right. 

' The extension of his line to his left, however, and its 
advance upon our right, notwithstanding that his troops still 
occupied very strong ground, and his position was well 
defended by cannon, gave me an opportunity of attacking 
him, for which I had long been anxious. I reinforced our 
right with the 5th Division, under Lieutenant-General Leith, 
which I placed behind the village of Arapiles, on the right 
of the 4th Division, and with the 6th and 7th Divisions in 
reserve ; and as soon as these troops had taken their station, 
I ordered Major-General the Hon. E. Pakenham to move 
forward with the 3rd Division and General D'Urban's cavalry, 
and two squadrons of the 14th Light Dragoons, under Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel Hervey, in four columns, to turn the enemy's 
left on the heights ; while Brigadier-General Bradford's 



WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 



Brigade, the 5th Division, under Lieutenant-General Leith, 
the 4th Division, under Lieutenant-General the Hon. L. Cole, 
and the cavalry under Lieutenant-General Sir Stapleton 
Cotton, should attack them in front, supported in reserve by 
the 6th Division, under Major- General Clinton, the 7th under 
Major-General Hope, and Don Carlos de Espana's Spanish 
Division ; and Brigadier-General Pack should support the 
left of the 4th Division by attacking that of the Dos Arapiles 
which the enemy held. The 1st and Light Divisions occupied 
the ground on the left, and were in reserve. 

' The attack upon the enemy's left was made in the manner 
above described, and completely succeeded. Major-General 
the Hon. E. Pakenham formed the 3rd Division across the 
enemy's flank, and overthrew everything opposed to him. 
These troops were supported in the most gallant style by 
the Portuguese cavalry, under Brigadier-General D' Urban, 
and Lieutenant-Colonel Hervey's squadron of the 14th, who 
successfully defeated every attempt made by the enemy on 
the flank of the 3rd Division. 

' Brigadier-General Bradford's Brigade, the 5th and 4th 
Divisions, and the cavalry under Lieutenant - General Sir 
Stapleton Cotton, attacked the enemy in front, and drove his 
troops before them from one height to another, bringing 
forward their right, so as to acquire strength upon the enemy's 
flank in proportion to the advance. Brigadier - General 
Pack made a very gallant attack upon the Arapiles, in 
which, however, he did not succeed, excepting in diverting 
the attention of the enemy's corps placed upon it from the 
troops under the command of Lieutenant-General Cole in his 
advance. 

' The cavalry under Lieutenant-General Sir Stapleton 
Cotton made a most gallant and successful charge against a 
body of the enemy's infantry, which they overthrew and cut 
to pieces. In this charge Major-General Le Marchant was 
killed at the head of his brigade, and I have to regret the 
loss of a most able officer. 

'After the crest of the height was carried, one division of 
the enemy's infantry made a stand against the 4th Division, 



THE PENINSULA 



which, after a severe contest, was obliged to give way in 
consequence of the enemy having thrown some troops on 
the left of the 4th Division, after the failure of Brigadier- 
General Pack's attack upon the Arapiles and Lieutenant- 
General the Hon. L. Cole having been wounded. 

' Marshal Sir William Beresford, who happened to be on 
the spot, directed Brigadier-General Spry's brigade of the 
5th Division, which was in the second line, to change its 
front, and to bring its fire on the flank of the enemy's 
division ; and I am sorry to add that, while engaged in this 
service, he received a wound which I am apprehensive will 
deprive me of the benefit of his counsel and assistance for 
some time. Nearly about the same time Lieutenant-General 
Leith received a wound which unfortunately obliged him to 
quit the field. I ordered up the 6th Division under Major- 
General Clinton. v to relieve the 4th, and the battle was soon 
restored to its former success. 

' The enemy's right, however, reinforced by the troops 
which had fled from his left, and by those which had now 
retired from the Arapiles, still continued to resist, and I 
ordered the 1st and Light Divisions, and Colonel Stubbs's 
Portuguese brigade of the 4th Division, which was re-formed, 
and Major-General William Anson's brigade, likewise of the 
4th Division, to turn the right, while the 6th Division, 
supported by the 3rd and 5th, attacked the front. It was 
dark before this point was carried by the 6th Division, and 
the enemy fled through the woods towards the Tormes. I 
pursued them with the 1st and Light Divisions, and Major- 
General William Anson's brigade of the 4th Division, and 
some squadrons of cavalry under Lieutenant-General Sir 
Stapleton Cotton, as long as we could find any of them 
together, directing our march upon Huerta and the fords of 
the Tormes, by which the enemy had passed on their 
advance ; but the darkness of the night was highly advan- 
tageous to the enemy, many of whom escaped under its cover 
who must otherwise have been in our hands. 

' I am sorry to report that, owing to this same cause, 

21 



322 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

Lieutenant-General Sir Stapleton Cotton was unfortunately 
wounded by one of our own sentries after we had halted. 

' We renewed the pursuit at break of day in the morning 
with the same troops, and Major-General Bock's and Major- 
General Anson's brigades of cavalry, which joined during 
the night, and, having crossed the Tormes, we came up with 
the enemy's rear of cavalry and infantry near La Serna. 
They were immediately attacked by the two brigades of 
dragoons, and the cavalry fled, leaving the infantry to their 
fate. I have never witnessed a more gallant charge than 
was made on the enemy's infantry by the heavy brigade of 
the King's German Legion, under Major-General Bock, 
which was completely successful, and the whole body of 
infantry, consisting of three battalions of the enemy's ist 
Division, were made prisoners. 

' The pursuit was afterwards continued cfe far as Penaranda 
last night, and our troops were still following the flying 
enemy. 

' Their headquarters were in this town, not less than ten 
leagues from the field of battle, for a few hours last night ; 
and they are now considerably advanced on the road towards 
Valladolid, by Arevalo. They were joined yesterday on their 
retreat by the cavalry and artillery of the army of the North, 
which have arrived at too late a period, it is to be hoped, to 
be of much use to them. 

' It is impossible to form a conjecture of the amount of the 
enemy's loss in this action, but, from all reports, it is very 
considerable. We have taken from them n pieces of cannon,* 
several ammunition waggons, 2 eagles, and 6 colours ; and 
1 General, 3 Colonels, 3 Lieutenant-Colonels, 130 officers of 
inferior rank, and between 6,000 and 7,000 soldiers, are 
prisoners, + and our detachments are sending in more at every 
moment. The number of dead on the field is very large. 

* The official returns only account for 1 1 pieces ot cannon, but it is 
believed that 20 have fallen into our hands. 

t The prisoners are supposed to amount to 7,000; but it has not been 
possible to ascertain their number exactly, from the advance of the army 
immediately after the action was over. 



THE PENINSULA 



323 



' I am informed that Marshal Marmont is badly wounded, 
and has lost one of his arms, and that four General Officers 
have been killed, and several wounded. 

' Such an advantage could not have been acquired with- 
out material loss on our side ;* but it certainly has not been 
of a magnitude to distress the army, or to cripple its opera- 
tions. 

' I have great pleasure in reporting to your lordship that 
throughout this trying day, of which I have related the events, 
I had every reason to be satisfied with the conduct of the 
General Officers and troops. 

' The relation which I have written of its events will give 
a general idea of the share which each individual had in 
them, and I cannot say too much in praise of the conduct of 
every individual in his station. . . . 

'In a case in which the conduct of all has been con- 
spicuously good, I regret that the necessary limits of a 
despatch prevent me from drawing your lordship's notice to 
the conduct of a larger number of individuals, but I can 
assure your lordship that there was no officer or corps engaged 
in this action who did not perform his duty by his Sovereign 
and his country. 

' Captain Lord Clinton will have the honour of laying at 
the feet of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent the eagles 
and colours taken from the enemy in this action. . . .' 

Return of Killed, Wounded and Missing of the Allied Army, 
under the Command of General the Earl of Wellington, 
K.B., in the Battle near Salamanca, on Jtdy 22, 1812. 



Officers. 



Killed - 41 
Wounded 252 
Missing - ] 1 



Rank 

Sergeants. and Horses. 
File. ! 



28 

178 

I 



625 1 114 

3,840 i 133 

254 ! 44 



Total. 



694 

4,270 
256 



British. Portuguese. Spanish 



2,714 

74 



3°4 

1,552 
182 



* The Devonshire Regiment— the old nth Foot — is known as the 
1 Bloody Eleventh,' a sobriquet arising out of the state of the corps after 
the battle of Salamanca. — W. W. 

21 — 2 



324 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

To Earl Bathurst. 

' Flores de Avila, 

' July 24, 1812. 

' I hope that you will be pleased with our battle, of which 
the despatch contains as accurate an account as I can give 
you. There was no mistake; everything went on as it 
ought ; and there never was an army so beaten in so short a 
time. If we had had another hour or two of daylight, not 
a man would have passed the Tormes. . . .' 

To Lieutenant- General Sir T. Graham, K.B. 

' Flores de Avila, 

'July 25, 1812. 

' . . . I am in great hopes that our loss has not been great. 
In two divisions, the 3rd and 5th, it is about 1,200 men, 
including Portuguese. There are more in the 4th and 6th, 
but there are many men who left the ranks with wounded 
officers and soldiers, who are eating and drinking, and 
engaged in regocijos with the inhabitants of Salamanca ; I 
have sent, however, to have them all turned out of the 
town. . . .' 

Continued Distress. 

To Earl Bathurst. 

1 Olmedo, 

'July 28, 18 12. 

' . . . We are absolutely bankrupt. The troops are now five 
months in arrears, instead of being one month in advance. 
The staff have not been paid since February ; the muleteers 
not since June, 181 1 ; and we are in debt in all parts of the 
country. . . .' 

To Earl Bathurst. 

' Cuellar, 

'August 4, 1 81 2. 

' I have the pleasure to send you a letter from Dr. M'Grigor, 
which I have received since I wrote my despatch on our 
sickness this day. However, it is very bad, and it is melan- 
choly to see the finest and bravest soldiers in the world 



THE PENINSULA 32S 



falling down, owing to their own irregularities, and the 
ignorant presumption of those who think they know better 
what is good for them than those do who have been serving 
so long in this country. . . .' 

Arrival in Madrid. 

To Earl Bathurst. 

'Madrid, 

' August 13, 1812. 

' ... It is impossible to describe the joy manifested by the 
inhabitants of Madrid upon our arrival ; and I hope that the 
prevalence of the same sentiments of detestation of the French 
yoke, and of a strong desire to secure the independence of 
their country, which first induced them to set the example 
of resistance to the usurper, will induce them again to make 
exertions in the cause of their country, which being more 
wisely directed, will be more efficacious than those formerly 
made. . . .' 

Proclamation. 

' Madrid, 

' August 29, 18 1 2. 
'Spaniards, 

' It is unnecessary to take up your time by recalling to 
your recollection the events of the last two months, or by 
drawing your attention to the situation in which your enemies 
now find themselves. 

'Listen to the accounts of the numerous prisoners daily 
brought in and deserters from their army ; hear the details 
of the miseries endured by those who, trusting to the pro- 
mises of the French, have followed the vagabond fortunes of 
the Usurper, driven from the capital of your monarchy ; hear 
these details from their servants and followers who have had 
the sense to quit this scene of desolation, and if the suffer- 
ings of your oppressors can soften the feeling of those 
inflicted upon yourselves, you will find ample cause for con- 
solation. 

' But much remains still to be done to consolidate and 



326 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

secure the advantages acquired. It should be clearly under- 
stood that the pretended King is an usurper, whose authority 
it is the duty of every Spaniard to resist ; that every French- 
man is an enemy, against whom it is the duty of every 
Spaniard to raise his arm. . . . 

' Spaniards ! resist this odious tyranny, and be independent 
and happy. 

' Wellington.' 

Misunderstanding in England. 
To Colonel Torrens. 

' TORQUEMADA, 

' September 13, 1 8 1 2 . 

'. . . In truth, my dear Torrens, the difficulties under 
which we labour are but little known in England. First, 
there is no soldier in the army who has at present been paid 
to a later date than April 24 for want of money. His 
accounts are settled every month. But, secondly, if a soldier 
has been in hospital since the month of March last, at which 
time the soldiers had not been paid later than January, and 
the pay for March not received till June or July, I should 
like to know how it is possible for any officer to come to a 
settlement by a correspondence with one officer, who has to 
settle the accounts of probably 500 men going to England at 
the same moment ? It is quite impossible ; and the conse- 
quence is, that the poor men are detained three, four, or five 
months, to the loss of many, till the correspondence respect- 
ing their accounts is finished, during which time many settle 
all accounts with this world. 

' It is a great error to suppose that the lower orders are 
always right in their complaints, and the higher orders 
always in the wrong. My experience has taught me that, 
nine times in ten, the soldiers loudest in their complaints 
and claims have no ground for either the one or the other, 
and are generally in debt to their Captains. Those who 
are wounded invariably either throw away or sell their neces- 
saries ; and whether the ground is held or not by the army, 
they claim compensation from the public. Their claim can 



THE PENINSULA 327 



be settled only by a Board. No officer of a regiment has 
the power either to admit or to refuse it. Yet if a soldier 
makes such a claim at Lisbon, the officer who is to settle the 
soldier's claims before they go to England must detain at 
least as many as one transport will contain, till the claims of 
one for losses of this description shall be inquired into by 
post ; every letter now requiring three weeks to get an 
answer. While this is going on, many die who might be 
saved ; and, after all, a soldier's account can never be settled 
satisfactorily excepting with his regiment. . . .' 

Capture of San Miguel. 
To Earl Bathurst. 

'Villa Toro, 

' September 21, 181 2. 

' I continued to follow the enemy with the troops under 
my command till the i6th, when I was joined at Pampliega 
by three divisions of infantry and a small body of cavalry of 
the army of Galicia, His Excellency the Captain-General 
Castanos having arrived at headquarters on the 14th. The 
enemy had on the 16th taken a strong position on the 
heights behind Celada del Camino, and arrangements were 
made to attack them on the morning of the 17th ; but the 
enemy retired in the night ; and they were driven on the 
17th to the heights close to Burgos. They retired through 
the town in the night, leaving behind them some clothing 
and other stores, and a large quantity of wheat and barley ; 
and have since continued their retreat to Briviesca, where 
it is reported that they have been joined by 7,000 conscripts. 
It is likewise reported that the Prince of Essling has been 
ordered by the local government in France to come and take 
the command of the army. 

' The Castle of Burgos commands the passages of the 
river Arlanzon in the neighbourhood and the roads com- 
municating with them so completely that we could not pass 
the river till the 19th ; when we effected that operation in 
two columns, the 5th Division and General Bradford's 



WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 



brigade above, and the ist Division and General Pack's 
brigade and General Anson's cavalry below the town. 

' Burgos is situated in that division of Spain allotted to 
the army of the North ; and General Caffarelli, who had been 
here on the 17th, had placed in the castle a garrison of the 
troops of that army, consisting, as is reported, of 2,500 men. 
The enemy had taken considerable pains to fortify the 
Castle of Burgos ; and had occupied with a horn work the 
hill of San Miguel, which has a considerable command over 
some of the works of the castle at the distance of 300 yards. 
They had likewise occupied other parts of the hill with 
fleches and other works for the protection of their piquets 
and out-posts. 

'As soon as the ist Division crossed the Arlanzon on the 
19th, the enemy's outposts were driven in by the light 
infantry battalion of Colonel Stirling's brigade, under the 
command of Major the Hon. C. Cocks, supported by 
Brigadier-General Pack's brigade ; and the enemy's outworks 
on the hill of San Miguel, with the exception of the horn 
work, were occupied by our troops, which were posted close 
to the horn work. 

' As soon as it was dark, the same troops, with the 
addition of the 42nd Regiment, attacked and carried by 
assault the horn work which the enemy had occupied in 
strength. . . . We took three pieces of cannon and one 
Captain and 62 prisoners ; but I am sorry to add that our 
loss was severe, as appears by the enclosed return. . . .' 



Return of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Army under 
the Command of General the Marquis of Wellington, K.B., in 
the Assault and Capture of the Fort of San Miguel, on 
September iq, 1812. 



Killed - 

Wounded 

Missing 



Officers. 


Sergeants. 


Rank and 
File. 


Horses, j 


6 
15 


i 


60 

297 
16 


1 

i 



Total Loss of Officers, 

Non-commissioned 

Officers, and Rank 

and File. 



71 

333 
16 



THE PENINSULA 



329 



THE SIEGE OF BURGOS. 

To Earl Bathurst. 

'Villa Toro, 

'■September 27, 181 2. 

' The operations against the Castle of Burgos have been 
continued since I addressed you on the 20th ; and on the 
night of the 22nd I directed that an attempt might be made 
to take by storm the exterior line of the enemy's works, one 
of the batteries destined to support our position within them 
having been in such a state of preparation as to afford hopes 
that it would be ready to open on the morning of the 23rd. 
The attack was to have been made by detachments of 
Portuguese troops belonging to the 6th Division, which 
occupied the town of Burgos and invested the castle on the 
S.W. side on the enemy's left, while a detachment of the 
1st Division under Major Lawrie of the 79th should scale 
the wall in front. Unfortunately, the Portuguese troops 
were so strongly opposed that they could not make any 
progress on the enemy's flank ; and the escalade could not 
take place. I am sorry to say that our loss was severe. . . . 

' We have since established ourselves close to the exterior 
wall, and have carried a gallery towards it, and I hope that 
a mine under it will be completed in the course of to-morrow. 
In the meantime our batteries are completed, and ready to 
open upon the enemy's interior lines, as soon as we shall 
have established our troops within the exterior lines. . . .' 

Return of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the A rmy under 
the Command of General the Marquis of Wellington, K.B., 
in the Siege of the Castle of Burgos, from September 20 to 26, 
1812, inclusive. 



Killed - 

Wounded 

Missing 



Officers. 


Sergeants. 


Rank and 
File. 


Horses. 


7 
12 


2 
13 


SO 
264 



Total Loss of Officers, 

Non-commissioned 

Officers, and Rank 

and File. 



59 



33° WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

To Marshal Beresford. 

'Villa Toro, 

' October 5, 18 12. 

' Something or other has made a terrible alteration in the 
troops for the worse. They have lately, in several instances, 
behaved very ill, and whether it be owing to the nature of 
the service or their want of pay I cannot tell ; but they are 
not at all in the style they were. I am rather inclined to 
attribute their misbehavour to the misery and consequent 
indifference of both officers and soldiers, on account of their 
want of pay. . . . 

' I do not know what to say of this d d place. Our 

success of yesterday evening has opened a new scene to us, 
but our final success is still doubtful. Luckily, the French 
give me more time than I had a right to expect.' 

To Earl Bathurst. 

1 Villa Toro, 

' October 5, 18 12. 

' One of the mines which had been prepared under the 
exterior line of the Castle of Burgos was exploded at midnight 
of the 29th, and effected a breach in the wall, which some of 
the party, destined to attack it, were enabled to storm ; but 
owing to the darkness of the night the detachment who 
were to support the advanced party missed their way, and 
the advance were driven off the breach again before they 
could be effectually supported. The breach effected by the 
mine was not of a description to be stormed except at the 
moment of the explosion, and it was necessary to improve it 
by fire, before the attempt could be repeated. But all our 
endeavours to construct batteries in the best situation to fire 
upon the wall failed, in consequence of the great superiority 
of the enemy's fire. One of the only three battering guns 
we had and two carriages were destroyed, and another gun 
was much injured. In the meantime another mine had been 
placed under the wall, which was ready yesterday, and a fire 



THE PENINSULA 



33i 



was opened yesterday morning from a battery constructed 
under cover of the horn work. 

' The fire from this battery improved the breach first 
made, and the explosion of the mine, at five o'clock yesterday 
evening, effected a second breach. Both were immediately 
stormed by the 2nd Battalion of the 24th Regiment, under 
the command of Captain Hedderwick, which I had ordered 
into the trenches for that purpose, and our troops were 
established within the exterior line of the works of the Castle 
of Burgos. The conduct of the 24th Regiment* was highly 
praiseworthy, and Captain Hedderwick and Lieutenants 
Holmes and Fraser, who led the two storming parties, 
particularly distinguished themselves. I am happy to add, 
the operation was effected without suffering a very severe 
loss. . . .' 

Return of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Army under 
the Command of General the Marquis of Wellington, K.B., 
in the Siege of the Castle of Burgos, from September 27 to 
October 5, inclusive. 



Killed - 

Wounded 

Missing 



Officers. ' Sergeants. 



5 
10 



Rank and 
File. 



71 
302 

4 



Horses. 



Total Loss of Officers, 

Non-commissioned 

Officers, and Rank 

and File. 



76 
323 

4 



Return of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Army under 
the Command of General the Marquis of Wellington, K.B., 
in the Siege of the Castle of Burgos, from October 6 to 10, 
18 1 2, inclusive. 




Horses. 



Total Loss of Officers 

Non-commissioned 

Officers, and Rank 

and File. 



127 

292 

18 



* Now the South Wales Borderers. In later years — at Chillianwallah 
and Isandhlwana — the 24th was almost annihilated. -W. W. 



332 



WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 



To Major-General the Hon. C. Stewart. 

' Villa Toro, 

' October [4, 181 2. 

' I have in hand the toughest job I have ever undertaken, 
but, notwithstanding deficiencies of means of all kinds, I 
hope I shall succeed yet. If I do, I shall be better satisfied 
than I have ever been with any success.' 

Return of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Army under 
the Command of General the Marquis of Wellington, K.B., 
in the Siege of the Castle of Burgos, from October 11 to 17, 

inclusive. 



| Officers. 


Sergeants. 


Rank and 
File. 


Horses. 


Total Loss of Officers, 

Non-commissioned 

Officers, and Rank 

and File. 


Killed - - — 
Wounded - 4 
Missing - — 


I 

3 


27 
66 




28 

73 



Return of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Army under 
the Command of General the Marquis of Wellington, K.B., 
in the Siege of the Castle of Burgos, from October 18 to 21, 

inclusive. 





Officers. 


Sergeants. 


Rank and 
File. 


Horses. 


Total Loss of Officers, 

Non-commisioned 

Officers, and Rank 

and File. 


Killed 
Wounded 

Missing 


4 3 
10 4 


89 
l6o 

4 


— 


96 
174 

4 



To Earl Bathurst. 

' Cabezon, 

' October 26, 18 12. 

' I have been so much occupied by the movements and 
operations of the army since the 18th instant that I have 
not been able to write to your lordship. The operations of 
the siege of the Castle of Burgos continued nearly in the state 



THE PENINSULA 333 



in which they were when I addressed your lordship on the 
nth instant, until the 18th. . . . 

' I had long had reports of the enemy's intention to 
advance for the relief of the Castle of Burgos with the army 
of Portugal, reinforced by troops recently arrived from 
France and with that part of the army of the North which 
was disposable ; and they did advance in considerable force 
against the post of Monasterio, on the evening of the 
18th. . . . 

' I assembled the troops, excepting those necessary for 
carrying on the operations of the siege, as soon as it appeared, 
by the enemy's movement of the 18th, that they entertained 
serious intentions of endeavouring to raise it, and placed the 
allied army on the heights, having their right at Ibeas, on 
the Arlanzon, the centre at Riobena and Mijaradas, and the 
left at Soto Palacios. The enemy's army likewise assembled 
in the neighbourhood of Monasterio. 

' They moved forward on the evening of the 20th with 
about 10,000 men, to drive in our outposts from Quintana- 
palla and Olmos. . . . 

•'On the morning of the 21st I received a letter from Sir 
Rowland Hill of the 17th, in which he acquainted me with 
the enemy's intention to move towards the Tagus, which 
was already fordable by individuals in many places, and was 
likely to become so by an army. 

' The Castle of Chinchilla had surrendered on the 9th 
instant, and General Ballesteros, although he had entered 
Granada on September 17, had not assumed the position in 
La Mancha which he had been ordered to assume by the 
Spanish Government, at my suggestion. 

' The enemy's force in Valencia was supposed to amount 
to not less than 70,000 men, a very large proportion of 
which, it was expected, would be disposable for service out 
of that kingdom. 

' I had desired Lieutenant-General Sir Rowland Hill to 
retire from his position on the Tagus, if he should find that 
he could not maintain himself in it with advantage, and it 
was necessary that I should be near him, in order that the 



334 



WELLING TON ' S BE SPA TCHES 



corps under my command might not be insulated in conse- 
quence of the movements which he should find himself under 
the necessity of making. I therefore raised the siege of 
Burgos on the night of the 21st, and moved the whole army 
back towards the Duero. 

' I felt severely the sacrifice I was obliged to make. Your 
lordship is well aware that I never was very sanguine in my 
expectations of success in the siege of Burgos, notwithstand- 
ing that I considered that success was attainable, even with 
the means in my power, within a reasonably limited period. 
If the attack on the first line, made on the 22nd or the 
29th, had succeeded, I believe we should have taken the 
place, notwithstanding the ability with which the Governor 
conducted the defence, and the gallantry with which it was 
executed by the garrison. Our means were very limited, but 
it appeared to me that if we should succeed, the advantage 
to the cause would be great, and the final success of the 
campaign would have been certain. 

' I had every reason to be satisfied with the conduct of the 
officers and troops during the siege of Burgos, particularly 
with the brigade of Guards. During the latter part of the 
siege the weather was very unfavourable, and the troops 
suffered much from the rain. . . .' 

Return of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing in the Movements 
of the Army under the Command of General the Marquis 
of Wellington, K.B., from October 22 to 29, inclusive. 



Killed 

Wounded 

Missing 



Officers. 



4 
45 



Sergeants. 



14 

35 
12 



Rank and 
File. 



IO9 
442 
223 



Horses. 



74 
65 
59 



Total Loss of Officers, 

Non-commissioned 

Officers, and Rank 

and File. 



127 
522 
243 



THE PENINSULA 



335 



The Revolution in Spain. 
To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley. 

' RUEDA, 

' November i, 1812. 

' ... It is extraordinary that the revolution in Spain 
should not have produced one man with any knowledge of 
the real situation of the country. It really appears as if 
they were all drunk, and thinking and talking of any other 
subject but Spain. How it is to end God knows ! . . .' 

Alba de Tormes. 
To Earl Bat hurst. 

'ClUDAD RODRIGO, 

' November 19, 18 12. 

' . . . I enclose Lieutenant-General Hamilton's report to 
Sir Rowland Hill of the transactions at Alba, which were 
highly creditable to the troops employed. . . .' 

Return of the Killed and Wounded of the Army wider the 
Command of General the Marquis of Wellington, K.B., 
in the Defence of Alba de Tonnes, on November 10 and n, 
1812. 





Officers. 


Sergeants. 


Rank and 
File. 


Horses. 


Total Loss of Officers, 

Non-commissioned 

Officers, and Rank 

and File. 


Killed - 
Wounded - 
Missing 


3 


4 


21 
85 


— 


21 
92 



Return of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing in the Operations of 
the Army under the Command of General the Marquis of 
Wellington, K.B., from November 15 to 19, inclusive. 





Officers. 


Sergeants. 


Rank and tr™.„ 
File. Horses. 


Total Loss of Officers, 

Non-commissioned 

Officers, and Rank 

and File. 


Killed - 

Wounded 

Missing 


5 
6 
1 


2 
7 
3 


43 
126 

174 


15 

9 
58 


5° 
139 

178 



336 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

A Successful Campaign. 
To the Earl of Liverpool. 

' ClUDAD RODRIGO, 

' November 23, 1 8 1 2 . 

' . . . From what I see in the newspapers, I am much 
afraid that the public will be disappointed at the result of 
the last campaign, notwithstanding that it is, in fact, the 
most successful campaign in all its circumstances, and has 
produced for the cause more important results than any 
campaign in which a British army has been engaged for the 
last century. We have taken by siege Ciudad Rodrigo, 
Badajoz, and Salamanca ; and the Retiro surrendered. In 
the meantime the allies have taken Astorga, Guadalaxara 
and Consuegra, besides other places taken by Duran and 
Sir H. Popham. In the months elapsed since January this 
army has sent to England little short of 20,000 prisoners, 
and they have taken and destroyed or have themselves the 
use of the enemy's arsenals in Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz, 
Salamanca, Valladolid, Madrid, Astorga, Seville, the lines 
before Cadiz, etc. ; and upon the whole we have taken and 
destroyed, or we now possess, little short of 3,000 pieces of 
cannon. The siege of Cadiz has been raised, and all the 
countries south of the Tagus have been cleared of the 
enemy. . . . 

' I see that a disposition already exists to blame the 
Government for the failure of the siege of Burgos. The 
Government had nothing to say to the siege; it was entirely 
my own act. In regard to means, there were ample means 
both at Madrid and at Santander for the siege of the strongest 
fortress. That which was wanting at both places was means 
of transporting ordnance and military stores to the place where 
it was desirable to use them. 

' The people in England, so happy as they are in every 
respect, so rich in resources of every description, having the 
use of such excellent roads, etc., will not readily believe that 
important results here frequently depend upon fifty or sixty 



THE PENINSULA 337 



mules, more or less, or a few bundles of straw to feed them ; 
but the fact is so, notwithstanding their incredulity. . . .' 

Irregularities and Outrages. 
To Officers commanding Divisions and Brigades. 

' Freneda, 

' November 28, 1 8 1 2 . 

' I have ordered the army into cantonments, in which I 
hope that circumstances will enable me to keep them for 
some time, during which the troops will receive their 
clothing, necessaries, etc., which are already in progress 
by different lines of communication to the several divisions 
of brigades. 

' But besides these objects, I must draw your attention in 
a very particular manner to the state of discipline of the 
troops. The discipline of every army, after a long and 
active campaign, becomes in some degree relaxed, and 
requires the utmost attention on the part of the general and 
other officers to bring it back to the state in which it ought 
to be for service; but I am concerned to have to observe 
that the army under my command has fallen off in this 
respect in the late campaign to a greater degree than any 
army with which I have ever served, or of which I have ever 
read.* Yet this army has met with no disaster; it has 
suffered no privations which but trifling attention on the 
part of the officers could not have prevented, and for which 
there existed no reason whatever in the nature of the 
service ; nor has it suffered any hardships, excepting those 
resulting from the necessity of being exposed to the in- 
clemencies of the weather at a moment when they were most 
severe. 

* At the inquiry into military punishments, Wellington, asked if he 
conceived that the army, when it left France from the Pyrenees, was in as 
efficient a state for service as an army can well be brought to, made his 
famous answer : ' I always thought that I could have gone anywhere and 
done anything with that army.' He also stated that he considered the 
discipline of his Peninsular army to be infinitely superior to that of the 
French troops opposed to him. — W. W. 

22 



338 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

' It must be obvious, however, to every officer that from 
the moment the troops commenced their retreat from the 
neighbourhood of Burgos on the one hand, and from 
Madrid on the other, the officers lost all command over 
their men. Irregularities and outrages of all descriptions 
were committed with impunity, and losses have been sus- 
tained which ought never to have occurred. Yet, the 
necessity for retreat existing, none was ever made on which 
the troops had such short marches, none on which they 
made such long and repeated halts, and none on which the 
retreating armies were so little pressed on their rear by the 
enemy. 

' We must look, therefore, for the existing evils, and for the 
situation in which we now find the army, to some cause 
besides those resulting from the operations in which we have 
been engaged. 

' I have no hesitation in attributing these evils to the 
habitual inattention of the officers of the regiments to their 
duty, as prescribed by the standing regulations of the service, 
and by the orders of this army. 

' I am far from questioning the zeal, still less the gallantry 
and spirit, of the officers of the army ; and I am quite 
certain that if their minds can be convinced of the necessity 
of minute and constant attention to understand, recollect, 
and carry into execution the orders which have been issued 
for the performance of their duty, and that the strict per- 
formance of this duty is necessary to enable the army to 
serve the country as it ought to be served, they will in future 
give their attention to these points. 

' Unfortunately, the inexperience of the officers of the army 
has induced many to consider that the period during which 
an army is on service is one of relaxation from all rule, 
instead of being, as it is, the period during which of all 
others every rule for the regulation and control of the con- 
duct of the soldier, for the inspection and care of his arms, 
ammunition, accoutrements, necessaries, and field equip- 
ments, and his horse and horse appointments, for the 
receipt and issue and care of his provisions, and the reguia- 



THE PENINSULA 339 



tion of all that belongs to his food and the forage for his 
horse, must be most strictly attended to by the officers of 
his company or troop, if it is intended that an army, a 
British army in particular, shall be brought into the field of 
battle in a state of efficiency to meet the enemy on the day 
of trial. 

'These are the points, then, to which I most earnestly 
intreat you to turn your attention, and the attention of the 
officers of the regiments under your command, Portuguese 
as well as English, during the period in which it may be in 
my power to leave the troops in their cantonments. The 
Commanding Officers of regiments must enforce the orders 
of the army regarding the constant inspection and super- 
intendence of the officers over the conduct of the men of 
their companies in their cantonments; and they must 
endeavour to inspire the non-commissioned officers with 
a sense of their situation and authority; and the non- 
commissioned officers must be forced to do their duty by 
being constantly under the view and superintendence of 
the officers. By these means the frequent and discreditable 
recourse to the authority of the Provost, and to punishments 
by the sentence of courts-martial, will be prevented, and the 
soldiers will not dare to commit the offences and outrages of 
which there are too many complaints, when they well know 
that their officers and their non-commissioned officers have 
their eyes and attention turned towards them. 

'The Commanding Officers of regiments must likewise 
enforce the orders of the army regarding the constant, real 
inspection of the soldiers' arms, ammunition, accoutrements, 
and necessaries, in order to prevent at all times the shameful 
waste of ammunition, and the sale of that article and of the 
soldiers' necessaries. With this view, both should be in- 
spected daily. 

* In regard to the food of the soldier, I have frequently 
observed and lamented in the late campaign the facility and 
celerity with which the French soldiers cooked in comparison 
with those of our army. 

' The cause of this disadvantage is the same with that of 

22 — 2 



340 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

every other description — the want of attention of the officers 
to the orders of the army, and the conduct of their men, 
ind the consequent want of authority over their conduct. 
Certain men of each company should be appointed to cut 
and bring in wood, others to fetch water, and others to get 
the meat, etc., to be cooked ; and it would soon be found 
that if this practice were daily enforced, and a particular 
hour for seeing the dinners, and for the men dining, named, 
as it ought to be, equally as for parade, that cooking would 
no longer require the inconvenient length of time which it 
has lately been found to take, and that the soldiers would 
not be exposed to the privation of their food at the moment 
at which the army may be engaged in operations with the 
enemy. 

' You will, of course, give your attention to the field 
exercise and discipline of the troops. It is very desirable 
that the soldiers should not lose the habits of marching, and 
the division should march ten or twelve miles twice in each 
week, if the weather should permit, and the roads in the 
neighbourhood of the cantonments of the division should 
be dry. 

' But I repeat that the great object of the attention of the 
General and Field Officers must be to get the Captains and 
Subalterns of the regiments to understand and perform the 
duties required from them, as the only mode by which the 
discipline and efficiency of the army can be restored and 
maintained during the next campaign.' 

Ladies in Billets. 
To Marshal Beresford. 

' Cadiz, 

' December 29, 181 2. 

' ... In regard to the ladies, they have certainly no right 
to be lodged in billets, but it would be cruel to deprive them 
of that accommodation. I do not believe I can authorize 
their having this advantage by an order, and the point can 
be settled only in communication with the Government. If 



THE PENINSULA 341 



the matter could be allowed to go on, as it is now, I would 
write a letter to Peacocke to be circulated among the ladies, 
which would give them a little advice on this subject, and 
make them better behaved. . . .' 

The Publication of Despatches. 

To Don J. de Carvajal. 

' Xerez, 

'•January 10, 181 3. 

' Before I left Cadiz I omitted to communicate personally 
with your Excellency regarding those parts of the despatches 
and reports to your Excellency which should be published, 
and those which should be kept for the information of the 
Regency alone. 

' It is obvious that it may be necessary to keep parts of 
every despatch from the knowledge of the public for some 
time, and therefore I shall take the liberty of marking in the 
margin of every despatch, for the information of the public, 
those parts of it, and of its enclosures, which it shall appear 
to me ought not to be made public' 

Quitting the 33RD. 

To Colonel Arthur Gore, commanding 33rd Regiment. 

' Freneda, 

'February?,, 18 13. 

' Before you receive this letter you will have heard that 
His Royal Highness the Prince Regent has been pleased to 
appoint me to be Colonel of the Royal Horse Guards, an 
honour entirely unexpected by me. I do not know who is 
to be my successor in the 33rd Regiment. 

' Although highly gratified by the honour which has been 
thus conferred upon me, as well as by the manner in which 
it has been conferred, I cannot avoid feeling a regret at one 
of its circumstances, viz., that I should be separated from 
the 33rd Regiment, to which I have belonged, with so much 
satisfaction to myself, for more than twenty years. . . .' 



342 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

Punishment for Desertion. 
To Major-General the Hon. C. Colville. 

' Headquarters, Freneda, 
'Februarys, 1813. 

' It appearing that the sentence of the enclosed court- 
martial is, at present, in part illegal, by exceeding the powers 
given by the Mutiny Act to the court, I return the proceed- 
ings for the purpose of revision. 

' By the twentieth section of the Act, upon which this 
sentence must be founded, the court is enabled to sentence a 
deserter to any one of the following three distinct punishments : 

'First: "to service in such country, or place, or places 
abroad, or otherwise, and in such regiment, or regiments, or 
corps, as His Majesty shall please to direct." That is, to 
general service. 

' Secondly : " to service for life as a soldier." 

' Thirdly : " to service for any term of years beyond the 
period for which such non-commissioned officer or soldier 
shall have enlisted, and to a forfeiture of all, or any part, of 
the benefit, or advantage as to increase of pay, or as to 
pension, or discharge, which might otherwise have accrued 
to such non-commissioned officer or soldier from the length 
or nature of the service." 

' But the court is not authorized to pass the cumulative 
sentence of any two or more of these three distinct punish- 
ments, which in this case it has done, namely, general service, 
and for life. 

' By the sixth section, the marking with the letter D,* as 
described there, may be added to any one of the former three 
punishments.' 

A Money-Chest robbed. 

To the Adjutant-General. 

' Freneda, 

' March 9, 1813. 

' I have received your letter of January 18, in regard to 
four soldiers of the — th Regiment. 

* To mark a soldier with the letter " D " signified deserter. — W. W. 



THE PENINSULA 343 



' These soldiers were part of a guard who, when escorting 
treasure from Lisbon and Badajoz in the year 1809, robbed 
the money-chest of £2,500 sterling. Shortly after the 
robbery was committed, 2,500 dollars were found in the 
possession of the prisoners, but no proof could ever be ob- 
tained that they had robbed the military chest, although I, 
and those who considered the subject with me, never enter- 
tained the slightest doubt upon the subject. 

' For this reason I did not think it proper to bring these 
persons to trial before a court-martial. They must have 
been acquitted, and they would have had a claim to the 
money which had been found in their possession. As the 
robbery by the soldiers of the guard of the money and other 
articles under their charge was but too common a practice, 
I did not deem it expedient to hold forth to the army this 
example of the success with which such an outrage to such 
a serious extent might be committed with impunity. . . . 

' I now request to have orders what I am to do with these 
men, and particularly whether I am to restore to them the 
money taken from them and locked in the military chest in 
the year 1809. . . .' 



Medals. 
To Earl Bathunt. 



Freneda, 

'March 16, 18 13. 



' I have received your letter of February 24 in regard to 
the medals, and I concur entirely with you regarding all the 
improvements you propose on the subject. You have provided 
a remedy for a difficulty which I could never get over in a 
way at all satisfactory to myself. 

' I likewise agree with you in the propriety of having a 
cross with eight bars,, or a star with eight points, for those 
who are entitled to more than seven distinctions. 

' I am not certain that it would not be best that all 
General Officers, as well as others, should wear the medal 
or cross at the buttonhole till they should receive the last 



344 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

distinction. It is very awkward to ride in round the 
neck. . . .' 

To Earl Bathurst. 

'Freneda, 

'■April 20, 1 8 13. 
' . . . We must have the orders of the Secretary of. State 
for any alteration in the mode of wearing the medal by the 
General Officers. It may do very well for an Admiral to 
wear his medal round his neck on his quarter-deck, but we 
on horseback ought to wear it always at our buttonhole. . . .' 

Abduction by an Officer. 

To Lieutenant-General Cole. 

' Freneda, 

' March 19, 18 13. 

' The mother of the lady carried off by of the 

— th Regiment, having complained to me of his conduct, and 
having desired my assistance to remove her daughter from 
the disgraceful situation in which she is now placed, I con- 
sented to grant it, on the condition of a promise on her part 
that the daughter should not be ill-treated, and, above all, 
should not be confined in a convent. 

' I enclose the letter from the lady, in which she makes the 
engagement as above pointed out ; and I beg that you will 

call upon to restore the young lady to her family. 

If he should decline to do so upon your order, I beg you 
to put him in close arrest, and then to take measures to 
remove the young lady from his power into that of her 

family at ; as I cannot allow any officer of this army to 

be guilty of such a breach of the laws of Portugal as to carry 
away a young lady, and retain her in the cantonments of 
the army, contrary to the wishes of her parents and re- 
lations. . . .' 

' Freneda, 

'March 25, 18 13. 

' I have received your letter of the 22nd instant ; and 
being satisfied myself of the validity of the promise made by 
the mother of the young lady who has been carried off by 
of the — th Regiment, I do not conceive that 



THE PENINSULA 345 



doubts entertained by any other person on that subject ought 
to prevent or delay the execution of the directions which I 
gave on that subject. 

' In regard to 's inclination to marry the young 

lady, I cannot but observe that he has it in his power, when- 
ever he pleases, to compensate in that manner the injury 
which he has done to the family ; and it is no excuse that 
the influence of the family has prevented the clergy in the 
neighbourhood from performing the ceremony. That in- 
fluence could not extend to the clergy in Spain, from which 
country is distant but a few miles. 

\ has been guilty of a gross breach, not only 

of the laws of Portugal, but of the laws of his own and of all 
civilized countries, and if I should be called upon by the 

Government, as I most probably shall, to deliver over 

to the Portuguese tribunals, to be dealt with according 



to the Portuguese law, I shall most undoubtedly comply with 
their desire. 

' I cannot but observe upon 's complaint " that 

he is to be placed at the disposal of a foreign tribunal," that 
the notion is too common among the officers and soldiers of 
the army that they are not obliged to obey the laws of the 
country in which they are acting ; or, in other words, that 
they may act as they please, and may commit such outrages 
as they think proper, provided they do not offend against the 
Mutiny Act and Articles of War. 

' I cannot, however, admit of such a doctrine ; and 

will be an instance that the laws of the country must 



be obeyed, if the Portuguese Government shall desire that 
he may be delivered over to the tribunals of that 
country. . . .' 

Gallantry of the ioth Hussars. 

To Earl Bathurst. 

' Ampudia, 

'June 6, 18 13. 

' . . . The English hussars, being in the advanced-guard, 
fell in, between Toro and Morales, with a considerable body 



346 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

of the enemy's cavalry, which were immediately attacked by 
the ioth, supported by the 18th and 15th. The enemy 
were overthrown, and pursued for many miles; and 210 
prisoners, with many horses, and two officers, fell into our 
hands. 

' I enclose Colonel Grant's report of this gallant affair, 
which reflects great credit upon Major Robarts and the ioth 
Hussars, and upon Colonel Grant, under whose directions 
they acted. . . .' 

BATTLE OF VITORIA. 

To Earl Bathurst. 

' Salvatierra, 

1 June 22, 1813. 

' The enemy, commanded by King Joseph, having Marshal 
Jourdan as the Major-General of the army, took up a position, 
on the night of the 19th instant, in front of Vitoria ; the left 
of which rested upon the heights which end at La Puebla de 
Arganzon, and extended from thence across the valley of the 
Zadorra, in front of the village of Arifiez. They occupied 
with the right of the centre a height which commanded the 
valley to the Zadorra. The right of their army was stationed 
near Vitoria, and was destined to defend the passages of the 
river Zadorra, in the neighbourhood of that city. They had 
a reserve in rear of their left, at the village of Gomecha. 
The nature of the country through which the army had 
passed since it had reached the Ebro had necessarily 
extended our columns ; and we halted on the 20th, in order 
to close them up, and moved the left to Murguia, where 
it was most likely it would be required. I reconnoitred the 
enemy's position on that day, with a view to the attack to 
be made on the following morning, if they should still remain 
in it. 

' We accordingly attacked the enemy yesterday, and I am 
happy to inform your lordship that the allied army under 
my command gained a complete victory, having driven them 
from all their positions ; having taken from them 151 pieces 



THE PENINSULA 347 



of cannon, waggons of ammunition, all their baggage, pro- 
visions, cattle, treasure, etc., and a considerable number of 
prisoners. 

' The operations of the day commenced by Lieutenant- 
General Sir Rowland Hill obtaining possession of the heights 
of La Puebla, on which the enemy's left rested, which 
heights they had not occupied in great strength. He 
detached for this service one brigade of the Spanish division 
under General Morillo ; the other brigade being employed 
in keeping the communication between his main body on 
the highroad from Miranda to Vitoria, and the troops 
detached to the heights. The enemy, however, soon dis- 
covered the importance of these heights, and reinforced 
their troops there to such an extent that Lieutenant-General 
Sir Rowland Hill was obliged to detach, first, the 71st 
Regiment* and the light infantry battalion of General 
Walker's brigade, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel 
the Hon. H. Cadogan, and successively other troops to the 
same point ; and the allies not only gained, but maintained 
possession of these important heights throughout their 
operations, notwithstanding all the efforts of the enemy to 
retake them. 

' The contest here was, however, very severe, and the loss 
sustained considerable. General Morillo was wounded, but 
remained in the field, but I am concerned to have to report 
that Lieutenant-Colonel the Hon. H. Cadogan has died of a 
wound which he received. In him His Majesty has lost an 
officer of great merit and tried gallantry, who had already 
acquired the respect and regard of the whole profession, and 
of whom it might have been expected that, if he had lived, 
he would have rendered the most important services to his 
country. 

' Under cover of the possession of these heights, Sir 
Rowland Hill successively passed the Zadorra, at La Puebla, 
and the defile formed by the heights and the river Zadorra, 

* Now the 1st Battalion the Highland Light Infantry. A piper of the 
71st at Vitoria valiantly encouraged his comrades in the battle by 
playing ' Up an' waur them a', Willie.' — W. W. 



348 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

and attacked and gained possession of the village of Subijana 
de Alava in front of the enemy's line, which the enemy made 
repeated attempts to regain. 

' The difficult nature of the country prevented the com- 
munication between our different columns moving to the 
attack from their stations on the river Bayas at as early an 
hour as I had expected ; and it was late before I knew that 
the column, composed of the 3rd and 7th Divisions, under 
the command of the Earl of Dalhousie, had arrived at the 
station appointed for them. The 4th and Light Divisions, 
however, passed the Zadorra immediately after Sir Rowland 
Hill had possession of Subijana de Alava, the former at the 
bridge of Nanclares, and the latter at the bridge of Tres- 
puentes ; and almost as soon as these had crossed, the 
column under the Earl of Dalhousie arrived at Mendoza, 
and the 3rd Division, under Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas 
Picton, crossed at the bridge higher up, followed by the 
7th Division, under the Earl of Dalhousie. These four 
divisions, forming the centre of the army, were destined to 
attack the height on which the right of the enemy's centre 
was placed, while Lieutenant-General Sir Rowland Hill 
should move forward from Subijana de Alava to attack the 
left. The enemy, however, having weakened his line to 
strengthen his detachment on the hills, abandoned his posi- 
tion in the valley as soon as he saw our disposition to attack 
it, and commenced his retreat in good order towards Vitoria. 

' Our troops continued to advance in admirable order, not- 
withstanding the difficulty of the ground. In the meantime, 
Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Graham, who commanded 
the left of the army, consisting of the 1st and 5th Divisions, 
and the General Pack's and Bradford's brigades of infantry, 
and General Bock's and Anson's of cavalry, and who had 
been moved on the 20th to Murguia, moved forward from 
thence on Vitoria, by the highroad from that town to 
Bilbao. He had, besides, with him the Spanish division 
under Colonel Longa, and General Giron, who had been 
detached to the left, under a different view of the state of 
affairs, and had afterwards been recalled, and had arrived on 



THE PENINSULA 349 



the 20th at Ordufia, marched that morning from thence, so 
as to be in the field in readiness to support Lieutenant- 
General Sir Thomas Graham, if his support had been 
required. 

' The enemy had a division of infantry with some cavalry 
advanced on the great road from Vitoria to Bilbao, resting 
their right on some strong heights covering the village of 
Gamarra Mayor. Both Gamarra and Abechuco were strongly 
occupied as tetes de pont and the bridges over the Zadorra at 
these places. Brigadier-General Pack with his Portuguese 
brigade, and Colonel Longa with his Spanish division, were 
directed to turn and gain the heights, supported by Major- 
General Anson's brigade of light dragoons, and the 5th 
Division of Infantry under the command of Major-General 
Oswald, who was desired to take the command of all these 
troops. 

' Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Graham reports that in 
the execution of this service the Portuguese and Spanish 
troops behaved admirably. The 4th Battalion of Cayadores 
and the 8th Ca^adores particularly distinguished themselves. 
Colonel Longa, being on the left, took possession of Gamarra 
Menor. 

' As soon as the heights were in our possession, the village 
of Gamarra Mayor was most gallantly stormed and carried 
by Major-General Robertson's brigade of the 5th Division, 
which advanced in columns of battalions, under a very heavy 
fire of artillery and musketry, without firing a shot, assisted 
by two guns of Major Lawson's brigade of artillery. The 
enemy suffered severely, and lost three pieces of cannon. 

' The Lieutenant-General then proceeded to attack the 
village of Abechuco with the 1st Division, by forming a 
strong battery against it, consisting of Captain Dubourdieu's 
brigade and Captain Ramsay's troop of Horse Artillery ; and 
under cover of this fire Colonel Halkett's brigade advanced 
to the attack of the village, which was carried ; the light 
battalions having charged and taken three guns and a howitzer 
on the bridge. This attack was supported by General Brad- 
ford's brigade of Portuguese infantry. 



350 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

' During the operation at Abechuco the enemy made 
the greatest efforts to repossess themselves of the village 
of Gamarra Mayor, which were gallantly repulsed by the 
5th Division, under the command of Major-General Oswald. 
The enemy had, however, on the heights on the left of the 
Zadorra, two divisions of infantry in reserve, and it was im- 
possible to cross by the bridges till the troops which had 
moved upon the enemy's centre and left had driven them 
through Vitoria. 

' The whole then co-operated in the pursuit, which was 
continued by all till after it was dark. 

' The movement of the troops under Lieutenant-General 
Sir Thomas Graham, and their possession of Gamarra and 
Abechuco, intercepted the enemy's retreat by the highroad 
to France. They were then obliged to turn to the road 
towards Pamplona, but they were unable to hold any position 
for a sufficient length of time to allow their baggage and 
artillery to be drawn off. The whole, therefore, of the latter 
which had not already been taken by the troops in their 
attack of the successive positions taken up by the enemy in 
their retreat from their first position at Arinez and on the 
Zadorra, and all their ammunition and baggage, and every 
thing they had, were taken close to Vitoria. I have reason 
to believe that the enemy carried off with them one gun and 
one howitzer only. 

' The army under King Joseph* consisted of the whole of 
the armies of the South, and of the Centre, and of four 
divisions and all the cavalry of the army of Portugal, and 
some troops of the army of the North. General Foy's 
division of the army of Portugal was in the neighbourhood 
of Bilbao ; and General Clausel, who commanded the army 
of the North, was near Logrono with one division of the 
army of Portugal commanded by General Taupin, and 
General Van-der-Maesen's division of the army of the North. 
The 6th Division of the allied army, under Major-General 

* The 14th (King's) Hussars took King Joseph's carriage, and with it 
a remarkable silver trophy — which the regiment still possesses — known 
throughout the service as ' The Emperor.' — W. W. 



THE PENINSULA 351 



the Hon. E. Pakenham, was likewise absent, having been 
detained at Medina de Pomar for three days, to cover the 
march of our magazines and stores. 

' I cannot extol too highly the good conduct of all the 
General Officers, officers, and soldiers of the army in this 
action. . . . 

' It was impossible for the movements of any troops to be 
conducted with more spirit and regularity than those of their 
respective divisions by Lieutenant-Generals the Earl of 
Dalhousie, Sir Thomas Picton, Sir Lowry Cole, and Major- 
General Baron Charles Alten. The troops advanced in 
echelons of regiments in two, and occasionally three, lines ; 
and the Portuguese troops in the 3rd and 4th Divisions, 
under the command of Brigadier-General Power and Colonel 
Stubbs, led the march with steadiness and gallantry never 
surpassed on any occasion. 

' Major-General the Hon. C. Colville's brigade of the 
3rd Division was seriously attacked in its advance by a very 
superior force well formed, which it drove in, supported by 
General Inglis's brigade of the 7th Division, commanded by 
Colonel Grant of the 82nd. These officers and the troops 
under their command distinguished themselves. . . . 

' Mariscal de Campo Don Luis Wimpffen, and the 
Inspector-General Don Thomas O'Donoju, and the officers 
of the staff of the Spanish army, have invariably rendered me 
every assistance in their power in the course of these opera- 
tions, and I avail myself of this opportunity of expressing my 
satisfaction with their conduct, as likewise with that of 
Mariscal de Campo Don Miguel Alava, and of the Brigadier- 
General Don Josef O'Lalor, who have been so long and use- 
fully employed with me. 

' The artillery was most judiciously placed by Lieutenant- 
Colonel Dickson, and was well served, and the army is 
particularly indebted to that corps. 

' The nature of the ground did not allow of the cavalry 
being generally engaged, but the General Officers command- 
ing the several brigades kept the troops under their command 
respectively close to the infantry to support them, and they 



35 2 



WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 



were most active in the pursuit of the enemy after they had 
been driven through Vitoria. 

' I send this despatch by my Aide-de-Camp Captain Fre- 
mantle, whom I beg leave to recommend to your lordship's 
protection. He will have the honour of laying at the feet of 
His Royal Highness the colours of the 4th Battalion 
100th Regiment, and Marshal Jourdan's baton of a Marshal 
of France taken by the 87th Regiment. 

' I enclose a return of the killed and wounded in the late 
operations, and a return of the ordnance, carriages, and 
ammunition taken from the enemy in the action of the 21st. 
instant.' 

Return of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Allied Army, 
under the Command of General the Marquis of Wellington, 
K.G.,in the A ction with the French A rmy, under the Command 
of King Joseph Buonaparte, at Vitoria, on June 21, 1813. 









Rank 

and 
File. 


Total Loss of 
Officers, Non- 












Officers. 


Ser- 
geants. 


commissioned 
Officers, and 


British. 


Spanish. 


Portu- 
guese. 


Horses. 








Rank and 


















File. 










Killed - 


33 


19 


688 


740 


50I 


89 


I50 


92 


Wounded - 


230 


1*8 


3,782 


4,174 


2,807 


464 


899 


68 


Missing - 


— 


I 


265 


266 




- 


— 


26 



1 sergeant, 2 drummers, and 263 rank and file have been returned 

missing by the several corps of the army, British and Portuguese. It is 

supposed that the greater number of them lost their regiments in the 

course of the night, and that very few of them have fallen into the hands 

of the enemy. 

Aylmer, Deputy Adjutant-General. 

Return of Ordnance, Carriages, and Ammunition, captured from 
the Enemy in the Action at Vitoria, on June 21, 1813. 

1 5 1 brass ordnance, on travelling carriages. 
415 caissons. 
14,249 rounds of ammunition. 
1,973,400 musket-ball cartridges. 
40,668 pounds of gunpowder. 
56 forage waggons. 
44 forge waggons. 

A. Dickson, Lieutenant-Colonel 
commanding the Artillery. 



THE PENINSULA 353 



To Don Juan O'Donoju. 

' Salvatierra, 

'■June 22, 18 13. 

' 1 have the honour to inform you that I yesterday attacked 
the enemy's army, commanded by King Joseph, in the neigh- 
bourhood of Vitoria, and gained a complete victory, having 
taken from the enemy more than 120 pieces of cannon, all 
their ammunition, baggage, cattle, provisions, treasure, etc. 

' The enemy, prevented from retiring by the direct road to 
France, are on their retreat to Pamplona. I followed them 
this day with the advanced-guard to within six leagues of 
that place, to which the whole army are in march. 

' Our loss has not been severe. . . .' 

' Our Vagabond Soldiers.' 
To Earl Bathurst. 

'Caseda, on the River Aragon, 
' June 29, 18 13. 

' It is desirable that any reinforcements of infantry which 
you may send to this army may come to Santander, notwith- 
standing that I am very apprehensive of the consequence of 
marching our vagabond soldiers through the province of 
Biscay in that state of discipline in which they and their 
officers generally come out to us. It may be depended upon, 
that the people of this province will shoot them as they would 
the French, if they should misbehave. 

' We started with the army in the highest order, and up 
to the day of the battle nothing could get on better ; but 
that event has, as usual, totally annihilated all order and 
discipline. The soldiers of the army have got among them 
about a million sterling in money, with the exception of 
about 100,000 dollars, which were got for the military 
chest. The night of the battle, instead of being passed in 
getting rest and food to prepare them for the pursuit of 
the following day, was passed by the soldiers in looking 
for plunder. The consequence was that they were incapable 

23 



354 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 



of marching in pursuit of the enemy, and were totally 
knocked up. The rain came on and increased their fatigue, 
and I am quite convinced that we have now out of the 
ranks double the amount of our loss in the battle ; and that 
we have lost more men in the pursuit than the enemy have, 
and have never in any one day made more than an ordinary 
march. 

' This is the consequence of the state of discipline of the 
British army. We may gain the greatest victories, but we 
shall do no good until we shall so far alter our system as to 
force all ranks to perform their duty. The new regiments 

are, as usual, the worst of all. The — th are 

a disgrace to the name of a soldier, in action as well as else- 
where, and I propose to draft their horses from them, and to 
send the men to England, if I cannot get the better of them 
in any other manner.' 

Unrivalled Fighters. 

To Colonel Torrens. 

' Lesaca, 

'July 1 8, 1813. 

' I have received your letter of the 5th, and I am sorry 

that I cannot recommend for promotion, because 

I have had him in arrest since the battle for disobeying an 
order given to him by me verbally. The fact is, that if dis- 
cipline means habits of obedience to orders, as well as 
military instruction, we but have little of it in the army. 
Nobody ever thinks of obeying an order, and all the regula- 
tions of the Horse Guards, as well as of the War Office, and 
all the orders of the army applicable to this peculiar service, 
are so much waste paper. 

' It is, however, an unrivalled army for fighting, if the 
soldiers can only be kept in their ranks during the battle ; 
but it wants some of those qualities which are indispensable 
to enable a General to bring them into the field in the order 
in which an army ought to be to meet an enemy, or to take 
all the advantage to be derived from a victory ; and the 



THE PENINSULA 353 

cause of these defects is the want of habits of obedienct 
and attention to orders by the inferior officers, and, indeed, 
I might add, by all. They never attend to an order with an 
intention to obey it, or sufficiently to understand it, be it ever 
so clear, and therefore never obey it when obedience becomes 
troublesome, or difficult, or important. . . .' 

'The Fighting Cocks of the Army.' 
To the Earl of Liverpool. 

' Lesaca, 

'July 25, 1813. 

'As far as I have any knowledge, there are no troops 
paid in Spain at prese .t excepting those to whom I have 
been enabled to spare money out of our military chest in 
payment of the Spanish subsidy. Your lordship must have 
seen enough of the Spanish character, during the contest and 
our connection with them, to be aware that it will not answer 
to press any measure upon them which they do not like. I 
have not seen amongst them the slightest inclination to 
employ English officers to discipline their troops to such an 
extent as would answer any useful purpose ; and I believe 
that one of the reasons for which they like me so well is 
that, contrary to their expectations, I have not pressed them 
to take English officers. Besides, as I have above stated to 
your lordship, the Spanish troops do not want discipline — 
if by discipline is meant instruction — so much as they do a 
system of order, which can be founded only on regular pay 
and food, and good care and clothing. These British officers 
could not give them ; and, notwithstanding that the Portu- 
guese are now the fighting cocks of the army, I believe we 
owe their merits more to the care we have taken of their 
pockets and bellies than to the instruction we have given 
them. . . .' 



23—2 



356 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

THE PYRENEES. 

To Earl Bathurst. 

'San Estevan, 

'■August i, 1813. 

' Two practicable breaches having been effected at San 
Sebastian on July 24, orders were given that they should be 
attacked on the morning of the 25th. 

' I am concerned to have to report that this attempt to 
obtain possession of the place failed, and that our loss was 
very considerable. 

' I went to the siege on the 25th, and, having conferred 
with Lieutenant - General Sir Thomas Graham and the 
officers of the engineers and artillery, it appeared to me 
that it would be necessary to increase the facilities of the 
attack before it should be repeated. But, upon adverting 
to the state of our ammunition, I found that we had not a 
sufficiency to do anything effectual till that should arrive for 
which I had written on June 26, which I had reason to 
believe was embarked at Portsmouth, and to expect every 
hour. I therefore desired that the siege should for the 
moment be converted into a blockade, a measure which I 
found to be the more desirable when I returned to Lesaca in 
the evening. 

' The allied army was posted in the passes of the moun- 
tains, with a view to cover the blockade of Pamplona and 
the siege of San Sebastian. . . . 

' The defect of this position was that the communication 
between the several divisions was very tedious and difficult, 
while the communication of the enemy in front of the passes 
was easy and short ; and in case of attack those in the front 
line could not support each other, and could look for support 
only from their rear. 

' On the 24th Marshal Soult collected the right and left 
wings of his army, with one division of the centre and two 
divisions of cavalry at St. Jean Pied de Port, and on the 25th 



THE PENINSULA 35? 



attacked, with between 30,000 and 40,000 men, General 
Byng's post at Roncesvalles. Lieutenant-General Sir Lowry 
Cole moved up to his support with the 4 th Division, and 
these officers were enabled to maintain their post throughout 
the day, but the enemy turned it in the afternoon, and 
Lieutenant-General Sir Lowry Cole considered it to be 
necesssary to withdraw in the night, and he marched to the 
neighbourhood of Zubiri. 

' In the actions which took place on this day the 20th 
Regiment distinguished themselves. 

Two divisions of the centre of the enemy's army attacked 
Sir R. Hill's position in the Puerto de Maya at the head of 
the valley of Baztan, in the afternoon of the same day. The 
brunt of the action fell upon Major-General Pringle's and 
Major-General Walker's brigades, in the 2nd Division, under 
the command of Lieutenant-General the Hon. W. Stewart. 
These troops were at first obliged to give way, but having 
been supported by Major-General Barnes's brigade of the 
7th Division, they regained that part of their post which was 
the key of the whole, and which would have enabled them 
to reassume it if circumstances had permitted it. But Sir 
R. Hill, having been apprised of the necessity that Sir Lowry 
Cole should retire, deemed it expedient to withdraw his 
troops likewise to Irurita, and the enemy did not advance on 
the following day beyond the Puerto de Maya. 

' Notwithstanding the enemy's superiority of numbers, 
they acquired but little advantage over these brave troops 
during the seven hours they were engaged. All the regi- 
ments charged with the bayonet. The conduct of the 
82nd Regiment, which moved up with Major-General 
Barnes's brigade, is particularly reported. 

' I was not apprised of these events till late in the nights 
of the 25th and 26th, and I adopted immediate measures 
to concentrate the army to the right, still providing for the 
siege of San Sebastian, and for the blockade of Pam- 
plona. . . . 

'The British cavalry under Lieutenant-General Sir 
Stapleton Cotton were placed near Huarte on the right, being 



358 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

the only ground on which it was possible to use the 
cavalry. . . . 

' I joined the 3rd and 4th Divisions just as they were 
taking up their ground on the 27th, and shortly afterwards 
the enemy formed their army on a mountain the front of 
which extends from the highroad to Ostiz to the highroad 
to Zubiri ; and they placed one division on the left of that 
road on a height, and in some villages in front of the 
3rd Division ; they had here also a large body of cavalry. 

' In a short time after they had taken up their ground, 
the enemy attacked the hill on the right of the 4th Division, 
which was then occupied by one battalion of the 4th Portu- 
guese Regiment, and by the Spanish regiment of Pravia. 
These troops defended their ground, and drove the enemy 
from it with the bayonet. Seeing the importance of this hill 
to our position, I reinforced it with the 40th Regiment, and 
this regiment, with the Spanish regiments El Principe and 
Pravia, held it from this time, notwithstanding the repeated 
efforts of the enemy during the 27th and 28th to obtain 
possession of it. 

' Nearly at the same time that the enemy attacked this 
height on the 27th, they took possession of the village of 
Sorauren on the road to Ostiz, by which they acquired the 
communication by that road, and they kept up a fire of 
musketry along the line till it was dark. 

'We were joined on the morning of the 28th by the 
6th Division of Infantry, and I directed that the heights 
should be occupied on the left of the valley of the Lanz, and 
that the 6th Division should form across the valley in rear 
of the left of the 4th Division, resting their right on Orcain, 
and their left on the heights above mentioned. 

' The 6th Division had scarcely taken their position when 
they were attacked by a very large force of the enemy which 
had been assembled in the village of Sorauren. 

' Their front was, however, so well defended by the fire of 
their own light troops from the heights on their left, and by 
the fire from the heights occupied by the 4th Division and 
Brigadier-General Campbell's Portuguese brigade, that the 



THE PENINSULA 359 



enemy were soon driven back with immense loss from a fire 
on their front, both flanks, and rear. 

' In order to extricate their troops from the difficulty in 
which they found themselves in their situation in the valley 
of the Lanz, the enemy now attacked the height on which 
the left of the 4th Division stood, which was occupied by the 
7th Cacadores, of which they obtained a momentary posses- 
sion. They were attacked, however, again by the 7th Caca- 
dores, supported by Major-General Ross with his brigade of 
the 4th Division, and were driven down with great loss. 

' The battle now became general along the whole front 
of the heights occupied by the 4th Division, and in every 
part in our favour, excepting where one battalion of the 
10th Portuguese Regiment of Major-General Campbell's 
brigade was posted. This battalion having been overpowered, 
and having been obliged to give way immediately on the 
right of Major-General Ross's brigade, the enemy established 
themselves on our line, and Major-General Ross was obliged 
to withdraw from his post. 

' I, however, ordered the 27th and 48th Regiments to 
charge, first, that body of the enemy which had first estab- 
lished themselves on the height, and next, those on the left. 
Both attacks succeeded, and the enemy were driven down 
with immense loss, and the 6th Division, having moved 
forward at the same time to a situation in the valley nearer 
to the left of the 4th, the attack upon this front ceased 
entirely, and was continued but faintly on other points of 
our line. 

' In the course of this contest, the gallant 4th Division, 
which had so frequently been distinguished in this army, 
surpassed their former good conduct. Every regiment 
charged with the bayonet, and the 40th, 7th, 20th, and 23rd, 
"four different times. Their officers set them the example, 
and Major-General Ross had two horses shot under him. 

' The Portuguese troops likewise behaved admirably, and 
I had every reason to be satisfied with the conduct of the 
Spanish regiments El Principe and Pravia. . . . 

' The enemy's force which had been in front of Sir 



360 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

Rowland Hill followed his march, and arrived at Ostizonthe 
29th. The enemy, thus reinforced, and occupying a position 
on the mountains which appeared little liable to attack, and 
finding that they could make no impression on our front, 
determined to endeavour to turn our left by an attack on Sir 
Rowland Hill's corps. They reinforced with one division 
the troops which had been already opposed to him, still 
occupying the same points in the mountain on which was 
formed their principal force, but they drew in to their left 
the troops which occupied the heights opposite the 
3rd Division, and they had, during the night of the 29th 
and 30th, occupied in strength the crest of the mountain on 
our left of the Lanz opposite to the 6th and 7th Divisions, 
thus connecting their right in their position with the 
divisions detached to attack Lieutenant-General Sir Rowland 
Hill. 

' I, however, determined to attack their position, and 
ordered Lieutenant-General the Earl of Dalhousie to possess 
himself of the top of the mountain in his front, by which the 
enemy's right would be turned, and Lieutenant-General Sir 
Thomas Picton to cross the heights on which the enemy's 
left had stood, and to turn their left by the road to Ron- 
cesvalles. All the arrangements were made to attack the 
front of the enemy's position, as soon as the effect of these 
movements on their flanks should begin to appear. Major- 
General the Hon. Edward Pakenham, whom I had sent to 
take the command of the 6th Division, Major-General Pack 
having been wounded, turned the village of Sorauren as soon 
as the Earl of Dalhousie had driven the enemy from the 
mountain by which that flank was defended, and the 
6th Division, and Major-General Byng's brigade, which 
had relieved the 4th Division on the left of our position on 
the road to Ostiz, instantly attacked and carried that village.' 
Lieutenant-General Sir Lowry Cole likewise attacked the 
front of the enemy's main position with the 7th Cacadores, 
supported by the nth Portuguese Regiment, the 40th, and 
the battalion under Colonel Bingham, consisting of the 53rd 
and Queen's Regiment. All these operations obliged the 



THE PENINSULA 361 



enemy to abandon a position which is one of the strongest 
and most difficult of access that I have yet seen occupied by 
troops. 

' In their retreat from this position, the enemy lost a 
great number of prisoners. I cannot sufficiently applaud 
the conduct of all the General Officers, officers, and troops 
throughout these operations. The attack made by Lieu- 
tenant-General the Earl of Dalhousie was admirably con- 
ducted by his lordship, and executed by Major-General 
Inglis and the troops composing his brigade ; and that by 
Major- General the Hon. E. Pakenham, and Major-General 
Byng, and that by Lieutenant-General Sir Lowry Cole ; and 
the movement made by Sir Thomas Picton merited my 
highest commendation. The latter officer co-operated in the 
attack of the mountain, by detaching troops to his left, in 
which Lieutenant-Colonel the Hon. R. Trench was wounded, 
but I hope not seriously. 

' While these operations were going on, and in proportion 
as I observed their success, I detached troops to the support 
of Lieutenant-General Sir Rowland Hill. 

' The enemy appeared in his front late in the morning, and 
immediately commenced an extended manoeuvre upon his 
left flank, which obliged him to withdraw from the height 
which he occupied behind Lizasso to the next range. He 
there, however, maintained himself, and I enclose his report 
of the conduct of the troops. 

' I continued the pursuit of the enemy after their retreat 
from the mountain to Olague, where I was at sunset 
immediately in the rear of their attack upon Lieutenant- 
General Sir Rowland Hill. They withdrew from his front 
in the night, and yesterday took up a strong position with 
two divisions to cover their rear on the pass of Dona Maria. 

' Lieutenant-General Sir Rowland Hill and the Earl of 
Dalhousie attacked and carried the pass, notwithstanding the 
vigorous resistance of the enemy, and the strength of their 
position. . . . 

' In the meantime I moved with Major-General Byng's 
brigade, and the 4th Division, under Lieutenant-General the 



362 



WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 



Hon. Sir Lowry Cole, by the Pass of Velate, upon Irurita, 
in order to turn the enemy's position on Dona Maria. 
Major-General Byng took in Elizondo a large convoy going 
to the enemy, and made many prisoners. 

' We have this day continued the pursuit of the enemy 
in the valley of the Bidasoa, and many prisoners and much 
baggage have been taken. Major- General Byng has 
possessed himself of the valley of Baztan, and of the posi- 
tion on the Puerto de Maya, and the army will be this 
night nearly in the same positions which they occupied on 
July 25. . . . 

' The enemy, having been considerably reinforced and re- 
equipped after their late defeat, made a most formidable 
attempt to relieve the blockade of Pamplona, with the whole 
of their forces, excepting the reserve, under General Villatte, 
which remained in front of our troops on the great road from 
Irun. This attempt has been entirely frustrated by the 
operations of a part only of the allied army, and the enemy 
has sustained a defeat, and suffered a severe loss in officers 
and men. . . .' 

Return of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the A rmy under 
the Command of Field-Marshal the Marquis of Welling- 
ton, K.G., at the Siege of San Sebastian, from July 7 to 27, 
1813. 



Killed - 

Wounded 

Missing 



Officers. Sergeants. 

1 


Rank and 
File. 


Horses. 


11 9 

44 34 
6 6 


184 
696 
288 






Total Loss of Officers, 

Non-commissioned 

Officers, and Rank 

and File. 



204 

774 
300 



Portuguese loss included. 



To Earl Bathurst. 

' Lesaca, 

'■August 3, 18 13. 

' . . . We have had some desperate fighting in these 
mountains, and I have never known the troops behave so 



THE PENINSULA 36.3 



well. In the battle of the 28th we had hard fighting, 
and in my life I never saw such an attack as was made 
by General Barnes's brigade in the 7th Division upon the 
enemy above Echalar yesterday ; the loss of the French 
is immense. I understand they say themselves that they 
have lost 15,000 men. That is what I estimated their loss ; 
but if they acknowledge that number, I ought to estimate 
it at 20,000 men, which is the number more generally 
believed.' 

To Lieutenant-Gcncral Sir T. Graham, K.B. 

' Lesaca, 

'■August 4, 1813, 9 a.m. 

' I have received your letters to the 3rd instant, which I 
have been obliged to delay acknowledging till this moment. 
The troops are, of course, a good deal fatigued, and we 
have suffered very considerably, particularly the English 
troops in the 2nd Division, in the affair in the Puerto de 
Maya, which, with the existing want of shoes and of musket 
ammunition, induces me to delay for a day or two any 
forward movement, and to doubt the expediency of making 
one at all. I keep everything in readiness, however. I 
am perfectly aware of the objections to our positions in 
the Pyrenees ; but if we should not be able to advance from 
them without incurring more loss than we ought, or than we 
can well afford, I am afraid that we cannot well retire from 
them. 

' Many events turned out unfortunately for us on the 
1st instant, each of which ought to have been in our favour ; 
and we should have done the enemy a great deal more 
mischief than we did in his passage down this valley. But 
as it is, I hope that Soult will not feel an inclination to 
renew his expedition on this side at least. The French 
army must have suffered terribly. Between the 25th of 
last month and 2nd of this they were engaged seriously 
not less than ten times ; on many occasions in attacking 
very strong positions, in others beat from them or pur- 
sued. . . .' 



364 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

To the Earl of Liverpool. 

i Augus( 4, 18 13. 

' The enemy had no success on any other ground, and 
were terribly beat after I joined the troops at Sorauren. 
Their loss cannot be less than 15,000 men, and I am not 
certain that it is not 20,000 men. We have about 4,000 
prisoners. I never saw such fighting as on July 27 and 28, 
the anniversary of the Battle of Talavera, nor such deter- 
mination as the troops showed. 

' I wish some measures could be adopted to punish the 
recruiters for the foreign corps. Above 150 men deserted 
from the Chasseurs Britanniques from Lizasso in one night, 
and the Brunswick Oels lost by desertion go men in the 
course of a very few days on the outposts. The fact is, 
the men were enlisted from the prisons. There are now not 
less than 800 deserters in confinement at Lisbon, whom the 
Admiralty have forbidden should be sent home ; and they 
are excessively discontented with their treatment, which 
has now effectually stopped desertion in the French army 
in aid of the enlistment of deserters by the York Light 
Infantry. 

' The desertion of the foreign troops has had the bad effect 
of teaching desertion to our own troops.' 



To Earl Bathurst. 



' Lesaca, 

'■August 4, 1813. 



' The enemy still continued posted on the morning of the 
2nd, with a force of two divisions, in the Puerto de Echalar, 
and nearly the whole army behind the Puerto, when the 
4th, 7th and Light Divisions advanced by the valley of 
the Bidasoa to the frontier; and I had determined to dis- 
lodge them by a combined attack and movement of the 
three divisions. 

' The 7th Division, however, having crossed the mountains 
from Sumbilla, and having necessarily preceded the arrival 
of the 4th, Major-General Barnes's brigade was formed for 



I 



THE PENINSULA 



365 



the attack, and advanced before the 4 th and Light Divisions 
could co-operate, with a regularity and gallantry which I 
have seldom seen equalled, and actually drove two divisions 
of the enemy from the formidable heights, notwithstanding 
the resistance opposed to them. 

'It is impossible that I can extol too highly the conduct of 
Major-General Barnes, and of these brave troops, which was 
the admiration of all who were witnesses of it. 

'Major-General Kempt's brigade of the Light Division 
likewise drove a very considerable force from the rock which 
forms the left of the Puerto. 

' There is now no enemy in the field within this part of the 
Spanish frontier.' 

General Return of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing in the 
Operations of the Allied Army, under the Command of 
Field-Marshal the Marquis of Wellington, K.G., from 
July 25 to August 2, 1813, inclusive. 



Officers. Sergeants. 



Killed 
Wounded 
Missing - 



43 

33i 

17 



59 

261 

16 



Rank and 
File. 



779 

4,918 

672 



Total Loss of 
Officers, Non- 
commissioned 
Officers, and 
Rank and File. 



88l 

5,5lO 

705 



British. 



559 

3,693 

504 



Portuguese. 



322 

1,817 

20I 



This return includes the whole of the casualties during the operations 
be ween July 25 and August 2, enclosed in the despatch of August as 
well as that of August 4. 6 ' ' as 

To Earl Bathurst. 

' Lesaca, 

'■August 9, 1 813. 
' I have not had a great deal of reason to complain of the 
conduct of the troops since the last battles, but we pulled 
up on the frontiers of France, and they are getting into 
good order again. As we are getting many men out of 
hospital, I hope that we shall soon have in the ranks within 
2,000 or 3,000 men of the number we had before the late 
battles. But our soldiers are terrible fellows for everything but 



366 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

fighting with their regiments. What do you think of seventy 
or eighty of them, having wandered from their regiments 
during the late operations, and having surrendered them- 
selves to some of the French peasantry who accompanied 
the French army, and whom they ought, and would at other 
times, have eaten up ? The foreign troops desert terribly ; 
150 men deserted from the Chasseurs Britanniques in one 
night at Lizasso. 

' Our having so much money has enabled me to adopt a 
plan for paying every non-commissioned officer and soldier 
a day's pay every day, which will, I think, produce a great 
reform in their conduct. Many of their outrages are certainly 
to be attributed to want of money. 

' Nothing has yet been done, my dear lord, about a naval 
force for us, which is really necessary.' 

Naval Help needed. 

To Viscount Melville. 

' Lesaca, 

' August 21, 1813. 

' I have received your letter of July 28. I do not know 
what Sir Charles Stuart has written to Government re- 
garding want of naval means on the Lisbon station. What 
I have written has been founded upon my own sense of the 
want of naval assistance on this coast, as well as on the 
coast of Portugal ; and I assure you that I neither know nor 
care what has passed, or may pass, in Parliament or in the 
newspapers on the subject. 

' I complain of an actual want of necessary naval assistance 
and co-operation with the army, of which I believe no man 
will entertain a doubt who reads the facts stated in my 
reports to Government. I know nothing about the cause 
of the evil ; it may be owing to a general deficiency of naval 
force for all the objects to which it is necessary to attend in 
an extended system of war. It may be owing to a proper 
preference of other services over this, or it may be owing to 
the inapplication of the force intrusted to their command by 



THE PENINSULA 367 



the Admirals and Captains. I state the fact, which nobody- 
will deny ; and leave it to Government to apply a remedy or 
not as they may think proper, hoping only that they will 
let me know whether they propose to apply a remedy or 
not. . . .' 

A Rare Loss. 

To Earl Bathurst. 

' Lesaca, 

' August 23, 1813. 

' I have received your letter of the 14th, with 



scheme. It is like all those which I have received from 
French officers, and might answer well enough if I could 
afford, or the British Government or nation would allow of 
my being as prodigal of men as every French General is. 
They forget, however, that we have but one army, and that 
the same men who fought at Vimeiro and Talavera fought 
the other day at Sorauren ; and that, if I am to preserve that 
army, I must proceed with caution. Indeed, this becomes 
doubly necessary, as I see that, notwithstanding the fond- 
ness of the British nation for the sport, and their exultation 
upon our success, they began to cry out the other day upon 
the loss of 300 or 500 men in the unsuccessful storm of San 

Sebastian, and of the men in the affair at the . 

The troops, however, will sometimes behave ill, and posts 
will sometimes be surprised, and the troops engaged be 
roughly handled. 

' The affair at the is certainly the worst that 

has ever occurred to the troops under my command, and 
the only one in which any guns have been lost, excepting 
at the Battle of * * * ; and it was entirely owing to t t t's 
settling in his own mind that the enemy would not attack 
him. If the troops had not regained their post, and behaved 
remarkably well, I should not have passed this affair without 
notice. 

' Your lordship may depend upon it that I am by no 
means tired of success ; and that I shall do everything in my 



368 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

power to draw the attention of the enemy to this quarter, as 
soon as I shall know that hostilities are really renewed in 
Germany.' 

To Lieutenant-General Sir William Stewart. 

' Lesaca, 

' September 13, 18 13. 

' I feel very unwilling to draw the attention of the 
Secretary of State again to the loss of the guns in the 
Puerto de Maya, in order to show that they were lost going 
to a position to which you had ordered them by the very 
same road, and under the very circumstances, under which I 
had stated they were lost, retiring to Elizondo. I was very 
sorry to have lost those guns, as they are the only guns that 
have ever been lost by troops acting under my command ; 
but I attributed their loss then, as I do now, to unfortunate 
accident to which the best arrangements must be liable, 
and, above all, to that most unfortunate accident of your 

being absent when the attack was made, and , 

who commanded, having been with the division only two 
days. . . .' 

The Capture of San Sebastian. 

To Earl Bathurst. 

' Lesaca, 

' September 2, 18 13. 

' The fire against the fort of San Sebastian was opened on 
August 26, and directed against the towers which flanked 
the bastion on the eastern face ; against the demi-bastion on 
the south-east angle, and the termination of the curtain of 
the south face. 

' Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Graham had directed 
that an establishment should be formed on the island of Sta. 
Clara, which was effected on the night of the 26th, and the 
enemy's detachment on the island were made prisoners. 
Captain Cameron of the gth had the command of the detach- 
ment which effected this operation, and Lieutenant-General 



THE PENINSULA 369 



Sir Thomas Graham particularly applauds his conduct and 
that of Lieutenant Chadwick, of the Royal Engineers. The 
conduct of Lieutenant the Hon. James Arbuthnot, of the 
Royal Navy, who commanded the boats, was highly 
meritorious, as likewise that of Lieutenant Bell of the Royal 
Marines. 

' All that was deemed practicable to carry into execution 
in order to facilitate the approach to the breaches before 
made in the wall of San Sebastian, having been effected on 
August 30, and the breach having been made at the termi- 
nation of the bastion, the place was stormed at eleven o'clock 
in the day on the 31st, and carried. 

' The loss on our side has been severe. Lieutenant- 
General Sir James Leith, who had joined the army only two 
days before, and Major-Generals Oswald and Robinson, were 
unfortunately wounded in the breach ; and Colonel Sir 
Richard Fletcher was killed by a musket-ball at the mouth 
of the trenches. 

' I have the honour to enclose Lieutenant-General Sir 
Thomas Graham's report* of this operation, in which your 

* To Field- Marshal the Marquis of Wellington, K.G. 

' Oyarzun, 

' September 1 , 1 8 1 3. 

' In obedience to your lordship's orders of the preceding day to 
attack and form a lodgment on the breach of San Sebastian, which now 
extended to the left, so as to embrace the outermost tower, the end and 
front of the curtain immediately over the left bastion, as well as the faces 
of the bastion itself, the assault took place at eleven o'clock a.m. yester- 
day ; and I have the honour to report to your lordship that the heroic 
perseverance of all the troops concerned was at last crowned with 
success. 

' The column of attack was formed of the 2nd Brigade of the 5th Divi- 
sion, commanded by Major- General Robinson, with an immediate support 
of detachments as per margin, and having in reserve the remainder of 
the 5th Division, consisting of Major- General Spry's Portuguese brigade 
and the 1st Brigade under Major-General Hay, as also the 5th Battalion 
of Cacadores of General Bradford's brigade, under Major Hill, the whole 
under the direction of Lieutenant-General Sir James Leith, commanding 
the 5th Division. 

24 



370 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

lordship will observe with pleasure another distinguished 
instance of the gallantry and perseverance of His Majesty's 
officers and troops under the most trying difficulties. . . . 

The garrison retired to the castle, leaving about 270 
prisoners in our hands, and I hope that I shall soon have 

' Having arranged everything with Sir J. Leith, I crossed the Urumea 
to the batteries of the right attack, where everything could be most 
distinctly seen, and from whence the orders for the fire of the batteries, 
according to circumstances, could be immediately given. 

' The column, in filing out of the right of the trenches, was as before 
exposed to a heavy fire of shells and grape-shot, and a mine was exploded 
in the left angle of the counterscarp of the hornwork, which did great 
damage, but did not check the ardour of the troops in advancing to the 
attack. There never was anything so fallacious as the external appear- 
ance of the breach ; without some description, the almost insuperable 
difficulties of the breach cannot be estimated. Notwithstanding its great 
extent, there was but one point where it was possible to enter, and there 
by single files. All the inside of the wall to the right of the curtain 
formed a perpendicular scarp of at least 20 feet to the level of the streets, 
so that the narrow ridge of the curtain itself, formed by the breaching 
of its end and front, was the only accessible point. During the suspension 
of the operations of the siege, from want of ammunition, the enemy had 
prepared every means of defence which art could devise, so that great 
numbers of men were covered by entrenchments and traverses, in the 
hornwork, on the ramparts of the curtain, and inside of the town opposite 
to the breach, and ready to pour a most destructive fire of musketry 
on both flanks of the approach to the top of the narrow ridge of the 
curtain. 

' Everything that the most determined bravery could attempt was 
repeatedly tried in vain by the troops, who were brought forward from 
the trenches in succession. No man outlived the attempt to gain the 
ridge, and though the slope of the breach afforded shelter from the 
enemy's musketry, yet still the nature of the stone rubbish prevented 
the great exertions of the engineers and working parties from being 
able to form a lodgment for the troops, exposed to the shells and grape 
from the batteries of the castle, as was particularly directed, in obedience 
to your lordship's instructions ; and, at all events, a secure lodgment 
could never have been obtained without occupying a part of the curtain. 

' In this almost desperate state of the attack, after consulting with 
Colonel Dickson, commanding the Royal Artillery, I ventured to order 
the guns to be turned against the curtain. A heavy fire of artillery was 
directed against it, passing a few feet only over the heads of our troops 
on the breach, and was kept up with a precision of practice beyond all 



THE PENINSULA 371 



the pleasure to inform your lordship that we have possession 
of that post. 

' Since the fire against San Sebastian had been recom- 
menced, the enemy had drawn the greatest part of their 
force to the camp of Urogne, and there was every reason to 
believe that they would make an attempt to relieve the 
place. . . . 

example. Meanwhile, I accepted the offer of a part of Major-General 
Bradford's Portuguese brigade to ford the river near its mouth. The 
advance of the 1st Battalion 13th Regiment, under Major Snodgrass, 
over the open beach and across the river, and of a detachment of the 
24th Regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel M'Bean, in support, was made 
in the handsomest style, under a very severe fire of grape. Major Snod- 
grass attacked, and finally carried the small breach on the right of the 
great one, and Lieutenant-Colonel M 'Bean's detachment occupied the 
right of the great breach. I ought not to omit to mention that a similar 
offer was made by the 1st Portuguese Regiment of Brigadier-General 
Wilson's brigade, under Lieutenant-Colonel Fearon, and that both 
Major-General Bradford and Brigadier-General Wilson had from the 
beginning urged most anxiously the employment of their respective 
brigades in the attack, as they had had so large a share in the labour 
and fatigues of the right attack. 

' Observing now the effect of the admirable fire of the batteries against 
the curtain, though the enemy was so much covered, a great effort was 
ordered to be made to gain the high ridge at all hazards, at the same 
time that an attempt should be made to storm the hornwork. 

' It fell to the lot of the 2nd Brigade of the 5th Division, under the 
command of Colonel the Hon. Charles Greville, to move out of the 
trenches for this purpose, and the 3rd Battalion of the Royal Scots, under 
Lieutenant-Colonel Barns, supported by the 38th, under Lieutenant- 
Colonel Miles, fortunately arrived to assault the breach of the curtain 
about the time when an explosion on the rampart of the curtain 
(occasioned by the fire of the artillery) created some confusion among 
the enemy. The narrow pass was gained, and was maintained, after a 
severe conflict, and the troops on the right of the breach, having about 
this time succeeded in forcing the barricades on the top of the narrow 
line wall, found their way into the houses that joined it. Thus, after an 
assault which lasted above two hours, under the most trying circum- 
stances, a firm footing was obtained. 

' It was impossible to restrain the impetuosity of the troops, and in an 
hour more the enemy were driven from all the complication of defences 
prepared in the streets, suffering a severe loss on their retreat to the 
castle, and leaving the whole town in our possession. . . .' 

24 — 2 



372 



WELLING TON ' 5 DESPA TCHES 



' The enemy crossed the Bidasoa by the fords between 
Andara and the destroyed bridge on the highroad, before 
daylight on the morning of the 30th, with a very large force, 
with which they made a most desperate attack along the 
whole front of the position of the Spanish troops on the 
heights of San Marcial. They were beat back, some of them 
even across the river, in the most gallant style by the 
Spanish troops, whose conduct was equal to that of any 
troops that I have ever seen engaged ; and the attack, 
having been frequently repeated, was upon every occasion 
defeated with the same gallantry and determination. The 
course of the river being immediately under the heights on 
the French side, on which the enemy had placed a consider- 
able quantity of cannon, they were enabled to throw a bridge 
across the river three-quarters of a mile above the highroad, 
over which, in the afternoon, they marched again a con- 
siderable body, who, with those who had crossed the fords, 
again made a desperate attack upon the Spanish positions. 
This was equally beat back, and at length, finding all their 
efforts on that side fruitless, the enemy took advantage of 
the darkness of a violent storm to retire their troops from 
this front entirely. 

' Notwithstanding that I had a British division on each 
flank of the 4th Spanish army, I am happy to be able to 
report that the conduct of the latter was so conspicuously 
good, and they were so capable of defending their post 

Return of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Army under the 
Command of Field-Marshal the Marquis of Wellington, K.G.,.at 
the Siege, Assault, and Capture of San Sebastian, from July 28 to 
August 31, 1813. 



Killed 
Wounded 
Missing - 







Rank 


Officers. 


Sergeants. 


and 
File. 


45 


40 


676 


105 


93 


1,499 


1 


— 


44 



Total Loss of 
Officers, Non- 
commissioned 

Officers, and 
Rank and File. 



761 
1,697 

45 



British. Portuguese. 



572 

I,I03 

41 



189 

594 
4 



Horses. 



THE PENINSULA 373 



without assistance, in spite of the desperate efforts of the 
enemy to carry it, that, finding that the ground did not allow 
of my making use of the 1st or 4th Divisions on the flanks of 
the enemy's attacking corps, neither of them were in the least 
engaged during the action. 

' Nearly at the same time that the enemy crossed the 
Bidasoa in front of the heights of San Marcial, they like- 
wise crossed that river with about three divisions of in- 
fantry in two columns, by the fords below Salin, in front of 
the position occupied by the 9th Portuguese Brigade. I 
ordered General Inglis to support this brigade with that 
of the 7th Division under his command ; and as soon as I 
was informed of the course of the enemy's attack, I sent to 
Lieutenant-General the Earl of Dalhousie to request that 
he would likewise move towards the Bidasoa with the 
7th Division, and to the Light Division to support Major- 
General Inglis by every means in their power. Major- 
General Inglis found it impossible to maintain the heights 
between Lesaca and the Bidasoa, and he withdrew to those 
in front of the Convent of San Antonio, which he maintained. 
In the meantime Major-General Kempt moved one brigade 
of the Light Division to Lesaca, by which he kept the enemy 
in check, and covered the march of the Earl of Dalhousie to 
join General Inglis. 

' The enemy, however, having completely failed in their 
attempt upon the position of the Spanish army on the 
heights of San Marcial, and finding that Major-General 
Inglis had taken a position from which they could not drive 
him, at the same time that it covered and protected the right 
of the Spanish army, and the approaches to San Sebastian 
by Oyarzun, and that their situation on the left of the 
Bidasoa was becoming at every moment more critical, 
retired during the night. 

' The fall of rain during the evening and night had so 
swollen the Bidasoa that the rear of their column was 
obliged to cross the bridge of Vera. In order to effect this 
object, they attacked the post of Major-General Skerrett's 
brigade of the Light Division, at about three in the morning, 



374 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

both from the Puerto de Vera, and from the left of the 
Bidasoa. Although the nature of the ground rendered it 
impossible to prevent entirely the passage of the bridge after 
daylight, it was made under the fire of a great part of Major- 
General Skerrett's brigade, and the enemy's loss in the 
operation must have been very considerable. 

' While this was going on upon the left of the army, 
Mariscal de Campo Don P. A. Giron attacked the enemy's 
posts in front of the Pass of Echalar on the 30th and 31st. 
Lieutenant-General the Earl of Dalhousie made General 
Lecor attack those in front of Zugarramurdi with the 
6th Portuguese Brigade on the 31st, and the Hon. Major- 
General Colville made Colonel Douglas attack the enemy's 
posts in front of the Pass of Maya on the same day with the 
7th Portuguese Brigade. All these troops conducted them- 
selves well. 

' The attack made by the Earl of Dalhousie delayed his 
march till late in the afternoon of the 31st, but he was in 
the evening in a favourable situation for his further progress, 
and in the morning of the 1st in that allotted for him. 

' In these operations, in which a second attempt by the 
enemy to prevent the establishment of the allies upon the 
frontier has been defeated by the operations of a part only 
of the allied army, at the very moment at which the fort of 
San Sebastian was taken by storm, I have had great satisfac- 
tion in observing the zeal and ability of the officers, and the 
gallantry and discipline of the troops. . . . 

' I fully concur in the Lieutenant-General's report of the 
cordial assistance which he has received from Captain Sir 
George Collier, and the officers, seamen, and marines under 
his command, who have done everything in their power to 
facilitate and ensure our success. The seamen have served 
with the artillery in the batteries, and have upon every 
occasion manifested that spirit which is characteristic of the 
British navy. . . .' 



THE PENINSULA 



375 



Return of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Allied Army, 
under the Command of Field-Marshal the Marquis of Wel- 
lington, K.G., in Action with the Enemy on August 31 and 
September 1, 1813. 




King Joseph's Papers. 

To Earl Bathurst. 

' Lesaca, 

' September 3, 18 13. 
' . . . I will send you a selection of Joseph's papers ■ but 
as the Secretary of State's Office is a sink'of papers! and 
these are really curious, and will hereafter tend to illustrate 
many things that have occurred here, particularly in the last 
year, I shall be glad to have them again, and that they 
should remain among my papers.' 

Heavy Losses in Officers. 

To Earl Bathurst. 

1 Lesaca, 

' September 3, 18 13. 
' ... It would be very desirable to adopt some measure 
respecting the 51st and 68th Regiments— that is to say, 
either to order them home, or to allow me to form them 
into a provisional battalion. They are fully officered with 
very few men, and it is quite shocking to see the list of 
killed and wounded officers when they go into action. The 
other day the 51st lost 12 officers killed and wounded, 
and, I believe, not quite 100 men. As to sending them 
home, I must tell you that, in this country in particular, 



376 



WELLINGTON'S DESPA TONES 



one old soldier is worth at least five new ones. This 
place is about eighteen miles from Pasages, where the 
drafts recently arrived have been landed, and they came 
that distance in two marches. But they had two moun- 
tains to pass, and they are so knocked up by marching 
over them, that I have not seen one detachment go through 
entire. 

' Lord Aylmer's brigade cannot, I am convinced, march 
five miles in corps.' 

Capitulation of San Sebastian. 
To Earl Bathurst. 

' Lesaca, 

' September I o, 1 8 1 3. 

' A battery was constructed in the hornwork with great 
difficulty against the works of the Castle of San Sebastian, 
which opened on the morning of the 8th instant ; and I have 
the pleasure to inform you that the garrison surrendered 
before evening. I enclose Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas 
Graham's report, and the terms of capitulation agreed upon 
with the garrison, returns of ordnance, ammunition, etc., in 
the place. 

' The loss of the garrison during the siege is stated to 
have amounted to two-thirds of their number at its com- 
mencement. . . .' 

Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Army under 
the Command of Field-Marshal the Marquis of Welling- 
ton, K.G., in the Siege of the Castle of San Sebastian, from 
September 1 to 8, 1813. 



Killed 

Wounded 

Missing 



Officers. 


Sergeants. 


Rank and 
File. 


Horses. 


I 
I 


— 


I 

9 


— 



Total Loss of Officers, 

Non-commissioned 

Officers, and Rank 

and File. 



2 
IO 



Portuguese loss not included. 



THE PENINSULA 377 



Renewed Plundering. 

To Lieutenant-General Sir John Hope, K.B. 

' Lesaca, 

' October^, 18 13. 

' . . . I have sad accounts of the plunder of the soldiers 
yesterday, and I propose again to call the attention of the 
officers to the subject.* I saw yesterday many men coming 
in from Olague drunk and loaded with plunder ; and it 
cannot be prevented unless the General and other officers 
exert themselves.' 

Entrance into France. 

To Earl Bathurst. 

1 Lesaca, 

' October 9, 1813. 

' Having deemed it expedient to cross the Bidasoa with 
the left of the army, I have the pleasure to inform your 
lordship that that object was effected on the 7th instant. . . . 

' Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Graham, having thus 
established within the French territory the troops of the 
allied British and Portuguese army, which had been so 
frequently distinguished under his command, resigned the 

* 'G. O. 'Lesaca, 

' October 8, 18 13. 

' I. The Commander of the Forces is concerned to be under the neces- 
sity of publishing over again his orders of July 9 last, as they have been 
unattended to by the officers and troops which entered France yesterday. 

'2. According to all the information which the Commander of the 
Forces has received, outrages of all descriptions were committed by the 
troops in presence even of their officers, who took no pains whatever to 
prevent them. 

'3. The Commander of the Forces has already determined that some 
officers, so grossly negligent of their duty, shall be sent to England, that 
their names may be brought under the attention of the Prince Regent, 
and that His Royal Highness may give such directions respecting them 
as he may think proper, as the Commander of the Forces is determined 
not to command officers who will not obey his orders.' 



378 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 



command to Lieutenant- General Sir John Hope, who had 
arrived from Ireland on the preceding day. . . . 

' The 52nd Regiment, under the command of Major Mayne, 
charged, in a most gallant style, and carried the entrench- 
ment with the bayonet. The 1st and 3rd Cacadores, and 
the 2nd Battalion 95th Regiment, as well as the 52nd Regi- 
ment, distinguished themselves in this attack. . . . 

'The Light Division took 22 officers, and 400 prisoners, 
and three pieces of cannon ; and I am particularly indebted 
to Major-General Charles Baron Alten for the manner in 
which he executed this service. 

' On the right, the troops of the army of reserve of 
Andalusia, under the command of Don P. A. Giron, 
attacked the enemy's post and entrenchments on the moun- 
tain of La Rhune in two columns, under the command of 
Spaniards only. 

' These troops carried everything before them in the most 
gallant style, till they arrived at the foot of the rock on 
which the hermitage stands, and they made repeated attempts 
to take even that post by storm ; but it was impossible to get 
up, and the enemy remained during the night in possession of 
the hermitage, and on a rock on the same range of the moun- 
tain with the right of the Spanish troops. Some time 
elapsed yesterday morning before the fog cleared away 
sufficiently to enable me to reconnoitre the mountain, which 
I found to be least inaccessible by its right, and that the 
attack of it might be connected with advantage with the 
attack of the enemy's works in front of the camp of Sarre. 
I accordingly ordered the army of reserve to concentrate to 
their right, and as soon as the concentration commenced 
Mariscal de Campo Don P. A. Giron ordered the battalion 
de Las Ordenes to attack the enemy's post on the rock, on 
the right of the position occupied by his troops, which was 
instantly carried in the most gallant style. These troops 
followed up their success, and carried an entrenchment on 
a hill, which protected the right of the camp of Sarre ; and 
the enemy immediately evacuated all their works to defend 
the approaches to the camp, which were taken possession of 



THE PENINSULA 



379 



by detachments from the 7th Division, sent by Lieutenant- 
General the Earl of Dalhousie through the Puerto de Echalar 
for this purpose. 

1 Don P. A. Giron then established the battalion of Las 
Ordenes on the enemy's left, on the rock of the hermitage. 
It was too late to proceed farther last night ; and the enemy 
withdrew from their post at the hermitage, and from the 
camp of Sarre during the night. 

' It gives me singular satisfaction to report the good con- 
duct of the officers and troops of the army of reserve of 
Andalusia, as well in the operations of the 7th instant as in 
those of yesterday. The attack made by the battalion of 
Las Ordenes, under the command of Colonel Hore, yester- 
day, was made in as good order and with as much spirit as 
any that I have seen made by any troops, and I was much 
satisfied with the spirit and discipline of the whole of this 
corps. . . . 

1 When on my way to Roncesvalles, on the 1st instant, I 
directed Brigadier-General Campbell to endeavour to carry 
off the enemy's pickets in his front, which he attacked on 
that night ; and completely succeeded, with the Portuguese 
troops under his command, in carrying the whole of one 
picket, consisting of seventy men. A fortified post on the 
mountain of Airola was likewise stormed, and the whole 
garrison put to the sword. . . .' 



Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Army under the 
Command of Field-Marshal the Marquis of Wellington, K.G., 
in Action with the Enemy on October 7 and 8, 1813. 





Officers. 


c 

sergeants. 


Rank 
and 
File. 


Total Loss of 
Officers, Non- 
commissioned 
Officers, Rank 
and File. 


British. 


Portuguese. 


Horses. 


Killed - 
Wounded 
Missing - 


4 
40 


5 
33 


70 
422 

5 


127 

674 

13 


79 
495 

5 


48 
179 

s 






380 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 



Badly paid Generals. 
To Earl Bathnrst. 

' Vera, 

' October 10, 1813. 

' I wish to draw your attention to the situation of Sir 
Rowland Hill and Sir John Hope. They each of them 
command very large corps, and great expenses must be 
incurred by them ; and I know that the former, and I 
believe the latter, has not the means of defraying those 
expenses. 

' The General Officers of the British army are altogether 
very badly paid, and, adverting to the deductions from their 
pay, they receive less than they did fifty years ago, while 
their expenses are more than doubled ; and their allowances 
of all kinds are smaller than those of corresponding ranks 
in other services, while, from the custom of the British army, 
they are all obliged to keep tables for their staff, and their 
expenses are greater. 

' It would not probably be possible to increase the pay of 
General Officers generally ; but I earnestly recommend that 
Sir John Hope and Sir Rowland Hill should have an allow- 
ance each equal to that of the second in command in Sicily, 
or to the Commanding Officer at Cadiz. 

' I would beg your lordship to observe likewise that the 
expenses of an officer, who must spend more than he receives 
here, are vastly increased by the disadvantageous rate at 
which he is obliged to draw his money ; and I believe that, 
in this way, even Sir Thomas Graham, who has a large 
private fortune, has been frequently in distress here.' 

' Infamous Libels.' 

To the Magistrates of San Sebastian. 

'Vera, 

' November 2, 1 8 1 3. 

' I received only this day your letter of October 15, and 
I am very sorry that it is not in my power to be of any use 
to the town of San Sebastian. 



THE PENINSULA 381 



' The course of the operations of the war rendered neces- 
sary the attack of that town, in order to expel the enemy 
from the Spanish territory; and it was a subject of the 
utmost concern to me to see that the enemy wantonly 
destroyed it. 

' The infamous libels which have been circulated upon 
this subject, in which the destruction of the town has been 
attributed to the troops under my command, by order of 
their officers (notwithstanding that it was in great part 
burned, and was on fire in six places before they entered 
it by storm), render it a matter of delicacy for me to inter- 
fere in any manner in this affair ; and I am very desirous 
not to be applied to again, and not again to have occasion to 
write upon it.' 

Wholesale Desertion. 

To Earl Bathurst. 

' Vera, 

' November 9, 1813. 

' Although I am very well pleased with the German troops, 
(and in one respect, their health, they are very superior to 
any you could send us), they desert so terribly, and in this 
respect set our men so bad an example, that I should not be 
sorry to get rid of them. It is really quite disgraceful. I 
do not believe a man remains of the last recruits sent out to 
the German Legion. They were raised from the prisoners 
sent home after the Battle of Vitoria ; and I would observe, 
that if this is to be allowed it would be much better to enlist 
them here, as Government would at least save the expense 
of their passage to England and back. They generally 
belong to the Nassau regiment, which we are endeavouring 
to bring over in a body, and in the meantime are recruiting 
it in detail. 

' Between the Spaniards, Germans, and, I am sorry to add, 
English, I believe we have not lost less than 1,200 men in 
the last four months. The Portuguese (to their honour be it 
recollected) do not desert to the enemy. When they go, it 
is to return to their own country.' 



3 32 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

THE PASSAGE OF THE NIVELLE. 

To Earl Bathurst. 

'St. Pe, 

'■November 13, 1813. 

' The enemy had since the beginning of August occupied 
a position with their right upon the sea in front of St. Jean 
de Luz, and on the left of the Nivelle, their centre on La 
Petite Rhune, and on the heights behind that village ; and 
their left consisting of two divisions of infantry under the 
Comte d'Erlon on the right of that river, on a strong height 
in rear of Ainhoiie, and on the mountain of Mondarrain, 
which protected the approach to that village. They had had 
one division under General Foy at St. Jean Pied de Port, 
which was joined by one of the army of Aragon under 
General Paris, at the time the left of the allied army crossed 
the Bidasoa. General Foy's division joined those on the 
heights behind Ainhoiie, when Sir R. Hill moved into the 
valley of Baztan. The enemy, not satisfied with the natural 
strength of this position, had the whole of it fortified ; and 
their right in particular had been made so strong that I did 
not deem it expedient to attack it in front. 

'Pamplona having surrendered on October 31, and the 
right of the army having been disengaged from covering the 
blockade of that place, I moved Lieutenant-General Sir 
Rowland Hill on the 6th and 7th into the valley of Baztan, 
as soon as the state of the roads, after the recent rains, 
would permit, intending to attack the enemy on the 8th ; 
but the rain which fell on the 7th having again rendered the 
roads impracticable, I was obliged to defer the attack till 
the 10th, when we completely succeeded in carrying all the 
positions on the enemy's left and centre, in separating the 
former from the latter, and by these means turning the 
enemy's strong positions occupied by their right on the 
LowerNivelle. which they were obliged to evacuate during the 
night, having taken 51 pieces of cannon and 1,400 prisoners. 

' The object of the attack being to force the enemy's 
centre, and to establish our army in rear of their right, the 
attack was made in columns of divisions, each led by the 



THE PENINSULA 383 



General Officer commanding it, and each forming its own 
reserve. Lieutenant-General Sir Rowland Hill directed the 
movements of the right, consisting of the 2nd Division under 
Lieutenant-General the Hon. Sir William Stewart ; the 
6th Division under Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Clinton ; 
a Portuguese division under Lieutenant-General Sir John 
Hamilton, and a Spanish division under General Morillo, and 
Colonel Grant's brigade of cavalry and a brigade of Portu- 
guese artillery, under Lieutenant-Colonel Tulloh, and three 
mountain guns under Lieutenant Robe, which attacked the 
positions of the enemy behind Ainhoiie\ 

' Marshal Sir William Beresford directed the movements 
of the right of the centre, consisting of the 3rd Division 
under Major-General the Hon. C. Colville, the 7th Division 
under Mariscal de Campo Le Cor, and the 4th Division 
under Lieutenant-General the Hon. Sir Lowry Cole. 

1 The latter attacked the redoubts in front of Sarre, that 
village, and the heights behind it, supported on their left by 
the Army of Reserve of Andalusia, under the command of 
Mariscal de Campo Don P. A. Giron, which attacked the 
enemy's positions on the right of Sarre, on the slopes of 
La Petite Rhune, and the heights behind the village on the 
left of the 4th Division. 

' Major-General Charles Baron Alten attacked, with the 
Light Division, and General Longa's Spanish division, the 
enemy's positions on La Petite Rhune ; and, having carried 
them, co-operated with the right of the centre in the attack 
of the heights behind Sarre. 

' General V. Alten's brigade of cavalry, under the direction 
of Lieutenant-General Sir Stapleton Cotton, followed the 
movements of the centre ; and there were three brigades of 
British artillery with this part of the army, and three moun- 
tain guns with General Giron, and three with Major-General 
C. Alten. 

' Lieutenant-General Don Manuel Freyre moved in two 
columns from the heights of Mandale towards Ascain, in 
order to take advantage of any movement the enemy might 
make from the right of their position towards their centre ; 
and Lieutenant-General Sir John Hope with the left of the 



384 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

army drove in the enemy's outposts in front of their en- 
trenchments on the Lower Nivelle, carried the redoubt above 
Urogne, and established himself on the heights immediately 
opposite Siboure, in readiness to take advantage of any move- 
ment made by the enemy's right. 

' The attack began at daylight ; and Lieutenant-General 
Sir Lowry Cole having obliged the enemy to evacuate the 
redoubt on their right in front of Sarre by a cannonade, and 
that in front of the left of the village having been likewise 
evacuated on the approach of the 7th Division under General 
Le Cor to attack it, Lieutenant-General Sir Lowry Cole 
attacked and possessed himself of the village, which was 
turned on its left by the 3rd Division, under Major-General 
the Hon. C. Colville ; and on its right, by the reserve of 
Andalusia under Don P. A. Giron ; and Major-General C. 
Baron Alten carried the positions on La Petite Rhune. 
The whole then co-operated in the attack of the enemy's main 
position behind the village. The 3rd and 7th Divisions 
immediately carried the redoubts on the left of the enemy's 
centre, and the Light Division those on the right, while the 
4th Division with the reserve of Andalusia on their left, 
attacked their positions in their centre. By these attacks the 
enemy were obliged to abandon their strong positions which 
they had fortified with much care and labour ; and they left 
in the principal redoubt on the height the 1st Battalion 88th 
Regiment, which immediately surrendered. 

' While these operations were going on in the centre, I 
had the pleasure of seeing the 6th Division, under Lieutenant- 
General Sir H. Clinton, after having crossed the Nivelle, 
and having driven in the enemy's pickets on both banks, and 
having covered the passage of the Portuguese division under 
Lieutenant-General Sir John Hamilton on its right, make 
a most handsome attack upon the right of the enemy's 
position behind Ainhoiie and on the right of the Nivelle, and 
carry all the entrenchments, and the redoubt on that flank. 
Lieutenant-General Sir John Hamilton supported, with the 
Portuguese division, the 6th Division on its right ; and both 
co-operated in the attack of the second redoubt, which was 
immediately carried. 



THE PENINSULA 38s 



' Major-General Pringle's brigade of the 2nd Division,, 
under the command of Lieutenant-General Sir W. Stewart,, 
drove in the enemy's pickets on the Nivelle and in front 
of Ainhoii6, and Major-General Byng's brigade of the 
2nd Division carried the entrenchments and a redoubt further 
on the enemy's left : in which attack the Major-General and 
these troops distinguished themselves. Major - General 
Morillo covered the advance of the whole to the heights 
behind Ainhoiie, by attacking the enemy's posts on the slopes 
of Mondarrain, and following them towards Itsassu. The 
troops on the heights behind Ainhoiie were, by these opera- 
tions, under the direction of Lieutenant-General Sir Rowland 
Hill, forced to retire towards the bridge of Cambo, on the 
Nive, with the exception of the division on Mondarrain, 
which, by the march of a part of the 2nd Division, under 
Lieutenant-General Sir William Stewart, was pushed into 
the mountain towards Baygorry. 

' As soon as the heights were carried on both banks of 
the Nivelle, I directed the 3rd and 7th Divisions, being the 
right of our centre, to move by the left of that river upon 
St. Pe, and the 6th Division by the right of the river on the 
same place, while the 4th and Light Divisions, and General 
Giron's reserve, held the heights above Ascain, and covered 
this movement on that side, and Lieutenant-General Sir 
Rowland Hill covered it on the other. A part of the enemy's 
troops had retired from their centre and had crossed the 
Nivelle at St. Pe ; and as soon as the 6th Division 
approached, the 3rd Division, under Major-General the Hon. 
C. Colville, and the 7th Division, under General Le Cor r 
crossed that river, and attacked, and immediately gained 
possession of, the heights beyond it. We were thus estab- 
lished in the rear of the enemy's right ; but so much of the 
day was now spent that it was impossible to make any 
further movement ; and I was obliged to defer our further 
operations till the following morning. 

i The enemy evacuated Ascain in the afternoon, of which 
village Lieutenant-General Don Manuel Freyre took posses- 
sion, and quitted all their works and positions in front of 
St. Jean de Luz during the night, and retired upon Bidart, 

25 



386 



WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 



destroying all the bridges on the Lower Nivelle. Lieutenant- 
General Sir John Hope followed them with the left of the 
army as soon as he could cross the river, and Marshal Sir 
W. Beresford moved the centre of the army as far as the 
state of the roads, after a violent fall of rain, would allow ; 
and the enemy retired again on the night of the nth into an 
entrenched camp in front of Bayonne. 

' In the course of the operations, of which I have given 
your lordship an outline, in which we have driven the 
enemy from positions which they had been fortifying with 
great labour and care for three months, in which we have 
taken 51 pieces of cannon and 6 tumbrils of ammunition, 
and 1,400 prisoners, I have great satisfaction in reporting 
the good conduct of all the officers and troops. . . . 

' I likewise particularly observed the gallant conduct of 
the 51st and 68th Regiments, under the command of Major 
Rice and Lieutenant-Colonel Hawkins, in Major-General 
Inglis's brigade, in the attack of the heights above St. Pe, in 
the afternoon of the 30th. . . . 

' Our loss, although severe, has not been so great as might 
have been expected, considering the strength of the positions 
attacked and the length of time, from daylight in the morning- 
till night, during which the troops were engaged. . . . 

' The artillery which was in the field was of great use to 
us, and I cannot sufficiently acknowledge the intelligence 
and activity with which it was brought to the point of attack 
under the directions of Colonel Dickson, over the bad roads 
through the mountains in this season of the year. . . .' 

Return of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing in the Operations of 
the Army under the Command of General the Marquis of 
Wellington, K.G., in the Passage of the Nivelle on Novem- 
ber 10, 1813. 



Killed 

Wounded 

Missing 



Officers. 


Sergeants. 


Rank and 
File. 


Horses. 


26 

155 

3 


28 

132 

I 


289 

1,991 
69 


16 

25 



Total Loss of Officers, 

Non-commissioned 

Officers, and Rank 

and File. 



343 
2,278 

73 



THE PENINSULA 387 



Terrible Punishments. 

' St. Jean de Luz, 

' December 3, 18 13. 

' I have received your letter of November 17, with eight 
proceedings of a general court-martial on certain soldiers 
of Dillon's regiment at Carthagena, all of which I have 
confirmed. 

' I desire that and may be pardoned, 

that -, , and Lance-Corporal , 

may be executed by being shot, and that the remainder of 
the prisoners should first draw lots for one more to be 
executed by being shot, according to the sentence of the 
general court-martial. 

' The other eleven prisoners are then to have the choice 
of suffering corporal punishment, or to be executed according 
to sentence ; and those who shall prefer to be executed are 
to be shot ; those who prefer to receive corporal punishment 
are to receive a punishment not exceeding three hundred 
lashes. 

' The punishments are to be carried into execution in the 
most solemn manner at Carthagena, in presence of the 
British troops to be paraded there for that purpose ; and care 
is to be taken to impress upon the troops that their entrance 
into the British service is voluntary, that they are well treated, 
well fed, and taken care of, and that they must expect that 
any attempt to desert and break their engagement will be 
followed by certain punishment.' 

THE PASSAGE OF THE NIVE 

To Earl Bathurst. 

'St. Jean de Luz, 

'•December 14, 1813. 

' Since the enemy's retreat from the Nivelle they had 
occupied a position in front of Bayonne, which had been 
entrenched with great labour since the battle fought at Vitoria 
in June last. . . . 

25—2 



388 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

1 I had determined to pass the Nive immediately after the 
passage of the Nivelle, but was prevented by the bad state 
of the roads, and the swelling of all the rivulets occasioned 
by the fall of rain in the beginning of that month ; but the 
state of the weather and roads having at length enabled me 
to collect the materials, and make the preparations for form- 
ing bridges for the passage of that river, I moved the troops 
out of their cantonments on the 8th, and ordered that the 
right of the army, under Lieutenant-General Sir Rowland 
Hill, should pass on the gth at and in the neighbourhood of 
Cambo, while Marshal Sir William Beresford should favour 
and support his operation by passing the 6th Division, under 
Lieutenant-General Sir H. Clinton, at Ustaritz. Both 
operations succeeded completely. The enemy were im- 
mediately driven from the right bank of the river, and retired 
towards Bayonne by the great road of St. Jean Pied de Port. 
Those posted opposite Cambo were nearly intercepted by 
the 6th Division, and one regiment was driven from the road 
and obliged to march across the country. 

' The enemy assembled in considerable force on a range 
of heights running parallel with the Adour, and still keeping 
Ville Franque by their right. The 8th Portuguese Regi- 
ment, under Colonel Douglas, and the 9th Cagadores, under 
Colonel Brown, and the British Light Infantry battalion of 
the 6th Division, carried this village and the heights in the 
neighbourhood. The rain which had fallen the preceding 
night, and on the morning of the 8th, had so destroyed the 
road that the day had nearly elapsed before the whole 
of Sir Rowland Hill's corps had come up, and I was there- 
fore satisfied with the possession of the ground which we 
occupied. . . . 

' On the morning of the 10th Lieutenant-General Sir 
Rowland Hill found that the enemy had retired from the 
position which they had occupied the day before on the 
heights, into the entrenched camp on that side of the Nive, 
and he therefore occupied the position intended for him, 
with his right towards the Adour, and his left at Ville 
Franque, and communicating with the centre of the army 



THE PENINSULA 389 

under; ^vlarshal Sir William Beresford by a bridge laid over 
* np j' Nive; and the troops under the Marshal were again 
drawn to the left of the Nive. . . . 

' On the 10th in the morning the enemy moved out of the 
entrenched camp with their whole army, with the exception 
only of what occupied the works opposite to Sir Rowland 
Hill's position, and drove in the pickets of the Light Division 
and of Sir John Hope's corps, and made a most desperate 
attack upon the post of the former at the chateau and church 
of Arcangues, and upon the advanced posts of the latter on 
the highroad from Bayonne to St. Jean de Luz, near the 
Mayor's house of Biaritz. Both attacks were repulsed in the 
most gallant style by the troops, and Sir John Hope's corps 
took about 500 prisoners. The brunt of the action with Sir 
John Hope's advanced post fell upon the 1st Portuguese 
Brigade, under Major-General A. Campbell, which were on 
duty, and upon Major-General Robinson's brigade of the 
5th Division, which moved up to their support. . . . 

' When the night closed the enemy were still in large 
force in front of our posts, on the ground from which they 
had driven the pickets. They retired, however, during the 
night, from Lieutenant-General Sir John Hope's front, 
leaving small posts, which were immediately driven in. They 
still occupied in force the bridge on which the pickets of the 
Light Division had stood, and it was obvious that the whole 
army was still in front of our left, and about three in the 
afternoon they again drove in Lieutenant-General Sir John 
Hope's pickets, and attacked his post. They were again 
repulsed with considerable loss. The attack was recom- 
menced on the morning of the 12th, with the same want of 
success. The 1st Division, under Major-General Howard, 
having relieved the 5th Division, the enemy discontinued it 
in the afternoon, and retired entirely within the entrenched 
camp on that night. They never renewed the attack on the 
posts of the Light Division after the 10th. . . . 

' The enemy, having thus failed in all their attacks with 
their whole force upon our left, withdrew into their entrench- 
ments on the night of the 12th, and passed a large force 



39o WELLING TON ' 5 DESPA TCHES 

through Bayonne, with which, on the morning of ih$ I 3 tn » 
they made a most desperate attack upon Lieutenant-Geiin^^ 
Sir Rowland Hill. 

' In expectation of this attack, I had requested Marshal 
Sir William Beresford to reinforce the Lieutenant-General 
with the 6th Division, which crossed the Nive at daylight in 
the morning, and I further reinforced him by the 4th Division 
and two brigades of the 3rd. 

' The expected arrival of the 6th Division gave the Lieu- 
tenant-General great facility in making his movements, but 
the troops under his own immediate command had defeated 
and repulsed the enemy with immense loss before their 
arrival. The principal attack having been made along the 
highroad from Bayonne to St. Jean Pied de Port, Major- 
General Barnes's brigade of British infantry, and the 
5th Brigade of Portuguese infantry under Brigadier- General 
Ashworth, were particularly engaged in the contest with the 
enemy on that point, and these troops conducted themselves 
admirably. The Portuguese division of infantry, under the 
command of Mariscal de Campo F. Le Cor, moved to their 
support on their left in a very gallant style, and regained an 
important position between those troops and Major-General 
Pringle's brigade engaged with the enemy in front of Ville 
Franque. I had great satisfaction also in observing the 
conduct of Major-General Byng's brigade of British infantry, 
supported by the Portuguese brigade under the command of 
Major-General Buchan, in carrying an important height from 
the enemy on the right of our position, and maintaining it 
against all their efforts to regain it. 

' Two guns and some prisoners were taken from the 
enemy, who, being beat in all points, and having suffered 
considerable loss, were obliged to retire upon their entrench- 
ments. . . . 

' The enemy marched a large body of cavalry across the 
bridge of the Adour yesterday evening, and retired their 
force opposite to Sir Rowland Hill this morning towards 
Bayonne. . . .' 



THE PENINSULA 



391 



Return of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Army under 
the Command of Field-Marshal the Marquis of Welling- 
ton, K.G., in the Operations connected with the Passage of 
the Nive, from December 9 to 13, 1813. 





Officers. 


Sergeants. 


Rank and 
File. 


Horses. 


Total Loss of Officers, 

Non-commissioned 

Officers, and Rank 

and File. 


Killed 

Wounded - 
Missing" 


32 

233 

17 


15 

215 

14 


603 

3,459 
473 


13 

21 

I 


650 

3,907 
504 



Unfounded Charges. 

To General Don Manuel Freyrc. 

'St. Jean de Luz, 

1 January 8, 18 14. 

4 ... I head repeatedly sent to General Morillo, through 
Sir Rowland Hill and by other channels, to request he 
would keep his troops in order ; in answer to which the 
General stated to Sir Rowland Hill that it was impossible, 
as the officers and soldiers received by every post letters from 
their friends congratulating them upon their good fortune in 
being in France, and urging them to take advantage of their 
situation to make their fortunes. This Sir Rowland Hill 
told me, and I therefore saw there was no remedy but a 
strong one. 

' I can assure you that, in my opinion, it was essentially 
necessary to put an effectual stop to the evils complained of; 
and I can equally assure you that neither in the measure 
adopted, nor in the orders given to carry that measure into 
execution, had I the most distant intention to insult or injure 
the officers. I considered what General Morillo told General 
Hill as an acknowledgment that neither he nor his officers 
could stop the evil, and I acted accordingly. 

' I might satisfy myself with this answer to General 
Morillo's complaints, and justify myself as the Commander- 
in-Chief of the British army to those who have a right to call 
upon me for such justification. 



392 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

' General Morillo is, however, entirely mistaken in his 
assertions respecting the measures adopted to preserve dis- 
cipline among the British troops ; and, instead of asserting, 
as he has, that they may commit what crimes they please 
with impunity, he ought, if informed, to say that no crime 
ever goes unpunished when the criminal can be discovered. 
Hundreds of times in Spain and Portugal whole corps and 
divisions have been placed and kept under arms, not only to 
prevent disorder, but to obtain the discovery of criminals ; 
and in no instance has a criminal been discovered that he 
has not been tried, and the sentence of the court-martial put 
into execution. I defy General Morillo — I defy any man — 
to show an instance in which injury has been done to any 
individual, of which proof could be adduced that the officer 
or soldier doing it has not been punished. Let him inquire 
how many soldiers have been hanged in Spain for plundering, 
and how many more have been otherwise punished and made 
to pay for the damage done, and he will find that there is no 
reason to complain on this ground. . . . 

' The British officers and soldiers, like others, require to 
be kept in order, and till I read General Morillo's letter I 
imagined that the last accusation that could be made against 
me was that I neglected this duty. But, however I may 
endeavour to perform it, I must admit that, in a large and 
widely extended army, evils and injuries may be committed 
without my knowing it ; but with this admission I must say 
that it is quite groundless to assert or suppose that British 
officers and soldiers are allowed to do what they please with 
impunity. 

' I beg your Excellency to ask the question whether the 
British officers and soldiers have no ground of complaint. 
During the summer and autumn there were frequent 
instances of officers and soldiers shot at and robbed by 
the Spanish troops on the roads, and one soldier was 
murdered between Oyarzun and Lesaca. Our stores and 
convoys are frequently robbed, and only yesterday the 
accounts were received of an officer put to death at Vitoria ; 
and a few days ago I had accounts of others ill-treated 



THE PENINSULA 393 



at Santander ; and other events of the same kind occur 
frequently. 

' I must produce some much stronger proof of a design 
to ill-treat the officers and soldiers of the British army than 
the death and ill-treatment of these individuals would give, 
supposing I were inclined to assert that such design existed ; 
and yet this proof would be stronger than any General 
Morillo could adduce to support his assertion ; as I again 
defy him to produce a single instance of a complaint made 
and proof adduced, and a denial or even a delay of redress. 

' General Morillo has made two complaints, one of injustice 
and breach of the Ordenanza of the Spanish army by me, the 
other of unjust and improper conduct in allowing officers and 
soldiers of the British army to misconduct themselves with 
impunity. 

' I hope this letter will show the General that there is no 
foundation for either complaint, and that he will withdraw 
them, as made in a moment of irritation, to which every man 
is liable. If he does not do so, I hope that he is prepared to 
prove them. 

' I feel the same respect and regard for General Morillo 
and his troops that I do for all the other troops under my 
command, and I do everything in my power for them. 
This very regard must prevent me from allowing these 
charges of injustice to remain unrefuted, and they must be 
proved or formally withdrawn.' 

Accommodation for Women. 
To the Junta of Bilbao. 

' St. Jean de Luz, 

i January 12, 18 14. 

' I have had the honour of receiving your letter of Decem- 
ber 24, to which I should have replied at an earlier period if 
I had not been engaged with the operations of the army, and 
I assure you that I feel the utmost concern that you should 
conceive that you have any reason to complain of any of the 
persons attached to the British army. 



394 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

' There can be no doubt that no person can have a right 
to claim quarters in any town to which he is not obliged to 
go upon duty, or by wounds or sickness acquired in the 
service ; and the grant of quarters to ladies, the wives of 
officers of the army, can be considered in no other light than 
as an indulgence. 

' I should not do justice to the town of Bilbao if I could 
believe it possible that they would withhold this indulgence 
from the wives of the officers of the British army, more par- 
ticularly as I have reason to believe that in that, any more 
than in other towns in Spain, it is not easy to get lodgings 
fit for the reception of respectable females ; and that I have 
every reason to hope that those ladies, feeling that they owe 
the accommodation they possess in the town to the desire of 
the town to gratify the officers of the British army, will, on 
their parts, refrain from giving any cause whatever for future 
complaint. 

' I cannot expect that the Ayuntamiento will grant this 
indulgence to women not married ; indeed, I am astonished 
that any officer should have ventured to ask for billets for 
such persons ; and I beg that, in future, a quarter may not 
be granted to any woman with an officer, or to any lady 
singly, unless the military Commandant of the hospital 
should certify that she is the wife of an officer. 

' There is no reason whatever, also, why the wives of non- 
commissioned officers and soldiers of the army should be 
quartered in the houses with the officers of the army, unless 
their husbands should be in the house as the servant or 
orderly of the officer in question ; and, in case there should 
be an}' of that description, I beg you to apply for the inter- 
ference of the military Commandant of the hospital, to have 
them removed to their husbands.' 



THE PENINSULA 395 



BATTLE OF ORTHEZ. 

To Earl Bathurst. 

'St. Sever, 

' March 1, 18 14. 

' The sense which I had of the difficulties attending the 
movement of the army by its right, across so many rivers as 
must have been and as have lately been passed in its pro- 
gress, induced me to determine to pass the Adour below the 
town of Bayonne, notwithstanding the difficulties which 
opposed this operation ; and I was the more induced to 
adopt this plan as, whatever might be the mode in which I 
should eventually move upon the enemy, it was obvious that 
I could depend upon no communication with Spain and the 
seaports of that kingdom and with St. Jean de Luz, excepting 
that alone which is practicable in the winter, viz., by the high- 
roads leading to and from Bayonne. 

' I likewise hoped that the establishment of a bridge 
below Bayonne would give me the use of the Adour as a 
harbour. 

' The movements of the right of the army were intended 
to divert the enemy's attention from the preparations at 
St. Jean de Luz and Pasages for the passage of the Adour 
below Bayonne, and to induce the enemy to move his force 
to his left, in which objects they succeeded completely ; but 
upon my return to St. Jean de Luz on the 19th, I found 
the weather so unfavourable at sea, and so uncertain, that I 
determined to push forward my operations on the right, 
notwithstanding that I had still the Gave d'Oleron, the Gave 
de Pau, and the Adour to pass. 

' Accordingly, I returned to Garris on the 21st, and 
ordered the 6th and Light Divisions to break up from the 
blockade of Bayonne, and General Don Manuel Freyre to 
close up the cantonments of his corps towards Irun, and to 
be prepared to move when the left of the army should cross 
the Adour. 

' I found the pontoons collected at Garris, and they were 
moved forward on the following days to and across the Gave 



396 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

de Mauleon, and the troops of the centre of the army 
arrived. 

' On the 24th, Lieutenant-General Sir Rowland Hill 
passed the Gave d'Oleron at Villenave, with the Light, 
2nd, and Portuguese Divisions, under the command of 
Major-General Baron Charles Alten, Lieutenant-General 
Sir William Stewart, and Mariscal de Campo Le Cor ; 
while Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Clinton passed with 
the 6th Division between Monfort and Laas, and Lieutenant- 
General Sir Thomas Picton made demonstrations, with the 
3rd Division, of an intention to attack the enemy's position 
at the bridge of Sauveterre, which induced the enemy to 
blow up the bridge. 

' Mariscal de Campo Don Pablo Morillo drove in the 
enemy's posts near Navarreins, and blockaded that place. 

'Field-Marshal Sir William Beresford likewise, who, since 
the movement of Sir Rowland Hill on the 14th and 15th, 
had remained with the 4th and 7th Divisions, and Colonel 
Vivian's brigade, in observation on the Lower Bidouze, 
attacked the enemy on the 23rd in their fortified posts at 
Hastingues and Oeyregave, on the left of the Gave de 
Pau, and obliged them to retire within the tete de pont at 
Peyrehorade. 

' Immediately after the passage of the Gave d'Oleron was 
effected, Sir Rowland Hill and Sir Henry Clinton moved 
towards Orthez and the great road leading from Sauveterre 
to that town ; and the enemy retired in the night from 
Sauveterre across the Gave de Pau, and assembled their 
army near Orthez on the 25th, having destroyed all the 
bridges on the river. 

' The right and right of the centre of the army assembled 
opposite Orthez, Lieutenant-General Sir Stapleton Cotton, 
with Lord Edward Somerset's brigade of cavalry, and the 
3rd Division, under Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Picton, 
were near the destroyed bridge of Berenx ; and Field- 
Marshal Sir William Beresford, with the 4th and 7th Divi- 
sions, under Lieutenant-General Sir Lowry Cole and 
Major-General Walker, and Colonel Vivian's brigade, 



THE PENINSULA 397 



towards the junction of the Gave de Pau with the Gave 
d'Oleron. 

' The troops opposed to the Marshal having moved on 
the 25th, he crossed the Gave de Pau below the junction of 
the Gave d'Oleron on the morning of the 26th, and moved 
along the highroad from Peyrehorade towards Orthez, on 
the enemy's right. As he approached, Lieutenant-General 
Sir Stapleton Cotton crossed with the cavalry, and Lieu- 
tenant-General Sir Thomas Picton with the 3rd Division, 
below the bridge of Berenx ; and I moved the 6th and 
Light Divisions to the same point, and Lieutenant-General 
Sir Rowland Hill occupied the heights opposite Orthez and 
the highroad leading to Sauveterre. 

' The 6th and Light Divisions crossed in the morning of 
the 27th at daylight, and we found the enemy in a strong 
position near Orthez, with his right on a height on the high- 
road to Dax, and occupying the village of St. Boes, and his 
left on the heights above Orthez and that town, and opposing 
the passage of the river by Sir Rowland Hill. 

' The course of the heights on which the enemy had placed 
his army necessarily retired his centre, while the strength of 
the position gave extraordinary advantages to the flanks. 

' I ordered Marshal Sir William Beresford to turn and 
attack the enemy's right with the 4th Division under Lieu- 
tenant-General Sir Lowry Cole, and the 7th Division under 
Major-General Walker and Colonel Vivian's brigade of 
cavalry ; while Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Picton 
should move along the great road leading from Peyrehorade 
to Orthez, and attack the heights on which the enemy's 
centre and left stood, with the 3rd and 6th Divisions under 
Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Clinton, supported by Sir 
Stapleton Cotton, with Lord Edward Somerset's brigade of 
cavalry. Major-General Baron Charles Alten, with the 
Light Division, kept the communication, and was in reserve 
between these two attacks. I likewise desired Lieutenant- 
General Sir Rowland Hill to cross the Gave, and to turn 
and attack the enemy's left. 

1 Marshal Sir William Beresford carried the village of 



398 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

St. Boes with the 4th Division, under the command of Lieu- 
tenant-General Sir Lowry Cole, after an obstinate resistance 
by the enemy ; but the ground was so narrow that the troops 
could not deploy to attack the heights, notwithstanding the 
repeated attempts of Major- General Ross and Brigadier- 
General Vasconcellos' Portuguese brigade ; and it was im- 
possible to turn them by the enemy's right without an 
excessive extension of our line. 

' I therefore so far altered the plan of the action as to 
order the immediate advance of the 3rd and 6th Divisions, 
and I moved forward Colonel Barnard's brigade of the 
Light Division to attack the left of the height on which 
the enemy's right stood. 

' This attack, led by the 52nd Regiment under Lieutenant- 
Colonel Colborne, and supported on their right by Major- 
General Brisbane's and Colonel Keane's brigades of the 
3rd Division, and by simultaneous attacks on the left by 
Major-General Anson's brigade of the 4th Division, and on 
the right by Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Picton, with 
the remainder of the 3rd Division and the 6th Division, 
under Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Clinton, dislodged the 
enemy from the heights and gave us the victory. 

' In the meantime Lieutenant-General Sir Rowland Hill 
had forced the passage of the Gave above Orthez, and seeing 
the state of the action he moved immediately, with the 
2nd Division of infantry under Lieutenant-General Sir 
William Stewart and Major-General Fane's brigade of 
cavalry, direct for the great road from Orthez to St. Sever, 
thus keeping upon the enemy's left. 

' The enemy retired at first in admirable order, taking 
every advantage of the numerous good positions which the 
country afforded him. The losses, however, which he sus- 
tained in the continued attacks of our troops, and the 
danger with which he was threatened by Lieutenant-General 
Sir Rowland Hill's movement, soon accelerated his move- 
ments, and the retreat at last became a flight, and the troops 
were in the utmost confusion. 

' Lieutenant-General Sir Stapleton Cotton took advantage 



THE PENINSULA 399 



of the only opportunity which offered to charge with Major- 
General Lord Edward Somerset's brigade, in the neighbour- 
hood of Sault de Navailles, where the enemy had been 
driven from the highroad by Lieutenant-General Sir Rowland 
Hill. The 7th Hussars distinguished themselves upon this 
occasion, and made many prisoners. 

' We continued the pursuit till it was dusk, and I halted 
the army in the neighbourhood of Sault de Navailles. I 
cannot estimate the extent of the enemy's loss ; we have 
taken six pieces of cannon and a great many prisoners, the 
numbers I cannot at present report. The whole country is 
covered by their dead. The army was in the utmost con- 
fusion when I last saw it passing the heights near Sault de 
Navailles, and many soldiers had thrown away their arms. 
The desertion has since been immense. 

' We followed the enemy on the following day to this 
place, and we this day passed the Adour. Marshal Sir 
William Beresford marched with the Light Division and 
General Vivian's brigade upon Mont de Marsan, where he 
has taken a very large magazine of provisions. Lieutenant- 
General Sir Rowland Hill has moved upon Aire, and the 
advanced posts of the centre are at Cazeres. 

' The enemy are apparently retiring upon Agen, and have 
left open the direct road towards Bordeaux. 

' While the operations of which I have above given the 
report were carrying on on the right of the army, Lieutenant- 
General Sir John Hope, in concert with Rear-Admiral Pen- 
rose, availed himself of an opportunity which offered on 
February 23 to cross the Adour below Bayonne, and to 
take possession of both banks of the river at its mouth. 
The vessels destined to form the bridge could not get in 
till the 24th, when the difficult, and at this season of the 
year dangerous, operation of bringing them in was effected 
with a degree of gallantry and skill seldom equalled. 
Lieutenant-General Sir John Hope particularly mentions 
Captain O'Reilly, Lieutenant Cheshire, Lieutenant Douglas, 
and Lieutenant Collins of the navy, and also Lieutenant 
Debenham, Agent of Transports ; and I am infinitely 



400 WELLING TON' S DESPA TCHE S 



indebted to Rear-Admiral Penrose for the cordial assistance 
I received from him in preparing for this plan, and for that 
which he gave Lieutenant-General Sir John Hope in carry- 
ing it into execution. 

'The enemy, conceiving that the means of crossing the 
river which Lieutenant-General Sir John Hope had at his 
command, viz., rafts made of pontoons, had not enabled 
him to cross a large force in the course of the 23rd, attacked 
the corps which he had sent over on that evening. This 
corps consisted of 600 men of the 2nd Brigade of Guards 
under the command of Major-General the Hon. E. Stopford, 
who repulsed the enemy immediately. The Rocket brigade 
was of great use upon this occasion. 

' Three of the enemy's gunboats were destroyed this 
day ; and a frigate lying in the Adour received considerable 
damage from the fire of a battery of eighteen-pounders, and 
was obliged to go higher up the river to the neighbourhood 
of the bridge. 

' Lieutenant-General Sir John Hope invested the citadel 
of Bayonne on the 25th ; and Lieutenant-General Don 
Manuel Freyre moved forward with the 4th Spanish army 
in consequence of directions which I had left for him. 

' On the 27th, the bridge having been completed, Lieu- 
tenant-General Sir John Hope deemed it expedient to invest 
the citadel of Bayonne more closely than he had done before ; 
and he attacked the village of St. Etienne, which he carried, 
having taken agun and some prisoners from the enemy; and his 
posts are now within goo yards of the outworks of the place. 

' The result of the operations which I have detailed to 
your lordship is that Bayonne, St. Jean Pied de Port, and 
Navarreins, are invested ; and the army, having passed the 
Adour, are in possession of all the great communications 
across that river, after having beaten the enemy and taken 
their magazines. . . . 

' The charge made by the 7th Hussars under Lord Edward 
Somerset was highly meritorious. 

' The conduct of the artillery throughout the day deserved 
my highest approbation. . . .' 



THE PENINSULA 



401 



Return of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Allied 
Army under the Command of Marshal the Marquis of 
Wellington, K.G., in Action with the French Army tender 
the Command of Marshal Soult, on February 27, at Orthez. 





Officers. 


Sergeants. 


Rank and 
File. 


Horses. 


Total Loss of Officers, 

Non-commissioned 

Officers, and Rank 

and File. 


Killed 

Wounded - 
Missing 


18 

134 
I 


25 
89 

5 


234 

1,700 

64 


7 
33 
5i 


277 

*>923 
70 



To Earl Bathurst. 

1 St. Sever, 

' March 4, 18 14. 

' The rain which fell in the afternoon of the 1st swelled 
the Adour and all the rivulets falling into that river so 
considerably as materially to impede our further progress, 
and to induce me on the next day to halt the army till I 
could repair the bridges, all of which the enemy had 
destroyed. 

' The rain continued till last night, and the river is so 
rapid that the pontoon cannot be laid upon it. 

'The enemy had collected a corps at Aire, probably to 
protect the evacuation of a magazine which they had at that 
place. Sir Rowland Hill attacked this corps on the 2nd, and 
drove them from their post with considerable loss, and took 
possession of the town and magazine. . . .' 

Return of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Army under 
the Command of Field-Marshal the Marquis of Welling- 
ton, K.G., in the Various Operations from February 28 to 
March 2, inclusive. 





Officers. 


Sergeants. 


Rank and 
File. 


Horses. 


Total Loss of Officers 

Non-commissioned 

Officers, and Rank 

and File. 


Killed 

Wounded - 
Missing 


3 
13 


I 

9 


16 

114 

2 


5 
11 


20 

J 36 

2 



26 



402 



WELLINGTON'S DESPA TCHES 



Affair at Tarbes.* 



To Earl Bathurst. 



' Samatan, 

' March 25, 18 14. 



' The enemy continued his retreat after the affair near 
Tarbes on the 20th, during the night and following days, 
and arrived yesterday at Toulouse. Their troops have 
marched with such celerity that, excepting the advanced- 
guard of the cavalry attached to Lieutenant-General Sir 
Rowland Hill's corps under Major-General Fane, who 
attacked the enemy's rear-guard at St. Gaudens, our troops 
have never been able to come up with them. 

' I enclose Major-General Fane's report to Lieutenant- 
General Sir Rowland Hill of this affair, which is highly 
creditable to the 13th Light Dragoons. . . .' 

Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the A rmy under the 
Command of Field-Marshal the Marquis of Wellington, 
K.G., in the Operations from March 7 to 20, 18 14. 



Killed 

Wounded 

Missing 



Officers. 


Sergeants. 


Rank and 
File. 


Horses. 


4 

36 

4 


3 
29 

1 


41 
360 

33 


21 

40 

34 



Total Loss of Officers, 

Non-commissioned 

Officers, and Rank 

and File. 



51 
425 

38 



THE BATTLE OF TOULOUSE. 

To Earl Bathurst. 

' Toulouse, 

'April 12, 1814. 

' I have the pleasure to inform your lordship that I entered 
this town this morning, which the enemy evacuated during 
the night, retiring by the road of Carcassone. 

* The Rifle Brigade is particularly associated with Tarbes. The 
95th were the only British troops who fired on the hill where the fight 
took place, although other regiments were in reserve ; and consequently 
Tarbes is regarded as the regimental fight of the Rifle Brigade. — W. W. 



THE PENINSULA 403 

' The continued fall of rain and the state of the river 
prevented me from laying the bridge till the morning of the 
8th, when the Spanish corps and the Portuguese artillery, 
under the immediate orders of Lieutenant-General Don 
Manuel Freyre, and the headquarters, crossed the Garonne. 

' We immediately moved forward to the neighbourhood of 
the town, and the 18th Hussars, under the immediate com- 
mand of Colonel Vivian, had an opportunity of making a 
most gallant attack upon a superior body of the enemy's 
cavalry, which they drove through the village of Croix 
d'Orade, and took about 100 prisoners, and gave us posses- 
sion of an important bridge over the river Ers, by which it 
was necessary to pass in order to attack the enemy's position. 
Colonel Vivian was, unfortunately, wounded upon this 
occasion, and I am afraid that I shall lose the benefit of his 
assistance for some time. 

' The town of Toulouse is surrounded on three sides by the 
canal of Languedoc and the Garonne. On the left of that 
river, the suburb, which the enemy had fortified with strong 
field works in front of the ancient wall, formed a good tete 
de pont. They had likewise formed a tete de pont at each 
bridge of the canal, which was, besides, defended by the fire 
in some places of musketry, and in all of artillery from the 
ancient wall of the town. Beyond the canal to the eastward, 
and between that and the river Ers, is a height which extends 
as far as Montaudran, and over which pass all the approaches 
to the canal and town from the eastward, which it defends, 
and the enemy, in addition to the tetes de pont on the bridges 
of the canal, had fortified this height with five redoubts, 
connected by lines of entrenchments, and had, with extra- 
ordinary diligence, made every preparation for defence. They 
had likewise broken all the bridges over the Ers within our 
reach, by which the right of their position could be approached. 
The roads, however, from the Arriege to Toulouse being 
impracticable for cavalry or artillery, and nearly so for 
infantry, as reported in my despatch to your lordship of the 
1st instant, I had no alternative, excepting to attack the 
enemy in this formidable position. 

26 — 2 



4 o [ WELLINGTON >S DESPA TCHES 



' It was necessary to move the pontoon bridge higher up 
the Garonne, in order to shorten the communication with 
Lieutenant-General Sir Rowland Hill's corps, as soon as the 
Spanish corps had passed, and this operation was not effected 
till so late an hour on the gth as to induce me to defer the 
attack till the following morning. 

' The plan, according to which I determined to attack the 
enemy, was for Marshal Sir William Beresford, who was on 
the right of the Ers with the 4th and 6th Divisions, to cross 
that river at the bridge of Croix d'Orade, to gain possession 
of Montblanc, and to march up the left of the Ers to turn 
the enemy's right, while Lieutenant-General Don Manuel 
Freyre, with the Spanish corps under his command, 
supported by the British cavalry, should attack the front. 
Lieutenant-General Sir Stapleton Cotton was to follow the 
Marshal's movement with Major-General Lord Edward 
Somerset's brigade of hussars, and Colonel Vivian's brigade, 
under the command of Colonel Arentschildt, was to observe 
the movements of the enemy's cavalry on both flanks of the 
Ers beyond our left. 

' The 3rd and Light Divisions, under the command of 
Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Picton and Major-General 
Charles Baron Alten, and the brigade of German cavalry, 
were to observe the enemy on the lower part of the canal, 
and to draw their attention to that quarter by threatening 
the tetes de pont, while Lieutenant-General Sir Rowland 
Hill was to do the same on the suburb on the left of the 
Garonne. 

' Marshal Sir William Beresford crossed the Ers, and 
formed his corps in three columns of lines in the village of 
Croix d'Orade, the 4th Division leading, with which he 
immediately carried Montblanc. He then moved up the Ers 
in the same order, over most difficult ground, in a direction 
parallel to the enemy's fortified position, and as soon as he 
reached the point at which he turned it, he formed his lines 
and moved to the attack. During these operations Lieu- 
tenant-General Don Manuel Freyre moved along the left of 
the Ers to the front of Croix d'Orade, where he formed his 



THE PENINSULA 405 



corps in two lines with a reserve on a height in front of the 
left of the enemy's position, on which height the Portuguese 
artillery was placed, and Major-General Ponsonby's brigade 
of cavalry in reserve in the rear. 

' As soon as formed, and that it was seen that Marshal Sir 
William Beresford was ready, Lieutenant-General Don 
Manuel Freyre moved forward to the attack. The troops 
marched in good order, under a very heavy fire of musketry 
and artillery, and showed great spirit, the General and all 
his staff being at their head ; and the two lines were soon 
lodged under some banks immediately under the enemy's 
entrenchments ; the reserve and Portuguese artillery, and 
British cavalry, continuing on the height on which the troops 
had first formed. The enemy, however, repulsed the move- 
ment of the right of General Freyre's line round their left 
flank, and having followed up their success, and turned our 
right by both sides of the highroad leading from Toulouse to 
Croix d'Orade, they soon compelled the whole corps to 
retire. It gave me great satisfaction to see that, although 
they suffered considerably in retiring, the troops rallied again 
as soon as the Light Division, which was immediately on 
their right, moved up, and I cannot sufficiently applaud the 
exertions of Lieutenant-General Don Manuel Freyre, the 
officers of the staff of the 4th Spanish army, and of the 
officers of the General Staff, to rally and form them again. 

' Lieutenant-General Mendizabal, who was in the field as a 
volunteer, General Ezpeleta, and several officers of the Staff 
and chiefs of corps, were wounded upon this occasion ; but 
General Mendizabal continued in the field. The regiment 
de Tiradores de Cantabria, under the command of Colonel 
Leon de Sicilia, kept its position, under the enemy's entrench- 
ments, until I ordered it to retire. 

' In the meantime Marshal Sir William Beresford, with 
the 4th Division, under the command of Lieutenant-General 
Sir Lowry Cole, and the 6th Division, under the command 
of Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Clinton, attacked and 
carried the heights on the enemy's right, and the redoubt 
which covered and protected that flank ; and he lodged those 



406 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

troops on the same height with the enemy ; who were, 
however, still in possession of four redoubts, and of the 
entrenchments and fortified houses. 

' The badness of the roads had induced the Marshal to 
leave his artillery in the village of Montblanc ; and some 
time elapsed before it could be brought to him, and before 
Lieutenant-General Don Manuel Freyre's corps could be re- 
formed and brought back to the attack. As soon as this 
was effected, the Marshal continued his movement along the 
ridge, and carried, with General Pack's brigade of the 6th 
Division, the two principal redoubts and fortified houses in 
the enemy's centre. The enemy made a desperate effort 
from the canal to regain these redoubts, but they were 
repulsed with considerable loss ; and the 6th Division con- 
tinuing its movement along the ridge of the height, and the 
Spanish troops continuing a corresponding movement upon 
the front, the enemy were driven from the two redoubts and 
entrenchments on the left ; and the whole range of heights 
were in our possession. We did not gain this advantage, 
however, without severe loss ; particularly in the brave 6th 
Division. Lieutenant-Colonel Coghlan of the 6ist, an officer 
of great merit and promise, was unfortunately killed in the 
attack of the heights. Major-General Pack was wounded, 
but was enabled to remain in the field ; and Colonel Douglas, 
of the 8th Portuguese Regiment, lost his leg; and I am 
afraid that I shall be deprived for a considerable time of his 
assistance. 

' The 36th, 42nd, 79th, and 61st, lost considerable numbers, 
and were highly distinguished throughout the day. 

' I cannot sufficiently applaud the ability and conduct of 
Marshal Sir William Beresford throughout the operations of 
the day ; nor that of Lieutenant-Generals Sir Lowry Cole, 
Sir Henry Clinton, Major-Generals Pack and Lambert, and 
the troops under their command. Marshal Sir William 
Beresford particularly reports the good conduct of Brigadier- 
General D'Urban, the Quartermaster-General, and General 
Brito Mozinho the Adjutant-General to the Portuguese 
army. 



THE PENINSULA 407 



' The 4th Division, although exposed on their march along 
the enemy's front to a galling fire, were not so much engaged 
as the 6th, and did not suffer so much ; but they conducted 
themselves with their usual gallantry. 

' I had also every reason to be satisfied with the conduct 
of Lieutenant-General Don Manuel Freyre, Lieutenant- 
General Don Gabriel Mendizabal, Mariscal de Campo Don 
Pedro Barcenas, Brigadier-General Don J. de Ezpeleta, 
Mariscal de Campo Don A. Garces de Marcilla, and the 
Chief of the Staff Don E. S. Salvador, and the officers of the 
Staff of the 4th army. The officers and troops conducted 
themselves well in all the attacks which they made subsequent 
to their being re-formed. 

' The ground not having admitted of the operations of the 
cavalry, they had no opportunity of charging. 

' While the operations above detailed were going on, on 
the left of the army, Lieutenant-General Sir Rowland Hill 
drove the enemy from their exterior works in the suburb, on 
the left of the Garonne, within the ancient wall. Lieutenant- 
General Sir Thomas Picton likewise, with the 3rd Division, 
drove the enemy within the tete de pont on the bridge of the 
canal nearest to the Garonne ; but the troops having made an 
effort to carry it, they were repulsed, and some loss was sus- 
tained. Major-General Brisbane was wounded, but I hope 
not so as to deprive me for any length of time of his assist- 
ance ; and Lieutenant-Colonel Forbes, of the 45th, an officer 
of great merit, was killed. 

'The army being thus established on three sides of 
Toulouse, I immediately detached our light cavalry to cut off 
the communication by the only road practicable for carriages 
which remained in the country, till I should be enabled to 
make arrangements to establish the troops between the canal 
and the Garonne. 

' The enemy, however, retired last night, leaving in our 
hands General Harispe, General Baurot, General St. Hilaire 
and 1,600 prisoners. One piece of cannon was taken on the 
field of battle, and others, and large quantities of stores of all 
descriptions, in the town. . . .' 



408 



WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 



Return of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Army 
under the Command of Field -Marshal the Marquis of 
Wellington, K.G., at the Battle of Toulouse, April 10, 
1814* 





Officers J Ser " 
1 geants. 


Rank 
and 
File. 


Total Loss of 
Officers, Non- 
commissioned 
Officers, and 
Rank and 
File. 


British. 


Spanish. 


Portu- 
guese. 


Horses. 


Killed 
Wounded 
Missing - 


31 
248 

3 


21 
123 


543 

3,675 

15 


595 

4,046 

18 


312 

i,795 
17 


205 

1,722 

I 


78 
529 


62 

59 

2 



Suspension of Hostilities. 
To Major-General Colville. 

' Toulouse, 

'April 19, 1 8 14. 

' I have the honour to enclose you the copy of a con- 
vention for the suspension of hostilities, into which I have 
entered with Marshal the Due de Dalmatie ; and an extract 
of a letter from the Marshal, ratifying the convention, although 
not in so formal a manner as is necessary, owing to his 
waiting for the ratification of Marshal the Due d'Albufera. 

' I beg that on the receipt of this letter you will communi- 
cate the convention to the Governor of Bayonne, and call 
upon him to suspend hostilities. 

*'.... The casualties of a British army, after a battle, are collected, 
in returns, by the sergeants of companies, under the direction of, and 
signed by, the officers commanding them, accounting for all the men of 
the company thus become non-effective, absent or present. The regi- 
mental returns made from those of companies, as well as those of the 
brigades and divisions, are transmitted to headquarters, and from them 
the general return is made out and signed by the Adjutant-General and 
laid before the General commanding the Forces. They are transmitted 
to the Secretary of State, and published in the London Gazette, recapitu- 
lating the loss of each battalion. No officer in command of a British 
army could venture to garble or alter a return. The loss so returned 
generally exceeds the actual loss, the officers and soldiers being inter- 
ested, as their claims to pensions and rewards depend upon their names 
being included in the returns. . . .' 



THE PENINSULA 409 

' You will appoint an officer to settle with him the number 
of rations of provisions and forage which will be required 
daily by the garrison, and to settle with him the villages and 
towns of the country from which to be drawn ; from which, 
of course, you will draw nothing. 

' You will maintain your fortified posts in the neighbour- 
hood of the garrison, giving at the same time free ingress 
to the provisions which it will be settled shall enter, and 
egress to whatever it may be wished to send out ; and you 
will canton or encamp the troops in such situations as may 
be most convenient to you till I shall send you farther 
orders.' 

Sortie from Bayonne. 

To Earl Bathurst. 

' Toulouse, 

''April 19, 1814. 

' It gives me much concern to have to lay before your 
lordship the enclosed reports from Major-General Colville 
and Major-General Howard of a sortie from the citadel of 
Bayonne on the morning of the 14th instant, in which 
Lieutenant-General Sir John Hope having been unfortu- 
nately wounded, and his horse killed under him, he was 
made prisoner. 

' I have every reason to believe that his wounds are not 
severe, but I cannot but regret that the satisfaction generally 
felt by the army upon the prospect of the honourable ter- 
mination of their labours should be clouded by the mis- 
fortune and sufferings of an officer so highly esteemed and 
respected by all. 

' I sincerely regret the fall of Major- General Hay, whose 
services and merits I have had frequent occasion to bring 
under your lordship's notice. . . . 

' Upon the breaking up of this army, I perform a most 
satisfactory duty of reporting to your lordship my sense of 
the conduct and merits of Lieutenant-General William 
Clinton and of the troops under his command since they 
have been employed in the Peninsula. 



4io 



WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 



' Circumstances have not enabled those troops to have so 
brilliant a share in the operations of the war as their brother 
officers and soldiers on this side of the Peninsula. But they 
have not been less usefully employed ; their conduct when 
engaged with the enemy has always been meritorious, and 
I have had every reason to be satisfied with the General 
Officers commanding and with them.' 

Return of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing, in the Operations 
of the Army under the Command of Field-Marshal the 
Marquis of Wellington, K.G., in a Sortie made by the 
Garrison of Bayonne, on the Morning of April 14, 1814. 



Killed - 

Wounded 

Missing 



Officers. 


Sergeants. 


Rank and 

File. 


Horses. 


8 

36 

6 


3 

28 

7 


139 

393 

223 


1 



Total Loss of Officers, 

Non-commissioned 

Officers, and Rank 

and File. 



I50 

457 
236 



Portuguese loss included. 



Proclamation. 

' Toulouse, 

''April 20, 1 8 14. 

' Field- Marshal the Marquis of Wellington, etc., having 
concluded a convention with Marshal the Due d'Albufera 
for the evacuation of the strong places in Catalonia and 
Valencia by the French troops, and for a suspension of 
hostilities between the allied armies under the command of 
Field-Marshal the Marquis of Wellington, etc., and Marshal 
the Due d'Albufera, respectively; and the Field-Marshal 
having promised the Due d'Albufera that all French vessels 
in the port of Barcelona should be allowed to return to the 
ports of France unmolested, the Commanders of His 
Majesty's ships and vessels, and the Commanders of the 
vessels of the Allied Powers in the Mediterranean, are hereby 
requested to allow those vessels to pass to those ports 
unmolested. 

' Wellington.' 



THE PENINSULA 411 



General Order. 

' Toulouse, 

' April 21, 1814. 

' I. The Commander of the Forces has the pleasure to 
inform the army that he has agreed upon the following 
Convention* for the suspension of hostilities between the 
allied armies under his command and the French armies 
opposed to them, and hostilities are forthwith to be sus- 
pended accordingly. 

' 2. Upon congratulating the army upon this prospect of 
an honourable termination of their labours, the Commander 
of the Forces avails himself of the opportunity of returning 
the General Officers, officers, and troops, his best thanks for 
their uniform discipline and gallantry in the field, and for 
their conciliating conduct towards the inhabitants of the 
country, which, almost in an equal degree with their disci- 
pline and gallantry in the field, have produced the fortunate 
circumstances that now hold forth to the world the prospect 
of genuine and permanent peace. 

' 3. The Commander of the Forces trusts that they will 
continue the same good conduct while it may be necessary 
to detain them in this country, and that they will leave it 
with a lasting reputation, not less creditable to their 
gallantry in the field than to their regularity and good con- 
duct in quarters and in camp. 

1 Wellington.' 

Memorandum. 

To His Catholic Majesty Ferdinand VII., King of Spain. 

' The Spanish nation having been engaged for six years in 
one of the most terrible and disastrous contests by which 
any nation was ever afflicted, its territory having been 
entirely occupied by the enemy, the country torn to pieces 
by internal divisions, its ancient constitution having been de- 
stroyed, and vain attempts made to establish a new one ; its 
marine, its commerce, and revenue entirely annihilated ; its 
colonies in a state of rebellion, and nearly lost to the mother 
* Convention of Toulouse. — W. W. 



412 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 



country ; it becomes a question for serious consideration 
what line of policy should be adopted by His Majesty upon 
his happy restoration to his throne and authority. 

' . . . Great Britain is materially interested in the pros- 
perity and greatness of Spain, and a good understanding and 
close alliance with Spain is highly important to her, and she 
will make sacrifices to obtain it ; and there is no act of kind- 
ness which may not be expected from such an ally. But it 
cannot be expected from Great Britain that she will take 
any steps for the firm establishment of a Government which 
she shall see in the fair way of connecting itself with her 
rival, and of eventually becoming her enemy ; like other 
nations, she must by prudence and foresight provide for her 
own interests by other modes, if circumstances should prevent 
His Majesty from connecting himself with Great Britain, as 
it appears by the reasoning in this memorandum is desirable 
to him.' 

General Order. 

1 Bordeaux, 

' June 14, 1814. 

' I. The Commander of the Forces, being upon the point 
of returning to England, again takes this opportunity of con- 
gratulating the army upon the recent events which have 
restored peace to their country and to the world. 

' 2. The share which the British army has had in pro- 
ducing these events, and the high character with which the 
army will quit this country, must be equally satisfactory to 
every individual belonging to it, as they are to the Com- 
mander of the Forces ; and he trusts that the troops will 
continue the same good conduct to the last. 

' 3. The Commander of the Forces once more requests the 
army to accept his thanks. 

' 4. Although circumstances may alter the relations in 
which he has stood towards them, so much to his satisfac- 
tion, he assures them that he shall never cease to feel the 
warmest interest in their welfare and honour, and that he 
will be at all times happy to be of any service to those to 
whose conduct, discipline, and gallantry, their country is so 
much indebted.' 



WELLINGTON AND AMERICA 



High Duties against America. 

To His Excellency Charles Stuart. 

' Freneda, 

' October 25, 181 1. 

' . . . I have heard of the exportations of silver by the 
Americans, which it does not appear to me to be possible to 
prevent, excepting by laying such high duties upon the 
import of all articles, including corn, the produce of America, 
as shall prevent the Americans from resorting to the Portu- 
guese markets. 

1 When the Americans sell their corn at Lisbon, they must 
receive payment in money, as, owing to the uncomfortable 
state of affairs between Great Britain and America, they 
cannot take bills upon England, because that which they 
would purchase with those bills in England would not be 
admitted into America. The only remedy, therefore, ex- 
cepting that of a settlement between Great Britain and 
America, is for Portugal to lay high duties upon the import 
of the produce of America. 

1 The question upon this remedy, which will exclude the 
Americans from the Portuguese markets, is whether the 
Portuguese can do without the produce of America ? or, in 
other words, whether Great Britain and Ireland, the Barbary 
States, and the Greek islands, can supply the demands of 
Portugal for provisions ? If these demands can be supplied, 
I should recommend this measure, but it is desirable that 
you should write to the British Government upon the sub- 
ject, to let them know how the matter stands. I shall also 
mention it to Lord Liverpool. . . .' 



4 i6 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 



Memorandum. 

' In considering the paper on the subject of Portuguese 
finances of October, 1811, it is necessary to advert to the 
state of the kingdom and its credit, the probability of suc- 
cess in the war, and the chances which exist that Portugal 
may again become the theatre of the operations of the war. 

• I am not acquainted with the law adverted to in the 
paper, which has for its object to prevent the exportation of 
specie, but I am apprehensive that it cannot be put into 
execution. The exporters of specie, to the great distress of 
the army and the ruin of the country, are the American 
merchants, who have brought to Portugal articles of the first 
necessity ; these merchants cannot venture to take in pay- 
ment bills upon England, because the non-importation law 
in America would prevent them from importing into their 
own country the goods which they would purchase in 
England with the produce of these bills. 

' They must continue, therefore, to export specie from 
Portugal as long as the non-importation law of America shall 
continue in force, unless the Portuguese Government, upon 
finding the inconvenience of this drain of the precious metals, 
shall adopt measures to put an end to the importation into 
Portugal of the produce of America. The Government 
should consider whether the country can do without the 
importation from America ; whether His Majesty's dominions, 
and his influence with the Greek islands in the Barbary 
States, would procure for the country the articles of first 
necessity which it requires ; and if these articles can be 
procured in this manner, it is a measure of vital impor- 
tance to put an end to the trade with America.' 

American Embargo. 
To Lieutenant-General Graham. 

' FUENTE GUINALDO, 

'May 8, 1812. 
' . . . I have a paper from America, from which it appears 
that the Americans have laid a general embargo on all 



WELLINGTON AND AMERICA 417 



vessels. This is a measure of importance, as all this part , 
of the Peninsula has been living this year on American 
flour.' 

' These Cunning Americans.' 
To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley. 

' FUENTE GUINALDO, 

1 May IO, 1812. 

' . . . You will have heard of the American embargo 
for ninety days, from April 7 — that is to say, to see whether 
their corn will be absolutely necessary for our subsistence 
next year. If it should not be so, they will take off the 
embargo. But I see that the new Ministry have lowered 
their tone about the Orders in Council. Indeed, they have 
laid themselves on this subject at the mercy of France and 
America. . . . 

' Would it be possible to come to any arrangement with 
the Barbaresque powers to supply Cadiz, Lisbon, etc., with 
corn ? It would be capital to turn the tables upon these 
cunning Americans, and not to allow them to have any 
intercourse with those ports. I have sent to the Brazils and 
to the Mediterranean for corn, and to the British settlements 
in North America ; to the Western Islands, etc. Mexico 
ought to be able to supply some.' 



American Naval Successes. 

To Marshal C. Beresford. 

' Freneda, 

' February t>, 181 3. 

' . . . I have been very uneasy about the American naval 
successes. I think we should have peace with America 
before the season for opening the campaign in Canada, if 

we could take one or two of these d d frigates.' 

27 



4 i8 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 



Hostility of the Worst Description. 
To the Earl of Liverpool. 

' FUENTE GUINALDO, 

1 May 12, 1813. 

' We have received here the accounts of the American 
embargo for three months from April 7 ; and, adverting to 
the quantity of provisions imported into the kingdom of 
Portugal, principally, I believe, from the American States, in 
the last twelve months, of which I enclose a return, you will 
readily believe that these accounts have occasioned a good 
deal of anxiety. Not only Portugal, but the neighbouring 
provinces of Spain have subsisted upon these importations. 

' I feel no anxiety respecting the subsistence of the army 
in consequence of this measure. . . . 

'When your lordship informed me, in your letter of 
November 21, that we could not expect any supplies of grain 
from England, I desired that the magazines of the army 
might be augmented from a stock for three months' con- 
sumption to one for six months' consumption. We had 
accordingly in the magazines, when we received the accounts 
of the embargo, more than sufficient to last our army 200 
days, including that part of the Portuguese army serving in 
the British divisions. 

1 The Portuguese demands upon us for grain instead of 
money as subsidy will reduce that stock in some degree ; but 
I have directed additional purchases, in order to keep up our 
magazines to that quantity till the state of the next harvest 
in England shall be known, when, if it should be plentiful, I 
shall reduce them again to a supply for three months. 

' Expecting that something of the kind that has lately 
taken place in America would occur, I requested Mr. Stuart 
in the winter to take measures to get corn from the Brazils, 
from the North American States, and from the coast of 
Barbary, and I have since adopted measures to get some from 
the British Colonies in North America, where I believe much 
can be got. 



WELLINGTON AND AMERICA 419 

' I believe that our expectations of a supply from the 
Brazils will not be disappointed, and indeed I believe that 
a very large supply could be drawn from thence if ships were 
sent there. I am afraid that our demands in North America 
were too late. 

' It is not impossible that this measure of hostility (under 
the disguise of peace) of the worst description has been 
adopted by the American Government at an earlier period 
than was intended, in consequence of their receiving intelli- 
gence of the measures taken by us to purchase supplies there. 

' Our measures to procure supplies on the coast of Barbary 
have failed, principally, as I am informed, from the deficiencies 
of the persons employed by the British Government to 
conduct their affairs on that coast. The affairs of that 
coast become every day more interesting. It is very desirable 
that the allies should, and that the enemy should not, enjoy 
the benefit of their resources, and I believe that both 
objects could be accomplished if persons of character and 
talents were employed to conduct the affairs of the British 
Government there, instead of those who are there at present. 

' The persons who should be sent from England on these 
services, if any should be sent, might call at Lisbon and at 
Cadiz, in order to converse with the King's Ministers, and 
the persons employed at those places to superintend the 
supply of the markets, and of the magazines of the army. 

' The measures which I have adopted to get corn from the 
British Colonies in North America have been confined to 
the Commissary-General directing the Commissary-General 
there to make purchases for him, and to send them to 
Portugal ; and Mr. Stuart has desired Mr. Foster to employ 
some money which he had sent him to make purchases in 
the American States, in making purchases in the British 
Colonies. But if the embargo should be renewed, these 
measures will not be sufficient to supply the demands of this 
country and Cadiz, notwithstanding the prospects of the 
plentiful harvest. 

' Your lordship knows best whether the British Colonies 
in North America can supply any large quantity of corn ; if 

27 — 2 



420 WELLING TON ' 5 DESPA TCHES 

they can, I would beg leave to suggest that some measures 
should be adopted by Government, probably through the 
Board of Trade, to secure the importation of a large quantity 
into the Peninsula before the winter. 

' You will see in the enclosed paper the prices which the 
different kinds of grain have brought in the Lisbon market. 
Flour has latterly been from 15 to 17 dollars the barrel of 
196 pounds. The price has increased very much since the 
accounts of the embargo have been received, but I think 
they will fall again as the harvest approaches, which 
promises to be remarkably plentiful. We have already had 
an offer from America to supply us with 60,000 barrels of 
flour, at an advance of 50 per cent, beyond the price before 
the accounts of the embargo were received, to which I have 
declined to agree, as there is no want at present, and we 
could not get this supply before the harvest even in England ; 
and if the want should be so great as that the price will rise 
to the amount demanded by about 23 dollars a barrel, the 
embargo will prevent the Americans from bringing their 
corn to the Lisbon market. If the price should not rise to 
that sum, it will be because there will be plenty of corn, and if 
that should be the case there is no reason why we should 
engage to pay this exorbitant price. 

' However, the subject requires early attention to counter- 
act the mischief which the American Government certainly 
intended by laying on the embargo at the time they did, 
and I am certain that by attention there will be plenty 
in Portugal, notwithstanding the failure of the supply from 
America. . . .' 

American Vessels to be taken. 

To Marshal Beresford. 

'St. Sever, 

'-March 7, 18 14. 
' I understand that there are some American vessels in 
the river, of which you will take possession, and take the 
crews as prisoners of war.' 



WELLINGTON AND AMERICA 421 

The Expedition to North America. 
To Lieutenant-General Hill. 

' Paris, 

' May 5, 1 8 14. 

' I arrived here yesterday, and I received in the night the 
enclosed extract of a letter which Lord Bathurst had written 
to me on April 14, the original of which I ought to have 
received before I left Toulouse, but which Freemantle 
delivered to me only this day. 

' You know as much of the force and object of this expedi- 
tion* as I do. It is to be 12,000 infantry, the 14th Light 
Dragoons, and four companies of artillery. If you should 
determine to accept the command, you should prepare to set 
out for England by Paris. . . .' 

The Slave Trade. 

To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley. 

' London, 

' July 20, 1 8 14. 

' I was not aware till I had been some time here, and 
am unable to describe to you, the degree of frenzy existing 
here about the slave trade. People in general appear to 
think that it would suit the policy of the nation to go to 
war to put an end to that abominable traffic, and many 
wish that we should take the field on this new crusade. All 
agree that no favour can be shown to a slave-trading country, 
and as Spain, next to Portugal, is supposed to be the 
country which gives most protection to this trade, the 
interests and wishes of Spain are but little attended to 
here. . . .' 

* The projected expedition to North America under General Lord Hill, 
afterwards divided into separate corps, under Generals Kempt, Power, 
and Robinson, and sent to serve in Canada. Other corps were also sent 
under Generals Ross, Pakenham, Gibbs, and Keane. 



422 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

Claim of American Ships. 
To Earl Bathurst. 

' Paris, 

' August 29, 1 8 14. 

' I have the honour to inform you that there are now 
lying in the Garonne River at Bordeaux two ships, supposed, 
on good grounds, to be American, which were taken when 
the army entered that place. 

' I beg your lordship will observe that the fort of Blaye, 
which in some degree commands the passage from Bordeaux 
to the sea, was never in our possession ; and that when 
Lieutenant-General Lord Dalhousie agreed with the French 
General to a convention for the suspension of hostilities, he 
did not insist upon the free navigation of the river. 

' Under these circumstances, your lordship will be the 
best judge whether instructions ought to be given to His 
Majesty's Ambassador to claim these ships from the French 
Government.' 

Complaint against American Privateers. 
To His Highness the Prince de Benevent. 

' Paris, 

' September 4, 18 12. 

' The undersigned Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister 
Plenipotentiary from His Britannic Majesty begs to call the 
attention of His Highness the Prince de Benevent to the 
enclosed statements which he has received of the fitting 
out, the arming, manning, provisioning, and providing with 
papers, of American privateers, in the ports of France ; and 
the consequences which have resulted to the British trade in 
the Channel. 

' It is obvious that the conduct of which these papers 
give the reports deprives the ports of France of all character 
of neutrality ; and that the orders which His Highness the 
Prince de Benevent stated in His Highness's note of 
May 20 had been given by His Majesty, any more than 
those referred to in His Highness's note of June 15, have 



WELLINGTON AND AMERICA 423 

not been obeyed in the ports of Cherbourg, Morlaix, and 
L'Orient. 

' The undersigned is confident that it is only necessary 
to draw His Highness's attention to these facts, to induce 
him to take measures to insure an obedience to His Majesty's 
orders in future. . . .' 

A Right of War. 
To the Prince de Benevent. 

' Paris, 

' September 9, 18 14. 

* I have the honour to inform your Highness that I have 
received the directions of the Prince Regent to bring under 
your Highness's consideration the following circumstances 
attending the captures made by the allied forces at Bordeaux 
and in the. Garonne, and to make certain propositions, which 
follow hereafter, for the consideration of His Most Christian 
Majesty. 

' When the allied troops entered Bordeaux on March 12, 
1814, there were in the Garonne several vessels, as well of 
war as belonging to merchants ; and in the Government 
stores quantities of tobacco, the property of the late Govern- 
ment ; of miscellaneous articles confiscated, likewise the 
property of the late Government ; of salt and colonial 
produce, the property of individuals, but held by the late 
Government as a security for the payment of duties ; and 
of wine, the property of individuals, but held by the late 
Government as a security for the payment of certain sums 
due by the proprietors to Government. 

' All these vessels and goods were taken possession of by 
the Commander-in-Chief of the allied army as a right of 
war. 

' In regard to the vessels, as well of war, belonging to 
Government, as merchant vessels belonging to individuals, 
the Commander-in-Chief of the army thought proper to 
make use of the authority vested in him to give directions 
in the month of June last that the whole should be restored, 
the vessels of war to the officers of Government, and the 



424 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

merchant vessels to their owners, with the exception of two 

American vessels, and the , which still remain in 

the possession of the agents of the captors. 

' In regard to the goods, the Commander-in-Chief of the 
army, having thought proper, in consequence of the political 
state of affairs at Bordeaux at the period of the arrival 
there of the allied troops, to make over that city and its 
dependencies to the Government of His Royal Highness 
the Due d'Angouleme, he likewise made over to M. Laine, 
the Prefet appointed by His Royal Highness, the charge 
of the tobacco, miscellaneous articles, salt, colonial produce, 
and wine in the public stores, on the condition that the 
property of Government in those several articles should 
be forthcoming for the use of the allied army when called 
for. 

' It was subsequently agreed between His Royal Highness 
and the Commander-in-Chief that the salt and colonial 
produce should be allowed to be taken out of the stores by 
the proprietors of those articles, on condition of their pay- 
ing the reduced duties fixed by the Provisional Government 
of France, in their proclamation of April 24, to be levied on 
those articles respectively, instead of the duties laid on by 
the former Government; the amount of which reduced duties 
was to be forthcoming for the benefit of the captors when 
called for. 

1 Notwithstanding the undoubted right of the captors to 
the whole of this property, which they would have sold for 
their benefit at the moment of their entry into Bordeaux, 
if it had not been for the attention which the Commander- 
in-Chief thought it proper to pay to the situation of His 
Royal Highness the Due d'Angouleme ; and notwithstand- 
ing the engagements on the part of His Royal Highness 
the Due d'Angouleme, the actual Prefet refuses to give over 
any part of this property to the agents appointed to take 
charge of it on the part of the Commander-in-Chief of the 
allied army for the benefit of the captors. 

' I have, therefore, received the directions of His Royal 
Highness the Prince Regent to request your Highness to 



WELLINGTON AND AMERICA 425 

apply to His Majesty that the American ships, and 

, captured by the allied army in March last, may be 

allowed to depart from the Garonne to the place to which 
the captors may think proper to take them ; and that His 
Majesty will be pleased to give directions to the Prefet at 
Bordeaux to pay to the agent appointed by the Commander- 
in-Chief of the allied army the sum of £23,633 sterling, 
being the value of the tobacco taken in the Government 
stores on March 12 ; £1,500 sterling, being the value of 
the confiscated goods taken in the same stores at the same 
period; £21,590 sterling, being the amount of the reduced 
duties on the salt taken in the same ; £8,257 sterling, being 
the amount of the reduced duties of the articles of colonial 
produce taken in the same ; and £48,982, sterling, being 
the amount of the debts due to the late Government, for 
which the wine taken in the public stores on March 12 was 
the security. 

' Although I am instructed to lay claim to these vessels 
and sums of money on the part of His Royal Highness the 
Prince Regent, I have to inform your Highness that it is 
the intention of His Royal Highness, according to the 
custom of His Majesty's service, to give this property to 
the allied army.' 

The 'True-Blooded Yankee.' 
To the Comte de Jancourt. 

' Paris, 

' October 8, 1814. 

' I beg to draw your Excellency's attention to the follow- 
ing reports which I have received of American privateers 
in the ports of France, upon which I request your Excellency 
will order inquiries to be made. 

' The American privateer called the True-Blooded Yankee 
has been completely fitted for sea at Brest, and manned with 
a crew of 200 men. She sailed on September 21 from 
Brest. 

' The American schooner Transit has arrived at Bordeaux 
with a messenger from the United States. This vessel has 



426 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

shown only 5 guns, and reports that her crew consists only 
of 30 men ; but she carries 18 guns and 120 men (the 
latter are supposed to be in the villages on shore). A 
vessel of the same description, of the same size, and mount- 
ing the same number of guns, chased the Collingwood, a 
British merchant vessel of Plymouth, in the mouth of 
the Garonne, on September 17, and nearly ran her on shore. 
' I am convinced that your Excellency will see, in these 
instances which I have been directed to lay before you, an 
abuse of the neutrality of the French ports, and a breach of 
those rules which His Majesty has been pleased to lay down 
for the conduct of belligerents in the ports and on the coasts 
of his kingdom.' 

Misuse of French Harbours. 
To the Comte de Jaucourt. 

' Paris, 

1 October 30, 1814. 

' I have the honour to inform you that I have received 
intelligence that on the 23rd instant fifty-three American 
seamen left Bordeaux on their way to L'Orient, to be there 
embarked on board the American schooner Lion, which is at 
L'Orient. 

' I trust your Excellency will take measures to prevent 
the harbours of France from being the ports in which 
American vessels of war and privateers are fitted, manned, 
and armed, to cruise against the commerce of His Majesty's 
subjects.' 

Private Ships. 

To the Comte de Jaucourt. 

' Paris, 

' November 5, 1814. 

' I have had the honour of receiving your letter of the 4th 
instant, regarding the embarkation in a private ship, and 
passage to the United States, of certain persons from this 
country, and the return of the same ship with certain other 
persons from the United States to France. 



WELLINGTON AND AMERICA 427 

1 1 know of nothing that is to prevent or impede the safe 
arrival and return of this ship, excepting the actual blockade 
of the American port into which she should attempt to enter 
by the fleets of His Majesty; but, as it is the wish of His 
Royal Highness the Prince Regent to render the existing 
war with the United States as little troublesome as possible 
to friendly and neutral States, I should have no hesitation 
in addressing to your Excellency such a letter as you desire 
if I were not so near to His Royal Highness, and had it not 
in my power to procure immediately His Royal Highness's 
orders direct to the commanders of His Majesty's ships to 
offer no molestation to the voyage of the private ship in 
question. 

' I therefore take the earliest opportunity of making applica- 
tion for these orders, which I hope to have the honour of 
delivering to you in a few days.' 

Refusal of Terms by America. 
To the Earl of Liverpool. 

' Paris, 

' November 21, 1 8 1 4 . 

' I hear that accounts have been received here of October 23 
from America, stating that the American Government had 
refused to accede to the terms offered by us to the American 
Commissioners. 

1 1 have not been able to see the person who has got this 
letter, and I give you only what I have heard of its contents, 
but I hope to see him to-morrow.' 

A Suspicious Vessel. 
To Viscount Castlereagh. 

' Paris, 

' November 26, 1814 

1 1 enclose the copy of a letter from the Consul at Bordeaux, 
to which I beg to draw your attention. 

' I had already received reports of the sailing of the Lion 
from L' Orient, and, as I had warned the Minister of Foreign 



428 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 



Affairs of the nature of this ship, I have remonstrated against 
her being permitted to sail. He was not acquainted at the 
time I spoke to him of her having sailed, and appeared to be 
of opinion that she had escaped without the knowledge of 
the officers of the port ; but the truth is that, whatever she 
may be turned to hereafter, she has not sailed from L'Orient 
in the character of a privateer, though she is a very sus- 
picious vessel. 

' According to the system of neutrality adopted by the 
French Government, and admitted by that of His Majesty, 
it is impossible to prevent even privateers from resorting 
freely to the ports of France and quitting them at pleasure. 
I remonstrate whenever I hear of one, and the French 
Government declare, and I believe with truth, that they 
are sincerely desirous of being strictly neutral, and that the 
Americans complain of the system they have adopted, and of 
the manner in which they carry it into execution. But still 
the evil continues. I would beg leave to suggest to your 
lordship that by far the easiest way of preventing the resort 
of American privateers, and even of merchantmen, to French 
ports, would be to station a ship of war to cruise off each. 
This measure could not with justice be objected to by the 
French Government, and would effectually prevent an evil 
which, under existing circumstances, cannot be remedied in 
any other manner.' 

The Blockade of American Ports. 
To Viscount Castlereagh. 

' Paris, 

• December 4, 1814. 

1 In consequence of the directions contained in Earl 
Bathurst's despatch of November 29, I have informed 
M. de Jaucourt that the blockade of the American ports 
could not be permitted to be relieved for the purpose of 
exporting the timber required at St. Pierre and Miquelon. 

' In the meantime I received the answer, of which the 
enclosed is a copy, of the 2nd instant, to a letter I addressed 



WELLINGTON AND AMERICA 429 

M. de Jaucourt on November 21, desiring to know for what 
number of vessels passports would be required to export the 
timber wanted at St. Pierre and Miquelon. The return in 
this letter may be of use in showing your lordship what 
quantity of timber will be required from His Majesty's 
possessions in case the offer to allow it to be supplied from 
His Majesty's possessions should be accepted.' 



The War in America. 

To Lieutenant-General Sir George Murray. 

' Paris, 

' December 22, 1814. 

' I congratulate you upon the arrangement which takes 
you to America, if you like it ; but will not forget your wish 
to join me again, which I assure you I feel as it deserves, if 
I should ever again be employed in a military capacity. I 
believe your opinions and mine are not far different as to 
the war in America. I approve highly — indeed, I go 
further, I admire — all that has been done by the military in 
America, as far as I understand it generally. Whether 
Sir George Prevost was right or wrong in his decision at 
Lake Champlain is more than I can tell ; but of this I am 
very certain : he must equally have retired to Kingston after 
our fleet was beaten, and I am inclined to believe he was 
right. 

' I have told the Ministers repeatedly that a naval superi- 
ority on the lakes is a sine qua non of success in war on the 
frontier of Canada, even if our object should be solely defen- 
sive, and I hope that when you are there they will take care 
to secure it for you. 

' We have rumours of peace which I believe to be well 
founded, which I hope will stop you, unless, indeed, you 
should decidedly prefer to be there to any other situa- 
tion. . . .' 



43o WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

British Prisoners. 

To Viscount Castlereagh. 

' Paris, 

'■January 9, 181 5. 

' In reference to my despatch of the 2nd, I have now the 
honour to enclose the copy of another letter from His 
Majesty's Consul at Bordeaux, reporting that he has suc- 
ceeded in procuring the release of the British prisoners from 
on board the American ship MacDonnough.' 

Works of Art retaken. 
To Viscount Castlereagh. 

' Paris, 

'■January 15, 181 5. 

' M. le Comte de Goltz, the Prussian Minister, has in- 
formed me that the Alexander merchantship, bound from 
Leghorn to England, and lately taken by the American 
privateer Leo, was lately retaken by a British cruiser, and 
was carried into Cherbourg, and thence to a British port. 
She had on board a monument of the late Queen of Prussia, 
and other works of art belonging to His Prussian Majesty ; 
and M. de Goltz is very anxious that they should be secured, 
in order that His Majesty may get possession of them.' 



WATERLOO 



The Duke of Brunswick's Troops. 

To H.S.H. the Duke of Brunswick, K.G. 

' Bruxelles, 

'April 6, 1815. 

' It has been arranged in a treaty signed by Great 
Britain, Austria, Russia, and Prussia, to which all the other 
Powers of Europe have been called upon to accede, that the 
measures to be adopted, in consequence of the position in 
which the Powers of Europe have been placed in relation to 
France by Buonaparte's recent invasion of that kingdom, 
shall be adopted by common accord ; and His Majesty's 
Minister will make known your Highness's desire that your 
troops should be at the disposition of His Royal Highness 
the Prince Regent.' 

Memorandum 
On the Defence of the Frontier of the Netherlands. 

' Paris, 

' September 22, 18 14. 

1 . . . There are good positions for an army at La Trinite 
and at Renaix behind Tournay ; another between Tournay 
and Mons, on the high grounds about Blaton ; there are 
many good positions about Mons ; the course of the Haine 
from Binch towards Mons would afford some good ones ; 
about Nivelle, and between that and Binch, there are many 
advantageous positions ; and the entrance of the foret de 
Soignies* by the highroad which leads to Brussels from 
Binch, Charleroi, and Namur, would, if worked upon, afford 
others. . . .' 

* Where the Battle of Waterloo was fought in the following year. 

28 



434 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

A Mutiny and ' Poor Old Blucher. ' 
To the Earl of Clancarty, G.C.B. 

' Bruxelles, 

1 May 3, 1815. 

' . . . The Saxons mutinied last night at Liege, and obliged 
poor old Blucher to quit the town ; the cause of the mutiny 
was the order to divide the corps, and that the Prussian part, 
in which the guards were included, should take the oath of 
allegiance to the King of Prussia. 

' We hear of Buonaparte's qutting Paris, and of the march 
of troops to this frontier, in order to attack us. I met 
Blucher at Tirlemont this day, and received from him the 
most satisfactory assurances of support. 

' For an action in Belgium I can now put 70,000 men into 
the field, and Blucher 80,000, so that I hope we should give 
a good account even of Buonaparte. 

' I am not satisfied with our delays.' 

Buonaparte's Movements. 

To Lieutenant-General Lord Hill. 

1 Bruxelles, 

' May 9, 181 5, noon. 

' Matters look a little serious upon the frontier ; the 
enemy have certainly got the greatest part of their force 
collected at Valenciennes and Maubeuge, and it is said that 
Buonaparte arrived yesterday at Conde. I was assured at 
Ghent on Sunday that he was to leave Paris on this day. 
It is certain that all communication is stopped since yester- 
day morning. . . .' 

To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley. 

1 Bruxelles, 

1 May 12, 1815. 

' . . . There has been a good deal of movement upon the 
frontier in the last week, but I am inclined to believe it is 
entirely defensive, and that Buonaparte cannot venture to 



WATERLOO 435 



quit Paris. Indeed, all accounts give reason to hope that, 
even without the aid of the Allies, his power will not be of 
long duration.' 

To General Lord Lynedoch, G.C.B. 

' Bruxelles, 

'June 13, 1815. 

' . . . There is nothing new here. We have reports of 
Buonaparte's joining the army and attacking us, but I have 
accounts from Paris of the 10th, on which day he was still 
there, and I judge from his speech to the Legislature that 
his departure was not likely to be immediate. I think we 
are now too strong for him here.' 

Rations for Brunswick Troops. 

To Commissary -General Dunmore. 

' Bruxelles, 

' May 13, 1815. 

' I beg you will take measures to feed the Brunswick 
troops to-morrow, and afterwards ; you will learn from the 
Quartermaster-General where they are, and I beg you will 
send somebody to their cantonments at Vilvorde in the 
morning at daylight. 

' Their ration for men must be two pounds of bread, half 
a pound of meat and vegetables. The ration for their 
horses is ten pounds of hay, and one-eighth of a peck of 
oats. 

' The vegetables should be : A quarter of a pound of grits, 
barley, or rice ; or half a pound of peas, beans, vetches, or 
oatmeal ; or one pound of potatoes, or other vegetables.' 

Disposition of French Troops. 
To Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Henry Hardinge, K.C.B. 

' Bruxelles, 

' May 16, 1815, 11 a.m. 

' I enclose a memorandum which I have drawn from 
intelligence I have recently received, from which the Marshal 

28—2 



436 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

will see the strength and disposition of the French army ; 
and that with the ist, 2nd, 3rd and 6th Corps, and the 
Guards, and the 3rd Division of cavalry of reserve, we have 
a good lot of them in our front. I should think not less than 
110,000 men. . . .' 

Memorandum. 

For the Deputy Quartermaster-General. 

Movements of the Army. 

' Bruxelles, 

'■June 15, 1815. 

' General Dornberg's brigade of cavalry, and the Cumber- 
land Hussars, to march this night upon Vilvorde, and to 
bivouac on the highroad near to that town. 

' The Earl of Uxbridge will be pleased to collect the 
cavalry this night at Ninhove, leaving the 2nd Hussars 
looking out between the Scheldt and the Lys. 

' The ist Division of infantry to collect this night at Ath 
and adjacent, and to be in readiness to move at a moment's 
notice. 

'The 3rd Division to collect this night at Brainele Comte, 
and to be in readiness to move at the shortest notice. 

' The 4th Division to be collected this night at Grammont, 
with the exception of the troops beyond the Scheldt, which 
are to be moved to Audenarde. 

' The 5th Division, the 81st Regiment, and the Hanoverian 
brigade of the 6th Division, to be in readiness to march from 
Bruxelles at a moment's notice. 

' The Duke of Brunswick's corps to collect this night on 
the highroad between Bruxelles and Vilvorde. 

'The Nassau troops to collect at daylight to-morrow morn- 
ing on the Louvain road, and to be in readiness to move at 
a moment's notice. 

'The Hanoverian brigade of the 5th Division to collect 
this night at Hal, and to be in readiness at daylight to- 
morrow morning to move towards Bruxelles, and to halt on 
the highroad between Alost and Assche for further orders. 



WATERLOO 437 



' The Prince of Orange is requested to collect at Nivelles 
the 2nd and 3rd Divisions of the army of the Low Countries ; 
and, should that point have been attacked this day, to move 
the 3rd Division of British infantry upon Nivelles as soon as 
collected. 

' This movement is not to take place until it is quite 
certain that the enemy's attack is upon the right of the 
Prussian army, and the left of the British army. 

' Lord Hill will be so good as to order Prince Frederick 
of Orange to occupy Audenarde with 500 men, and to collect 
the 1st Division of the army of the Low Countries, and the 
Indian brigade at Sotteghem, so as to be ready to march in 
the morning at daylight. 

' The reserve artillery to be in readiness to move at day- 
light. 

' Wellington.' 

Movement of the Army. 
After-Orders, 10 o'clock p.m. 

' Bruxelles, 

l Jime 15, 18 15. 

' The 3rd Division of infantry to continue its movement 
from Braine le Comte upon Nivelles. 

' The 1st Division to move from Enghien upon Braine le 
Comte. 

' The 2nd and 4th Divisions of infantry to move from Ath 
and Grammont, also from Audenarde, and to continue their 
movements upon Enghien. 

' The cavalry to continue its movement from Ninhove upon 
Enghien. 

'The above movements to take place with as little delay as 
possible. 

' Wellington.' 



438 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

Instructions for the Movement of the Army on 
the i6th.* 

Signed by Colonel Sir W. De Lancey, Deputy Quartermaster- 
General. 

To General Lord Hill. 

'•June 16, 1815. 

' The Duke of Wellington requests that you will move the 
2nd Division of infantry upon Braine le Comte immediately. 
The cavalry has been ordered likewise on Braine le Comte. 
His Grace is going to Waterloo.' 

1 June 16, 1 81 5. 

' Your lordship is requested to order Prince Frederick of 
Orange to move, immediately upon the receipt of this order, 
the 1st Division of the army of the Low Countries, and the 
Indian brigade, from Sotteghem to Enghien, leaving 500 
men, as before directed, in Audenarde.' 

' Genappe, 

'■June 16, 1815. 

' The 2nd Division of infantry to move to-morrow morning 
at daybreak from Nivelles to Quatre Bras. 

' The 4th Division of infantry to move at daybreak to- 
morrow morning to Nivelles.' 

'■June 16, 181 5. 

' The reserve artillery to move at daybreak to-morrow 
morning, the 17th, to Quatre Bras, where it will receive 
further orders.' 

To Major-General Sir J. Lambert, K.C.B. 

'June 16, 181 5. 

' The brigade of infantry, under the command of Major- 
General Sir J. Lambert, to march from Assche at daybreak 
to-morrow morning, the 17th instant, to Genappe, on the 
Namur road, and to remain there until further orders.' 

* The original instructions issued to Colonel de Lancey were lost with 
that officer's papers. These memorandums of movements have been 
collected from the different officers to whom they were addressed. 



WATERLOO 439 



Instructions for the Movement of the Army on 
the 17TH. 

To General Lord Hill. 

'June 17, 1815. 

' The 2nd Divison of British infantry to march from 
Nivelles on Waterloo at ten o'clock. 

' The brigades of the 4th Division now at Nivelles to 
march from that place on Waterloo at ten o'clock. Those 
brigades of the 4th Division at Braine le Comte, and on the 
road from Braine le Comte to Nivelles, to collect and halt at 
Braine le Comte this day. 

'All the baggage on the road from Braine le Comte to 
Nivelles to return immediately to Braine le Comte, and to 
proceed immediately from thence to Hal and Bruxelles. 

' The spare musket ammunition to be immediately parked 
behind Genappe. 

' The corps under the command of Prince Frederick of 
Orange will move from Enghien this evening, and take up a 
position in front of Hal, occupying Braine le Chateau with 
two battalions. 

' Colonel Erstorff will fall back with his brigade on Hal, 
and place himself under the orders of Prince Frederick.' 

Final Words. 

To Major-General Colville. 

'June 17, 1815. 

'The army retired this day from its position at Quatre 
Bras to its present position in front of Waterloo. 

1 The brigades of the 4th Division at Braine le Comte are 
to retire at daylight to-morrow morning upon Hal. 

' Major- General Colville must be guided by the intelligence 
he receives of the enemy's movements in his march to Hal, 
whether he moves by the direct route or by Enghien. 

' Prince Frederick of Orange is to occupy with his corps 
the position between Hal and Enghien, and is to defend it as 
long as possible. 



440 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

' The army will probably continue in its position in front 
of Waterloo to-morrow. 

' Lieutenant - Colonel Torrens will inform Lieutenant- 
General Sir C. Colville of the position and situation of the 
armies.' 

To Sir Charles Stuart. 

' Waterloo, 

' June 18, 1815, 3 a.m. 

' I enclose two letters, which I beg you to peruse and 
forward without loss of time. You will see in the letter to 
the Due de Berri the real state of our case and the only risk 
we run. The Prussians will be ready again in the morning 
for anything. 

' Pray keep the English quiet if you can. Let them all 
prepare to move, but neither be in a hurry or a fright, as all 
will yet turn out well. 

' I have given the directions to the Governor of Antwerp 
to meet the crotchets which I find in the heads of the King's 
Governors upon every turn. 

' The post-horses are embargoed in my name — I conclude, 
to prevent people from running away with them ; but give 
the man orders to allow anybody to have them who goes 
with an order from you.' 

THE WATERLOO DESPATCH.* 

To Earl Bathurst. 

' Waterloo, 

'■June 19, 18 1 5. 

' My Lord, 

' Buonaparte, having collected the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 
and 6th Corps of the French army, and the Imperial Guards, 
and nearly all the cavalry, on the Sambre, and between that 
river and the Meuse, between the 10th and 14th of the month, 

* Captain William Siborne's celebrated model of the Battle of Waterloo 
is in the Museum of the Royal United Service Institution, Whitehall. 
It represents the time when Napoleon was making his last effort for 
victory. It was claimed by Siborne that the Government entrusted him 
with the task of making the model, but when the work was suspended in 



WATERLOO 441 



advanced on the 15th and attacked the Prussian posts at 
Thuin and Lobbes, on the Sambre, at daylight in the 
morning. 

' I did not hear of these events till in the evening of the 
15th ; and I immediately ordered the troops to prepare to 
march, and afterwards to march to their left, as soon as I 
had intelligence from other quarters to prove that the 
enemy's movement upon Charleroi was the real attack. 

' The enemy drove the Prussian posts from the Sambre on 
that day ; and General Ziethen, who commanded the corps 
which had been at Charleroi, retired upon Fleurus ; and 
Marshal Prince Bliicher concentrated the Prussian army 
upon Sombref, holding the villages in front of his position of 
St. Amand and Ligny. 

' The enemy continued his march along the road from 
Charleroi towards Bruxelles ; and on the same evening, the 
15th, attacked a brigade of the army of the Netherlands, 
under the Prince de Weimar, posted at Frasne, and forced 
it back to the farmhouse, on the same road, called Les 
Quatre Bras. 

'The Prince of Orange immediately reinforced this brigade 
with another of the same division, under General Perponcher, 
and, in the morning early, regained part of the ground which 
had been lost, so as to have the command of the communi- 
cation leading from Nivelles and Bruxelles with Marshal 
Bliicher's position. 

' In the meantime I had directed the whole army to 
march upon Les Quatre Bras ; and the 5th Division, under 
Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Picton, arrived at about 
half-past two in the day, followed by the corps of troops 
under the Duke of Brunswick, and afterwards by the con- 
tingent of Nassau. 

' At this time the enemy commenced an attack upon 

1833, owing to the change of Administration, he finished it on his own 
account, and at a cost to himself of more than ,£4,000. After suffering 
much disappointment in connection with the model, it was purchased 
from Captain Siborne by public subscription, and placed in the museum 
for permanent exhibition. — W. W. 



442 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

Prince Bliicher with his whole force, excepting the ist and 
2nd Corps, and a corps of cavalry under General Kellermann, 
with which he attacked our post at Les Quatre Bras. 

' The Prussian army maintained their position with their 
usual gallantry and perseverance against a great disparity 
of numbers, as the 4th Corps of their army, under General 
Biilow, had not joined ; and I was not able to assist them 
as I wished, as I was attacked myself, and the troops, the 
cavalry in particular, which had a long distance to march, 
had not arrived. 

' We maintained our position also, and completely de- 
feated and repulsed all the enemy's attempts to get posses- 
sion of it. The enemy repeatedly attacked us with a large 
body of infantry and cavalry, supported by a numerous and 
powerful artillery. He made several charges w T ith the cavalry 
upon our infantry, but all were repulsed in the steadiest 
manner. 

' In this affair His Royal Highness the Prince of Orange, 
the Duke of Brunswick, and Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas 
Picton, and Major-Generals Sir James Kempt and Sir Denis 
Pack, who were engaged from the commencement of the 
enemy's attack, highly distinguished themselves, as well as 
Lieutenant-General Charles Baron Alten, Major-General Sir 
C. Halkett, Lieutenant-General Cooke, and Major-Generals 
Maitland and Byng, as they successively arrived. The 
troops of the 5th Division, and those of the Brunswick 
corps, were long and severely engaged, and conducted them- 
selves with the utmost gallantry. I must particularly men- 
tion the 28th, 42nd, 79th, and 92nd Regiments,* and the 
battalion of Hanoverians. 

' Our loss was great, as your lordship will perceive by the 
enclosed return, and I have particularly to regret His Serene 

* The 28th is now the ist Battalion the Gloucestershire Regiment. 
The 42nd is the ist Battalion the Black Watch (Royal Highlanders), the 
79th is the Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders, and the 92nd is the 
2nd Battalion the Gordon Highlanders. The pipers mustered the High- 
land Brigade for Waterloo to the terribly prophetic strains of ' Come to 
me, and I will give you flesh.' — W. W. 



WATERLOO 443 



Highness the Duke of Brunswick, who fell fighting gallantly 
at the head of his troops. 

' Although Marshal Bliicher had maintained his position 
at Sombref, he still found himself much weakened by the 
severity of the contest in which he had been engaged, and, 
as the 4th Corps had not arrived, he determined to fall back, 
and to concentrate his army upon Wavre ; and he marched 
in the night, after the action was over. 

' This movement of the Marshal rendered necessary a 
corresponding one upon my part ; and I retired from the 
farm of Quatre Bras upon Genappe, and thence upon 
Waterloo the next morning, the 17th, at ten o'clock. 

1 The enemy made no effort to pursue Marshal Bliicher. 
On the contrary, a patrol which I sent to Sombref in the 
morning found all quiet,* and the enemy's vedettes fell back 
as the patrol advanced. Neither did he attempt to molest 
our march to the rear, although made in the middle of the 
day, excepting by following, with a large body of cavalry 
brought from his right, the cavalry under the Earl of 
Uxbridge. 

'This gave Lord Uxbridge an opportunity of charging 
them with the 1st Life Guards, upon their debouche from 
the village of Genappe, upon which occasion his lordship 
has declared himself to be well satisfied with that regiment. 

' The position which I took up in front of Waterloo 
crossed the highroads from Charleroi and Nivelles, and had 
its right thrown back to a ravine near Merke Braine, which 
was occupied, and its left extended to a height above the 
hamlet Ter la Haye, which was likewise occupied. In front 
of the right centre, and near the Nivelles road, we occupied 
the house and gardens of Hougoumont, which covered the 
return of that flank ; and in front of the left centre we occu- 
pied the farm of La Haye Sainte. By our left we com- 
municated with Marshal Prince Bliicher at Wavre, through 

* Lieutenant- Colonel the Hon. Alexander Gordon was sent, escorted 
by a squadron of the 10th Hussars, to communicate with the Prussian 
headquarters as to co-operation with the British army ordered to retire 
to the position in front of Waterloo. 



444 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

Ohain ; and the Marshal had promised me that, in case we 
should be attacked, he would (support me with one or more 
corps, as might be necessary. 

' The enemy collected his army, with the exception of the 
3rd Corps, which had been sent to observe Marshal Bliicher, 
on a range of heights in our front, in the course of the 
night of the 17th and yesterday morning, and at about ten 
o'clock he commenced a furious attack upon our post at 
Hougoumont. I had occupied that post with a detachment 
from General Byng's brigade of Guards, which was in 
position in its rear ; and it was for some time under the 
command of Lieutenant-Colonel Macdonell, and afterwards 
of Colonel Home ; and I am happy to add that it was main- 
tained throughout the day with the utmost gallantry by these 
brave troops, notwithstanding the repeated efforts of large 
bodies of the enemy to obtain possession of it. 

' This attack upon the right of our centre was accompanied 
by a very heavy cannonade upon our whole line, which was 
destined to support the repeated attacks of cavalry and 
infantry, occasionally mixed, but sometimes separate, which 
were made upon it. In one of these the enemy carried the 
farmhouse of La Haye Sainte, as the detachment of the 
light battalion of the German Legion, which occupied it, 
had expended all its ammunition ; and the enemy occupied 
the only communication there was with them. 

' The enemy repeatedly charged our infantry with his 
cavalry, but these attacks were uniformly unsuccessful ; and 
they afforded opportunities to our cavalry to charge, in one 
of which Lord E. Somerset's brigade, consisting of the Life 
Guards, the Royal Horse Guards, and 1st Dragoon Guards, 
highly distinguished themselves, as did that of Major-General 
Sir William Ponsonby, having taken many prisoners and an 
eagle. 

' These attacks were repeated till about seven in the 
evening, when the enemy made a desperate effort with 
cavalry and infantry, supported by the fire of artillery, to 
force our left centre, near the farm of La Haye Sainte, 
which after a severe contest was defeated ; and, having 



WATERLOO 445 



observed that the troops retired from this attack in great 
confusion, and that the march of General Billow's corps, by 
Frischermont upon Planchenois and La Belle Alliance, had 
begun to take effect, and as I could perceive the fire of his 
cannon, and as Marshal Prince Bliicher had joined in person 
with a corps of his army to the left of our line by Ohain, I 
determined to attack the enemy, and immediately advanced 
the whole line of infantry, supported by the cavalry and 
artillery. The attack succeeded in every point : the enemy 
was forced from his positions on the heights, and fled in the 
utmost confusion, leaving behind him, as far as I could judge, 
150 pieces of cannon, with their ammunition, which fell into 
our hands. 

' I continued the pursuit till long after dark, and then 
discontinued it only on account of the fatigue of our troops, 
who had been engaged during twelve hours, and because I 
found myself on the same road with Marshal Bliicher, who 
assured me of his intention to follow the enemy throughout 
the night. He has sent me word this morning that he had 
taken 60 pieces of cannon belonging to the Imperial Guard, 
and several carriages, baggage, etc., belonging to Buonaparte 
in Genappe. 

' I propose to move this morning upon Nivelles, and not 
to discontinue my operations. 

' Your lordship will observe that such a desperate action 
could not be fought, and such advantages could not be 
gained, without great loss ; and I am sorry to add that 
ours has been immense. In Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas 
Picton His Majesty has sustained the loss of an officer who 
has frequently distinguished himself in his service, and he 
fell gloriously leading his division to a charge with bayonets, 
by which one of the most serious attacks made by the enemy 
on our position was repulsed. The Earl of Uxbridge, after 
having successfully got through this arduous day, received a 
wound by almost the last shot fired, which will, I am afraid, 
deprive His Majesty for some time of his services. 

' His Royal Highness the Prince of Orange distinguished 
himself by his gallantry and conduct, till he received a 



446 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 



wound from a musket -ball through the shoulder, which 
obliged him to quit the field. 

' It gives me the greatest satisfaction to assure your 
lordship that the army never upon any occasion conducted 
itself better. The division of Guards, under Lieutenant- 
General Cooke, who is severely wounded, Major-General 
Maitland, and Major-General Byng, set an example which 
was followed by all, and there is no officer nor description of 
troops that did not behave well. 

' I must, however, particularly mention for His Royal 
Highness's approbation Lieutenant-General Sir H. Clinton, 
Major-General Adam, Lieutenant-General Charles Baron 
Alten (severely wounded), Major-General Sir Colin Halkett 
(severely wounded), Colonel Ompteda, Colonel Mitchell 
(commanding a brigade of the 4th Division), Major-Generals 
Sir James Kempt and Sir D. Pack, Major-General Lambert, 
Major-General Lord E. Somerset, Major-General Sir W. 
Ponsonby, Major-General Sir C. Grant, and Major-General 
Sir H. Vivian, Major-General Sir O. Vandeleur, and Major- 
General Count Dornberg. 

' I am also particularly indebted to General Lord Hill 
for his assistance and conduct upon this, as upon all former 
occasions. 

' The artillery and engineer departments were conducted 
much to my satisfaction by Colonel Sir George Wood and 
Colonel Smyth ; and I had every reason to be satisfied with 
the conduct of the Adjutant-General, Major-General Barnes, 
who was wounded, and of the Quartermaster - General, 
Colonel De Lancey, who was killed by a cannon-shot in the 
middle of the action. This officer is a serious loss to His 
Majesty's service, and to me at this moment. 

' I was likewise much indebted to the assistance of Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel Lord FitzRoy Somerset, who was severely 
wounded, and of the officers composing my personal staff, 
who have suffered severely in this action. Lieutenant- 
Colonel the Hon. Sir Alexander Gordon, who has died of his 
wounds, was a most promising officer, and is a serious loss 
to His Majesty's service. 



WATERLOO 447 



' General Kruse, of the Nassau service, likewise conducted 
himself much to my satisfaction, as did General Tripp, com- 
manding the heavy brigade of cavalry, and General Vanhope, 
commanding a brigade of infantry, in the service of the King 
of the Netherlands. 

' General Pozzo di Borgo, General Baron Vincent, General 
Muffling, and General Alava, were in the field during the 
action, and rendered me every assistance in their power. 
Baron Vincent is wounded, but I hope not severely, and 
General Pozzo di Borgo received a contusion. 

' I should not do justice to my own feelings, or to Marshal 
Bliicher and the Prussian army, if I did not attribute the 
successful result of this arduous day to the cordial and 
timely assistance I received from them. The operation of 
General Biilow upon the enemy's flank was a most decisive 
one ; and even if I had not found myself in a situation to 
make the attack which produced the final result, it would 
have forced the enemy to retire if his attacks should have 
failed, and would have prevented him from taking advantage 
of them if they should unfortunately have succeeded. 

' Since writing the above, I have received a report that 
Major -General Sir William Ponsonby is killed, and, in 
announcing this intelligence to your lordship, I have to add 
the expression of my grief for the fate of an officer who had 
already rendered very brilliant and important services, and 
was an ornament to his profession. 

' I send with this despatch three eagles,* taken by the 

troops in this action, which Major Percy will have the 

honour of laying at the feet of His Royal Highness. I beg 

leave to recommend him to your lordship's protection. 

' I have the honour to be, etc., 

' Wellington. 
' Earl Bathurst. 5 

* One of these was taken by Sergeant Ewart, of the Scots Greys. 
That regiment — now the 2nd Dragoons (Royal Scots Greys) — bears as a 
badge an eagle with which is the word 'Waterloo.' The ist (Royal) 
Dragoons also bear an eagle as a badge, to represent the capture of a 
French standard at Waterloo. — W. W. 



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29 



45° 



WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 



Return of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing, of the British and 
Hanoverian Army under the Command of Field-Marshal the 
Duke of Wellington, K.G., in the Battle fought at Quatre 
Bras on June 16, 1815. 











Total Loss of 
















Officers, Non- 










Officers. 


Ser- 
geants. 


Rank 

and File. 


commissioned 

Officers, and 

Rank and 

File. 


British. 


Hano- 
verians. 


Horses. 


Killed - 


29 


19 


302 


350 


316 


34 


19 


Wounded 


126 


III 


2,143 


2,380 


2,156 


224 


14 


Missing - 


4 


6 


171 


l8l 


32 


149 


I 



On the Retreat from Quatre Bras to Waterloo on June 17, 

1815- 











Total Loss of 
















Officers, Non- 










Officers. 


Ser- 
geants. 


Rank 

and File. 


commissioned 

Officers, and 

Rank and 

File. 


British. 


Hano- 
verians. 


Horses. 


Killed - 


I 


I 


33 


35 


26 


9 


45 


Wounded 


7 


13 


112 


132 


52 


80 


20 


Missing - 


4 


3 


64 


71 


3° 


32 


33 



In the Battle foug 


hi at Waterloo on 


June 18, 1815 






Officers. 


Ser- 
geants. 


Rank 
and File. 


Total Loss of 
Officers, Non- 
commissioned 
Officers, and 
Rank and 
File. 


British. 


Hano- 
verians. 


Horses. 


Killed 
Wounded 
Missing - 


116 

504 

20 


IO9 

3D4 
29 


1,822 
6,148 

1,574 


2,047 
7,Ol6 
1,623 


1,759 

5,892 

807 


288 

1,124 

8l6 


i,495 
891 

773 



Total 



Killed. 
2,432 



Wounded. 
9,528 



Missing. 
1,875 



The greater number of the men returned as missing had gone to the 
rear with wounded officers and soldiers, and joined afterwards. The 
officers are supposed killed. 



WATERLOO 451 



To the Earl of Aberdeen, K.T. 

' Bruxelles, 

'■/tine 19, 18 1 5. 

1 You will readily give credit to the existence of the extreme 
grief with which I announce to you the death of your gallant 
brother, in consequence of a wound received in our great 
battle of yesterday. 

' He had served me most zealously and usefully for many 
years, and on many trying occasions ; but he had never 
rendered himself more useful, and had never distinguished 
himself more, than in our late actions. 

' He received the wound which occasioned his death when 
rallying one of the Brunswick battalions which was shaking 
a little, and he lived long enough to be informed by myself 
of the glorious result of our actions, to which he had so much 
contributed by his active and zealous assistance. 

' I cannot express to you the regret and sorrow with which 
I look round me, and contemplate the loss which I have 
sustained, particularly in your brother. The glory resulting 
from such actions, so dearly bought, is no consolation to me, 
and I cannot suggest it as any to you and his friends ; but 
I hope that it may be expected that this last one has been 
so decisive as that no doubt remains that our exertions and 
our individual losses will be rewarded by the early attainment 
of our just object. It is then that the glory of the actions in 
which our friends and relations have fallen will be some con- 
solation for their loss. 

' Your brother had a black horse, given to him, I believe, 
by Lord Ashburnham, which I will keep till I hear from you 
what you wish should be done with it.' 

Broken Down by Losses. 
To the Duke of Beaufort, K.G. 

' Bruxelles, 

'■June 19, 181 5. 

' I am very sorry to have to acquaint you that your 
brother FitzRoy is very severely wounded, and has lost 

29 — 2 



452 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

his right arm. I have just seen him, and he is perfectly 
free from fever, and as well as anybody could be under such 
circumstances. You are aware how useful he has always 
been to me, and how much I shall feel the want of his 
assistance, and what a regard and affection I feel for him ; 
and you will readily believe how much concerned I am for 
his misfortune. Indeed, the losses I have sustained have 
quite broken me down,* and I have no feeling for the 
advantages we have acquired. I hope, however, that your 
brother will soon be able to join me again, and that he 
will long live to be as he is likely to become, an honour 
to his country, as he is a satisfaction to his family and 
friends.' 

To Earl Bathurst. 

1 Bruxelles, 

''June 19, 181 5. 

' I have to inform your lordship, in addition to my despatch 
of this morning, that we have already got here 5,000 prisoners, 
taken in the action of yesterday, and that there are above 
2,000 more coming in to-morrow. There will probably be 
many more.t 

' Amongst the prisoners are the Comte de Lobau, who 
commanded the 6th Corps, and General Cambrone, who 
commanded a division of the Guards. 

' I propose to send the whole to England, by Ostend.' 

To General Doumouriez. 

' a Nivelles, 

1 ce 20 Juin, 18 1 5. 

' . . . J'avais commence cette lettre le 14, et, comme 
ce n'etait pas jour de poste, je ne l'avais pas finie; et j'etais 
engage avec l'ennemi le Vendredi, qui etait jour de poste. 
J'ai depuis recu votre lettre du 15, pour laquelle je vous 
suis bien oblige. 

* The tears ran down Wellington's cheeks as he listened to the 
surgeon's report of the losses in the battle. — W. W. 

•f The French loss at Waterloo has been estimated at 30,000, with 
200 guns. The Prussian loss was about 7,000. — W. W. 



WATERLOO 453 



' Vous aurez vu ce que j'ai fait, et j'espere que vous en 
serez content. Jamais je n'ai vu une telle bataille que celle 
d'avant hier, ni n'ai remport6 une telle victoire ; et j'espere 
que c'est fini de Buonaparte. . . .' 

General Order. 

' NlVELLES, 

'June 20, 181 5. 

' I. As the army is about to enter the French territory, 
the troops of the nations which are at present under the 
command of Field-Marshal the Duke of Wellington are 
desired to recollect that their respective Sovereigns are the 
Allies of His Majesty the King of France, and that France 
ought, therefore, to be treated as a friendly country. It is 
therefore required that nothing should be taken, either by 
officers or soldiers, for which payment be not made. The 
Commissaries of the army will provide for the wants of the 
troops in the usual manner, and it is not permitted either to 
soldiers or officers to extort contributions. The Commissaries 
will be authorized, either by the Field-Marshal or by the 
Generals who command the troops of the respective nations, 
in cases where their provisions are not supplied by an English 
Commissary, to make the proper requisitions, for which 
regular receipts will be given ; and it must be strictly under- 
stood that they will themselves be held responsible for what- 
ever they obtain in way of requisition from the inhabitant 
of France, in the same manner in which they would be 
esteemed accountable for purchases made for their own 
Government in the several dominions to which they belong. 

' 2. The Field-Marshal takes this opportunity of returning 
to the army his thanks for their conduct in the glorious action 
fought on the 18th instant, and he will not fail to report his 
sense of their conduct in the terms which it deserves to their 
several Sovereigns.' 

Proclamation. 
' Je fais savoir aux Francais que j'entre dans leur pays a 
la tete d'une armee deja victorieuse, non en ennemi (excepte 
de l'usurpateur, prononce l'ennemi du genre humain, avec 



454 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

lequel on ne peut avoir ni paix ni treve), mais pour les aider 
a secouer le joug de fer par lequel ils sont opprimes. 

' En consequence j'ai donne les ordres ci-joints a mon 
armee, et je demande qu'on me fasse connaitre tout infrac- 
teur. 

'Les Francais savent cependant que j'ai le droit d'exiger 
qu'ils se conduisent de maniere que je puisse les proteger 
contre ceux qui voudraient leur faire du mal. 

' II faut done qu'ils fournissent aux requisitions qui leur 
seront faites de la part des personnes autorisees a les faire, 
en exchange pour des recus en forme et ordre ; et qu'ils se 
tiennent chez eux paisiblement, et qu'ils n'aient aucune cor- 
respondance ou communication avec l'usurpateur ennemi, ni 
avec ses adherens. 

' Tous ceux qui s'absenteront de leur domicile apres 
l'entree en France, et tous ceux qui se trouveront absens au 
service de l'usurpateur, seront considered comme ses adherens 
et comme ennemis ; et leurs proprietes seront affectees a la 
subsistance de l'armee. 

1 Donne au Quartier General, a Malplaquet, ce 22 Juin, 
1815. 

' Wellington.' 

' Declaration an Penfile Francais. 

' Au Palais de l'Elysee, 

' Francais ! ' U 22 Juin, 1815. 

' En commencant la guerre pour soutenir l'independance nationale, 

je comptais sur la reunion de tous les efforts, de toutes les volonte's, et le 

concours de toutes les autorite's nationales ; j'etais fonde" a en espdrer le 

succes, et j'avais brave* toutes les declarations des puissances contre moi. 

' Les circonstances me paraissent change'es. Je m'ofifre en sacrifice a 
la haine des ennemis de la France. Puissent-ils etre sinceres dans leurs 
declarations, et n'en avoir nfellement voulu qu'a ma personne. 

' Ma vie politique est termine'e, et je proclame mon fils sous le titre de 
Napole"on II., Empereur des Frangais. 

' Les ministres actuels formeront provisoirement le conseil de gouverne- 
ment. 

' Lntd ret que je porte a mon fils m'engage a inviter les Chambres a 
organiser sans ddlai la Rdgence par une loi. 

' Unissez-vous tous pour le salut public et pour rester une nation inde - - 

pendante. 

' Napoleon.' 



WATERLOO 455 



After the Battle. 

To Earl Bathurst. 

' Le Cateau, 

' June 22, 1815. 

' We have continued in march on the left of the Sambre 
since I wrote to you. Marshal Bliicher crossed that river 
on the 19th in pursuit of the enemy, and both armies entered 
the French territory yesterday ; the Prussian by Beaumont, 
and the allied army under my command, by Bavay. 

' We have blockaded Le Quesnoi and Valenciennes ; the 
Prussian army Landrecy and Maubeuge. Avesnes surren- 
dered to the latter last night. 

' I expect the King of France at Mons to-morrow. I have 
written to urge him to come forward, as I find the people 
in this country well disposed to his cause, and I think it 
probable that he might be able to get possession of some of 
the fortresses. 

' The remains of the French army have retired upon Laon. 
All accounts agree in stating that it is in a very wretched 
state, and that, in addition to its losses in battle and in 
prisoners, it is losing vast numbers of men by desertion. The 
soldiers quit their regiments in parties, and return to their 
homes, those of the cavalry and artillery selling their horses 
to the people of the country. 

' The 3rd Corps, which in my despatch of the 19th I 
informed your lordship had been detached to observe the 
Prussian army, remained in the neighbourhood of Wavre till 
the 20th. It then made good its retreat by Namur and 
Dinant. This corps is the only one remaining entire. . . .' 

Napoleon's Death-blow. 
To Lientenant-General the Earl of Uxbridge, G.C.B. 

'Le Cateau, 

1 June 23, 181 5. 

' . . . I may be wrong, but my opinion is, that we have 
given Napoleon his death-blow; from all I hear his army is 



456 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 



totally destroyed, the men are deserting in parties, even the 
Generals are withdrawing from him. The infantry throw 
away their arms, and the cavalry and artillery sell their 
horses to the people of the country and desert to their homes. 
Allowing for much exaggeration in this account, and knowing 
ihat Buonaparte can still collect, in addition to what he has 
brought back with him, the 5th Corps d'armee, under Rapp, 
which is near Strasbourg, and the 3rd Corps, which was at 
Wavre during the battle, and has not suffered so much as 
the others, and probably some troops from La Vendee, I am 
still of opinion that he can make no head against us, qu'il ria 
qiCa se pendre. . . . 

1 We have blockaded Le Quesnoi and Valenciennes ; the 
Prussians, Landrecy and Maubeuge. Buonaparte is trying 
to collect his army at Laon. Avesnes has surrendered to the 
Prussians.' 

Dissatisfaction with Inferiors. 
To Earl Bathurst. 

' Le Cateau, 

' Jttne 23, 1815. 

' I am sorry to be obliged to report that in the recent 
operations I had reason to be extremely dissatisfied, not 
with the Commissary-General and the heads of that depart- 
ment, but with the inferiors, who quitted their brigades 
and corps without leave and without cause, to the great 
inconvenience and injury of the service, and were brought 
back from Bruxelles only by my threatening to dismiss them 
all. . . .' 

Capture of Cambray. 

To Lieutenant-General Colville. 

' Le Cateau, 

'■June 25, 1815. 

' I congratulate you, and am very much obliged to you for 
your success of last night. . . .' 



WATERLOO 



457 



Return of the Killed and Wounded of the Allied Army, under 
the Command of Field-Marshal His Grace the Duke of 
Wellington, K.G. and G.C.B., in the Capture of Cambray, 
on June 24, 181 5. 





Officers. 


Sergeants. 


Rank 
and 
File. 


Horses. 


Total Loss of Officers, 

Non-commissioned 

Officers, and Rank 

and File. 


Killed 
Wounded - 


I 

3 


I 


7 

25 


— 


8 
29 



A Gloomy Report. 

To Earl Bathurst. 

' Joncourt, 

'•June 25, 1815. 

I I hope we are going on well, and that what we are doing 
will bring matters to the earliest and best conclusion, as we 
are in a very bad way. 

' We have not one quarter of the ammunition which we 
ought to have, on account of the deficiency of our drivers 
and carriages ; and I really believe that, with the exception 
of my old Spanish infantry, I have got not only the worst 
troops, but the worst equipped army, with the worst staff, 
that was ever brought together. 

1 knows no more of his business than a child, and I 

am obliged to do it for him ; and, after all, I cannot get him 
to do what I order him. Some of the regiments (the new 
ones, I mean) are reduced to nothing ; but I must keep them 
as regiments, to the great inconvenience of the service, at 
great expense ; or I must send them home, and part with the 
few British soldiers I have. 

I I never was so disgusted with any concern as I am with 
this ; and I only hope that I am going the right way to bring 
it to an early conclusion in some way or other. 

' Napoleon aicx braves soldats de Fawnee devant Parts. 

' De La Malmaison, 
' SOLDATS ! ' fo 25 Juin, 1815. 

' Quand de cede a la ne'cessite' qui me force de m'e'loigner de la 
brave amide Francaise, j'emporte avec moi l'heureuse certitude qu'elle 



458 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 



justifiera, par les services que la patrie attend d'elle, les doges que nos 
ennemis eux-memes ne peuvent pas lui refuser. Soldats ! je suivrai vos 
pas, quoique absent. Je connais tous les corps, et aucun deux ne rem- 
portera aucun avantage signale" que je ne rende justice au courage qu'il 
aura deploye. 

' Vous et moi, nous avons e"te" calomnie's. Des hommes indignes 
d'apprecier vos travaux ont vu dans les marques d'attachement que vous 
m'avez donndes un zele dont j'dtais le seul objet ; que vos succes futurs 
leur apprennent que c'e"tait la patrie par-dessus tout que vous serviez en 
m'obeissant, et que, si j'ai quelque part a votre affection, je le dois a mon 
ardent amour pour la France, notre mere commune. 

' Soldats ! encore quelques efforts et la coalition est dissoute. Napo- 
leon vous reconnaitra aux coups que vous allez porter. Sauvez l'honneur, 
l'independance des Francais. Soyez jusqu'a la fin tels que je vous ai 
connus depuis vingt ans, et vous serez invincibles. 

' Napoleon.' 



Wellington declines to be Napoleon's Executioner. 

To Sir Charles Stuart. 

' Orville, 

'■June 28, 181 5. 

' I send you my despatches, which will make you acquainted 
with the state of affairs. You may show them to Talleyrand 
if you choose. 

' General has been here this day to negotiate for 

Napoleon's passing to America, to which proposition I have 
answered that I have no authority. The Prussians think the 
Jacobins wish to give him over to me, believing that I will 

save his life. wishes to kill him ; but I have told 

him that I shall remonstrate, and shall insist upon his being 
disposed of by common accord. I have likewise said that, 
as a private friend, I advised him to have nothing to do with 
so foul a transaction ; that he and I had acted too distin- 
guished parts in these transactions to become executioners ; 
and that I was determined that if the Sovereigns wished to 
put him to death they should appoint an executioner, which 
should not be me. . . .' 



WATERLOO 



459 



The Basis of an Armistice. 
To Lieutenant-General the Earl of Uxbridge. 

' GONESSE, 

l July 2, 1815. 

' . . . We are going on very well. We have shut the 
French into Paris and their lines ; Blucher has crossed the 
Seine. Buonaparte is off, I believe, to Havre. They offer 
an armistice ; but I won't grant it unless I shall be certain it 
will lead to a permanent settlement. . . .' 

Waterloo a Pounding Match. 

To Marshal Lord Beresford. 

' Gonesse, 

' July 2, 1 8 15. 

' . . . You will have heard of our battle of the 18th. Never 
did I see such a pounding match. Both were what the 
boxers call gluttons. Napoleon did not manoeuvre at all. 
He just moved forward in the old style, in columns, and 
was driven off in the old style. The only difference was, 
that he mixed cavalry with his infantry, and supported both 
with an enormous quantity of artillery. 

' I had the infantry for some time in squares, and we had 
the French cavalry walking about us as if they had been our 
own. I never saw the British infantry behave so well. 

' Boney is now off, I believe, to Rochefort, to go to 
America. The army, about 40,000 or 50,000, are in Paris. 
Bliicher on the left of the Seine, and I with my right in front 
of St. Denis, and the left upon the Bois de Bondy. They 
have fortified St. Denis and Montmartre very strongly. The 
Canal de l'Ourcq is filled with water, and they have a parapet 
and batteries on the bank ; so that I do not believe we can 
attack this line. However, I will see.' 

General Order. 

' GONESSE, 

' July 4, 18 1 5. 

' I. The Field-Marshal has great satisfaction in an- 
nouncing to the troops under his command that he has, 



460 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

in concert with Field - Marshal Prince Bliicher, con- 
cluded a military convention with the Commander-in-Chief 
of the French army in Paris, by which the enemy are to 
evacuate St. Denis, St. Ouen, Clichy, and Neuilly, this day 
at noon ; the heights of Montmartre to-morrow at noon ; and 
Paris the next day. 

' 2. The Field-Marshal congratulates the army upon this 
result of their glorious victory. He desires that the troops 
may employ the leisure of this day to clean their arms, 
clothes and appointments, as it is his intention that they 
should pass him in review. 

' Wellington.' 

Napoleon's Surrender. 
To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley. 

'Paris, 

'July 19, 1815. 

1 You will have heard of our great battle in Flanders, 
and of its final result in the surrender of Buonaparte to the 
Bellerophon, off the Isle d'Aix ; and if the Allies will only be 
a little moderate — that is, if they will prevent plunder by 
their troops, and take only what is necessary for their own 
security — we may hope for permanent peace. 

' But I confess that I am a little afraid of them. They are 
all behaving exceedingly ill.' 

Idle Troops. 

To Earl Bathnrst. 

' Paris, 

'July 20, 1815. 

' As we keep our troops here for nothing, and it is impos- 
sible to say what may happen under the system of plunder 
which it is proposed to adopt, it is best that you should send 
us as many as you can. They had still better come by 
Ostend ; but, as I am hereafter to occupy the country from 
the Seine to the frontier of the Low Countries, we shall then 
open our communication by Dieppe or Boulogne.' 



WATERLOO 461 



' Pitch them to the Devil.' 

To Marshal Beresford. 

' Paris, 

' August 7, 181 5. 

' I received only last night your letter of the 8th, for which 
I am very much obliged to you. 

' The Battle of Waterloo was certainly the hardest fought 
that has been for many years, I believe, and has placed in 
the power of the Allies the most important results. We 
are throwing them away, however, by the infamous conduct 
of some of us ; and I am sorry to add that our own Govern- 
ment also are taking up a little too much the tone of their 
rascally newspapers. They are shifting their objects, and, 
having got their cake, they want both to eat it and keep it. 

' As for your Portuguese concerns, I recommend to you 
to resign and come away immediately. It is impossible for 
the British Government to maintain British officers for the 
Portuguese army, at an expense even so trifling as it is, if 
the Portuguese Government are to refuse to give the service 
of the army in the cause of Europe in any manner. Pitch 
them to the devil, then, in the mode which will be most 
dignified for yourself, and that which will have the best 
effect in opening the Prince's eyes to the conduct of his 
servants in Portugal, and let the matter work its own way. 
Depend upon it, the British Government must and will recall 
the British officers. 

' I shall hold a language here that will correspond with 
your actions in Portugal.' 

A True Account of Waterloo impossible. 

To , Esq. 

' Paris, 

' August 8, 1815. 

' I have received your letter of the 2nd, regarding the 
Battle of Waterloo. The object which you propose to 
yourself is very difficult of attainment, and, if really at- 
tained, is not a little invidious. The history of a battle is 



462 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 



not unlike the history of a ball. Some individuals may 
recollect all the little events of which the great result is the 
battle won or lost ; but no individual can recollect the order in 
which, or the exact moment at which, they occurred, which 
makes all the difference as to their value or importance. 

' Then the faults or the misbehaviour of some gave occa- 
sion for the distinction of others, and perhaps were the 
cause of material losses ; and you cannot write a true history 
of a battle without including the faults and misbehaviour of 
part at least of those engaged. 

' Believe me that every man you see in a military uniform 
is not a hero ; and that, although in the account given of a 
general action, such as that of Waterloo, many instances of 
individual heroism must be passed over unrelated, it is better 
for the general interests to leave those parts of the story 
untold, than to tell the whole truth. 

' If, however, you should still think it right to turn your 
attention to this subject, I am most ready to give you every 
assistance and information in my power.' 

1 Paris, 

'■August 17, 181 5. 

'I have received your letter of the nth, and I regret 
much that I have not been able to prevail upon you to 
relinquish your plan. 

' You may depend upon it you will never make it a satis- 
factory work. 

' I will get you the list of the French army, Generals, etc., 

' Just to show you how little reliance can be placed, even 
on what are supposed the best accounts of a battle, I 
mention that there are some circumstances mentioned in 

General's 's account which did not occur as he relates 

them. 

' He was not on the field during the whole battle, par- 
ticularly not during the latter part of it. 

' The battle began, I believe, at eleven.* 

* In his despatch Wellington stated that the battle began ' at about 
10 o'clock.' In 1836 he said no two persons agreed as to the exact hour 
when it commenced. — W. W. 



WATERLOO 463 



' It is impossible to say when each important occurrence 
took place, nor in what order. We were attacked first with 
infantry only, then with cavalry only, lastly and principally 
with cavalry and infantry mixed. 

' No houses were possessed by the enemy in Mont St. 
Jean, excepting the farm in front of the left of our centre, 
on the road to Genappe, can be called one. This they got, 
I think, at about two o'clock, and got it from a circumstance 
which is to be attributed to the neglect of the officer com- 
manding on the spot. 

' The French cavalry were on the plateau in the centre 
between the two highroads for nearly three-quarters of an 
hour, riding about among our squares of infantry, all firing 
having ceased on both sides. I moved our squares forward 
to the guns ; and our cavalry, which had been detached by 
Lord Uxbridge to the flanks, was brought back to the centre. 
The French cavalry were then driven off. After that circum- 
stance, repeated attacks were made along the whole front of 
the centre of the position by cavalry and infantry till seven 
at night. How many I cannot tell. 

' When the enemy attacked Sir Thomas Picton I was 
there, and they got as far as the hedge on the cross-road, 

behind which the had been formed. The latter 

had run away, and our troops were on our side of the hedge. 
The French were driven off with immense loss. This was 
the first principal attack. At about two in the afternoon, as 
I have above said, they got possession of the farmhouse on 
the highroad, which defended this part of the position ; and 
they then took possession of a small mound on the left of the 
highroad going from Bruxelles, immediately opposite the 
gate of the farm ; and they were never removed from thence 
till I commenced the attack in the evening ; but they never 
advanced farther on that side. 

' These are answers to all your queries ; but remember I 
recommend to you to leave the Battle of Waterloo as it is.' 



464 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

Division of Spoil. 
To General Comte Gneisenau. 

' Paris, 

'■August 10, 18 j 5. 

' General Muffling, who was desired by Marshal Prince 
Bliicher to speak to me some time ago on the subject of the 
guns taken at the battle of June 18 will have told him that 
I was ready to do anything that was agreeable to him on the 
subject. 

' I beg you to tell him that it appears to me that it would 
be best to nominate an officer on each side to make the 
division of everything taken during and after the battle, and 
in Paris. 

Disgraceful Robberies. 
To the Officer commanding the Brigade of Cavalry at Beauvais. 

' Paris, 

'■September?.'], 1815. 

' I enclose a letter with its enclosure which I have received 
from the French Minister at War, from which I am sorry to 
observe that robberies on the highway still continue in the 
neighbourhood of Beauvais, committed by the British troops, 
and, there is every reason to believe, by the — Regiment 
of . 

' This is a most disgraceful circumstance, and proves that 
the internal discipline of the regiment must have been so 
entirely neglected as that all recollection of it must be 
effaced. It is impossible that, if the officers and non-com- 
missioned officers attended to and knew the character of 
their men, and visited their cantonments constantly, these 
nightly depredations upon the passengers on the highroad, 
and even in the towns and villages in which the troops are 
cantoned, could be carried on, without some discovery being 
made of the persons who committed them. 

' I beg now to know whether any report had been made 
to you of these robberies, and what measures you have taken 



WATERLOO 465 



to discover the robbers, or to prevent these disgraceful pro- 
ceedings in future. 

' If nothing else will answer, you must have guards placed 
and a chain of vedettes in sight of each other, along the 
highroad through the whole length of your cantonments, and 
the rolls must be called every hour during the day and night, 
officers and all being present, in order to prevent the soldiers 
from quitting their cantonments for the purpose of highway 
robbery. 

' I must hold you responsible that this practice shall be 
put a stop to without loss of time, and that the most active 
measures shall be taken to discover those soldiers who have 
disgraced the army and their country by being guilty of it.' 

Provision for the Wounded. 

To W. Rowcroft, Esq. 

' Paris, 

' September 28, 181 5. 

' I am very much obliged to you for your several commu- 
nications on the subject of the Waterloo fund, the last of 
which, of the 25th instant, I have received this day. . . . 

' In the provision for the wounded, I strongly recommend 
that the provision should be confined to those who have lost 
a limb, or, as soldiers, are entirely disabled from service or 
from work. Attention to these inquiries will place at the 
disposal of the Committee a larger fund for the provision for 
the widows and orphans of officers and soldiers, who are the 
really distressed.' 

The Question of Promotion. 
To Lieutenant-General the Marquis of Anglesey, G.C.B. 

' Paris, 

'■October 12, 1815. 

' . . . It is quite impossible to do what everybody deserves, 
viz., to recommend him for a step of promotion. A line 
must be drawn somewhere, and I conceived I could not 
draw one that was more just towards everybody than to 
take an officer for promotion from each regiment. I might 

30 



466 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

have gone farther, but the General Officers all recom- 
mended their staff, some even who, from their standing in 
the service, could not be promoted ; and this circumstance 
has rendered it necessary to leave unnoticed the claims of 
many meritorious individuals serving in the line of the 
army. . . .' 

Disposal of Honours. 
To Major -General Sir Henry Torrens. 

' Paris, 

1 October 14, 181 5. 

' I enclose a letter from Mr. Browne to Lord Stewart 
regarding Lieutenant-Colonel Sir J. Browne's claim to be a 
Companion of the Order of the Bath. 

1 1 will not recommend him, as I will not recommend any- 
body excepting for the Battle of Waterloo ; but I perfectly 
recollect his good conduct in the battle fought by the Spanish 
army near Badajoz. It was unsuccessful, and everybody 
behaved ill excepting Browne and Don Carlos de Espana, 
who behaved remarkably well.' 

• Paris, 

'•October 14, 181 5. 

' I enclose a memorandum from Colonel Dalbiac respect- 
ing the third class of the Order of the Bath, which, as I 
expected, is as much looked after now as the second was last 
year. 

' I do not wish to interfere in recommending him, but I 
must say that he is a very deserving officer. In regard to 
the case of Stanhope* and the others, I feel a great disinclina- 
tion to do anything, though I think Stanhope in particular 
deserves the Order. We had better, however, adhere to the 
rule, as we have it, that none shall have the Order except 
those who actually commanded. 

' My own opinion is, that the best mode of disposing of 
these honours is arbitrary — that is to say, without any rule 
excepting a sense of merit in the persons receiving them. 

* Lieutenant-Colonel the Hon. James Stanhope. 



WATERLOO 467 



But this principle excludes all rule, neither can you intro- 
duce it where there is a rule. I am perfectly aware, how- 
ever, of the inconveniences, particularly in a country and 
in an army like ours, of disposing of honours of this descrip- 
tion without rule ; and I am now suffering them all from 
having disposed by selection of the Orders placed at my dis- 
position by the Sovereigns without attending to any rule 
excepting that of taking those I thought most deserving.' 

The Best Troops in the World. 
To Earl Bathurst. 

' Paris, 

' October 23, 18 15. 
' . . . My opinion is that the best troops we have, pro- 
bably the best in the world, are the British infantry, particu- 
larly the old infantry that has served in Spain. This is what 
we ought to keep up, and what I wish above all others to 
retain. . . .' 

Memorandum 

On the Twenty-jive Millions of Francs as Prize-Money. 

To Viscount Castlereagh. 

' Paris, 

' November 6, 1 8 1 5 . 

' My opinion is that Government ought to give this sum 
to the army, to be distributed amongst them in the shape 
prize-money. 

' It should be given to the officers and troops present in 
the battles of June 15, 16, 17, and 18, or present with 
their regiments or at their posts with the army at any 
period from that time till July 7, when the army entered 
Paris. 

' According to this scheme, the officers and troops of the 
armies of the King of the Netherlands, the King of Hanover, 
with the exception of those corps in garrison in the Nether- 
lands, the Grand-Duke of Nassau, and the Duke of Bruns- 
wick, would be included with the British troops, with the 

30—2 



468 WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 

exception of those of the latter in garrisons in the Nether- 
lands ; and the consent of the King of the Netherlands, the 
King of Hanover, the Grand-Duke of Nassau, and the 
Duke of Brunswick must be obtained. If this plan should 
not be adopted, the sum of 25,000,000 francs would be 
divided between the several Powers whose troops formed the 
army under the command of the Duke of Wellington, 
according to the numbers which each Power was bound to 
furnish for the common cause. Thus, then, Great Britain 
would receive for 150,000 men, the Netherlands for 50,000, 
Hanover for 10,000, Brunswick and Nassau each for 3,000. 
But the regiments and battalions composing the Hanoverian 
and Brunswick subsidiary corps, the former consisting of 
16,400 men, and the latter of 4,100 men, would share with 
the British troops, supposing, as I imagine, that the British 
Government would allot its share to be divided in prize- 
money to the army. 

' It is obvious that, supposing all the Powers should agree 
each to give what should come to them on this account to 
their troops who were present in the battles and on the 
occasions mentioned, there would be a great difference in the 
amount received by the officers and soldiers of each rank in 
the several services ; and, therefore, it would probably be the 
best mode to allow the whole sum to be divided according to 
the plan first proposed, as one mass among the officers and 
soldiers of the whole army. 

' Wellington.' 

Protests against Newspaper Statements. 

To . 

' Paris, 

4 November 24, 1 8 1 5 . 

' My name is frequently mentioned in your newspaper, 
and, as it is a sort of privilege of modern Englishmen to 
read in the daily newspapers lies respecting those who serve 
hem, and I have been so long accustomed to be so treated, 
I should not have thought it necessary to trouble you on the 
subject if you had not thought proper to contradict, as from 



WATERLOO 469 



authority, in a late paper, certain reports which you had 
before published respecting differences between the Due de 
Berri and me. . . . 

' Other circumstances respecting me have been published 
in your paper, which are equally false with those to which I 
have above referred ; but I will not trouble you upon them ; 
nor should I have written to you at all, as I am really quite 
indifferent respecting what is read of me in the newspapers, 
if you had not given an appearance of truth to some reports 
by the formal contradiction which you have published of 
others.' 

Wellington's Farewell. 

general order. 

' Paris, 

' November 30, 181 5. 

'48. Upon breaking up the army which the Field-Marshal 
has had the honour of commanding, he begs leave again to 
return thanks to the General Officers, and the officers and 
troops, for their uniform good conduct. 

' 49. In the late short but memorable campaign they have 
given proofs to the world that they possess in an eminent 
degree all the good qualities of soldiers, and the Field- 
Marshal is happy to be able to applaud their regular good 
conduct in their camps and cantonments, not less than when 
engaged with the enemy in the field. 

' 50. Whatever may be the future destination of those 
brave troops, of which the Field-Marshal now takes his 
leave, he trusts that every individual will believe that he will 
ever feel the deepest interest in their honour and welfare, 
and will always be happy to promote either.' 



INDEX 



Absence, leave of, 35 

Abuses and hardships, horrible, 162 

Affair, a regrettable, 308 

Ahmednuggur, capture of, 36 ; losses 
at, 38 

Alba de Tormes, 335 

Albuera, the battle of, 260 ; Marshal 
Beresford's reports on, 262 ; losses 
at, 267 

Almaraz, operations at, 302 

Ambition, the demon of, 92 

America, high duties against, 415 ; 
memorandum, 416 ; embargo on 
vessels, 416 ; ' these cunning Ameri- 
cans,' 417; naval successes, 417; 
hostility of the worst description, 
418 ; American vessels to be taken, 
420 ; the expedition to, 421 ; the 
slave trade, 421 ; claim of American 
ships, 422 ; privateers, 422 ; a right 
of war, 423 ; the True-Blooded Yankee, 

425 ; misuse of French harbours, 

426 ; private ships, 426 ; refusal of 
terms by, 427; a suspicious vessel, 
427 ; the blockade of American 
ports, 428 ; the war in, 429 ; British 
prisoners, 430 ; works of art retaken, 
430 

Appointment, an unfortunate, 21 
Arab troops, bravery of, 39 
Argaum, battle of, 68 ; losses at, 69 
Armistice, the basis of an, 459 
'Army, an unanimous,' 199 
Army, Great Britain's skeleton, 88 
Arroyo dos Molinos, 282 ; Lieutenant- 
General Hill's despatch, 282 ; losses 
at, 286 
Artillery practice, poor, 295 
Assaye, battle of, 50 ; battle honour 
of, 51 note; losses at, 52; a hot 
cannon fire, 53 ; wounded by can- 
non-shot, 54 ; the fiercest fight in 
India, 55 ; the guns and colours 
taken, 56 ; a mistake that caused 
heavy loss, 58 
Asseerghur, capture of, 66 
Avarice in the Deccan, 77 
Aurungabad Fort, 41 



Badajoz, misery in, 240 ; raising of 
the siege of, 267 ; storm of, 296 ; 
losses at, 270, 301 

Barba de Puerco, the affair at, 205 ; 
a garbled version, 286 

Barrosa, the battle of, 247 ; losses at, 
249 ; Lieutenant-General Graham's 
despatch, 247 

Bengal troops, bravery of, 89 

Bonaparte system, hollowness of the, 
210 ; and his fleet, 275 ; the tyranny 
of, 288 ; declaration by, 454 ; death 
blow of, 455 ; to his soldiers, 457 

Border Regiment, the, 284 note 

Boy, an incorrigible, 273 

Breach of trust, flagrant, 100 

Briscall, Mr., 241 

British and Portuguese, friendly, 274 

British power in India, 77 ; soldier, a 
plea for the, 245 

Buffs, the, 147 note 

Burgos, siege of, 329 

Busaco, battle of, 227 ; losses at, 234 

Cambray, capture of, 456 
Camels for camp equipage, 40 
Campaign, a successful, 336 
Campbell, Colin : his early career, 103 
Cannon fire, a hot, 53; shot, wounded 

by. 54 

Carriages, destruction of wheel, 31 

Cartel of exchange, 196 

Cattle, dearth of, 41 

Castrejon, losses at, 316 

Casualties, a year's, 289; method of 
returning, 408 note 

Cavalry, sickly, 20 ; a fine perform- 
ance, 32 

Chaplains for the army, 240 

Character, a mistake in, 36 

Charges, unfounded, 391 

Ciudad Rodrigo, capitulation of, 218, 
289 ; losses at, 293 

Clive, Lady, elephants for, 17 

Closing people's mouths, 94 

Clothing, troops wanting, 95 

Coa, affair at the, 220 

Coghlan, Major, 198 note 



472 



WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES 



Complaints, more, 175 
Convention of Cintra, the, 138 
Command, uneasiness about a, 18 ; 

unfit to, 67 
Commissariat, inefficient, 120; bun- 
gling the, 246 
Commissary- General, memorandum 

for the, 117 
Confidence, unfaltering, 206 
Correspondence, needless, 67 ; of- 
ficers' private, 225 
Country, a, not worth fighting for, 15 
Courts-martial, private quarrels and, 

48 
Craufurd, General, death of, 294 
Criminals, short shrift for, 91 
Criticism, adverse, 143 
Croaking in the army, 227 

Dalrymple, Sir Hew, 137 
Dead, eight months' loss in, 201 
Death punishment, withholding the, 

189 
Debt, the army head over ears in, 

155 

Deeds, not words, required, 217 

Desertion of soldiers of the 84th, 43 ; 
and crime, 211 ; of a mad officer, 
243 ; punishment for, 342 ; whole- 
sale, 381 

Despatches, the publication of, 341 

Devonshire Regiment, the, 323 note 

Dhoondiah Waugh, 14 

Discontent, snowball growth of, 19 

Disembarkation, memorandum for, 
116 

Distress, continued, 324 

Don, plain words to a, 174 

Dooley-boys, trouble with, 16 

Douro, passage of the, 146 

Dragoons, the 1st, 192 

Drunkenness, 211 note 

Duelling, 43 

Duel, shot in a, 162 

Durbar, an undignified, 78 

Duty must be first, 90 

Eagle, capture of first French, 248; 

as military badge, 447 note 
Egypt, the expedition to, 28 
El Bodon, the affair at, 276 ; losses 

at, 279 
' Emperor,' the silver trophy, 350 
Encyclopaedia, absurd enough for an, 

275 
Enemies, employment of, 46 
English name disgraced, 42 
Enlistment, wrongful, 214 
Europeans, arrest of wandering, 33 
Exploit, a brilliant, 302 



Famine, sufferings from, 39 

Fighters, unrivalled, 354 

' Fighting-cocks of the army, the,' 

355 

Flogged and sent about their busi- 
ness, 18 

Forces, strength of the opposing, 236 

Fort Drummond, storm of, 22 

Forts, attacking, 62 

France, entrance into, 377 

Fraud, disgraceful, 99 

French army, admiration of the, 238 ; 
desertion, to encourage, 207 ; losses, 
immense, 252 ; defeats, 252 ; as- 
tonishing numbers of the, 273 ; 
tools, superiority of, 295 ; troops, 
barbarity of, 243 

French sick and wounded, 149 ; a 
handsome dressing for the, 251 

Fuentes de Onoro, 252 ; losses at, 
258 

Funeral expenses, soldiers', 218 

Game, a desperate, 94 

Gawilghur, siege and storm of, 72 ; 

losses at, 76 
General order on leaving India, 104 ; 

Peninsula, 377; Toulouse, 411; 

Bordeaux, 412 
Generals, badly paid, 380 
German deserters from the French 

service, 192 
German troops, prejudice against, 216 
Goklah : his deserved fate, 21 
Gordon Highlanders, the, 71 note 
' Governments, the things called,' 60 
Guards, excessive, 64 
Gurwood, Colonel, ix., 293 note 

Hand-grenades : none in India, 19 

Hatred, mutual, 206 

' Hell to pay,' 274 

Highland Brigade at Waterloo, the, 

442 note 
Hope, a fervent, 104 
Hospital stoppages, 155 
Hospitality, violating, 251 
Hostilities, rule as to, 68 ; suspension 

of, 135 
Hussars, gallantry of the 10th, 345 

India, poverty in, 86 

Inefficiency, evils of, 85 

' Infamous libels,' 380 

Irish deserters from the French, 214 

Iron, lack of, 34 

Irregularities and outrages, 337 

Kettles, the care of, 191 
King Joseph's papers, 375 



INDEX 



473 



King of the Two Worlds, the, 25 
King's Royal Rifle Corps, the, 122 
note 

Ladies in billets, 340 

Leaders, over-zealous, 258 

Licentiousness, suppressing, 95 

Lieutenant, a litigious, 49 

Light Division, Craufurd's, 231 note 

Loss, a rare, 367 

March, Wellington's greatest, 86 
Marching for a year, 59 
Marhatta campaign, lessons from the, 
97 ; troops, character of, 84 ; war, 
the, 30 
Marhattas, depredations by, 69 
Marquis, lenient treatment of a, 153 
Marshals, the enmity of, 286 
Medals, the grant of, 271 ; the wear- 
ing of, 343 
Methodism in the army, 241 
Middlesex Regiment, the, 266 note 
Military law, a definition of, 215 
Misunderstanding in England, 326 
Money-chest robbed, a, 342 
Money, hard pressed for, 21 
Moore, Sir John, a frank letter to, 136 
Murder of deserters, 216 
Murray, Lieutenant - General Sir 
John, 34 note 

Naval help needed, 366; officers, 

praise of, 133 
News, injudicious, 197 
Nive, passage of the, 387 ; losses at 

the, 391 
Nivelle, passage of the, 382 ; losses 

at the, 386 
Northumberland Fusiliers, the, 276 

note 

Officer, a troublesome, 20 ; a fine but 
quarrelsome, 34 ; recommending a 
brave, 198 ; abduction by an, 344 

Officers, riotous behaviour of, 70 ; 
English-Portuguese, 151 ; striking, 
164 ; unbecoming conduct of, 194 ; 
misbehaviour in theatres, 195 ; 
changes in general, 280 ; dubious, 
287 ; heavy losses in, 375 

Oporto, the battle of, 145 ; losses at, 
148 ; proclamation to the inhabi- 
tants of, 149 

Orthoz, battle of, 395 ; losses at, 401 

Outrages, continued, 203, 306 

Party spirit the bane of armies, 219 
' Passions, dirty little,' 84 
Pay, arrears of, 324 



'Peninsula,' battle - honour of, in 

note ; British force for the, 1 14 ; 

early obstacles in the, 120 
Peninsular Campaign, the, 111 ; third 

year of the, 205 ; honours for the, 

236 ; history of the, 238 
Plunder, an army spoiled by, 214 
Plundering at Seringapatam, 11 ; 

hanging for, 90 ; in the Peninsula, 

153 ; renewed, 377 
Portuguese, proclamation to the, 119; 

troops, 117, 186 ; regiment, de- 
sertion of a, 225 
Prisoners of war, 154 ; shameful 

treatment of British, 284 
Prize-money, division of, 79 
Promotion in the army, 221 ; the 

question of, 465 
Property, sale of captured, 89 
Provisions, horribly distressed for, 176 
Public matters, silence on, 96 
Punishments, terrible, 387 
Pyche Rajah, to eat the, 16 
'Pyrenees,' battle-honour of the, 237 

note ; operations in the, 356 ; losses 

in the, 365, 375 

Rations, women and children's, 189 
Reformer, a too zealous, 200 
Regiments, disorderly, 156 
Religious worship, soldiers and, 188 
Remonstrance, undignified, 99 
Retaliation, justifiable, 46, 288 
Retreat, a terrible, 150 
Ribands, the wearing of, 236 
Rifle Brigade, the, 122 note, 206 note ; 

402 note 
' Rights of men ' man, a, 23 
Roleia, the battle of, 122 ; losses at, 

127 
Rupee, trouble with the, 63 

Salamanca, battle of, 309 ; losses at, 

323 

Salvage, 152 

San Miguel, capture of, 327 ; losses 
at, 328 

San Sebastian, losses at, 362, 372 ; 
capture of, 368 ; Lieutenant-General 
Graham's report on, 369 ; capitula- 
tion of, 376 

San Vincente, losses at, 311 

Second in command not desired, 305 

Seringapatam, operations at, 8 ; losses 
at, 10 

Servants, desertion of, 99 

Service, unfit for, 304 

Seyd Sultaun Aiy, freebooter im- 
postor, 40 

Ships, welcome, 162 



474 



WELLINGTON ' S BE SPA TCHES 



Shot picked from a breached wall, 47 

Shrapnell's shells, 296 

Siborne's model of the battle of 

Waterloo, 440 note 
Sick, the care of the, 32 
Sickness, one of the causes of, 237, 

324 

Sieges, a new principle in, 294 ; ill- 
equipped for, 301 

Situation, a satisfactory, 234 

Sixty-fifth Regiment, heart-breaking 
state of the, 64 

Soldier servants, 163 

Sortie from Bayonne, 409 

Soult, Marshal, plot to seize, 143 ; 
chase of, 177 

South Wales Borderers, the, 331 note 

Spain, Bonaparte's strength in, 115; 
the French force in, 220 ; the revo- 
lution in, 335 

Spain, Memorandum to King of, 411 

Spaniards, proclamation to the, 325 

Spanish general, an obstinate, 156; 
selfishness, 164 ; volunteers for 
British regiments, 304 

Spanish losses, heavy, 244 ; selfish- 
ness, 295 

Spanish officers, ignorant, 199 

Spanish troops, cowardice of, 183 

Starvation, dire effects of, 178 

Starved out of Spain, 180 

Store Department, villainies in the, 
16 

Stores, military, 202 

Subordinates, difficulty of pleasing, 17 

Supplies, condition of, 23 

Surgeon, the case of an assistant, 27 

Surgeons' claims, 78 

Surveyor, distrust of a, 28 

Sword, the power of the, in India, 60 

System, an unbearable, 26 

Talavera, the battle of, 165; ordnance 

captured at, 171 ; losses at, 171 ; 

memorandum upon, 171 
Tarbes, affair at, 402 
Territory, evils of extending, 24 
Thieves, hunting, 17 ; the gallows 

for, 65 
Tippoo Sultaun, 5 ; death of, 14 
Torres Vedras, 235 
Toulouse, battle of, 402 ; losses at, 

408 
Transaction, an absurd and odious, 

234 

Transportation for life, 76 

Troops, happy, 22 ; stores for the, 
30 ; want of, 45 ; good condition 
of, 47 ; unhealthiness of, 71 ; ex- 
cessive work for, 73 ; good appear 



ance of, 98 ; British, in time of 
war, 218 ; best in the world, 467 

Uniform, changes in, 281 

' Vagabond soldiers, our,' 353 

Vagabonds from hospital, 204 

Version, a garbled, 286 

Vimeiro, the battle of, 128 ; losses at, 
131 ; ordnance, etc., taken at, 132 

* Vittoria,' battle-honour of, 112 note ; 
battle of, 346 ; a piper at, 347 note ; 
losses at, 352 ; ordnance, etc., cap- 
tured at, 352 

Walcheren fever, the, 279 note 

Warnings, stern, 221 

War, animosity should cease with, 84 

War, the horrors of, 246 

' War, this extraordinary,' 273 

'Waterloo,' battle-honour of, 112 
note 

Waterloo, the Duke of Brunswick's 
troops, 433 ; the defence of the 
Netherlands, 433 ; a mutiny and 
Bliicher, 434 ; Bonaparte's move- 
ments, 434 ; rations for Brunswick 
troops, 435 ; disposition of French 
troops, 435 ; movements of the 
army, June 15, 1815, 436, 437 ; 
movementson the 16th, 438 ; on the 
17th, 439 ; final words, 439 ; the 
Waterloo despatch, 440 ; strength 
of the British army at the 
battle of, 448 ; losses at, 450 ; the 
French loss at, 452 note ; the Rus- 
sian loss at, 452 note ; General 
order, 453 ; proclamation, 453 ; 
after the battle, 455 ; a gloomy re- 
port, 457 ; a pounding match, 459 ; 
general order, 459 ; a true account 
of impossible, 461 ; division of 
spoil, 464 ; disgraceful robberies, 
464 ; provision for the wounded, 
465 ; disposal of honours, 466 ; 
prize-money, 467 

Wellington, Duke of, precis of ser- 
vices, xiii ; early services of, 3 ; 
Governor of Seringapatam, 11 ; 
removal from command, 29 ; 
anxious to get to work, 32 ; anxiety 
for a young friend, 49 ; longing for 
England, 100 ; and the 33rd Regi- 
ment, 101, 102; sailing for home, 
105; in Denmark, 107; to com- 
mand the Peninsular Army, 112; 
arrival off Oporto, 114 ; desires to 
quit the army, 135 ; and Sir Hew 
Dalrymple, 137 ; returns to Por- 
tugal, 143 ; and the French Ian- 



INDEX 



47 S 



guage, 149 note; escape at Talavera, 
177 ; refuses to divide the British 
Army, 183 ; first use of the name, 
191 ; and the Talavera Club, 197 ; 
assailed by Common Councilmen, 
201 ; faithful to the 33rd Regiment, 
201 ; and Sir John Moore, 208 ; 
anxious to leave by the hall door, 
209 ; and newspapers, 237 ; and 
Methodism, 241 ; ' I have done 
with the Portuguese Army,' 242; 
an affectionate letter, 287 ; arrival 
in Madrid, 325 ; and the Peninsular 
Army, 337 note ; quits the 33rd 
Regiment, 341 ; proclamation at 
Toulouse, 410 ; broken down by 
Waterloo losses, 451 ; dissatisfac- 



tion with inferiors, 456 ; declines to 
be Napoleon's executioner, 458 ; 
' Pitch them to the devil,' 461 ; 
protests against newspaper state- 
ments, 468; farewell, 469 

West Riding Regiment, the, 3 note 

Wine, the evils of, 235 

Wish, a hearty, 235 

Women, accommodation for, 393 

Worcestershire Regiment, the, 190 
note 

Wounded inhabitants, Seringapatam, 
15 ; mutual good treatment of the, 
224 

York and Lancaster Regiment, the, 
64 note 



THE END. 



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 



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020 690 032 5 



